✦ High Court of India · 30 Jul 2025

Smt. Anita Joshi and Others v. Km. Leela

Case Details High Court of India · 30 Jul 2025
Court
High Court of India
Case No.
Misc. Application No. 316 of 2015
Decided
30 Jul 2025
Length
1,525 words

Cited in this judgment

Presence:- Mr. Lalit Miglani, learned counsel for the applicants. Mr. Pradeep Kumar Chauhan, learned counsel for the respondent. --------------------------------------------------------------------- Hon'ble Alok Mahra, J. The present application has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to quash the order dated order dated 10.11.2014 passed in Complaint Case No. 1816 of 2014 and order dated 24.02.2015 passed in Criminal Misc. Case No. 52 of 2015 and to quash the entire proceedings of Complaint Case No. 1816 of 2014, Km. Leela Vs. Smt. Anita Joshi and Others, for the offences punishable under Sections 323, 452, 504, 506 IPC and Section 3(1)(X) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (for ‘SC/ST Act’) pending the Court of Judicial Magistrate/1st Additional Civil Judge (Jr. Div.), Haridwar, District Haridwar.

2. Facts of the case, in a nutshell, are that on 30.05.2014, the complainant – Km. Leela filed a complaint before the Court 2 of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Haridwar alleging therein that she is living in Geeta Ashram, Rishikesh, District Haridwar for the past 11 years and is a practicing lawyer too in the District and Sessions Court, Haridwar. In her complaint, she has further alleged that she has been given the task of looking after the property of Anand Ashram by Gita Ashram, Rishikesh and the applicants herein are the tenants in the said property. It is further alleged in the complaint that on 23.05.2014, at about 08:30 p.m., when the complainant reached her residence after finishing her court works, after opening her room, she went to the bathroom and found it locked. When the complainant enquired about it from the applicants, they started hurling abuses to her and made castiest remarks against her. According to the complaint, the applicants entered into her room and did marpeet with her and threatened her of dire consequences, upon hearing the noise, one Vipin Kumar Sharma also entered into the room and he alongwith other applicants, threatened the complainant and did marpeet with her; it is further alleged in the complaint that one Smt. Anita Joshi broke the gold chain weighing 10 gms from the neck of the complainant; that on making hue & cry, two persons namely Om Prakash and Sanjay came to the spot and rescued the complainant.

3. Learned counsel for the applicants further submitted that offence under Section 3(1)(X) of SC/ST Act is not made out 3 against the applicants; that the offences punishable under SC/ST Act are added only to pressurize the applicants with malafide intention and ulterior motive to keep applicants in jail, because other sections are non-cognizable and bailable offence.

4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the complainant/respondent faced atrocities, harassment and castiest remarks from the applicants, who are not members of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes and were fully aware that the complainant/respondent is a member of Scheduled Caste, therefore, the summoning order is not bad in the eye of law.

5. The provisions of Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act deals with this situation, which reads as hereunder:- “3(1)(x). intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view.”

6. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Hitesh Verma Vs. State of Uttarakhand & another”, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 710, has held that offence under the Act is not established merely on the fact that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste. Paragraph Nos. 11, 12 and 14 of the aforesaid judgment are extracted hereunder:- 4

11. It may be stated that the charge-sheet filed is for an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. The said section stands substituted by Act 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26-1-2016. The substituted corresponding provision is Section 3(1)(r) which reads as under: “3.(1)(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;”

12. The basic ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act can be classified as “(1) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and (2) in any place within public view”.

14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] . The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view (sic) [Ed. : This sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 435, at p. 736d-e, and in the application of this principle in para 15, below:“Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view.”] . The Court held as under : (SCC pp. 443-44, para 28) “28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.”

7. A bare perusal of the complaint would reveal that the entire incident took place inside a room, which clearly shows 5 that the applicants did not use these offensive words in the public view. There is nothing in the complaint to show that the applicants uttered these words in a place within public view, or that the place where the applicants uttered these words was a place which ordinarily could be seen by the public. Furthermore, a bare perusal of the complaint would reveal that the accused have not humiliated the complainant on the basis that she belongs to Scheduled Caste. Hence, this Court is of the view that no prima facie offence is made out against the applicants under Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act.

8. In view of the aforesaid legal position, this Court has no hesitation in quashing the proceedings of the aforesaid criminal case so far it relates to offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act.

9. Accordingly, the criminal misc. application is allowed and the proceedings of Complaint Case No. 1816 of 2014, Km. Leela Vs. Smt. Anita Joshi and Others, pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate/1st Additional Civil Judge (Jr. Div.), Haridwar, District Haridwar, so far it relates to offence punishable under Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act, qua the applicants, are quashed.

10. This Court is not inclined to interfere as regards the proceedings pending against the applicants for the offences punishable under Sections 323, 452, 504 and 506 of IPC and 6 the trial court shall proceed against the applicants under Sections 323, 452, 504 and 506 of IPC. Ujjwal (Alok Mahra, J.) 30.07.2025

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