Ramesh Chandra v. State of Uttaranchal

In brief the prosecution case is that Smt. Munni who was daughter of informant, namely, Jeva Nand was married to Ramesh Chandra as per Hindu rites and rituals. On the fateful night of 18.04.2001, she was found dead. The informant alleges that she was killed as her paternal family was unable to fulfil dowry demand of Rs.1.25 lakhs and four tolas of gold.

3. On the basis of aforesaid report, a charge-sheet was filed by the investigating officer in the court of learned Judicial 2 Magistrate, who in turn, committed the case to the Sessions Court, Almora for trial.

4. Thereafter, on 13.08.2004, learned Sessions Judge, Almora framed charges under Sections 498A and 304B IPC. The charges were read over and explained to the accused, who pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

5. To prove its case, the prosecution has examined PW1 (Jiva Nand-informant), PW2 (Smt. Durga Devi-mother of deceased), PW3 (Ramesh Chandra-brother of deceased), PW4 (Dr. K.S. Dhami-Medical Officer), PW 5 (Chandra Singh Martoliya-Naib Tehsildar) and PW6 (Heera Singh Phartyal) to substantiate and prove the charges against the appellant.

6. After prosecution evidence, the statement of appellant was recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which, he stated that he was innocent and claimed to be tried.

7. During trial, PW1 reiterated the facts of prosecution story and supported it. He stated that the deceased was his daughter and died within 14 months of the marriage. He further deposed that whenever she used to visit her maternal house, she used to inform that her in-laws are demanding Rs.1.25 lakhs and four tolas gold. He also deposed that when he visited her matrimonial house for a function, his son-in-law demanded Rs.1.25 lakhs for establishing an Atta-Chakki to which he replied that he will not be able to arrange it due to lack of resources. He also explained the cacuse of delay in lodging the FIR.

8. PW2 on oath deposed that she is the mother of deceased. She stated that whenever the deceased used to visit her 3 maternal house, she used to inform about the demand of Rs.1.25 lakhs and four tolas gold

9. PW3 in his examination-in-chief deposed that he is the brother of deceased and got to know about her death when he was in Madhya Pradesh after which he rushed to his home. On reaching there his parents informed him that his sister’s in-laws used to demand Rs.1.25 lakhs and four tolas of gold, non- fulfilment of which ultimately resulted in her death. In cross- examination, he told that when his sister informed him regarding demand of dowry for the first time, he did not report about it to the police authorities. He further admitted that during investigation also he did not speak anything regarding demand of dowry and is raising this fact for the first time in the Court.

10. PW4 who happens to be the Medial Officer admitted that real cause of death could not be ascertained during post- mortem and in cross-examination admitted that death could have been caused due to epilepsy.

11. PW5 and PW6 were the Revenue Police authorities who investigated the case and supported the prosecution story during trial. They deposed regarding the veracity of charge-sheet, site plan, FIR etc.

12. It is vehemently argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that there is a delay in lodging the FIR on behalf of prosecution, which creates a serious doubt over their entire story. He further submits that the FIR was lodged as a result of a tussel regarding the custody of the minor child of the deceased.

13. It is also submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that essential conditions of culpability under Section 4 304B and 498A IPC were not established by the prosecution, therefore, the learned trial court committed grave error in raising the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act.

14. Per contra, learned State Counsel supported the case of prosecution.

15. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record and after going through the relevant provisions under Sections 498A and 304B IPC and Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, this Court is of the opinion that there is nothing on record to prove the guilt of the appellant to the hilt and beyond all reasonable doubts.

16. Section 304B IPC for which the appellant was convicted needs a look, before arriving at a conclusion. Section 304B IPC is quoted below:- “304B. Dowry death.-(1) where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.- For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).”

17. From perusal of Section 304B IPC, it reflects that following ingredients need to be proved to make out an offence viz:- (i) Unnatural death which may be suicidal/homicidal. 5 (ii) Within seven years of marriage. (iii) Soon before her death cruelty or harassment. (iv) By the husband or his relative in connection with dowry.

18. Here in the case in hand, it is very clear from perusal of the record that neither any prosecution witness alleges “cruelty or harassment” meted out by the appellant “in connection to dowry” nor the prosecution has proved the same. It is amply clear that the statements given by PW1, PW2 & PW3 are bald statements which do not indicate any form of cruelty meted out to deceased by the appellant.

19. As held by the Apex Court in a catena of judgments that presumption under Section 113-B of Indian Evidence Act would be attracted only when it is proved that soon before her death the woman was subjected to cruelty that too in connection with any demand of dowry. Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, which is quoted hereinbelow:- “113B. Presumption as to dowry death.- When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section, “dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”

20. This Court is of the opinion that in the case in hand as the appellant did not subject the deceased women to cruelty in connection with the demand of dowry soon before her death, the 6 learned trial court was wrong in raising a presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act against the appellant. My view is further substantiated by para 32 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Baijnath & others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh; reported in (2017) 1 SCC 101. For the sake of convenience, para 32 of Baijnath (Supra) is quoted below:- “32. This Court while often dwelling on the scope and purport of Section 304-B of the Code and Section 113-B of the Act have propounded that the presumption is contingent on the fact that the prosecution first spell out the ingredients of the offence of Section 304-B as in Shindo v. State of Punjab [Shindo v. State of Punjab, (2011) 11 SCC 517 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 394] and echoed in Rajeev Kumar v. State of Haryana [Rajeev Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2013) 16 SCC 640 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 346] . In the latter pronouncement, this Court propounded that one of the essential ingredients of dowry death under Section 304-B of the Code is that the accused must have subjected the woman to cruelty in connection with demand for dowry soon before her death and that this ingredient has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and only then the Court will presume that the accused has committed the offence of dowry death under Section 113-B of the Act. It referred to with approval, the earlier decision of this Court in K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao [K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao, (2003) 1 SCC 217 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 271] to the effect that to attract the provision of Section 304-B of the Code, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that “soon before her death” she was subjected to cruelty and harassment “in connection with the demand for dowry”.”

21. In the absence of the essential, it cannot be safe to convict the appellant under Section 304B IPC.

22. Further, the offence punishable under Section 498A IPC in my opinion is also not made out against the appellant as the prosecution has failed to prove any sort of cruelty by the 7 appellant/husband towards to meet any unlawful demand as given in Section 498A (b) IPC. Neither the evidence of prosecution witnesses in the course of trial indicate any sort of cruelty as defined under Section 498A IPC.

23. In this view of matter, it is safe to conclude that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the appellant.

24. The upshot of the aforesaid discussions is that the appeal deserves to be allowed. Accordingly, present appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and order dated 13.03.2007, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Almora is hereby set-aside. The appellant is on bail. He needs not to surrender. His sureties be discharged forthwith.

25. Let the T.C.R. be immediately sent back to the trial court for consignment. AK (Pankaj Purohit, J.)

02.04.2025