Tehsil Khetri District Jhunjhunu- (Registered Owner Of Vehicle Jeep Di No v. R/o Bhobiya Tehsil Chirawa District Jhunjhunu

Judgment

1. Purnmal Son Of Shri Naruram Meghwal, Aged About 54 Years, R/o Bhobiya Tehsil Chirawa District Jhunjhunu.

2. The Oriental Insurance Company Limited, Through Branch Manager, Branch Office Station Road, Jhunjhunu (Insurance Company Of The Vehicle Jeep Di No. Rj-14C 0187)

3. The National Insurance Company Limited, Through Branch

6. Manager, Branch Office Station Road, Jhunjhunu (Insurance Company Of The Vehicle Jeep Di No. Rj-14C 0187)

Ramphal Son Of Shri Guljarilal, Resident Of Jini, Tehsil Chirawa District Jhunjhunu. Magaram Son Of Shri Tejaram Kumhar, Resident Of Kajda Tehsil Chirawa District Jhunjhunu. Naresh Kumar S/o Guljarilal, R/o Jini, Tehsil Chirawa, District Jhunjhunu. ----Respondents Connected With S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 3401/2022 Sajjan Singh Son Of Shri Meghchand Jat, Resident Of Mehada Jatuwas Tehsil Khetri District Jhunjhunu- (Registered Owner Of Vehicle Jeep Di No. Rj-14C 0187). Versus ----Appellant

3. Munni Devi Wife Of Shri Omprakash, Aged About 38 Years, R/o Bhobiya Tehsil Chirawa District Jhunjhunu. Kaushalya D/o Shri Omprakash, Aged About 20 Years, R/o Bhobiya Tehsil Chirawa District Jhunjhunu. Rakesh Son Of Shri Omprakash, Aged About 18 Years, R/o Bhobiya Tehsil Chirawa District Jhunjhunu.

4. Pinki Alias Priyanka Daughter Of Sh Omprakash, Aged About 16 Years, Minor Through Her Mother Smt. Munni [2025:RJ-JP:732] (2 of 8) [CMA-3400/2022] Devi Wife Of Shri Omprakash. R/o Bhobiya Tehsil Chirawa District Jhunjhunu.

5. Anil Son Of Shri Omprakash, Aged About 14 Years, Minor Through His Mother Smt. Munni Devi Wife Of Shri Omprakash. R/o Bhobiya Tehsil Chirawa District Jhunjhunu.

8. Sultan Son Of Shri Naruram, Aged About 65 Years, R/o Bhobiya Tehsil Chirawa District Jhunjhunu. Manohari Wife Of Shri Sultan, Aged About 55 Years, R/o Bhobiya Tehsil Chirawa District Jhunjhunu. The Oriental Insurance Company Limited, Through Branch Manager, Branch Office Station Road, Jhunjhunu (Insurance Company Of The Vehicle Jeep Di No. Rj-14C 0187)

9. The National Insurance Company Limited, Through Branch Manager, Branch Office Station Road, Jhunjhunu (Insurance Company Of The Vehicle Jeep Di No. Rj-14C 0187)

10. Ramphal Son Of Shri Guljarilal Jat, Resident Of Jini, Tehsil Chirawa District Jhunjhunu.

11. Magaram Son Of Shri Tejaram Kumhar, Resident Of Kajda Tehsil Chirawa District Jhunjhunu.

12. Naresh Kuamr S/o Guljarilal, R/o Jini, Tehsil Chirawa, District Jhunjhunu. ----Respondents For Appellant(s) : Mr. Harendra Singh with Mr. Dhruv Atri For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK KUMAR JAIN 02/01/2025 Order

1. These two civil misc. appeals were preferred by appellant- non-applicant aggrieved from award dated 12.09.2018 in Motor Accident Claim Case No. 408/2013 (188/2009) and 407/2013 [2025:RJ-JP:732] (3 of 8) [CMA-3400/2022] (189/2009) passed by learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jhunjhunu in two separate petitions filed under section 166 of Motor Vehicle Act.

2. Office has pointed out a delay of 1444 days and to substantiate the reasons of delay an application under section 5 of limitation act is filed on the ground that the counsel before the tribunal did not informed about the passing of award on time, and in case delay is not condoned then the appellant will suffer huge and irreparable loss.

3. Learned counsel for appellant submits that appellant is a poor and semi-illiterate person not having adequate knowledge of legal proceedings has filed this appeal. He submits that in case the delay is not condoned, the cause of appellant will not be addressed.

4. Heard learned counsel for appellant and perused the material placed on record.

5. Two claim petitions under Section 166 of Motor Vehicle Act for injuries sustained by Pooran Mal and on death of Om Prakash in an accident dated 02.02.2009 involving Motor Cycle No. RJ-18- 2M-9108 and RJ-14-C-0187, were filed before MACT. After registration of claim petition, present appellant who was registered owner of jeep number RJ-14-C-0187 was served a notice of both the petitions and he engaged a counsel and filed his reply before the Tribunal. During inquiry, the appellant Sajjan Singh was examined as a NAW-1. After considering the material and evidence, the Tribunal has passed an award on 12.09.2018. Learned Tribunal has exonerated the insurance company who were arrayed as non-claimant No.5 and 6. [2025:RJ-JP:732] (4 of 8) [CMA-3400/2022]

6. After an award dated 12.09.2018 these petitions were filed in the year 2022, thus there was a substantial delay of 1444 days. Only period from 23rd March 2020 to May, 2022 can be deducted as period of COVID-19 but for period perior to Covid-19 and after withdrawal of exemption from limitation, the appellant is required to show sufficient reasons for condonation of delay.

7. A perusal of application clearly shows that the appellant has failed to disclose a single reason for condonation of delay. Moreover, no material is placed on record which prevented appellant from filing the instant appeal. Therefore, in absence of sufficient reasons, application under section 5 of limitation act cannot be allowed, particularly in a case wherein the delay is more than 1444 days. 8. Section 5 of the Limitation Act prescribes that any appeal or revision or an application may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the petitioner satisfies the Court on sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal or revision or making an application within prescribed period.

9. In case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Katiji AIR 1987 SC 1353, Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the following principles to allow application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act:-

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. [2025:RJ-JP:732] (5 of 8) [CMA-3400/2022]

3. "Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay. every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

10. In case of Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors. 2010 (8) SCC 685, Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering Section 5 of Limitation Act has referred the judgment in the case of Union of India Vs. Ram Charan AIR 1964 SC 215 and observed that the explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown [2025:RJ-JP:732] (6 of 8) [CMA-3400/2022] for condonation of delay. The larger benches as well as equi- benches of Hon’ble Supreme Court have consistently followed these principles and have either allowed or declined to condone the delay in filing such applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay.

11. In the case of Brijesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.: (2014) 13 SCC 291, while referring the judgment of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors.: (2013) 12 SCC 649, Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court further observed that the Court cannot condone the delay, if it is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, and a delay cannot be condoned on sympathetic grounds.

12. Very recently condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act was considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of P. Subba Reddy (died) by LRs. And Ors. Vs. Special Deputy Collector (LA) 2024 INSC 286 wherein also it was held that unless sufficient cause is shown the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act cannot be allowed. The underlying provisions after harmonious construction of provision of law were formulated in following manner:- (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by [2025:RJ-JP:732] (7 of 8) [CMA-3400/2022] forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the L imitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; liberal (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, justice-oriented approach, though approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamount to disregarding the statutory provision.

13. Considering aforesaid, the counsel has failed to show sufficient reasons for delay, therefore, the civil misc. appeal is liable to be dismissed.

14. Consequently, the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is hereby dismissed along with civil misc. appeal.

15. Misc. application(s), if any, stands disposed of. [2025:RJ-JP:732] (8 of 8) [CMA-3400/2022]

16. No order as to costs. MONU /15-16 (ASHOK KUMAR JAIN),J