State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp v. Connected

483 of BNSS, the accused–petitioner has challenged the order dated 14.11.2024 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge No. 2, Kota (Narendra Singh, RJS, DJ Cadre) in Bail Application No. 2531/2024, Session Case No. 400/2021, CNR No. RJKT-010064632021, arising out of FIR No. 184/2021 registered at Police Station Anantpura, Kota City for the offences under Sections 302, 307, 452, 341, 384 and 34 IPC, whereby the bail application of the accused–petitioner came to be dismissed as withdrawn. S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 2324/2025

2. By way of filing this instant fourth bail application under Section 483 of BNSS, the accused–petitioner seeks enlargement on bail in connection with FIR No. 0184/2021 dated 24.04.2021, registered at Police Station Anantpura, District Kota, for the offences punishable under Sections 452, 307, 302, 341, 384 and 34 of IPC and Sections 3 and [2025:RJ-JP:34002] (3 of 16) [CRLMB-16217/2024] 25 of the Arms Act, 1959, inter alia on the ground of long incarceration. The lastly filed interim bail applicaion by the petitioner bearing no. 5997/2024 came to be dismissed by this court vide order dated 05.07.2024. S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No.

3. By way of filing this instant fifth bail application under Section 483 of BNSS, the accused–petitioner seeks release on bail in connection with FIR No. 0184/2021 dated

24.04.2021, registered at Police Station Anantpura, District Kota, for the offences punishable under Sections 452, 307, 302, 341, 384 and 34 of IPC, primarily on the ground of long incarceration. The lastly filed fourth bail applicaion by the petitioner bearing no. 9388/2024 came to be dismissed by this court vide order dated 27.09.2024. Facts of the case

4. Brief facts of the case are that on 24.04.2021, complainant Divyanshu Singh Jadon, while under treatment, lodged a report at Police Station Anantpura, Kota City, alleging that in the evening at about 5.15–5.30 PM, accused Narendra Singh @ Nandu Shooter, Bunty Vardhan and Harish Meena came in front of his house, demanded extortion from his father Balraj Singh Jadon in respect of property dealings and, upon refusal, assaulted and thereafter entered the house, where Nandu Shooter fired upon his father causing grievous [2025:RJ-JP:34002] (4 of 16) [CRLMB-16217/2024] injuries, and Bunty Vardhan also fired towards the complainant causing a gunshot injury on his waist. The injured Balraj Singh was taken to hospital where he succumbed to the injuries. The incident was witnessed by the complainant’s mother, sister-in-law and tenant. During investigation, site inspection was carried out, postmortem of the deceased was conducted, bullets, blood-stained clothes, empty and live cartridges, blood-stained tile pieces and other incriminating articles were seized, and medical and FSL/armourer reports were collected which confirmed use of a firearm. Statements of material witnesses under Sections 161 and 164 Cr.P.C. were recorded. The accused persons namely Narendra Singh @ Nandu Shooter, Bunty Vardhan, Ankit Tripathi @ Ankit Baccha, Harish Kumar Meena, Surendra Singh @ Sonu and Jayprakash Meena were arrested on different dates, and at their instance, recoveries including the pistol used in the offence, cartridges, a mis- fired cartridge and the Swift car bearing registration RJ-20- SF-6703 used in the crime were effected. CDR analysis also corroborated communication between the accused regarding the weapon used. It further surfaced that accused Surendra Singh @ Sonu provided shelter to the main assailants after the crime, and accused Jayprakash Meena had concealed the pistol earlier used by Nandu Shooter. On completion of investigation, offences under Sections 452, 302, 307, 341, 384, 34 and 212 IPC and Sections 3/25 & 3/29 of the Arms [2025:RJ-JP:34002] (5 of 16) [CRLMB-16217/2024] Act, 1959 were found established against the accused persons, and accordingly charge-sheet No. 205/2021 dated

27.08.2021 was filed before the competent Court.

5. It is contended on behalf of the accused-petitioner that no case for the alleged offences is made out against him and his incarceration is not warranted. It is submitted that the petitioner has already suffered long incarceration, and that this Court, in its previous bail order, had directed that the trial should be conducted expeditiously. There are no factors at play in the case at hand that may work against grant of bail to the accused-petitioner, and he has been made an accused based on conjectures and surmises.

6. Contrary to the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Public Prosecutor opposes the bail application and submits that the present case is not fit for enlargement of accused on bail.

7. Having considered the rival submissions and perused the case diary, charge-sheet, and other documents placed on record, this Court is called upon to examine whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the accused–petitioner has been able to make out a case for grant of bail under Section 483 of BNSS. This Court is also mindful of the fact that this is the petitioner’s second, fourth and fifth successive attempt at securing release on bail, where earlier applications were either dismissed on merits or withdrawn. [2025:RJ-JP:34002] (6 of 16) [CRLMB-16217/2024] Therefore, the aspect of long incarceration, delay in conclusion of trial, the role attributed to the petitioner, the nature of allegations, and the gravity of the offences alleged, are required to be weighed cumulatively before arriving at any conclusion. Observation

8. Normally, this Court grants bail within a period of approximately four years in cases of this nature; however, in the present matter, the accused–petitioner’s earlier bail application was dismissed at a early stage. It is well-settled that delay in conclusion of trial can operate in favor of the detenue only when such delay is not attributable to the accused themselves. The trial court in its detailed status report ( dated 06.03.2025), summoned vide S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 15364/2023 (dated

13.02.2025), has categorically recorded that the majority of adjournments and resultant delays in the proceedings were occasioned due to actions on the part of the accused themselves. It is evident from the trial court record that notwithstanding repeated summons and scheduling, the accused repeatedly changed counsel, refused to appear physically in court, refused attendance even through video- conferencing, and in some instances, failed to cooperate with the court’s directions during cross-examination of key witnesses. The record further reflects that on one occasion, [2025:RJ-JP:34002] (7 of 16) [CRLMB-16217/2024] due to the accused’s repeated non-cooperation, refusal to mark presence both physically and via video-conference, and use of abusive language towards court officers, the court was compelled to initiate contempt proceedings and issue directions to the Jail Superintendent to secure the accused’s personal appearance. Such conduct has caused unnecessary prolongation of the trial, thereby directly impacting the speed of adjudication of the matter.

9. While it is true that, in cases where delay is caused by the prosecution or due to non-availability of witnesses, the Court may consider granting bail to prevent undue incarceration, the same principle cannot be applied when the delay is occasioned due to the deliberate actions of the accused. The trial court report dated 06.03.2025 provides a meticulous chronology of the proceedings in Sessions Case No. 400/2021, clearly indicating that key witnesses were produced and were ready to testify, but the accused failed to appear for personal cross-examination on multiple dates. On several occasions, the accused expressed a desire to self- represent, changed counsel repeatedly, and failed to record presence in court, thereby contributing to the delay in the progression of the trial. The report also highlights that the accused has been lodged in a high-security jail, which itself is indicative of the serious nature of the charges and the risk associated with regular jail attendance, necessitating enhanced security measures for both witnesses and court [2025:RJ-JP:34002] (8 of 16) [CRLMB-16217/2024] personnel. The trial court has carefully noted that adjournments due to security arrangements, particularly for witnesses, were unavoidable, but delays caused specifically by the accused cannot be attributed to systemic inefficiency.

10. The trial court’s report specifically records instances where the accused’s actions directly impeded examination- in-chief and cross-examination of witnesses, often requiring deferment of proceedings and scheduling of multiple dates. The conduct of the accused, which includes repeated refusal to engage with court proceedings, threats of non- cooperation, and utilization of procedural opportunities to delay trial, demonstrates deliberate obstruction rather than innocent or unavoidable delay. It is further recorded that despite being brought to court under adequate security arrangements, witnesses depositions had to be deferred on multiple occasions to ensure their protection. This Court notes that during the pendency of the trial, all efforts were made to ensure compliance with due process, and any resultant delay was primarily attributable to the accused’s actions, as opposed to systemic lapses by the prosecution or the judiciary.

11. This Court has meticulously perused the criminal records of the accused, namely Bunty Vardhan, Ankit Tripathi @ Ankit Baccha, and Harish Kumar Meena. The records reveal numerous criminal cases involving serious offences [2025:RJ-JP:34002] (9 of 16) [CRLMB-16217/2024] under the Indian Penal Code, including murder, attempt to murder, robbery, extortion, dacoity, criminal intimidation, grievous hurt, unlawful possession of arms, and violations under the Arms Act and NDPS Act. Several cases have resulted in convictions, including sentences of rigorous imprisonment, while multiple other cases remain pending. This history clearly demonstrates a persistent pattern of violent and organized criminal conduct.

12. The offences in the present matter are of a grave and heinous nature, involving use of firearms, assault causing death, and acts committed with a common intention. It is legally well-settled that in such cases, it is not necessary that each accused individually fires the fatal shot. What is crucial is that all participants acted with the shared intent to commit the crime, and each is liable for the consequences of the concerted action.

13. Perusal of the certified copies of the trial court’s order sheets demonstrates that following the directions of this Court for the expeditious disposal of the trial, the learned trial court undertook all sincere and diligent efforts to advance the proceedings. It is observed that in each instance, three consecutive dates were listed, with three to four witnesses summoned on each date, and the examination of witnesses was actively proceeding. While some unavoidable circumstances may have occasioned minor [2025:RJ-JP:34002] (10 of 16) [CRLMB-16217/2024] delays, it is evident that neither the prosecution nor the judiciary contributed to the protraction of the trial. The record clearly reflects that the trial court was making earnest endeavours for expeditious disposal, and any residual delay is primarily attributable to the conduct of the accused rather than systemic lapses or negligence by the prosecuting agency or the court.

14. This Court also relies on the Supreme Court judgment in Ashok Dhankad v. State of NCT of Delhi (Criminal Appeal No. 3495 of 2025, decided on 13.08.2025), which emphasizes that the grant of bail is a discretionary judicial remedy requiring a balance between the accused’s personal liberty and the gravity of the offence. The Court must assess the nature and seriousness of charges, the criminal antecedents, and potential risk to the trial process or witnesses. A superior court may set aside a bail order if it is found to be illegal, arbitrary, or based on irrelevant considerations. Importantly, the Court observed that in offences involving organized criminal conduct, the accused may exert domineering influence over witnesses, abscond, or delay trial proceedings, which are significant factors in bail adjudication.

15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed in the above case as under:

14. At the outset, we must clarify that setting aside an order granting bail and cancellation of bail are two distinct concepts. While [2025:RJ-JP:34002] (11 of 16) [CRLMB-16217/2024] the former contemplates the correctness of the order itself, the latter pertains to the conduct of the Accused subsequent to the order granting bail. Judicial pronouncements of this Court have time and again reiterated this position. Law on the issue

15. This Court in Jayaben v. Tejas Kanubhai Zala4 , while setting aside the order granting bail to the Accused therein, had expounded that different considerations must be applied while considering an order of releasing an Accused on bail and an application for cancellation (which would include breach of bail conditions). Moreover, the Court observed that the conduct of the accused subsequent to an order granting bail would not be relevant while considering an appeal against such order.

16. The discussion of this Court in Y v. State of Rajasthan5 underscored that an order granting bail can be tested on illegality, perversity, arbitrariness and being based on unjustified material. While setting aside the order granting bail, the Court made the following observation : “15. It is worth noting that what is being considered in this case relates to whether the High Court has exercised the discretionary power under Section 439CrPC in granting bail appropriately. Such an assessment is different from deciding whether circumstances subsequent to the grant of bail have made it necessary to cancel the same. The first situation requires the Court to analyse whether the order granting bail was illegal, perverse, unjustified or arbitrary. On the other hand, an application for cancellation of bail looks at whether supervening circumstances have occurred warranting cancellation.

16. In Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] this Court held as follows : (SCC p. 513, para 12) “12. We have referred to certain principles to be kept in mind while granting bail, as has been laid down by this Court from time to time. It is well settled in law that cancellation of bail after it is granted because the accused has misconducted himself or of some supervening circumstances warranting such cancellation have occurred is in a different compartment altogether than an order granting bail which is unjustified, illegal and perverse. If in a case, the relevant factors which should have been taken into consideration while dealing with the application for bail have not been taken note of, or bail is founded on irrelevant [2025:RJ-JP:34002] (12 of 16) [CRLMB-16217/2024] considerations, indisputably the superior court can set aside the order of such a grant of bail. Such a case belongs to a different category and is in a separate realm. While dealing with a case of second nature, the court does not dwell upon the violation of conditions by the accused or the supervening circumstances that have happened subsequently. It, on the contrary, delves into the justifiability and the soundness of the order passed by the court.”

17. In the present case, it is necessary to determine whether the High Court while granting bail to Respondent 2-accused has properly exercised its discretion under Section 439 CrPC by following various parameters laid down by this Court. A bare perusal of the impugned order [Omprakash v. State of Rajasthan, 2021 SCC OnLine Raj 3499] passed by the High Court does not suggest that the Court has considered any of the relevant factors for grant of bail.”

17. A division bench of this Court in Meena Devi v. State of U.P.6 had observed to similar effect: “26. At the cost of repetition, it may be highlighted that the considerations that weigh with the appellate court when called upon to examine the correctness of an order granting bail is not on the same footing when it comes to examining an application moved for cancellation of bail. The yardstick for testing the correctness of an order granting bail is whether the court below has exercised its discretion in an improper or arbitrary manner thereby vitiating the said order. When it comes to assessing an application seeking cancellation of bail, the appellate court looks out for, amongst others, supervening circumstances or any violation of the conditions of bail imposed on the person who has been accorded such a relief.” (emphasis supplied)

18. More recently, this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Indraj Singh Etc. 7 , while setting aside the bail granted to a person accused of an offence under Sections 419, 420, 467 of the IPC and Section 3 & 10 of the Rajasthan Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means Act), 2022, placed reliance on an earlier decision of this Court in Ajwar v. Waseem8 and observed: “8.3 The discussion made in Ajwar v. Waseem3 by a coordinate Bench of this Court (which included one of us, i.e., Amanullah J.) is on point. The relevant paragraphs are as under:— “Relevant parameters for granting bail

26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider [2025:RJ-JP:34002] (13 of 16) [CRLMB-16217/2024] relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer : Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558].] 27. It is equally well settled that bail once granted, ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is always open to interference by the superior court. If there are serious allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by a superior court if it transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material available on record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on the society resulting in such an order. In P v. State of M.P. [P v. State of M.P., (2022) 15 SCC 211] decided by a three-Judge Bench of this Court [authored by one of us (Hima Kohli, J.)] has spelt out the considerations that must weigh with the Court for interfering in an order granting bail to an accused under Section 439(1) CrPC in the following words : (SCC p. 224, para 24) “24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancelling bail once granted, the court must consider whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant of bail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to permit him to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of [2025:RJ-JP:34002] (14 of 16) [CRLMB-16217/2024] Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 237]. To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by the court below granting bail but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the appellate court.” Considerations for setting aside bail orders

28. The considerations that weigh with the appellate court for setting aside the bail order on an application being moved by the aggrieved party include any supervening circumstances that may have occurred after granting relief to the accused, the conduct of the accused while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to procrastinate, resulting in delaying the trial, any instance of threats being extended to the witnesses while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to tamper with the evidence in any manner. We may add that this list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. However, the court must be cautious that at the stage of granting bail, only a prima facie case needs to be examined and detailed reasons relating to the merits of the case that may cause prejudice to the accused, ought to be avoided. Suffice it is to state that the bail order should reveal the factors that have been considered by the Court for granting relief to the accused.” (emphasis supplied)

19. The principles which emerge as a result of the above discussion are as follows: (i) An appeal against grant of bail cannot be considered to be on the same footing as an application for cancellation of bail; (ii) The Court concerned must not venture into a threadbare analysis of the evidence adduced by prosecution. The merits of such evidence must not be adjudicated at the stage of bail; (iii) An order granting bail must reflect application of mind and assessment of the relevant factors for grant of bail that have been elucidated by this Court. [See: Y v. State of Rajasthan (Supra); Jaibunisha v. Meherban & Ors9 and Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip Kumar @ Deepu10] (iv) An appeal against grant of bail may be entertained by a superior Court on grounds such as perversity; illegality; inconsistency with law; relevant factors not been taken into consideration including gravity of the offence and impact of the crime; (v) However, the Court may not take the conduct of an accused subsequent to the grant bail into consideration while considering an appeal against the grant of such bail. Such grounds [2025:RJ-JP:34002] (15 of 16) [CRLMB-16217/2024] must be taken in an application for cancellation of bail; and (vi) An appeal against grant of bail must not be allowed to be used as a retaliatory measure. Such an appeal must be confined only to the grounds discussed above.

20. Keeping in view the above expositions of law, this Court is of the view that the High Court has erroneously passed an order releasing the Accused on bail. While considerations such as the period of custody and testimonies of key prosecution witnesses having been recorded are relevant, the Court errored by inter alia, not considering the grievous nature of the crime, the possibility of influencing the trial by the Accused and the conduct of the accused during investigation. “

16. Applying the above principles, it is evident that the petitioner and co-accused, given their criminal antecedents and the organized nature of the offences, pose a substantial risk of influencing witnesses and obstructing the trial. Furthermore, he likelihood of substantial punishment upon conviction underscore the potential consequences of release and the possibility of the accused absconding, given their conduct and flight risk, cannot be ignored. The cumulative assessment of the grave nature and gravity of the offences, prior criminal conduct, trial conduct, and principles laid down by the Supreme Court, weighs strongly against granting bail.

17. Considering all relevant factors, the seriousness of offences committed with common intention, prior criminal records of the accused, repeated obstruction in trial proceedings, and risk to witnesses, this Court is of the opinion that the balance of justice does not favour enlargement on bail. The petitioner has failed to demonstrate [2025:RJ-JP:34002] (16 of 16) [CRLMB-16217/2024] any exceptional circumstance warranting bail in the face of such grave offences.

18. It is also noted that the bail applications of the present accused were previously dismissed by this Court on

07.03.2022, 05.07.2024, and 27.09.2024, and the same circumstances persist today, as no significant change has come on record favouring the cause of the accused.

19. Accordingly, the instant Bail Applications of the petitioners stands dismissed. The petitioners is directed to fully cooperate with the trial proceedings, and the trial Court is urged to proceed expeditiously while ensuring adequate protection and security for all witnesses. Mamta /415 (FARJAND ALI),J