Lalit Giri Goswami v. State of Uttarakhand Another

Judgment

1. The present application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "Cr.P.C."), has been filed by the applicant, Lalit Giri Goswami, seeking quashing of the charge sheet dated 17.08.2019, the cognisance order dated 17.09.2019, and the entire proceedings of Criminal Case No. 6808 of 2019 pending before the Learned Judicial Magistrate, Haldwani, District Nainital, under Sections 376, 504, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

2. The applicant, a Sub-Inspector posted at Dharchula, Pithoragarh, has vehemently denied the allegations levelled against him by Respondent No. 2, Sarita Goswami, which include charges of rape (Section 376 IPC), criminal intimidation (Section 506 IPC), and intentional insult (Section 504 IPC).

3. The gravamen of the allegations is that the applicant, after promising marriage to the complainant, established a physical relationship with her and later reneged on his promise, causing her mental and emotional trauma.

Heard learned counsel for the parties—Mr. Vipul Sharma, learned counsel for the applicant, and Ms. Sukhwani Singh, learned counsel for the respondents, perused the annexures in light of the advanced arguments.

5. The genesis of the case lies in an FIR No. 0067 of 2019 registered on 01.07.2019 at Police Station Kaladhungi, District Nainital, under Sections 376, 504, and 506 IPC. The complainant, Sarita Goswami, alleged that the applicant, Lalit Giri Goswami, exploited her sexually on the false pretext of marriage. It was further alleged that the applicant and his family members threatened and defamed her when she insisted on solemnising the marriage.

6. The investigation culminated in a charge sheet filed on

17.08.2019, and the Learned Magistrate took cognisance of the offences on

17.09.2019. The applicant, aggrieved by these proceedings, filed the present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., contending that the allegations, even if taken at face value, do not constitute the offences charged, and the continuation of the proceedings would amount to a travesty of justice.

7. The learned counsel for the applicant, Mr. Vipul Sharma, submits that the allegations under Sections 504 and 506 of the IPC are vague and lack specificity. No overt acts or explicit threats have been substantiated in the complainant’s statements or the charge sheet.

8. It is also contended that the applicant, a public servant, has an unblemished record, and the allegations appear to be an afterthought to pressure him into marriage.

9. Concerning the allegation under Section 376 IPC, it was vehemently argued that the relationship between the applicant and the complainant was completely consensual. The applicant never made any false promise of marriage to deceive the complainant.

10. The learned counsel for the applicant relies on the Hon'ble Supreme Court judgement in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019) 9 SCC 608 has held that a mere breach of promise to marry does not constitute rape unless it is shown that the promise was false from its very inception and was made with the sole intention to exploit the victim sexually.

11. It is argued that in the present case, there is not enough evidence to suggest that the applicant had any malafide intention when entering into the relationship.

12. Regarding the allegations under Sections 504 and 506 IPC, it was submitted that they are vague, general, and lack specificity. The complainant has failed to particularise any instance of criminal intimidation or intentional insult.

13. The statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. do not disclose any overt act that would constitute these offences. The applicant, being a responsible police officer, has an unblemished service record, and these allegations appear to have been fabricated only to harass him.

14. It was further contended that the so-called compromise was not voluntary but was obtained under coercion from the local police. The medical report completely belies the allegation of rape as it does not show any signs of forcible sexual assault.

15. As per the applicant, the entire prosecution story contains contradictions and does not inspire confidence.

16. Per contra, the learned counsel for the State, argued that the complainant's statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. establish that the applicant had physical relations with her on the false pretext of marriage.

17. The applicant's subsequent refusal to marry her after exploiting her sexually clearly attracts the provisions of Section 376 IPC. The compromise document proves that the applicant had acknowledged his relationship with the complainant and agreed to marry her, a promise he later dishonoured.

18. Regarding the allegations under Sections 504 and 506 IPC, it was submitted that the complainant and her family members have consistently stated that the applicant and his family members not only refused to marry her but also threatened and intimidated her when she insisted on the marriage. The statements of the complainant's parents and other witnesses corroborate her version.

19. Having heard the learned the counsel for both the parties, this court observes that if an individual is accused of engaging in a sexual relationship under a false promise of marriage and is to be held criminally liable, the physical relationship in question must be directly attributable to the deceptive promise, unqualified by extraneous circumstances or considerations. It is also recognised that a woman may engage in a physical relationship for reasons independent of a promise of marriage, such as personal affection or a desire for companionship, without requiring formal marital commitment.

20. Therefore, in cases where a woman knowingly engages in a prolonged physical relationship, it cannot be conclusively determined that such a relationship was solely based on the appellant’s alleged promise of marriage.

21. To establish criminal liability, it must be demonstrated that the physical relationship was entered into purely due to the promise of marriage, with a direct and exclusive causal link, uninfluenced by any other considerations. In the absence of a clear nexus, it cannot be said that consent was vitiated under a misconception of fact.

22. Furthermore, for a promise to constitute a "false promise" amounting to a misconception of fact under Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code, it must be shown that the promise was made with fraudulent intent from the outset, specifically to mislead the woman into consenting to a physical relationship.

23. If it is proven that such consent was obtained through deception, it is rendered legally invalid. In this context, reference may be made to the decision in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana 2013 AIR SCW 2987, wherein it was held that: “21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like this, the court must very carefully examine whether the accused had wanted to marry the victim, or had mala fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is a distinction between merely breaching a promise and not fulfilling a false one. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her, despite having every intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and that he had clandestine motives."

24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to show that at the relevant time, i.e. at the initial stage itself, the Accused had no intention whatsoever of keeping his promise to marry the victim. There may be circumstances when a person with the best intentions cannot marry the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The "failure to keep a promise concerning a future uncertain date, due to reasons that are unclear from the evidence available, does not always amount to the misconception of fact. To come within the meaning of the term "misconception of fact", the fact must have an immediate relevance. Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be called into aid in such a situation, to pardon the act of a girl in its entirety, and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of the fact that from the very beginning, the Accused had never really intended to marry her.

25. It is also essential to recognise that there may be instances where a promise to marry was genuinely made at the outset. Still, the individual can ultimately not fulfil it due to unforeseen circumstances. However, suppose such a promise was not made with a dishonest intent from the beginning to deceive the woman. In that case, it does not constitute a false promise that would invoke the penal provisions of Section 375 of the IPC, punishable under Section 376.

26. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar Vs. Naval Singh Rajput and others reported in 2019 (3) MPLJ (Cri.) SC 52 has held as under:- ''20. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape and consensual sex. In such cases, the Court must carefully examine whether the complainant had wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives and had made a false promise to this effect only to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of cheating or deception. There is also a distinction between mere breach of a promise and not fulfilling a false promise. If the accused has not made the promise with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to indulge in sexual acts, such an act would not amount to rape. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and passion for the accused and not solely on account of the misconception created by accused, or where an accused, on account of circumstances which he could not have foreseen or which were beyond his control, was unable to marry her despite having every intention to do. Such cases must be treated differently. If the complainant had any mala fide intention and if he had clandestine motives, it is a clear case of rape. The acknowledged consensual physical relationship between the parties would not constitute an offence under section 376 of the Indian Penal Code.”

27. The factual matrix of the case reveals that the complainant was neither naive nor could she be easily deceived, but rather a mature individual fully capable of comprehending the nature and consequences of her actions. Her prior acquaintance with the applicant and the sustained physical relationship over multiple instances demonstrate her conscious participation in the relationship.

28. The circumstances indicate she entered into this relationship with full awareness, making informed choices rather than acting under any misconception. Her conduct throughout suggests a level of maturity that negates any claim of being misled or exploited, as she maintained the relationship voluntarily without immediate protest or indication of coercion. This factual backdrop undermines the allegation that her consent was vitiated by deception regarding marriage.

29. Where a woman does not "consent" to the sexual acts described in the main body of Section 375, the offence of rape has occurred. While Section 90 does not define the term "consent", a "consent" based on a "misconception of fact" is not consent in the eyes of the law.

30. The present case requires careful examination of the nature of consent and the distinction between consensual sexual relations and rape under Section 376 IPC. The material on record indicates a prolonged relationship between the parties where physical intimacy occurred over a significant period. The complainant's statements suggest this relationship continued with mutual understanding and without immediate protest.

31. The critical question before this Court is: whether the consent given was vitiated by any misconception of fact arising from a false promise of marriage.

32. The evidence reveals that the parties engaged in formal discussions about marriage, including horoscope matching, and the applicant sought time until 30.06.2019 for solemnisation. The subsequent failure to marry resulted from astrological incompatibility, “manglik and non-manglik”, rather than dishonest intentions. This sequence of events suggests the promise was made in good faith initially, with the inability to fulfil it arising from circumstances beyond the applicant's control.

33. “Manglik" is commonly translated as affected by “Mangal Dosha" or having Mars affliction in the horoscope. Owing to astrological incompatibility, specifically the applicant being identified as ‘Manglik’—a condition in Vedic astrology denoting Mars affliction in the horoscope, traditionally believed to affect marital harmony.

34. The medical examination records do not indicate signs of forcible sexual activity. The forensic analysis detected no seminal traces or foreign DNA in vaginal swabs. Crucially, the medical opinion concludes that findings are "consistent with consensual intercourse," directly contradicting the complainant's version of events.

35. The claims under Sections 504/506 IPC suffer from fatal evidentiary deficiencies. The complainant failed to provide specific dates, locations, or particulars of alleged threats.

36. No independent witnesses corroborate the family's claims of intimidation, despite the complainant's frequent public interactions with the applicant.

37. After the alleged compromise, the complainant's continued participation in the relationship suggests her consent may not have been solely contingent on the marriage promise. The absence of immediate complaints during the relationship's duration requires careful consideration.

38. The primary contention advanced by the learned counsel for the State on behalf of the complainant is that the applicant engaged in sexual relations with her on the false promise of marrying her, and therefore her "consent", being premised on a "misconception of fact" (the promise to marry), stands vitiated.

39. The learned Magistrate’s cognisance order dated 17.09.2019 does not reflect a reasoned analysis of whether the allegations prima facie constitute offences under Sections 376, 504, or 506 IPC. The charge sheet appears to be mechanically accepted without critically scrutinising the evidence. The absence of corroborative evidence and the contradictions in the complainant’s statements render the proceedings unsustainable.

40. The allegations of criminal intimidation (Section 506 IPC) and intentional insult (Section 504 IPC) are vague and lack specificity. The complainant has not provided concrete instances, dates, or independent witnesses to substantiate these claims. The statements of the complainant’s family members are hearsay and do not meet the threshold required to establish these offences. As a public servant with an unblemished record, the applicant has been subjected to these allegations without credible evidence, indicating a potential misuse of the legal process.

41. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has repeatedly held that consent concerning Section 375 IPC involves an active understanding of the proposed act's circumstances, actions and consequences. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) and the possible consequences flowing from such action or inaction consents to such action. In Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar vs The State of Maharashtra, AIR 2019 SC 327, which was a case involving the invoking of the jurisdiction under Section 482, this Court observed: (SCC para 15) “15.... An inference as to consent can be drawn if it is based only on evidence or probabilities of the case. "Consent" is also an act of reason coupled with deliberation. It denotes an active will in a person's mind to permit the doing of the act complained of.”

42. This understanding was also emphasised in the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala (SCC p. 118, para 12) wherein the Hon’ble Court held that: "12. "Consent", for Section 375, requires voluntary participation not only after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the significance of the moral quality of the act but after fully exercising the choice between resistance and assent. Whether there was consent is to be ascertained only by carefully studying all relevant circumstances.”

43. For consent under Section 375 to be legally valid, it must stem from an active and reasoned deliberation on the proposed act. Two key conditions must be met to determine whether consent was vitiated due to a "misconception of fact" arising from a promise of marriage. First, the promise of marriage must have been false from the outset, made in bad faith, and with no genuine intention of being fulfilled when it was given. Second, the false promise must have been directly relevant to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act, establishing a clear causal link between the deception and her consent.

44. Firstly, the evidence demonstrates that the applicant's promise of marriage was made in good faith, not with fraudulent intent. The parties engaged in formal marriage discussions, including horoscope matching, and even entered into a police-mediated compromise in 2016, showing a genuine intent to marry. The eventual failure to wed resulted from astrological incompatibility ("manglik and non-manglik"), an external factor beyond the applicant's control. Crucially, there is no evidence suggesting the applicant never intended to fulfil his promise when it was made. This satisfies the first condition that a promise must be proven false from inception to vitiate consent, which the complainant has failed to establish.

45. Secondly, the complainant's prolonged voluntary participation in the relationship undermines any claim that her consent was solely based on the marriage promise. Medical evidence confirms the physical relationship was consensual, with no signs of coercion. The complainant continued the relationship even after the alleged compromise, suggesting her consent stemmed from mutual affection rather than reliance on the promise.

46. As held in Dr. Dhruvaram Sonar, consent requires the promise to be the exclusive reason for the sexual relationship - a link completely absent here. The delayed allegations further weaken any claim of immediate misconception, failing to satisfy this critical second condition for invalidating consent under Section 375 IPC.

47. In this case, both conditions required to vitiate consent under Section 375 IPC remain unfulfilled. The promise of marriage was neither false at the outset nor the exclusive basis for the complainant’s consent. Thus, the allegations of rape under Section 376 IPC are unsustainable, and the proceedings qualify for quashing to prevent abuse of the legal process. ORDER In light of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and for the reasons discussed above, this Court is of the opinion that in the present case no prima facie case has been made out about commission of an offence of rape punishable under Section 376. Considering the above legal precedents, this Court finds that continuing the criminal proceedings against the applicant would result in a gross miscarriage of justice. The applicant, subjected to unnecessary litigation, has been compelled to seek legal recourse to prevent unwarranted harassment. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has time and again cautioned against the misuse of criminal law and has emphasised the duty of the courts to ensure that frivolous prosecutions do not consume judicial time and resources. Accordingly, the C482 application is allowed. The entire proceedings of Criminal Case No. 6808 of 2019, under Sections 376, 504 and 506 of IPC, along with Charge-sheet No.01, dated 17.08.2019, pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Haldwani, District Nainital, are quashed. No order as to costs. (Ashish Naithani J) Dated:03.04.2025 NR/