In case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji AIR

Judgment

1. Shambu Singh S/o Shyam Singh S/o Chhagan Ji, R/o Village-Rajor, Police Station-Bhim, Tehsil-Bhim, District- Rajsamand, Rajasthan.(Driver Vehicle Bus No. Rj 36 Pa 1109).

2. Kamlesh Kumar S/o Ghanshyam, R/o Chhipa Mohalla, Beawar, District-Ajmer, Rajasthan.(Owner Vehicle Bus No. Rj 36 Pa 1109).

3. United India Insurance Company Limited, Through Branch Manager, Branch Beawar, District-Ajmer, Rajasthan. (Insurance Company Vehicle Bus No. Rj 36 Pa 1109 Insurance Cover Note No. 1412013112003006 Which Is Insured From 16-6-2012 To 15-06-2013). ----Respondents For Appellant(s)

: Mr. Ritesh Jain with Dr. Ramdeo Arya For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK KUMAR JAIN 05/02/2025 Order

1. Instant S.B. CMA is preferred dissatisfied from award dated

25.05.2018 in Claim Case No. 421/2014 (301/2013) passed by learned MACT, (learned Additional District Judge No.2), Beawar, District Ajmer. [2025:RJ-JP:5209] (2 of 5) [CMA-373/2024]

2. Office has pointed out a delay of 1947 days and to substantiate the reasons of delay, an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is filed.

3. Learned counsel for appellant submits that the Tribunal has awarded compensation on lower side and due to Covid-19 and death of his counsel, the appeal could not be filed within time, therefore, the delay is bona fide.

4. Heard learned counsel for appellant and perused the material placed on record.

5. The award was passed on 25.05.2018 and appeal was filed on 22.12.2023. The exemption period for purpose of limitation due to pandemic Covid-19 period was between 23.03.2020 to February, 2022, but period prior to pandemic, and afterwards have not been explained by the appellant-claimant. No supporting document is filed with application to justify the delay occasion in filing the instant civil misc. appeal.

6. In case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Katiji AIR 1987 SC 1353, Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the following principles to allow application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act:-

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay. every seconds delay? The doctrine must be [2025:RJ-JP:5209] (3 of 5) [CMA-373/2024] applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

7. In case of Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors. 2010 (8) SCC 685, Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering Section 5 of Limitation Act has referred the judgment in the case of Union of India Vs. Ram Charan AIR 1964 SC 215 and observed that the explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay. The larger benches as well as equi- benches of Hon’ble Supreme Court have consistently followed [2025:RJ-JP:5209] (4 of 5) [CMA-373/2024] these principles and have either allowed or declined to condone the delay in filing such applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay.

8. In the case of Brijesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.: (2014) 13 SCC 291, while referring the judgment of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors.: (2013) 12 SCC 649, Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court further observed that the Court cannot condone the delay, if it is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, and a delay cannot be condoned on sympathetic grounds.

9. Very recently condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act was considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of P. Subba Reddy (died) by LRs. And Ors. Vs. Special Deputy Collector (LA) 2024 INSC 286 wherein also it was held that unless sufficient cause is shown the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act cannot be allowed. The underlying provisions after harmonious construction of provision of law were formulated in following manner:- (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come [2025:RJ-JP:5209] (5 of 5) [CMA-373/2024] to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the L imitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; liberal (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though justice-oriented approach, approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamount to disregarding the statutory provision.

10. Considering aforesaid, the ground is not sufficient to condone delay, therefore, the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is liable to be dismissed.

11. In view of aforesaid, an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act and consequently, instant civil misc. appeal are hereby dismissed.

12. Misc. application, if any, stands disposed of. GAURAV /38 (ASHOK KUMAR JAIN),J