THE STATE OF RAIASTHAN v. RAIASTHAN AGRICULTURE INPUT DEALERS ASSOCIATION

The High Court on consideration of the entire matter, took the view that when foodgrains of particular varieties were treated and subjected to chemical process for preservation, those grains become commercially F known as "seeds". Reservation was kept however by the High Court to its statement afore-referred that in case a dealer was found dealing in foodgrains under the garb of seeds, the appellants, were not precluded from prosecuting the offender in a Criminal Court. In sum, it was ordered that the appellants stand precluded from requiring the respondents to take licences under the provisions of the Act in relation to their business of G dealing in seeds of Bajra or any other foodgrain, as well as restrained from realising or recovering market fees in respect thereof. Sequelly, it was ordered that no licence under the Act was required for sale of such seeds. This is how these appeals' are before us. H Strong reliance was placed by Mr. Aruneshwar Gupta, learned coun- STATE v. RAJ AGRICULTURE INPUT DEALER ASSN. [PUNCHHI, J.J 269 sel for the appellants on Kishan Lal v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., [1990] A Suppl. SCC 742 to contend that for the purposes of Section 2 (l)(i) and the Schedule of the Act, the expression "agricultural produce" is an in clusive definition which could even include processed items from foodgrains. Thus processed foodgrains on becoming seeds, as alleged by the respondents, would all the same remain foodgrains requiring the respondents to take licence under the Act. Secondly, it was urged that by B virtue of Notification dated 16th May, 1980, certified seeds and foundation seeds of a description alone were excluded from the purview of the Schedule and no other seed. We are one with Mr. Gupta, learned counsel for the appellants, so far as the definition of the expression "agricultural produce" being wide and C inclusive goes. But, then the real difficulty comes in interpreting the items mentioned in the schedule as to whether mention of a particular item would ipso facto mean inclusion of all its forms and derivatives achieved by manufacture or processing or by some other method. On reading the schedule as it stood at the relevant time, we come to the view that .such a D wide interpretation tu the times in the schedule can in no event be given. In Kishan Lat's case, Khandsari, Shakkar, Gur and Sugar were brought in the Schedule as "agricultural produce" and the argument that these items were not agricultural produce per se, and thus incapable of being brought in the Schedule, was repelled because when a particular item finds way in the Schedule in that form, it stays there for all purposes as long as it is in E some way referable to the purpose for which the Schedule is set up. F The Schedule applicable on the relevant dates discloses that Item 2 is titled as "Dhanya" (foodgrains). Serial No. 1 thereunder is Gehun (wheat). Serial No. 11 is Aata (wheat flour). Serial No. 12 is Maida (refined wheat flour). Serial No. 13 is Suji and Serial No. 14 is Rava (both semilona). Similarly, Serial No. 2 is Jau Ghat Sahit (barley as also in the dehusked form). Serial No. 6 is Dhan (paddy) and Serial No. 7 is Chawal (rice). The scheme of serialising processed items in this manner is reflective of a positive application of mind that not only the original foodgrains ·which are foodgrains per' se included, but their products and derivatives too are G mentioned specifically as "agricultural produce" due' to its wide definition. Noticeably, Serial Nos. 3" to 5 are jawahar, Makka and Bajra but only-in their natural form and not in any other form. Going further down in the Schedule Item No.6 is Phal (fruit). At Serial No. 8 thereof is Kharbuja (Musk Melon) and Serial No. 9 is Tarbuj (Water Melon). Going to Item No. 11 Vividh (Miscellaneous), one finds at Serial No. 14 Tarbuj Ke Beej H 270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. A (Seeds of Waler Melon) and to Serial No. 16 Kharbuje Ke Beej (Seeds of Musk Melon). It is thus evident that wherever any produce of agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry or othe1wise is sought to be inducted in the Schedule, other than what it is in the natural form, it is given a name and identity distinct from the corpus from which it came. Mr. Gupta, learned counsel, could not point out to us anywhere if seeds of foodgrains, B inclusive of Bajra seed, per Item No. II were specifically mentioned as such in the Schedule. Wherever seeds were intended to be separately serialised, like seeds of musk melon and water melon, they distinctly found mentioned in contrast to the fruits, from which they came but as distinct products. It is undoubtedly true that foodgrains per se could be used as seeds C for being sown and achieving germination, but in that form they retain the dual utility of being foodgraias as well as seeds. By process of coating and applying insecticides, other chemicals and poisonous substances to the foodgrain meant to utilised as seeds, one of its basic character, i.e., its consumption as food by human beings or animals or for extraction for the D like purpose, gets irretrievably lost and such processed seeds become a commodity distinct from foodgrains as commonly understood. That distinc tion was borne in mind by the High Court in allowing the writ petition of the respondents, and in our view rightly. E The next argument of Mr. Gupta, learned counsel, based on Notifica- tion dated May 16, 1980 must also fail because by excepting from the purview of the Schedule, certified and foundation seeds, bearing tags of particular colours, it cannot be spelt out that words relating to foodgrains would automatically include seeds also. The Schedule is not meant to the filled by inferences. What is meant to contain therein shall be explicit and categoric. Nothing stops the State Government to add suitable words therein to convey that foodgrains, as processed for seeds, would also be agricultural produce \Vithin the n1eaning of the expression 11or otherwise" occurring in Section 2 (l)(i) of the Act. Since no such exercise has been taken, the State Government cannot be permitted to achieve indirectly which it could have achieved directly, by being specific in that regard. The G High Court rightly rejected such contention raised before it by the appel F lants. For the foregoing reasons, we find no merit in these appeals. The same are accordingly dismissed, but without any order as to costs. H v.s.s. Appeals dismissed.