District Karauli, Rajasthan. vs Director General (Capart), Council For Advancement Of

Judgment

1. Director General (Capart), Council For Advancement Of Public Action And Rural Technology Bharat Environment Centre Zone No 5A, Core C, Second Floor, Lodi Road, New Delhi.

2. Government Of Rajasthan, Through Collector Karauli, Rajsathan. ----Respondents Connected With S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 442/2024 Sarvajanik Vikas Seva Sansthan, Lapawali Tehsil Todabhim

District Karauli, Rajasthan Through Smt. Rajkumari Sharma Secretary, Sarvajanik Vikas Seva Sansthan, Tehsil Todabhim District Karauli, Rajasthan. Versus ----Appellant

1. Director General (Capart), Council For Advancement Of Public Action And Rural Technology Zone No. 5A,core C, Second Floor, Lodi Road, New Delhi.

2. Government Of Rajasthan, Through Collector Karauli, Rajasthan. ----Respondents For Appellant(s) For Respondent(s) : : Mr. Rahul Kamwar HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK KUMAR JAIN 31/01/2025 Order [2025:RJ-JP:4490] (2 of 8) [CSA-443/2024]

1. These two civil second appeals were filed by appellant plaintiff after dismissal of civil regular appeal no. 26/2017 (13/2013) and 27/2017 (14/2013) on 15/07/2024 by learned Additional District Judge no.1, Hindaun City, District Karauli affirming the judgment and decree for dismissal of civil suits for injunction on 08.02.2013 by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Todabhim, District Karauli.

2. Learned counsel for appellant while referring judgment in case of UMC Technologies Private Limited Vs. Food Corporation of India and Ors. AIR 2021 SC 166 = MANU/SC/058/2020 submits that without a notice of proposed blacklisting, an action has been initiated against the plaintiff and plaintiff has challenged the same before the trial court but civil suit(s) were dismissed by the trial court and the first appellate court has also dismissed the appeals. He referred to the evidence and the law point over the record and submitted that in para no. 9 of memo of appeal, he has suggested several substantial questions of law which arise from the grounds mentioned by the appellant.

3. Heard learned counsel for appellant and perused the judgments as referred by learned counsel for appellant. Also scanned the entire record summoned from the Courts below, from appeal and civil suit in both cases.

4. Both these appeals arise out of facts of similar nature, therefore, they are connected with each other and the facts in both the cases are similar, therefore, we are passing a common order. [2025:RJ-JP:4490] (3 of 8) [CSA-443/2024]

5. The appellant plaintiff- an NGO has filed two separate civil suit Nos. 26/2002 (67/2001) (242/1998) and 27/2002 (69/2001) (244/1998) for injunction against the defendants against proposed blacklisting and also for continuing assistance under the Government schemes. The plaintiff society has stated that it is working for development of scheduled castes and poor persons in rural areas by availing the benefit of government grant and the plaintiff is assisting the masses in development of under privileged community. The plaintiff has stated that without any show cause notice or opportunity of hearing, it was blacklisted by the defendants and the grant under the Government scheme was stopped. The plaintiff has filed suit for injunction. The defendants have filed written statement and alleged that plaintiff has misused the fund granted for development. Further, pleaded that instead of utilizing funds for the assigned development work, no money was spent for the purpose for which grant was sanctioned and on verification the misuse of funds was proved so the defendants have stopped the funding.

6. After framing of issues and recording of evidence from both the sides, the trial court has opined that the plaintiff has misused the funds and the plaintiff has failed to prove proper utilization of fund as sanctioned by the defendants. As a result, the issues were decided against the plaintiff and both the suit was dismissed. The plaintiff preferred appeals under Section 96 of CPC, but the first appellate Court after considering the grounds and dismissed both the appeals, affirming the findings recorded in both the suits.

7. Herein, this second appeal is preferred from concurrent findings of facts recorded by the Courts below in both the matters. [2025:RJ-JP:4490] (4 of 8) [CSA-443/2024]

8. In case of UMC Technologies Private Limited (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court has referred judgment in cases of Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. Vs. State of West Bengal (1975) 1 SCC 70, Raghunath Thakur Vs. State of Bihar (1989) 1 SCC 229, Gorkha Security Services Vs. Government (NCT of Delhi) and Ors. (2014) 9 SCC 105 and held that blacklisting is contrary to principle of natural justice and action of blacklisting was neither expressly proposed nor could it have been inferred from the language employed in show cause notice.

9. Herein this case, the plaintiff has not challenged any notice or order of blacklisting by seeking declaration in plaint. A simple suit for injunction was filed and a prohibitory order was sought on the proposed action of blacklisting. The facts noticed by trial court clearly indicate that the funds sanctioned and distributed to plaintiff were not utilized for the purpose for which same were sanctioned, by defendants. The case related to siphon off the money, meant for development of underprivileged community.

10. The plaintiff has failed to substantiate the work for which the grant was sanctioned and released by the defendants. The evidence clearly indicates that the utilization of funds for the same purpose for which was sanctioned has not been established. Herein, the case in hand is filed for injunction and not for declaration. No action of blacklisting was ever challenged before the trial court or the first appellate court. Otherwise, there is concurrent finding of fact which is in accordance with material on record, therefore, there is no perversity or illegality, in the judgments of both the Courts below. [2025:RJ-JP:4490] (5 of 8) [CSA-443/2024]

11. In view of above, when there is no perversity or illegality or no finding against the record, the appellant is not entitled for assistance from the judgment in case of UMC Technologies Private Limited Vs. Food Corporation of India (supra). The grounds does not give rise to any substantial question of law.

12. Section 100 of CPC provides for second appeal in cases wherein the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. Thus, the First Appellate Court is final court on facts and in second appeal normally cannot re-appreciate the evidence or facts.

13. Just to determine whether a question is substantial question of law or not, was laid down by a Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons. Ltd. Vs. Century Spg. and Mgf. Co. Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 1314, as under: "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law."

14. Recently Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Suresh Lataruji Ramteke versus Sau. Sumabai Pandurang Petkar & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 6070/2023, arising out of SLP(C)No.20183 of 2022 decided on 21.09.2023) considered the scope of Section 100 of CPC and summarised the law as under:

13. The jurisprudence on Section 100, CPC is rich and varied. Time and again this Court in numerous [2025:RJ-JP:4490] (6 of 8) [CSA-443/2024] judgments has laid down, distilled and further clarified the requirements that must necessarily be met in order for a Second Appeal as laid down therein, to be maintainable, and thereafter be adjudicated upon. Considering the fact that numerous cases are filed before this Court which hinge on the application of this provision, we find it necessary to reiterate the principles. 13.1 The requirement, most fundamental under this section is the presence and framing of a “substantial question of law”. In other words, the existence of such a question is sine qua non for exercise of this jurisdiction. 13.2 The jurisdiction under this section has been described by this Court in Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki (2007) 1 SCC 546 (Two-Judge Bench) stating that post 1976 amendment, the scope of Section 100 CPC stands drastically curtailed and narrowed down to be restrictive in nature. The High Court’s jurisdiction of interfering under Section 100 CPC is only in a case where substantial questions of law are involved, also clearly formulated/set out in the memorandum of appeal. It has been observed that: “At the time of admission of the second appeal, it is the bounden duty and obligation of the High Court to formulate substantial questions of law and then only the High Court is permitted to proceed with the case to decide those questions of law. The language used in the amended section specifically incorporates the words as “substantial question of law” which is indicative of the legislative intention. It must be clearly understood that the legislative intention was very clear that legislature never wanted second appeal to become “third trial on facts” or “one more dice in the gamble”. The effect of the amendment mainly, according to the amended section, was: (i) The High Court would be justified in admitting the second appeal only when a substantial question of law is involved; (ii) The substantial question of law to precisely state such question; (iii) A duty has been cast on the High Court to formulate substantial question of law before hearing the appeal; (iv) Another part of the section is that the appeal shall be heard only on that question.” Gurdev Kaur (supra) was referred to and relied upon in Randhir Kaur v. Prithvi Pal Singh & Ors. (2019) 17 SCC 71 13.3 In Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179 a Bench of three Judges, held as under in regard to what constitutes a substantial question of law:- a) Not previously settled by law of land or a binding precedent. b) Material bearing on the decision of case; and (c) New point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it [2025:RJ-JP:4490] (7 of 8) [CSA-443/2024] goes to the root of the matter. Therefore, it will depend on facts of each case. Such principles stand followed in Government of Kerala v. Joseph 2023 SCC Online SC 961 and Chandrabhan v. Saraswati 2022 SCC Online SC 1273.

16.5 Interference on findings of fact permitted in exceptional cases, i.e., when finding is based on either inadmissible or, no evidence. This Court in Dinesh Kumar v. Yusuf Ali (2010) 12 SCC 740 referring to various other cases held:- a) It is not permissible for High Court to reappreciate evidence as if it was the first appellate court unless findings were perverse. b) Finding of fact can be interfered in exceptional circumstances as rarity, rather than a regularity. c) Scrutiny of evidence in second appeal is not prohibited but has to be exercised upon proper circumspection.

15. In case of Amar Singh Vs. Dalip Singh (2012) 13 SCC 405, Hon’ble Supreme Court explained the purpose of framing question of law in following manner: “a) The purpose of framing of substantial question of law is to give the parties an opportunity to come prepared on that particular question. b) When a substantial question of law is formulated by the Court then the same must be made known to parties and thereafter they have to be given an opportunity to advanced arguments thereon. c) If any additional questions were framed at the time of hearing, the Court must hear the parties on that question as well.”

16. Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Chandrabhan Vs. Saraswati 2022 SCC Online (SC) 1273 (decided on 22.09.2022) has summarised principle relating to Section 100 of CPC in following words:- “(i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof.” [2025:RJ-JP:4490] (8 of 8) [CSA-443/2024]

17. In view of aforementioned, second appeals Nos. 443/2024 and 442/2024 are hereby dismissed.

18. Misc. application, if any, stands disposed of. CHETNA BEHRANI /7-8 (ASHOK KUMAR JAIN),J