Residents Of Rupla Paysa, Old Bayana Bus Stand, Bharatpur v. The State of Rajasthan through Secretary, Urban Development

Judgment

1. The State of Rajasthan through Secretary, Urban Development and Housing Department, Government of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur.

2. Bharatpur Development Authority, Bharatpur through its Secretary, B.D.A. Campus, Bharatpur. Land Acquisition Officer and City Magistrate, Bharatpur. Collector, Bharatpur.

4. Connected With D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1395/2017 ----Respondents Harviri Devi D/o Shri Hukum Singh aged about 52 years, resident of Opposite Bank of Baroda, Station Road, Nai Mandi, Bharatpur. Versus ----Appellant

1. State of Rajasthan through Secretary, Urban Development & Housing Department, Government of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur.

2. Bharatpur Development Authority, Bharatpur through its Secretary, B.D.A. Campus, Bharatpur.

4. Land Acquisition Officer and City Magistrate, Bharatpur. Collector, Bharatpur. ----Respondents [2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (2 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017] D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1396/2017 Rajendra Singh S/o Shri Jai Pal Singh, aged about 62 years, resident of Opposite Bank of Baroda, Station Road, Nai Mandi, Bharatpur. Versus ----Appellant

1. State of Rajasthan through Secretary, Urban Development and Housing Department, Government of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur.

2. Bharatpur Development Authority, Bharatpur through its Secretary, B.D.A. Campus, Bharatpur.

4. Land Acquisition Officer and City Magistrate, Bharatpur. Collector, Bharatpur. D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1408/2017

Suvita Devi D/o Shri Kripal Singh, aged about 67 years, resident of Opposite Bank of Baroda, Station Road, Nai Mandi, Bharatpur. ----Respondents Versus ----Appellant

1. State of Rajasthan through Secretary, Urban Development & Housing Department, Government of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur.

2. Bharatpur Development Authority, Bharatpur through its Secretary, B.D.A. Campus, Bharatpur.

4. Land Acquisition Officer and City Magistrate, Bharatpur. Collector, Bharatpur. D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1409/2017 Phulwar Singh S/o Shri Kedar Singh, aged about 62 years R/o Opposite Bank of Baroda, Station Road, Nai Mandi, Bharatpur. ----Respondents Versus ----Appellant

1. State of Rajasthan through Secretary, Urban Development & Housing Department, Government of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur.

2. Bharatpur Development Authority, Bharatpur through its Secretary, B.D.A. Campus, Bharatpur. [2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (3 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017]

4. Land Acquisition Officer and City Magistrate, Bharatpur. Collector, Bharatpur. D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 1423/2017 Smt. Shakuntala Devi W/o Uma Shankar, resident of Plot No. 394, Krishana Nagar, Bharatpur. ----Respondents Versus ----Appellant

1. State of Rajasthan, through Secretary, Urban Development & Housing Department, Government of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur.

2. Bharatpur Development Authority, Bharatpur through its Secretary, B.D.A. Campus, Bharatpur.

4. Land Acquisition Officer and City Magistrate, Bharatpur. Collector, Bharatpur. D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 1445/2017 Rameshwar Dayal Tiwari Son of Shri Badri Prasad Tiwari, resident of 546, Krishna Nagar, Bharatpur. ----Respondents Versus ----Appellant

1. State of Rajasthan through Secretary, Urban Development & Housing Department, Government Secretariat, Jaipur.

2. Bharatpur Development Authority, Bharatpur through its Secretary, B.D.A. Campus, Bharatpur.

4. The Land Acquisition Officer and City Magistrate, Bharatpur. Collector, Bharatpur. D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 1506/2017 Sanjay Singhal, Advocate Son of Shri Tara Chand Singhal, Advocate, R/o Opposite Govind Niwas, Krishna Nagar, Bharatpur. ----Respondents Versus ----Appellant

1. State of Rajasthan through the Secretary, Department of Urban Development & Housing, Government of Rajasthan, [2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (4 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017] Secretariat, Jaipur.

2. Bharatpur Development Authority, Bharatpur through its Secretary, B.D.A. Campus, Bharatpur.

4. Land Acquisition Officer and City Magistrate, Bharatpur. Collector, Bharatpur. D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 1533/2017 Smt. Nirmala Devi D/o Shri Ram Babu Garg, wife of Tara Chand Singhal R/o Opposite Govind Niwas, Krishna Nagar, Bharatpur. ----Respondents Versus ----Appellant

1. State of Rajasthan through Secretary, Urban Development & Housing Department, Government of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur.

2. Bharatpur Development Authority, Bharatpur through its Secretary, B.D.A. Campus, Bharatpur.

4. Land Acquisition Officer and City Magistrate, Bharatpur. Collector, Bharatpur. ----Respondents For Appellant(s) For Respondent(s) : Mr. Ashok Bansal with Mr. Ayush Bansal Mr. M.C. Taylor Mr. Saket Pareek : Mr. L.L. Gupta with Mr. Tanmay Mathur, Mr. Lakshaya Kumar Sharma, Ms. Vijeta Jain & Ms. Pratibha Sharma HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE INDERJEET SINGH HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA Order RESERVED ON PRONOUNCED ON :: ::

27.05.2025 30.05.2025 (Per Hon. Anand Sharma, J.)

1. This common judgment is being rendered in the above batch of cases, all of which arise out of substantially similar facts and [2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (5 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017] raise common questions of law. In view of the overlapping issues and to avoid repetition, the matters were heard analogously and are being disposed of together by this consolidated judgment.

2. For narrating the factual matrix with the consent of learned counsel for both the parties, the facts stated in D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No.1405/2017 (Sushila Singhal & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.) are being taken into consideration.

3. The petitioners filed writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution of India before the learned Single Judge with a prayer to quash the notification dated 06.09.2006 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter to be referred as, 'the Act of 1894'); notification dated 10.10.2007 under Section 6 and award under Section 11 of the Act of 1894 with the further prayer to direct the respondents not to dispossess the petitioners from their respective piece of land.

4. It has been contended by the petitioners that they own and possess different small plots of land for residential purposes which have been carved out over the agricultural land situated in revenue village Bharatpur Chak No.3. Such plots of land have been purchased by them from 'Khatedar' of the agriculture land.

5. It has further been submitted by the petitioners that earlier in the year 1986, one Scheme No.3 was sought to be framed by the respondent Urban Improvement Trust (hereinafter to be referred as, 'UIT') in the above revenue village, however, the Scheme was dropped vide notification dated 20.04.1993. Again, one new Scheme No.10 was proposed over the said agricultural [2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (6 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017] land, yet for the reasons best known to the respondents such Scheme was again dropped in the year 2002.

6. After dropping the Scheme twice and without preparing a proper Scheme as per law, the State Government issued one notification dated 06.09.2006 under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 whereby total 31.24 hectare land falling in revenue village Bharatpur Chak No.3 was intended to be acquired for "Multipurpose Scheme". Vide aforementioned notification issued by Land Acquisition Officer, UIT was also authorized to undertake the survey of the land sought to be acquired.

7. The said notification under Section 4 was published in Official Gazette on 12.10.2006 and thereafter in two different daily newspapers 'Dainik Bhaskar' and 'Dainik Sandhya Jyoti Darpan' on

18.10.2006 and 21.10.2006 respectively. Substance of the notification under Section 4 was also affixed/pasted at the conspicuous places in the locality on 17.10.2006.

8. The petitioners further submitted that by way of submitting different objections, they objected against the intended acquisition proceedings. However, ignoring the valid and legitimate objections raised by the petitioners and without giving proper opportunity of being heard, the Land Acquisition Officer submitted its report to the State Government on 25.01.2007.

9. The petitioners also submitted that without appreciating the genuineness of public purpose and the objections raised by the petitioners, in quite mechanical manner, the State Government issued declaration dated 10.10.2007 under Section 6 of the Act of

1894. [2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (7 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017]

10. The said declaration dated 10.10.2007 was published in Official Gazette on 25.10.2007 as well as into daily newspapers namely 'Rajasthan Patrika' and 'Dainik Sandhya Jyoti Darpan' on

22.10.2007. Thereafter, in order to give public notice, substance of the declaration under section 6 was also affixed in the locality on 05.08.2008.

11. Further notices dated 08.09.2009 under Section 9 of the Act of 1894 were also issued by the Land Acquisition Officer in order to require the persons interested to file their claim with regard to compensation in lieu of acquisition of land.

12. As per petitioners, thereafter the Land Acquisition Officer passed one undated draft award, which was sent for approval of the State Government vide letter dated 22.10.2009. The State Government accorded its approval of the award on 10.11.2009.

13. It has also been informed by learned counsel for the petitioners that earlier also some of the petitioners challenged the acquisition proceedings by way of filing different writ petitions, yet on account of subsequent developments, the earlier petitions were withdrawn with liberty to file fresh petitions.

14. In the writ petitions before the learned Single Judge, the acquisition proceedings were challenged by the petitioners inter alia on following grounds: – (i) In the notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, purpose of acquisition was not properly disclosed and the term "Multipurpose Scheme" used for showing the purpose of acquisition, was totally vague and not specific. [2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (8 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017] (ii) Despite mandate of the Act of 1894, in violation of Section 5A, opportunity of personal hearing was not provided and the objections raised on behalf of the petitioners have not been considered and decided objectively. (iii) Declaration under Section 6 was published after expiry of more than one year from the date of publication under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, hence the proceedings stood lapsed. (iv) Since notices under Section 9 of the Act of 1894 were not served upon the petitioners, therefore, without following the aforesaid mandatory provision the Land Acquisition Officer could not have proceeded further to pass award. (v) In view of Section 11A of the Act of 1894, award can be passed only within a period of two years from the date of publication of declaration under Section 6, however, in this case, the award has been passed after lapse of prescribed limitation of two years, therefore, the proceedings have lapsed. (vi) In the light of provisions of Section 24(2) of The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter to be referred as, 'the Act of 2013'), the proceedings are deemed to have been lapsed. (vii) On account of non-payment of compensation in lieu of acquisition, the proceedings have vitiated. (viii) Allegations of discrimination have also been levelled by stating that the lands of few land-holders were left from acquisition but the same treatment was not given to the petitioners. [2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (9 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017] (ix) Petitioners have not been allotted equivalent land qua the land sought to be acquired.

15. By pressing the aforementioned grounds, the petitioners prayed to quash the acquisition proceedings and to allow the writ petitions filed by the petitioners.

16. The respondents filed joint reply to the writ petition in which they categorically denied the averments in the writ petition. In the reply to the writ petition, the contentions raised by the petitioners have been countered in following manner by the respondents:- (i) The Writ Petitions filed by the petitioners suffer from the vice of delay and latches, for the reason that the notification under Section 4 was issued on 26.09.2006, followed by declaration under Section 6 dated 10.10.2007 and award under Section 11 of the Act of 1894 was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on

22.10.2009, whereas the above writ petitions have been filed in the year 2012 i.e. almost after three years from the date of passing of award. (ii) Merely, the fact that earlier Schemes framed over the land in question was dropped out on account of some technical reasons would not give rise to the presumption that the land was not required for public purposes. In fact, after dropping the earlier Scheme, the new Scheme has been framed in a better manner by including so many facilities for the welfare of public at large. (iii) It cannot be said that the purpose of acquisition shown in notification dated 26.09.2006 under Section 4, i.e. for "Multipurpose Scheme" was vague or evasive. It has been submitted that the aforesaid term "Multipurpose Scheme" is wide [2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (10 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017] enough to include so many utilities and facilities of public importance. It has been submitted that while issuing the notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, the State Government is not required to disclose its entire Scheme in detail and mere indication of public purpose is required to be given. (iv) The allegation with regard to not providing personal hearing for the objection under Section 5A were emphatically denied and it was submitted that after serving public notices, date of hearing was informed to the persons interested and they were also heard personally. In reply to the Writ Petition, even the details of filing Vakalatnama by the advocate on personal interest and participation in the proceedings have also been given. (v) It has also been submitted that the Land Acquisition Officer has properly considered the objections raised by the persons interested and has given the report in detail. Therefore, the allegations with regard to non-consideration of the objections have also been denied. (vi) It has been submitted in the reply that the last date of publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 was

21.10.2006 and declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 was issued on 10.10.2007 i.e. within a period of one year from the last date of publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, therefore, the objections raised by the petitioner with regard to their being a gap of more than one year between the publication of notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 and issuance of declaration under Section 6 is totally misconceived and against the facts. [2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (11 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017] (vii) It has also been submitted by the respondents that the contention raised by the petitioners with regard to not issuing notice under Section 9 of the Act of 1894 are not correct. In fact, notice under Section 9 of the Act of 1894 was issued on

08.09.2009 and was also served upon the persons interested. (viii) It has also been submitted that even otherwise issuance of notice under Section 9 of the Act of 1894 is directory in nature and merely by raising the grounds of non-issuance of notification under Section 9 of the Act of 1894, the land acquisition proceedings cannot be challenged. (ix) It has also been clarified in the reply that the award was passed on 22.10.2009 by the Land Acquisition Officer and same was approved by the Competent Authority of the State Government on 10.11.2009. Such award was passed within a period of two years from 05.08.2008, which was the last date of publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894, hence it cannot be said that land acquisition proceedings have lapsed in view of the Section 11A of the Act of 1894. (x) It has also been submitted by the respondents that application of Section 24(2) of the Act of the 2013 cannot be pressed into service by the petitioners for the reason that the aofresaid Act of 2013 has come into force w.e.f. 01.01.2014 and the award in question has been passed within a period of five years preceding the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013. (xi) It has also been emphatically denied that the compensation pursuant to land acquisition award has not been paid by the respondents. Respondents clarified that the compensation amount [2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (12 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017] has been paid to the persons interested, who have accepted the award and for the remaining persons, the amount of compensation has been deposited with Competent Authority on

18.11.2015. (xii) It has also been stated in the reply that no discrimination whatsoever has been done with the petitioners. Their land has been chosen for acquisition as per the Scheme and the proceedings have been conducted in accordance with the law. (xiii) It has also been submitted that there is no provision whatsoever for allotting land having equivalent area qua the land sought to be acquired. It has been clarified that as per the Scheme of the State Government, developed land @ 15% or 25% as the case may be, can be allotted to the person who wish to surrender their land. In the instant acquisition proceedings also, so many persons have surrendered their land in order to get developed land as per the Schemes of the State Government and even the reservation letters have also been issued to some of them. (xiv) It has also been indicated that in one of the writ petitions, the petitioner has filed reference petition in order to seek enhancement of compensation, therefore, in such a case writ petition is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. (xv) It has also been submitted on behalf of the respondents that as per the settled proposition of law, writ petition is not maintainable after passing an award. (xvi) It has also been submitted that the respondents have carried out the entire land acquisition proceedings strictly in accordance [2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (13 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017] with the provisions of the Act of 1894 and the petitioners have utterly failed to point out any manifest and illegality in the proceedings, therefore, the writ petitions filed by the petitioners are liable to be dismissed.

17. Learned Single Judge considered the pleadings of the parties, facts of the case, material on record and the law prevailing at the relevant time and ultimately dismissed the writ petitions filed by the petitioners vide judgment dated 10.07.2017.

18. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that while deciding the writ petitions vide judgment dated 10.07.2017, the learned Single Judge could not appreciate the Scheme of the Act of 1894 and the impugned judgment suffers from misappreciation of facts and misconstruction of law.

19. Learned counsel for the appellants would further submit that the Act of 1894 is an expropriatory law and therefore its provisions are to be construed strictly. Even a single non- compliance of expropriatory law would vitiate the entire land acquisition proceedings.

20. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the minimal right prescribed under the Act of 1894 to a person interested is to object against the acquisition proceedings by way of submitting objections under Section 5A. Such objections are required to be considered objectively by the Land Acquisition Officer after giving personal hearing to the objectors, whereas in the instant case neither the personal hearing was given to the appellants-objectors; nor were the objections decided after analyzing the facts stated in the objections by the appellants. [2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (14 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017] Therefore, the provisions of Section 5A of the Act of 1894 have not been followed in its letters and spirit, consequently, the entire land acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed and set aside.

21. Learned counsel for the appellants also submitted that the learned Single Judge could not properly appreciate the grounds raised by the appellants with regard to lapse of proceedings on account of declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 being published by lapse of one year. That apart, it was also not considered in right perspective that the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer was undated and was passed after expiry of mandatory limitation period of two years from the date of publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894.

22. Learned counsel further submitted that the question of non- payment of compensation and deemed lapse of acquisition in view of the Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 has not been decided in correct manner by the learned Single Judge.

23. It has also been submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that although plea of discrimination was raised before the learned Single Judge but no analytical finding had been given over the said issue by the learned Single Judge.

24. At the end, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that appellants are possessing small plots of land, which have been purchased through hard earned money, therefore, the respondents may be restrained from acquiring the land in question and to dispossess them. [2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (15 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017]

25. Learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon the judgments of (i) Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Darius Shapur Chenai & Ors. reported in (2005) 7 SCC 627, (ii) Laxman Lal (Dead) through LRs. & Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported in (2013) 3 SCC 764, (iii) V.K.M. Kattha Industries Private Limited Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. reported in (2013) 9 SCC 338, (iv) Kamal Trading Private Limited (Now known as Manav Investment and Trading Company Limited) Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in (2012) 2 SCC 25, (v) Women's Education Trust & Anr. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. reported in (2013) 8 SCC 99, (vi) J & K Housing Board & Anr. Vs. Kunwar Sanjay Krishan Kaul & Ors. reported in (2011) 10 SCC 714, (vii) Kulsum R. Nadiadwala Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in (2012) 6 SCC 348, (viii) Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti Ltd. & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported in (1993) 2 SCC 662, (ix) State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. Vs. A. Mohammer Yousef & Ors. reported in (1991) 4 SCC 224, (x) Kolkata Municipal Corporation & Anr. Vs. Bimal Kumar Shah & Ors. reported in (2024) 10 SCC 533.

26. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted total 12.55 hectares was included in a declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 issued by the respondents in the instant land acquisition proceedings and subsequently award has been passed and compensation has also been paid to different persons. So far as, appellants are concerned their total land, calculated on the basis of all the above writ petitions, comes to [2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (16 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017] around 1600 sq. yards, which is very small area in comparison to a total land sought to be acquired. The other persons have either accepted the compensation or have surrendered their land in order to claim allotment of developed land pursuant to the Scheme in the State Government. Therefore, in the light of above facts where the persons possessing hardly one percent of the land under acquisition have filed the instant writ petitions, their challenge is liable to be ignored in the interest of public at large.

27. Learned counsel for the respondents has also indicated that the award was passed way back in the year 2009 pursuant to acquisition proceedings initiated in the year 2006. Only on account of challenge raised by the petitioners in the instant writ petitions with regard to their small plots of land, which are falling amidst the Scheme framed by the respondents, the respondents are not in a position to properly carry out their Scheme, which was framed for public purpose.

28. It has been reiterated by the learned counsel for the respondents that as the writ petitions were filed in the year 2012 i.e. much after passing of the award, hence, no interference is warranted only on account of delay and latches in the instant matter.

29. As regards, ground raised by the appellant that opportunity of personal hearing was not given, it was seriously objected by the learned counsel for the respondents by submitting that such ground is totally misleading the against the record. By citing the example of the lead case of Sushila Singhal & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.9100/2012, it has [2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (17 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017] been submitted that notice for personal hearing on objection was issued by the Land Acquisition Officer on 08.12.2006, which was dispatched from the dispatch register having entries from serial No.221 to 270 and same was delivered to the appellant herself on

13.12.2006. It has also been submitted that even original record was placed before the learned Single Judge and after examining the same it has been observed by the learned Single Judge that even the advocate has appeared on behalf of the appellants before the Land Acquisition Officer during hearing under Section 5A. Relevant observations made by learned Single Judge in this regard are being reproduced hereunder:- "The other petitioners submitted objections under Section 5A of the Act of 1894 and orally alleged denial of opportunity of personal hearing. It is without making specific pleading that the notice for hearing was not served. The petitioners have concealed the fact about the notice of hearing given to them. The notice for hearing was issued by the Land Acquisition Officer on 8th December, 2006 to those, who raised the objections under Section 5A of the Act of 1894. The petitioners later on filed affidavit to indicate that service of notice was not made in person and, otherwise, they were not knowing English thus even signatures are forged. An additional affidavit was also filed on 27th January, 2017 along with exhibit A/1 to show that no notice for hearing was given. The reply filed by the respondents along with an affidavit shows that the objections were submitted on behalf of Mr. Sanjay Singhal through his Advocate, who was none else but his father Tarachand Singhal. The notice for hearing was also given to his mother Nirmla Devi and was received by the family members. In the other writ petition/s also, the fact pertaining to the issuance of notice has been narrated and, therein also, the Advocate put in appearance for hearing. The copy of "Vakalatnama" has been enclosed to show appearance of the representative. A copy of [2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (18 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017] the dispatch register has been filed by Mr. Kishan Singh Verma on the direction of this Court. It is to show issuance of the notice. The respondents earlier submitted documents along with the reply to show representation of the parties. It is to show an opportunity of hearing. The reply to the writ petition/s makes a reference of service of notice on the Khatedar and has not been disputed by the petitioners while filing rejoinder. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the objections were of no substance as it was nothing but narration of the fact about conversion of the land and permission to raise construction, etc. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. An argument in reference to Section 5A of the Act of 1894 has been raised. The argument for it would not be available to those, who failed to submit objections. It is in view of the catena of judgments referred by the respondents. The issue now remains for those, who raised objections under Section 5A of the Act of 1894. It is alleged that the opportunity of hearing was not given. The documents and the pleadings of both the parties have been perused. In the writ petition/s, initially a specific allegation was not made about denial of the hearing in absence of service of notice. The affidavits were submitted subsequently. The respondents have shown appearance of the Advocates to represent the parties. The perusal of the record shows that the Advocates have appeared on behalf of the parties, which cannot be in absence of notice. Once an Advocate or the party put in appearance then requirement of personal hearing gets satisfied. As per the direction of this Court, the respondents have produced the dispatch register and other documents to show dispatch of the notices for hearing and appearance thereupon through the Advocates, for which, a "Vakalatnama" was filed before the Land Acquisition Officer. In the circumstances aforesaid, I am unable to accept that an opportunity of personal hearing was not given to those, who have raised objections under Section 5A of the Act of 1894. Thus, the second ground raised by the petitioners is decided against [2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (19 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017] the petitioners and in favour of the respondents."

30. It has also been submitted that the report under Section 5A submitted by the land acquisition on 25.01.2007 is explicitly clear, which shows that the objections raised by every objector have been considered and decided by the Land Acquisition Officer by giving specific findings. Hence, the ground regarding violating the provisions of Section 5A of the Act of 1894 is not tenable in the eye of law.

31. It has been submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that from the facts admitted by the appellants in memo of writ petition, it would reveal that declaration under Section 6 was issued within a period of one year from last date of publication of Section 4, hence, no question of lapse of proceedings can arise on that ground. Similarly, award under Section 11 has been passed and approved within a period of two years from the last date of publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894, hence, provisions of Section 11A for the purpose of lapse of proceedings are also not attracted in the instant case.

32. It has been submitted that the other grounds with regard to deem lapse of the proceedings under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 are inconceivable in view of specific provisions of the Act of

33. It has been emphasized by learned counsel for the appellant that no discrimination whatsoever has been caused while carrying out the acquisition proceedings and the grounds raised in this regard are totally vague, unfounded and misconceived. [2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (20 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017]

34. In the light of importance of the Scheme for the residents of Bharatpur, in larger public interest, learned counsel for the respondents has prayed for rejecting the present special appeals.

35. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the judgments of (i) Aflatoon Vs. L.T. Governor reported in 1975 (4) SCC 285, (ii) Smt. Ratni Devi Vs. Chief Commissioner reported in AIR 1975 SC 1699, (iii) Sooraram Pratap Reddy Vs. District Collector reported in 2008 (9) SCC 552, (iv) State of Tamilnadu Vs. L. Krishnan reported in AIR 1996 SC 497, (v) Ajay Kishan Singhal Vs. UOI reported in AIR 1996 SC 2677, (vi) Nand Kishore Gupta & Ors. Vs. State of UP & Ors. reported in AIR 2010 SC 3654, (vii) Jawahar Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. in D.B. SAW No.1283/2014, (viii) State of Haryana Vs. Eros City Developrs Pvt. Ltd. reported in AIR 2016 SC 451, (ix) Abhey Ram Vs. UOI reported in AIR 1997 SC 2564, (x) Delhi Administration Vs. Gurdeen reported in AIR 1999 SC 3822.

36. We have considered the material on record and heard rival contentions raised at Bar by both the parties.

37. We have examined the proceedings of acquisition with regard to land in question, which reveal that notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 was initially issued on 06.09.2006. As per mandatory requirement of Section 4, such notification was published in Official Gazette as well as in two newspapers in vernacular language having circulation in the locality and substance of notification was also affixed at conspicuous place in the locality. Hence, in view of the provisions of Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894, the last mode of publication of notification under [2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (21 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017] Section 4 would be considered as "date of publication" of Section 4 for the purpose of calculating the limitation of one year in order to ascertain time gap between the notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6.

38. Provisions of Section 6 of the Act of 1894 were also followed by the respondents by way of issuing declaration under Section 6 on 10.10.2007, which was published in Official Gazette and later on in two newspapers. Therefore, substance of declaration was also affixed in the locality on 05.08.2008.

39. As per proviso appended of Section 6(1) for the purpose of ascertaining the gap of one year, last date of publication of notification under Section 4, whereas initial date of issuance of declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 are relevant. In the instant case, as observed hereinabove, the last date of publication of notification under Section 4 was 21.10.2006 and since the declaration under Section 6 was issued on 10.10.2007, it can safely be held that the declaration under Section 6 was issued within the prescribed time limit provided under proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act of the 1894. Hence, the ground raised by the appellants in this regard is not sustained in the eye of law.

40. In the case of SH Rangappa Vs. State of Karnataka & Anr. (2002) 1 SCC 538 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:- It is pertinent to note that sub-section "9. (2) of Section 6 does not prescribe any time limit within which the declaration made under Section 6(1) is to be published. It is well known that after an order or declaration is made there can be a time gap between the making of the order or a declaration and its publication in the Official Gazette. Whereas the time limit for the making of an order is [2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (22 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017] provided under Section 6(1), the legislature advisedly did not provide for any time limit in respect of the steps required to be taken under sub-section (2) of Section 6. If the contention of Mr. G.L. Sanghi, the learned senior counsel for the appellant is correct, the effect would be that not only the declaration would have to be published within the time prescribed under the proviso to Section 6(1) but all other steps, like publication in the daily newspaper and the Collector causing public notice of the declaration to be given at a convenient places in the locality, must also be completed within a period of one year of Section 4 notification. This could certainly not be a consequence contemplated by the legislature. As already observed, the purpose of Section 6 notification being no give a final declaration with regard to the need of the land for public purpose, the interest of the land owners was sufficiently safeguarded with the requirement of the making of the declaration under Section 6(1) within a prescribed period. It is difficult for us to read into sub-section (2) the provisions of the proviso to Section 6(1) which relate to the time limit for issuance of the notification under Section 6(1). 12. Mr. Sanghi also drew our attention to the observations of this Court in Sanjeeva Nagar Medical and Health Employees Co-operative Housing Society VS. Mohd. Abdul Bawahab MANU/SC/0919/1996:[1996]2SCR308. While referring to the various provision of the Act at page 606, it was observed that "the declaration should be within one year." Mr. Sanghi contends that this is a decision of three judges which we should follows. We are unable to accept this for the reason that what arose for consideration before the Court in Senjeeva Nagar's case was the provision of Section 4 as amended by the State of A.P. which fixed time limit of 40 days for giving public notice on the substance of a notification under Section, 4(1). The Court was called upon in that case to consider whether a declaration under Section 6(1) was required to be published in a Gazette within one year of the publication of Section 4 Notification. Therefore, the aforesaid observation is only an obiter and contrary to the decision of this Court of a larger Bench in Khadim Hussain's case which decision has neither been referred [2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (23 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017] to in the Senjeeva Nagar's case or in the Krishi Utpadhan Mandi's case and in Eugenia's case."

41. In the same string, we have also examined the ground of alleged lapse of acquisition proceedings under Section 11A of the Act of 1894 raised by the appellants. We find that last date of publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 is

05.08.2008, which is affixation of substance of declaration in the locality. In order to save the proceedings from being lapsed, the Land Acquisition Officer was required to pass the award under Section 11 of the Act of 1894, within a period of two years from the aforesaid last date of publication of declaration under Section 6 of the Act of 1894.

42. It is a matter of record that the draft award was prepared by the Land Acquisition Officer and sent for approval of the appropriate Government vide letter dated 22.10.2009 and thereafter approval was granted on 10.11.2009. Both the aforesaid dates fall within the period of two years from the last date of publication of declaration (i.e. 05.08.2008) under Section 6 of the Act of 1894. Hence, in view of above, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that provisions of Section 11A would come into force and hence, the acquisition proceedings have not lapsed on that ground.

43. In view of the detailed factual aspect given in reply and the observations made by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment would make it clear that personal notices under Section 5A of the Act of 1894 were duly issued and received by the appellants. Appellants were also duly represented by their counsels before the Land Acquisition Officer. Hence, the ground [2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (24 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017] with regard to non-compliance of provision with regard to personal hearing under Section 5A of the Act of 1894 is totally baseless, unfounded and against the record.

44. Bare perusal of the inquiry report dated 25.01.2007 submitted by Land Acquisition Officer under Section 5A of the Act of 1894 would also make it clear that the objections raised by the objectors were duly considered by the Land Acquisition Officer. In fact, the learned counsel for the appellants have utterly failed to point our any legitimate objection raised by the appellants in order to render the acquisition proceedings in valid or illegal. No procedural defect or violation of Principles of Natural Justice was alleged in the objections. Hence, the Land Acquisition Officer has committed no mistake whatsoever in rejecting their objections and in making recommendation to the appropriate Government for proceeding further with the acquisition of the land in question.

45. Since compensation pursuant to aforesaid land acquisition proceedings has either been paid in monetary terms to the persons interested or request made by them to allot developed land in lieu of acquired land has been accepted by the respondents and for remaining, the amount of compensation has been deposited with the Competent Authority, we find that neither the provisions of the Act of 1894 nor of Article 300A of the Constitution of India have been violated by the respondents in carrying out the acquisition proceedings.

46. As regards the application for Section 24(2) of new Acquisition Act of 2013, it is suffice to say that the provisions are abundantly clear. Such provision is applicable only in those cases where the award was passed at least five years prior to date of [2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (25 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017] enforcement of Act of 2013, which is 01.01.2014. Thus provisions of Section 24(2) are applicable only in respect of awards which have been passed prior to 01.01.2009. In the instant, since the award was passed on 22.10.2009 approved on 10.11.2009, therefore, there is no question of applicability of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.

47. So far as allegations of discrimination raised by the appellants is concerned, it is observed that for establishing such allegation the appellants are required to lay proper factual foundation. However, no sufficient facts have been given by the appellants in this regard. Hence, there was no occasion to accept the plea raised by the appellants.

48. One of the submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants was that since notice under Section 9 of the Act of 1894 was not issued or served prior to passing of award, therefore, only on that ground that proceedings can be rendered illegal and can also be quashed.

49. In this regard apart from the denial of this fact by the respondents, it is sufficient to observe that even otherwise the provisions of Section 9 of the Act of 1894 are directory and not mandatory in nature, hence, non-compliance thereof would not render the acquisition proceedings as illegal. In this regard it would be relevant to refer the judgment of May George Vs. Tahsildar reported in (2010) 13 SCC 198 where after examining the provisions of Section 9 qua the Scheme of Land Acquisition Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- [2025:RJ-JP:22340-DB] (26 of 30) [SAW-1405/2017]