State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp v. Smt. Khushboo Sharma W/o Shri Surendra, Aged About

Judgment

2. State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp Versus Smt. Khushboo Sharma W/o Shri Surendra, Aged About 28 Years, R/o Bhapar, Police Station Surajgarh, District Jhunjhunu. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Ashvin Garg For Respondent(s) : Mr. N. S. Dhakar, PP Mr. Ankur Singh Tomar for Mr. Manish Kumar Saini for accused respondent Mr. Sukhdev Singh SI PS Malsisar, Jhunjhunu HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR UPMAN O R D E R DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT: 12/03/2025

1. By way of this application under Section 439 (2) Cr.P.C., the petitioner-complainant has approached this Court seeking cancellation of bail granted to accused respondent No.2 by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Chirawa District Jhunjhunu vide order dated

29.08.2024 passed in Misc. Criminal (Bail) Application No.199/2024.

2. The petitioner-complainant submitted a written report at police station Surajgarh inter alia alleging that his grandson Arun Kumar, presently employed in Indian Army, came to home at Village Kumharo Ka Baas on leaves. On 17.08.2024 at 04:45 AM, he went for cycling to Village Bhapar. His grandson made a call to [2025:RJ-JP:10092] (2 of 12) [CRLBC-143/2024] his uncle Rajender and informed him that someone had thrown some inflammable thing on his face. On receiving such information, Rajendra and Mahendra went to him and took him to the Government Hospital at Chirawa, from where he was referred to Jhunjhunu. It is also alleged that on 04:23 AM, Khushboo Sharma, resident of Village Bhapar made 3-4 calls from a mobile (No.7042909533) on the mobile of his grandson. On the basis of

the written report, police registered FIR No.249/2024 for offences under Sections 124(1) BNS, 2023.

3. During investigation, on 19.08.2024, the accused respondent No.2 was arrested on 19.08.2024. Thereafter, she moved a bail application before learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Chirawa District Jhunjhunu which was allowed vide order dated 29.08.2024. Being dissatisfied with the release of the petitioner on bail, this bail cancellation application has been filed.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner complainant submits that looking to the gravity of the offence and seriousness of the allegations levelled against the accused respondent, she did not deserve indulgence of bail. During investigation, offences under Sections 118 (2), 124 (1) of BNS have been found proved. He contends that Section 124(1) of BNS deals with ‘causing grievous hurt by using acid or other means and same is punishable for a minimum of 10 years and up to life, along with fine whereas Section 118 (2) of BNS deals with causing grievous hurt using dangerous weapons or harmful method. The accused respondent has thrown acid on the face of the victim due to which, he received grievous injuries on his face and eyes and as a result of which, till date he is undergoing treatment in Army Hospital. The [2025:RJ-JP:10092] (3 of 12) [CRLBC-143/2024] accused respondent is an habitual offender as apart from the present FIR, two other FIRs for offences punishable under Sections 341, 323, 379, 506 IPC have been registered at Surajgarh police station, which are pending trial. Learned counsel submits that the conduct of the accused respondent shows that she is not a law abiding citizen and has no fear of law.

5. Learned counsel submits that in the order dated 29.08.2024, which is under challenge, it has been observed in para no.7 that there is no call details available on record, which shows that at 04:23 AM, Khushboo Sharma, accused respondent, made 3-4 calls to the victim on his mobile number 8306542939 by her mobile number 7042909533. In this regard, call details of the aforesaid mobile number from 01.08.2024 to 19.08.2024 are submitted on record, as per which calls were exchanged between these mobile numbers. Learned counsel argues that during investigation, it has come out that the injured and the accused respondents were in relationship. However, the injured came in contact with other girl and he broke up relationship, which was not acceptable to the accused respondent and being enraged and annoyed with this breakup, in order to take revenge and teach lesson to the injured, she threw acid on his face. In pursuance of the information provided by the accused respondent under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, steel glass which was used in commission of the offence has been recovered. The injured in his parcha-bayan clearly named the accused respondent. On these grounds, learned counsel prays for acceptance of this bail cancellation application.

6. Separate replies to the bail cancellation application have been filed on behalf of respondent No.1 State of Rajasthan and [2025:RJ-JP:10092] (4 of 12) [CRLBC-143/2024] accused respondent. Learned counsel for the accused respondent no.2 opposes the submissions made by counsel for the petitioner/complainant. He submits that there is no ground for cancellation of bail, granted to the accused respondent No.2. He also submits that the accused respondent is a mother of 14 months old baby, who cannot live without his mother. He submits that looking the facts and circumstances of the case in totality; considering the period of custody and conclusion of investigation and trial would take time as also the fact that the accused respondent is not named in the FIR, the accused respondent No.2 was granted benefit of bail. It is also contended that bail once granted cannot be cancelled until there are supervening circumstances and in the present case there are no such circumstances that require setting aside of the impugned order. The accused respondent upon her release on bail, has not misused the liberty of bail and is regularly abiding the conditions imposed upon her. learned counsel for the respondents supported the impugned order and requested that the present application be dismissed. He thus, craves dismissal of this bail cancellation application.

8. Heard. Perused the material available on record. First of all, this Court is conscious of the fact that there involves heinous offence of acid attack in the instant case. The allegation against the accused respondent is that being enraged and annoyed with the injured/victim due to break up of the relationship, she threw acid on his face. In pursuance of information provided by her under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the steel glass used in the commission of offence has already been [2025:RJ-JP:10092] (5 of 12) [CRLBC-143/2024] recovered. The injured in his parcha bayan has clearly named the accused respondent. During investigation, offences under Sections 124 (1) and 118 (2) BNS, 2023 have also been found proved and investigation is still going on. The injured is presently admitted in Military Hospital, Delhi and his detailed statement under Section 180 BNSS is yet to be recorded. As per the MLC report prepared at Military Hospital, Jaipur, it was an acid attack case in which, affected Body Surface Area (BSA) is 36%. Thus, from the material available on record, it is apparent that the present case involves a very heinous offence and the accused respondent has been granted benefit of bail within a very short duration of ten days from the date of alleged incident. Though the accused respondent is mother of 14 months old baby and this can be one of the consideration for granting bail to her but such ground is not sufficient enough to overlook or ignore seriousness of the allegations attributed to her and gravity of alleged offence, involved in the instant case.

9. Acid attack is a heinous offence in which, the victim suffers immense trauma both physically and mentally. In an acid attack, acid is thrown over someone’s face in order to cause a burn on the face. This is because the face is the part of the body that is usually not covered. Most of the time, the motive behind throwing acid is to torture, disfigure or kill the victim. In such cases, recovery of the patient is always very difficult. Women make up the vast majority of acid attack victims. But in the case at hand, surprisingly, it is a man who has suffered such attack. The call details of mobile numbers of the accused and the victim show that calls were exchanged between them. Two other cases involving [2025:RJ-JP:10092] (6 of 12) [CRLBC-143/2024] offences punishable under Sections 341, 323, 379 & 506 IPC have also been registered against her. The learned Sessions Judge, ought to have considered the gravity of offence and seriousness of allegations attributed to her, while granting bail to the accused respondent more particularly when investigation is still going on and victim has suffered 36% BSA and he is still hospitalized.

10. Law is well settled that while considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail.

11. In the case of Manik Madhukar Sarve & Ors. versus Vitthal Damuji Meher & Ors. reported in (2024) 10 SCC 753, Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under:- “19. Courts while granting bail are required to consider relevant factors such as nature of the accusation, role ascribed to the accused concerned, possibilities/chances of tampering with the evidence and/or witnesses, antecedents, flight risk et al. Speaking through Hima Kohli, J., the present coram in Ajwar v Waseem, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, apropos relevant parameters for granting bail, observed: [2025:RJ-JP:10092] (7 of 12) [CRLBC-143/2024] “26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. (Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P.3 ; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav (supra)4 ; Masroor v. State of Uttar Pradesh5 ; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee6 ; Neeru Yadav v. State oUttar Pradesh7 ; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)8 ; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar @ Polia (supra)9 .

27. It is equally well settled that bail once granted, ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is always open to interference by the superior Court. If there are serious allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by a superior Court if it transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material available on record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on the society resulting in such an order. In P v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra)10 decided by a three judges bench of this Court [authored by one of us (Hima Kohli, J)] has spelt out the considerations that must weigh with the Court for interfering in an order granting bail to an accused under Section 439(1)of the CrPC in the following words: “24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancelling bail once granted, the court must consider whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant of bail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to permit him to [2025:RJ-JP:10092] (8 of 12) [CRLBC-143/2024] retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 237]. To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by the court below granting bail but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the appellate court.” (emphasis supplied)

20. In State of Haryana v Dharamraj, 2023 SCC OnLine 1085, speaking through one of us (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.), the Court, while setting aside an order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court granting (anticipatory) bail, discussed and reasoned: “7. A foray, albeit brief, into relevant precedents is warranted. This Court considered the factors to guide grant of bail in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598and Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496, the relevant principles were restated thus: ‘9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; [2025:RJ-JP:10092] (9 of 12) [CRLBC-143/2024] (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.’

8. In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar alias Polia, (2020) 2 SCC 118, this Court opined as under: ‘16. The considerations that guide the power of an appellate court in assessing the correctness of an order granting bail stand on a different footing from an assessment of an application for the cancellation of bail. The correctness of an order granting bail is tested on the anvil of whether there was an improper or arbitrary exercise of the discretion in the grant of bail. The test is whether the order granting bail is perverse, illegal or unjustified. On the other hand, an application for cancellation of bail is generally examined on the anvil of the existence of supervening circumstances or violations of the conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has been granted. …’

9. In Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip Kumar @ Deepu @ Depak, 2023 INSC 761, this Court, in view of Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349; Kashmira Singh v. Duman Singh, (1996) 4 SCC 693 and X v. State of Telangana, (2018) 16 SCC 511, held as follows: ‘13. It is also required to be borne in mind that when a prayer is made for the cancellation of grant of bail cogent and overwhelming circumstances must be present and bail once granted cannot be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it in conducing to allow fair trial. This proposition draws support from the Judgment of this Court in Daulat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349, Kashmira Singh v. Duman Singh (1996) 4 SCC 693 and XXX v. State of Telangana (2018) 16 SCC 511.’

10. In XXX v. Union Territory of Andaman & Nicobar Islands, 2023 INSC 767, this Court noted that the principles in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar (supra) stood reiterated in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321. [2025:RJ-JP:10092] (10 of 12) [CRLBC-143/2024]

11. The contours of anticipatory bail have been elaborately dealt with by 5-Judge Benches in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 and Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1. Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 is worthy of mention in this context, despite its partial overruling in Sushila Aggarwal (supra). We are cognizant that liberty is not to be interfered with easily. More so, when an order of pre-arrest bail already stands granted by the High Court.

12. Yet, much like bail, the grant of anticipatory bail is to be exercised with judicial discretion. The factors illustrated by this Court through its pronouncements are illustrative, and not exhaustive. Undoubtedly, the fate of each case turns on its own facts and merits.” (emphasis supplied)

21. In Ajwar (supra), this Court also examined the considerations for setting aside bail orders in terms below: “28. The considerations that weigh with the appellate Court for setting aside the bail order on an application being moved by the aggrieved party include any supervening circumstances that may have occurred after granting relief to the accused, the conduct of the accused while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to procrastinate, resulting in delaying the trial, any instance of threats being extended to the witnesses while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to tamper with the evidence in any manner. We may add that this list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. However, the court must be cautious that at the stage of granting bail, only a prima facie case needs to be examined and detailed reasons relating to the merits of the case that may cause prejudice to the accused, ought to be avoided. Suffice it is to state that the bail order should reveal the factors that have been considered by the Court for granting relief to the accused.

29. In Jagjeet Singh (supra), a three-Judges bench of this Court, has observed that the power to grant bail under Section 439 Cr. P.C. is of wide amplitude and the High Court or a Sessions Court, as the case may be, is bestowed with considerable discretion while deciding an application for bail. [2025:RJ-JP:10092] (11 of 12) [CRLBC-143/2024] But this discretion is not unfettered. The order passed must reflect due application of judicial mind following well established principles of law. In ordinary course, courts would be slow to interfere with the order where bail has been granted by the courts below. But if it is found that such an order is illegal or perverse or based upon utterly irrelevant material, the appellate Court would be well within its power to set aside and cancel the bail. (Also refer: Puran v. Ram Bilas12; Narendra K. Amin (Dr.) v. State of Gujarat13)” (emphasis supplied)

12. In the case of Ajwar Versus Waseem & Anr., reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC974, it has been held as under:- “27. It is equally well settled that bail once granted, ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is always open to interference by the superior Court. If there are serious allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by a superior Court if it transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material available on record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on the society resulting in such an order. In P v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another(supra) decided by a three judges bench of this Court [authored by one of us (Hima Kohli, J)] has spelt out the considerations that must weigh with the Court for interfering in an order granting bail to an accused under Section 439(1) of the CrPC in the following words. “24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancelling bail once granted, the court must consider whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant of bail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to permit him to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 237] . To put it differently, in ordinary [2025:RJ-JP:10092] (12 of 12) [CRLBC-143/2024] circumstances, this Court would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by the court below granting bail but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the appellate court.”

13. In view of above and having regard to the totality of facts and circumstances of the case and considering the submissions advanced by learned counsel for both the sides and perusing the material available on record, I am of the considered opinion that the exercise of discretion by the learned Sessions Judge in the impugned order granting bail to the accused respondent cannot be sustained and deserves reversal.

14. Accordingly, the bail cancellation application succeeds. The impugned order dated 29.08.2024 stands set aside. The accused- Respondent No.2 Smt. Khushboo Sharma W/o Shri Surendra is directed to surrender on or before 28.03.2025 before the trial court. In case, the accused respondent fails to surrender within the given time, the trial Court is directed to take steps to ensure her arrest in accordance with law. Considering the fact that the accused respondent is a lady and is a mother of 14 months old baby, she would be at liberty to file fresh bail application after submission of result of investigation in the court concerned and same shall be decided in accordance with law without being influenced by any observation made herein.

15. The observations made hereinabove are only for decision of this bail cancellation application and shall not prejudice trial in any manner. LALIT MOHAN /752 (ANIL KUMAR UPMAN),J