R/o Jaichand Ka Bas, Harsuliya, P.s. Phagi, District Jaipur v. Govind Narain Prajapat S/o

Judgment

1. Govind Narain Prajapat S/o Shri Deendayal Prajapat, R/o Plot No. 17, Shankar Vihar Colony, Sanganer, Jaipur (Driver Of Vehicle Pick-Up No. Rj-47-Ga-0527)

2. Rupendra Singh S/o Shri Jaisingh, R/o Village - Palwas, Post - Aakoda, Tehsil - Fulera, District - Jaipur. (Owner Of Vehicle Pick Up No. Rj-47-Ga-0527)

3. Icici Lombard General Insurance Company Limited, Through Manager, Office At - 2Nd Floor, Bhagwati Bhawan, Govt. Hostel Chauraya, M.i. Road, Jaipur. ----Respondents Connected With S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 3373/2022

Sitaram Gurjar Son Of Shri Ranglal Gujar, Aged About 25 Years, Residents Of Dudu Road, Fhagi Kasba, Police Station- Fhagi, District Jaipur. Versus ----Appellant

1. Govind Narain Prajapat Son Of Shri Deendayal Prajapat, Resident Of Plot No. 17, Shankar Vihar Colony, Sanganer, Jaipur. (Driver Of Vehicle Pick Up No. Rj-47-Ga-0527)

2. Rupendra Singh Son Of Shri Jaisingh, Resident Of Village Palwas, Post Aakoda, Tehsil Fulera, District Jaipur. (Owner Of Vehicle Pick Up No. Rj-47-Ga-0527)

3. Icici Lombard General Insurance Company Limited, Through Manager, Office At 2Nd Floor, Bhagwati Bhawan, Govt. Hostel Chauraya, M.i. Road, Jaipur. (Insurer Of Vehicle Pick Up No. Rj-47-Ga-0527) ----Respondents For Appellant(s) : Mr. Vikas Bana for Mr. Nitesh Rawat [2025:RJ-JP:5443] (2 of 7) [CMA-3141/2022] For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK KUMAR JAIN 06/02/2025 Order

1. These two civil misc. appeals were preferred aggrieved from dismissal of motor accidents claim petitions No. 469/2018 (221/2016) and 470/2018 (223/2016) by learned Additional District Judge (MACT), Dudu, District Jaipur.

2. The claimant-injured have filed a claim petition under Sections 166 and 140 of Motor Vehicles Act on 19.12.2016 to claim compensation for alleged accident on 24.11.2016. Learned tribunal after considering the evidence both oral and documentary has opined that there was delay in reporting the matter to police and moreover, the incident was caused by an unknown vehicle and FIR was registered after delay, without explanation about implication of offending vehicle. The Tribunal has found that the vehicle of non-claimants was not involved in the accident and as a result claim petitions were dismissed.

3. Aggrieved from aforesaid, both the claimants injured have preferred civil misc. appeals and Office has pointed out a delay of 729 days in filing the instant misc. appeals and an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is filed.

4. Learned counsel for appellant submits that during period of Covid-19, the claim petition was dismissed and till February, 2022 the period of limitation was exempted, therefore the delay occasioned in filing the misc. appeals is required to be considered liberally. [2025:RJ-JP:5443] (3 of 7) [CMA-3141/2022]

5. Heard learned counsel for appellant-claimants and perused the material placed on record.

6. After dismissal of claim petition on 27.07.2020, instant appeal is preferred on 31.10.2022, the period from 20.03.2020 to February, 2022 is exempted for the purpose of computing limitation to file any appeal or petition. Herein, considering the period already exempted even then this appeal is filed after a delay and an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is filed. In application it was mentioned that Mr. Ramdhan Saran Advocate gave instruction to his Clerk to handover relevant file to Mr. Nitesh Rawat to prepare appeal but the Clerk has forgot to handover the record and ultimately when the counsel realized then they have taken steps. Here, in this case affidavit of Mr. Ramdhan Saran and Clerk of Mr. Ramdhan is not available on record to justify the reasons. It appears that the reasons assigned by the appellant in his application is not sufficient. 7. Section 5 of the Limitation Act prescribes that any appeal or revision or an application may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the petitioner satisfies the Court on sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal or revision or making an application within prescribed period.

8. In case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Katiji AIR 1987 SC 1353, Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the following principles to allow application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act:-

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being [2025:RJ-JP:5443] (4 of 7) [CMA-3141/2022] defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay. every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

9. In case of Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors. 2010 (8) SCC 685, Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering Section 5 of Limitation Act has referred the judgment in the case of Union of India Vs. Ram Charan AIR 1964 SC 215 and observed that the explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of [2025:RJ-JP:5443] (5 of 7) [CMA-3141/2022] delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay. The larger benches as well as equi- benches of Hon’ble Supreme Court have consistently followed these principles and have either allowed or declined to condone the delay in filing such applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay.

10. In the case of Brijesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.: (2014) 13 SCC 291, while referring the judgment of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors.: (2013) 12 SCC 649, Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court further observed that the Court cannot condone the delay, if it is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, and a delay cannot be condoned on sympathetic grounds.

11. Very recently condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act was considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of P. Subba Reddy (died) by LRs. And Ors. Vs. Special Deputy Collector (LA) 2024 INSC 286 wherein also it was held that unless sufficient cause is shown the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act cannot be allowed. The underlying provisions after harmonious construction of provision of law were formulated in following manner:- [2025:RJ-JP:5443] (6 of 7) [CMA-3141/2022] (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the L imitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; liberal (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though justice-oriented approach, approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamount to disregarding the statutory provision.

12. In case of H. Guruswamy & Ors. Vs. A. Krishnaiah Since Deceased by LRs (Civil Appeal no. 317/2025) reported as 2025 INSC 53 Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: “13. We are at our wits end to understand why the High Court overlooked all the aforesaid aspects. What was the good reason for the High Court to ignore all this? Time and again, the Supreme Court has [2025:RJ-JP:5443] (7 of 7) [CMA-3141/2022] reminded the District judiciary as well the High courts that the concepts such as “liberal approach”, “Justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” should not be employed to frustrate or jettison the substantial law of limitation. 17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time.”

13. When we consider the matter on merits for admission then we found that there is a serious doubt on involvement of vehicle and same is further fortified from delay which is recorded by police. The evidence of AW-2 Sitaram and AW-3 Shaitan is not sufficient to prove the incident. The discrepancies and the contradictions in the statement of both the witnesses who were injured in the alleged accident is sufficient to dent their case.

14. Looking to the material on record the case is not fit for admission. In view of aforesaid discussions made hereinabove, the appeal is liable to be dismissed on account of delay and also on merits.

15. As a result, the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act and also both the civil misc. appeals are hereby dismissed with pending application(s), if any. MONU /12-13 (ASHOK KUMAR JAIN),J