Jaipur, Rajasthan. vs Yojana Jagatpura, Jaipur.

Judgment

1. By filing the instant miscellaneous appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 (R) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiffs- [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (2 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024] appellants-applicants (for short 'the appellants') have challenged the order dated 30.08.2024 passed by the Court of learned Additional District Judge No.10, Jaipur Metropolitan-I (Headquarter Sanganer) (for short 'the court below') in temporary injunction Application No.36/2020, titled as M/s Surgitech Partnership Firm & Anr. vs. Nanagram & Ors., whereby the court below dismissed the application for temporary injunction filed by the appellants.

2. The facts borne out from the pleadings are that the plaintiffs/appellants on 27.07.2020 filed a suit for specific performance, permanent injunction and declaration against the defendants No.1 to 3 on the basis of agreement to sale dated 11th July, 2019 executed by the defendant No.1 in favour of both the plaintiffs. The defendant No.1 agreed to sale the developed land for which process of allotment in lieu of acquired land was pending before the Jaipur Development Authority. The plaintiffs sought a relief of specific performance on the basis of aforesaid agreement dated 11th July, 2019 executed in their favour and sought a consequential injunction. The plaintiffs along with the suit filed an original agreement dated 11th July, 2019 and also submitted a copy of registration certificate of plaintiff No.1 firm which was registered as per the provisions of Partnership Act, 1932 (for short 'the Act of 1932') on 18th July, 2020 and also submitted a partnership deed. A bare perusal of the registration certificate reveals that partnership firm was in existence since 13.12.2013, though [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (3 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024] registered on 18th July, 2020 as per the provisions of the Act of

3. In the said suit the defendant No.1 as well as the defendant Nos.2 & 3 filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC for rejection of plaint on 04.09.2020. However, the learned court below vide order dated 6th April, 2022 dismissed the said application.

The defendant No.1 preferred a revision petition before this High Court which was registered as S.B. Civil Revision Petition No.86/2020 and the High Court dismissed the said revision petition vide order dated 09.01.2023. The defendant No.1 filed a written statement of denial, however, it was admitted by the defendant No.1 that on 24th June, 2020 the Power of Attorney executed in favour of Rambabu Gupta, husband of plaintiff No.2, was cancelled. Besides, the defendant No.1 did not dispute that the land is going to be allotted to him in view of acquisition of land. The defendant Nos.2 & 3 also filed written statement of denial wherein it has been mentioned that defendant No.1 Nanagram has submitted a surrender deed for allotment of 25% land. However, it was admitted that he is entitled for 20% residential land measuring 6440 sqm. and 5% commercial land i.e. 1610 sqm. and process for allotment is pending. During the pendency of the suit, the defendant No.4 Shanti Vihar Vikas Samiti moved an application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC for impleadment of party and the application filed by it was allowed vide order dated 13.01.2021. However, the present [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (4 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024] applicant filed writ petition before the High Court challenging the order dated 13.01.2021 by filing SBCWP No.3790/2021 and the High Court vide order dated 25.03.2021 stayed the operation of the order dated 31.01.2021. In the application for temporary injunction the plaintiffs sought relief against the defendant No.1 in regard not to sale or transfer the land to be allotted to him and not to create any lien therein and the defendant Nos.2 & 3 may be restrained not to transfer the land in favour of any one else or do any act which is prejudice to plaintiff applicant. The aforesaid temporary injunction application filed by the plaintiff applicant was registered as TI Application No.36/2020 and the Court below vide order dated

05.08.2020 was pleased to pass the order to maintain status quo. The defendant Nos.2 & 3 submitted application under Section 151 CPC for vacation of the ad interim order dated

05.08.2020 but this Court vide order dated 25.04.2023 dismissed the application and posted the matter for awaiting order and the High Court in relation to writ petition of impleadment posted the matter for arguments of temporary injunction application. However on 21.04.2022, the counsel for the defendant submitted the order dated 09.01.2023 whereby the revision petition filed by the defendant No.1 was dismissed by this Court and persuaded the Court to decide the TI Application.

4. The learned court below after hearing the counsels appearing for the respective parties, dismissed the application for temporary injunction filed by the plaintiffs. [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (5 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024]

5. Mr. N.K. Maloo, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. L.L. Gupta, Mr. Prateek Madnani, Mr. Lakshaya K. Sharma & Mr. Harsh Pratap Singh appearing for the appellants submitted that the impugned order dated 30.08.2024 passed by the learned Court below is against the facts available on record and law applicable. Senior Advocate further submitted that the Court below has seriously erred in passing the impugned order dated

30.08.2024 and erred in rejecting the temporary injunction application much being influenced with the fact that defendant no. 1 is Member of Scheduled Caste and relying upon judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court delivered in the case of Pink City Grah Nirman Sahakari Samity overlooking the important fact that so far as maintainability of suit is not concerned, application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC was rejected by the Court below vide order dated

06.04.2022 and even revision petition was dismissed by the Court vide order dated 09.01.2023 repelling all the contentions in this regard. Once the court below has rejected the application filed under order 7 rule 11 and suit was found not barred under any of the provision, the court below could not have taken into consideration any fact that suit is not tenable. Even otherwise, maintainability of the suit is not at all to be considered while deciding the temporary injunction application. Senior Advocate further submitted that the Court below has seriously erred in passing the impugned order dated

30.08.2024 and erred in rejecting the temporary injunction application overlooking the fact that while deciding the point of prima facie case it is required to be looked into whether a Triable [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (6 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024] issue exists or not. As a matter of fact holding a mini trial that plaintiff would not succeed in the case on the alleged ground, could not have done at this stage. As such, rejection of the temporary injunction application on the basis of surmise and conjecture is illegal. Senior Advocate also submitted that the learned Court below has seriously erred in passing the impugned order dated

30.08.2024 and erred in entertaining the objection of the defendant Nos.2 & 3 that suit is barred by section 63 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short 'the Act of 2013') overlooking the order dated 06.04.2022 passed by the court below whereby the application filed by the defendant under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC on the same ground was dismissed by the court below. The said order was not challenged by the defendant Nos.2 & 3 which resulted into attaining of finality and therefore the objection and suit was not maintainable in view of the aforesaid provisions, could not have at all been considered for rejection of the temporary injunction application. Even otherwise the said objection was baseless as suit was not in relation to acquired land but related to the land allotted in lieu there of. As such, the reasoning assigned by the Court below is per se illegal. Senior Advocate further submitted that even otherwise the learned court below has seriously erred in rejecting the said claim overlooking the important fact that no relief was sought by the plaintiff with regard to acquired land. The relief was sought only with regard to the land which was going to be allotted in view [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (7 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024] of the decision of the Jaipur Development Authority. Admittedly, as per reply of the defendant Nos.2 & 3 a decision was taken to allot 25% land to the defendant No.1 and he was entitled for allotment of the land agreed to be purchased by the plaintiff and application was kept pending. As such, the aforesaid provisions could not have been considered while dismissing the temporary injunction application. He also stated that the developed land has been now allotted to the defendant No.1 by order dated 18.10.2024 filed with application (No.1/2025) under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. Senior Advocate also submitted that the court below has seriously erred in passing the impugned order dated

30.08.2024 on the ground that agreement with regard to future incident is void and no specific performance thereof can be made. The aforesaid reasoning assigned by the Court below is per se illegal. As a matter of fact, the reply of the respondent Nos.2 & 3 is concerned, it itself reveals that as per para No.3 thereof the defendant No.1 has already submitted an application for issuance of reservation letter as per section 44 of the JDA Act and he is entitled for allotment of 20% residential land measuring 6440 sqm. and 1600 sqm. and allotment is to be made but due to objection submitted by the Society and Vikas Samiti the proceeding is to be undertaken. Even otherwise, the State Government in exercise of its statutory power issued various Notifications whereunder even subsequent purchaser can get land allotted. Senior Advocate further submitted that the Court below has seriously erred in passing the impugned order dated [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (8 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024]

30.08.2024 by making observations that the application is premature. As a matter of fact as per statutory Notification issued by the State Government even the purchaser has got a right of allotment in view of acquired land. Merely, allotment is not made, the temporary injunction application cannot be said to be premature. As a matter of fact, if the defendant is allowed to transfer the said land which is permissible, the very purpose of filing of the suit would be frustrated. Senior Advocate further submitted that the Court below has seriously erred in passing the impugned order dated

30.08.2024 by observing that the agreement is void as per section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of New Pink City Grah Nirman Sahkari Samiti, is not enforceable. The aforesaid ground is illegal in view of the fact that the defendant No.1 moved an application under Order 7 Rule 11 on the same ground but the same was dismissed by the Court below vide order dated 06.04.2022 wherein all the grounds assigned by the learned court below for rejection of the temporary injunction application were considered and application was dismissed by the Court below and the suit was held to be maintainable. Even the said order was confirmed by the High Court in revision petition filed by defendant No.1 bearing S.B. Civil Revision Petition No.86/22 wherein the High Court specifically observed that the plaintiffs are not going to purchase the land which belong to Scheduled Caste person and section 42 of the Tenancy Act is not applicable but overlooked the said judgment of this Court and the order of its own Court. Thus rejection of [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (9 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024] Temporary injunction application by the court below on such ground is wholly illegal. Senior Advocate also submitted that the trial Court has seriously erred in passing the impugned order dated 30.08.2024 while taking into consideration the defence argument raised by the defendant that the plaintiff has not disclosed that in temporary injunction application, from which date the plaintiff firm No.1 came into existence. The aforesaid argument is contrary to the averment made in the application wherein it was specifically mentioned that plaintiff No.1 firm is carrying its business since 2013 but still the said fact has been overlooked and perverse finding has been given. The court below further erred in taking adverse inference at this stage of the fact that the plaintiff has not filed balance sheet and account of the firm and though payment made by the plaintiff No.1 was not at all in dispute. Admittedly that amount had been deposited in the Bank Account of the defendant No.1. Senior Advocate further submitted that the court below has seriously erred in passing the impugned order dated

30.08.2024 in taking into consideration the defence raised by the defendant No.1 that the agreement is forged one and amount was withdrawn by the Rajkumar. However, no relationship of Rajkumar was connected with any of the plaintiff. It is further pertinent to mention here that the defendant had took a plea that some blank paper got signed but the same was got executed by the plaintiff for getting land allotted by itself reveals and confirms the due execution of a document. Once, the plaintiff has admitted his [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (10 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024] signature merely denial on the ground that the blank document was taken, cannot be believed that too at the stage of deciding temporary injunction application. Senior Advocate also submitted that the court below has seriously erred in passing the impugned order dated

30.08.2024 much being influenced that the plea taken by the defendant that Rajkumar has withdrawn the amount from the Bank Account of the defendant No.1. This fact is also contrary to the averment made in the FIR wherein the defendant No.1 has admitted that he himself issued the cheques for Rs.3,00,000/- and Rs.10,00,000/-. This fact itself reveals that whole of defence is false. As a matter of fact, first of all, appellants have got no concern with the withdrawal of the amount from the bank account of the defendant once the amount was deposited. As a matter of fact, it was defendant who was required to protect his account if he has given any blank cheque or cheque book to Rajkumar, no allegation can be leveled against the plaintiff. Senior Advocate also submitted that the Court below has seriously erred in passing the impugned order dated

30.08.2024 in deciding the point of irreparable loss and balance of convenience only on the ground that the plaintiff has moved an application seeking amendment to claim an alternative remedy of refund of the security. The Court below has relied upon the judgment which is not at all applicable as it was not a case of specific performance of immovable property but it was a case of specific performance of a contract which s prohibited and damage was the remedy. Here in the present case, it was a specific [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (11 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024] performance of immovable property, merely the plaintiff has moved an application seeking amendment of the plaint could not have been considered that too when amendment was not yet allowed. Even otherwise, the said ground is wholly illegal. As a matter of fact, if the defendants are allowed to sale the land, neither the plaintiff can recover the amount nor specific performance. The alternative relief sought by the plaintiff is that in case specific performance is not granted up to last Court than and then the refund of the security. However, that round, the temporary injunction application could not have been dismissed. Senior Advocate also submitted that the Court below has seriously erred in passing the impugned order dated

30.08.2024 in rejecting the temporary injunction application overlooking the settled proposition of law that in a suit for specific performance the Court is required to maintain the status quo to prevent further transfer of the property and also prevent the multiplicity of the proceedings. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants has also referred the provisions of section 13(1)(a) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which is corresponding to section 18 of the Old Specific Relief Act. He also submitted that the reservation letters of the land in question have already been issued by the Jaipur Development Authority in favour of the defendant on 18.10.2024. It is also submitted that the defendant No.1 has never initiated any proceedings [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (12 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024] for cancellation of the agreement executed between the parties or issued any notice in regard thereto. Senior Advocate also submitted that the Court below has wrongly taken adverse inference against the appellants though no adverse inference was at all warranted, whereas the Court below has taken into consideration the irrelevant fact and based its conclusion simple on police remand paper. As a matter of fact merely lodging of the FIR and arrest, has got relevancy. Even the court below has overlooked the important fact that admittedly Power of Attorney too was executed in favour of Rambabu Gupta, husband of plaintiff No.2 and same was cancelled before filing of the suit. As a matter of fact, execution of the Power of Attorney and cancellation thereof reveals due execution of agreement. However the court below has overlooked the aforesaid important fact.

6. In support of the contentions, Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants has placed reliance upon the following judgments:- i. Silla Chandra Shekharam v. Ramchandra Sahu reported in AIR 1964 SUPREME COURT 1789. ii. Bhagwan Das v. Smt Chandra Kal reported in AIR 1979 ALLAHABAD 350. iii. P.C. Hawaladaar v. Jogen Das and Anr. reported in AIR 2009 MADHYA PRADESH 129 : : 2009 (4) ALL LJ NOC 770. iv. Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Regd.) Fadidkot v. Baldev Dass reported in AIR 2005 SUPREME COURT 104. v. Motilal Jain v. Smt. Ramdasi Devi and others reported in AIR 2000 SUPREME COURT 2408. [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (13 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024] vi. District Club Bundi & Ors. v. Madhukar Gupta in S.B.C. Revision No.1725/96 passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court decided on 12.05.1997. vii. Chander Mohan & Ors. v. The State of Rajasthan in S.B. Cr. Misc. Petition No.84/97 passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court at principal seat Jodhpur decided on 03.02.1997. viii. Mishri Lal & Anr. v. Ram Dev & Ors. in S.B. Cr. Revision Petition No.412/97 passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court at principal seat Jodhpur decided on 06.04.1998. ix. Smt. Bhoori & Anr. v. Dhannaram in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No.2432/2023 passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court decided on 20.10.2023. x. Kalyan through Legal Representative v. Dinesh Chand Jain in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No.5234/2016 passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court decided on 10.12.2018. xi. Sameer Kohli & Anr. v. Sh. Pawan Kumar Aggarwal in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No.6067/2019 passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court decided on 09.12.2022.

7. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellants, during the course of arguments has placed before the court the order dated 12th July, 2024 issued by the Urban Development and Housing Department, Government of Rajasthan and so also the order dated 01.06.2022 issued by the Urban Development Housing and Local Self Department, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur.

8. Mr. R.N. Mathur, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Bajrang Lal, Advocate appearing for respondent No.1 opposed the submissions advanced by Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants and submitted that the Court below after examining and going through the pleadings of the case, finding three settled principles of temporary injunction against the plaintiffs, dismissed [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (14 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024] the application for temporary injunction vide impugned order dated 30.08.2024. Thus, no interference is warranted by this Court in the impugned order. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent defendant No.1 has submitted that the agreement for which the suit for specific performance has been filed by the plaintiffs is a fraud for the reason that the defendant No.1 is an illiterate person and the signatures on the alleged agreement have been obtained by misleading him. It is also submitted that the bank account was also opened in the name of the defendant No.1 by misleading him wherein the phone number of one Raj Kumar has been given who is connected with the plaintiffs. Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent defendant No.1 further submitted that the defendant No.1 who was in the judicial custody, on his release when he came to know that such fraud has been committed by the plaintiff party, he lodged a criminal case No.157/2020 at Police Station Ramnagariya, Jaipur, wherein the plaintiff Dharmendra Dutta Sharma and Mr. Rambabu Gupta, husband of the plaintiff No.2 Rekha Gupta were arrested. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent / defendant No.1 further submitted that the suit is not maintainable for the reason that the same has been filed by one of the partner of the partnership firm without [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (15 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024] there being any resolution of the partners. He also submitted that the agreement has been prepared on a stamp paper which does not bear the signatures of the defendant No.1 which speaks that the defendant /respondent No.1 has not purchased the said stamp paper. Learned Senior Advocate has also referred section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. He also submitted that when the Court finds that there is a doubt about genuineness of a document as in the present case, the genuineness of the agreement is under doubt, the Court should not grant temporary injunction. However, at the time of conclusion of the suit proceedings if the plaintiff succeeds, he can be allowed damages. He has also submitted that the suit proceedings are premature as on the date of filing of the suit the land in question was not even allotted to the defendant No.1. Learned Senior Advocate to support his case has placed reliance upon the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Limited and Ors. vs. KS Infraspace LLP Limited and Ors. reported in AIR 2020 SC 307.

9. E-converso, Mr. Amit Kuri, Advocate with Mr. Dharma Ram, Ms. Nandini Mirdha, Mr. Harshvardhan Shekhawat, appearing for the respondent Nos.2 & 3 have also opposed the submissions advanced by Senior Counsel for the appellants and supported the findings given by the Court below in its order dated 30.08.2024. [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (16 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024] Counsels further submitted that the Court below after meticulously examining and scrutinizing the material made before it, has rightly dismissed the application for temporary injunction filed by the appellants. Counsels also submitted that the learned Court below also found three basic settled principle of temporary injunction against the appellants and thus has rightly dismissed the application for temporary injunction. Thus, no interference is warranted in the order impugned passed by the court below.

10. Considered the submissions advanced by the Senior counsels and other counsels appearing for the respective parties and gone through the material made available to the Court including the judgments and orders cited as also the record of the case.

11. The present misc. appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs/ appellants against the order of rejection of application for temporary injunction.

12. The cardinal principles for grant of temporary injunction are (i) Whether the plaintiff has prima facie case?, (ii) Whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of the plaintiff? and (iii) Whether the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury if his prayer for interlocutory injunction is disallowed.

13. The High Court of Bombay after relying upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court delivered in the case of UTO Nederland B.V. & Anr. Vs. Tilaknagar Industries Limited, Appeal No.66 of 2012 decided along-with other connected [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (17 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024] matters on April 28, 2025 has observed in paras 10, 13 and 17 as under:- “10. Now we may advert to the scope and ambit of the trinity test on the basis of which the discretionary prayer for grant of injunction has to be dealt with. The expression 'prima facie case' is a Latin expression means 'at first sight or based on first impression or on the face of it'. The expression 'prima facie case' has a well settled meaning in legal parlance. The House of Lords in AMERICAN CYNAMID CO. AND ETHICON LTD., reported in 1975(1) ALL ER 504, while dealing with scope and ambit of expression ' prima facie case' held as under: "The use of such expressions as "a probability," "a prima facie case," or "a strong prima facie case" in the context of the exercise of a discretionary power to grant an interlocutory injunction leads to confusion as to the object sought to be achieved by this form of temporary relief. The court no doubt must be satisfied that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious, in other words, that there is a serious question to be tried. It is no part of the court's function at this stage of the litigation to try to resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavit as to facts on which the claims of either party may ultimately depend nor to decide difficult questions of law which call for detailed argument and mature considerations. These are matters to be dealt with at the trial. One of the reasons for the introduction of the practice of requiring an undertaking as to damages upon the grant of an interlocutory injunction was that "it aided the court in doing that which was its great object, viz. abstaining from expressing any opinion upon the merits of the case until the hearing":Wakefield v. Duke of Buccleugh (1865) 12 L.T. 628, 629. So unless the material [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (18 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024] available to the court at the hearing of the application for an interlocutory injunction fails to disclose that the plaintiff has any real prospect of succeeding in his claim for a permanent injunction at the trial, the court should go on to consider whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting or refusing the interlocutory relief that is sought." The aforesaid principle was reiterated in GARDEN COTTAGE FOODS LTD. VS. MILK MARKETING BOARD, reported in (1983) 2 All ER 770.

13. The Supreme Court elucidated the meaning of expression 'prima facie case' in GUJARAT BOTTLING CO. LTD. (SUPRA) to mean that the Court should be satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried at the hearing, and there is a probability that of plaintiff obtaining the relief at the conclusion of the trial on the basis of the material placed before the Court. The expression 'prima facie case' means a substantial question raised bona fide which needs investigation and decision on merits and the Court, at the initial stage, cannot insist upon a full proof case warranting an eventual decree. [See: ANAND PRASAD AGARWAL VS. TARKESHWAR PRASAD13, RAMAKANT AMBALAL CHOKSI (SUPRA) and STATE OF KERALA VS. UNION OF INDIA, reported in (2024) 7 SCC 183].

17. A party is not entitled to an order of injunction as a matter of right. The grant of interlocutory injunction is a remedy which is discretionary in nature. However, such a discretion has to be exercised on the touchstone of trinity test viz. prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. [See SHIV KUMAR CHADHA ETC. VS. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI, REPORTED IN 1993 scc(3) 161]. It is equally well settled legal proposition that the temporary injunction being equitable relief, the [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (19 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024] discretion to grant such relief will be exercised only when the plaintiff's conduct is free from blame and he approaches the Court with clean hands SEEMA ARSHAD ZAHEER VS. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER MUMBAI, REPORTED IN (2006) 5 SCC 282.”

14. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 13001 of 2024 (@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 252 of 2023, decided on 22.11.2024 has observed in para 34 as under:- “34. The burden is on the plaintiff, by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise, to prove that there is “a prima facie case” in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition precedent for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that noninterference by the court would result in “irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (20 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024] condition also is that “the balance of convenience” must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus, the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit. (See: Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh reported in (1992) 1 SCC 719.)”

15. The plaintiffs/ appellants have filed a suit for specific performance and permanent injunction as regards to an agreement dated 11.07.2019 executed in between the parties. On perusal of the material available on record, the appellants/ plaintiffs by placing on record certain documentary evidence has been able to show that there is an agreement between the parties executed on 11.07.2019 for sale of developed land which was to be allotted to the respondent/ defendant No.1-Nanag Ram by the Jaipur Development Authority (respondent/defendant No.2) and later-on vide allotment order dated 18.10.2024 placed on record along-with an application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC the reservation letter has been issued in favour of respondent / defendant No.1- Nanag Ram for the developed land.

16. On the perusal of the material available on the record, this has also come out that in view of the agreement dated [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (21 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024]

11.07.2019 the appellants/ plaintiffs have already paid total Rs.59,13,882/- and out of which Rs.1 lakh has been paid in cash and remaining amount has been deposited in the bank account of respondent / defendant No.1 Nanag Ram.

17. Though the respondent/ defendant No.1 Nanag Ram has taken a plea that the agreement as well as the opening of the bank account in his name is a fraud played by the appellants/ plaintiffs in collusion with others. However, this fact has also come on record that the respondent/ defendant No.1 Nanag Ram himself has issued two cheques of the account which is in his name to any third party which clearly speaks that he was having full knowledge of the Bank account and its transactions.

18. Applications under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC were also filed- both by respondent / defendant No.1 Nanag Ram as well as by the JDA taking the plea that the plaint does not disclose the name of the partners of the plaintiff- firm, the sale agreement dated

11.07.2019 is an unregistered document and the suit cannot be maintained on such unregistered and forged document. In the application filed by the respondent-JDA under Order 7 Rule 11, the issue of jurisdiction in view of the provision of section 63 of the Right to Fair Compensation & Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 was also raised. It was pleaded that no triable issue has been raised by the appellants/ plaintiffs. The applications filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC were dismissed vide order dated 06.04.2022 by the court below. Against the order of dismissal of the applications filed under Order [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (22 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024] 7 Rule 11 CPC, the respondent/ defendant No.1 Nanag Ram filed S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 86/2022 before the Rajasthan High Court, Bench at Jaipur which was also dismissed vide order dated

09.01.2023 after considering all the issues raised therein. Before the High Court, it was argued on behalf of the respondent/ defendant No.1 Nanag Ram that the agreement entered between the parties is ab initio void and cannot be enforceable in view of the provisions of section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. The dismissal of the revision petition speaks that the appellants/ plaintiffs have raised an issue which is triable and to be adjudicated by the court below on the basis of the evidence to be adduced by the parties.

19. There is an agreement between the parties which is on record and payment of Rs.59,13,882/- has been made by the appellants/ plaintiffs to the respondent / defendant No.1 Nanag Ram through Bank transactions, the said amount has been paid by the appellants/ plaintiffs to the respondent/ defendant No.1- Nanag Ram through bank transactions. The said amount has been paid by the appellants/ plaintiffs to the respondent/ defendant No.1 Nanag Ram so as to purchase the developed land to be allotted to him and later-on vide reservation letter dated

18.10.2024 the land in question has been given to the respondent/ defendant No.1 Nanag Ram by the JDA.

20. The plaintiff- partnership firm M/s. Surgitech as per the partnership deed placed on record is for the business of sale and for purchase of Orthopedic Implants, Medical & Surgical Equipment & other related equipment and / or such other [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (23 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024] business or businesses as the partners hereto may from time to time mutually agreed upon. The agreement to sale has been executed by the plaintiff- partnership firm along-with Smt. Rekha Gupta, which goes to show that the plaintiff- partnership firm has executed an agreement for purchase of the land in question for their business for which they might require the developed land which is approved by the Statutory Development Authority.

21. The respondent/ defendant No.1 Nanag Ram, though might have registered a criminal case with the allegations of forgery and fraud in preparing the alleged agreement but has never issued any notice or initiated any proceedings for cancellation of the said agreement dated 11.07.2019.

22. One of the submission made by Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent / defendant No.1- Nanag Ram was that by the time the suit was filed by the appellants/ plaintiffs, the land was not even transferred in the name of respondent/ defendant No.1 Nanag Ram and therefore, the suit was premature.

23. The Allahabad High Court in the case of Bhagwan Das v. Smt. Chandra Kal, reported in AIR 1979 Allahabad 350 has observed in para 14 as under:- “14. It may be that the wordings are not very happy but the question arises as to what was meant by obtaining permission. According to the case taken in the plaint it was agreed to between the parties that the seller would obtain permission from the consolidation authorities as also acquire Bhumidhari rights and then execute the sale deed. This allegation is contained in paragraph 2 of the plaint. This [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (24 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024] paragraph was not admitted by defendant but in her written statement there was only a simple denial and in additional pleas nothing was said against it. Essentially in the additional pleas the very existence of the agreement was denied. The court below was of the opinion that because of Section 92 of the Evidence Act the plaintiff-appellant could not be allowed to give evidence to vary, add or alter the terms of the written contract. As I have noted above it was clearly provided in the agreement itself that the seller would obtain the permission for making the sale. In other words, it was in contemplation of the parties that the seller was to take certain steps with a view to execute the sale deed. It would, therefore, be a case fully covered by the decision in Moti Ram's case (supra). In other words, it was an agreement by a sirdar to execute the sale deed after acquiring Bhumidhari rights. Since the Bhumidhari rights were actually obtained subsequently the benefit of the same would be available to the plaintiff- appellant in view of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act read with Section 13(a) of the Specific Relief Act. The plaintiff- appellant was thus fully entitled to the specific performance of the contract. However, since the court below has not given any finding as to whether defendants 2 and 3 were bona fide purchasers for value without notice of the earlier contract by defendant No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff for sale of this property, this matter would have to be referred back to the court below for a fresh finding according to law.”

24. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh in the case P.C. Hawaladaar v. Jogen Das & Ors., reported in 2009 Madhya Pradesh 129 has observed in para 8 as under:- “8. Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act is based on the doctrine “feeding the grant by estoppel”. Accordingly where a [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (25 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024] person represents valid title and enters into contract to sell the property and subsequently acquires valid title cannot evade the performance of the contract but is obligated to perform the contract and cannot plead his prior defective or imperfect title to evade the contract.”

25. From the perusal of the material available on the record and so also the submissions of the parties and the discussion made above, this Court can safely held that the appellants/ plaintiffs have a good prima facie case in their favour.

26. The court below has given out its reasons for not finding good prima facie case in favour of the appellants/ plaintiffs. One of the ground for such finding as per para 20 of the judgment is that on the date of filing of the civil suit the land in question was not even recorded in the name of respondent/ defendant No.1 Nanag Ram. As has already been observed in above para of the judgment in view of the judgments delivered in the cases of Bhagwan Das (supra) and P.C. Hawaladaar (supra), even a suit for specific performance can be entertained for the rights which are to be accrued to the defendant and for which the concerned defendant has entered into an agreement with the plaintiff.

27. The other ground relied by the court below is that the agreement is hit by provision of Section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955. Since the land has already been acquired and has been recorded in the name of the Jaipur Development Authority and the agreement executed in between the plaintiff and the defendant is in relation to the developed land allotted to the [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (26 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024] defendant by the Jaipur Development Authority, the provisions of section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 are not at all applicable to the said land. The findings of the court below and the reasons for the same as regards the issue of prima facie case is concerned, are not justified.

28. The court below while deciding the application for temporary injunction has taken into consideration that the respondent / defendant No.1- Nanag Ram has pleaded that the alleged agreement has been prepared by fraud and the land in question is in the Khatedari of a person who belongs to a scheduled caste category and also the fact that on the date of filing of the suit the plaintiff- firm was not in existence and is an acquired land which is now recorded in the name of the JDA and the Bank account opened in the name of the respondent/ respondent No.1- Nanag Ram bears the mobile number of one Raj Kumar who is said to be in connection with the appellants/ plaintiffs. As regards the allegation of agreement by fraud is concerned, mere allegations cannot be made the basis for turning down the validity of a document which can only be adjudicated on the basis of evidence. The land in question was initially on the name of respondent- khatedar, however, later-in it vested with the Jaipur Development Authority- a Statutory Body and therefore, section 42 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 does not come in picture. Whether Raj Kumar whose numbers are there with the Bank where the account of the respondent / defendant No.1 Nanag Ram has been opened, is connected with the appellants/ plaintiffs or not, is an issue of trial to be decided on the basis of [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (27 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024] the evidence for the reason that the respondents/defendants are claiming Raj Kumar to be an accomplice of the plaintiffs whereas the plaintiff says that he has nothing to do with Raj Kumar.

29. Having regard to the detailed facts and the observations given in above part of the Judgment, this Court is of the opinion that the balance of convenience also lies in favour of the appellants/ plaintiffs.

30. One of the submission of Senior Counsel and other counsel appearing for the respondents / defendants is that even in case the suit is allowed to proceed after rejection of their applications filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, the appellants/ plaintiffs can be compensated by suitable damages in case they succeed in the suit. As this Court has already observed in the above paras of this judgment that the plaintiff- partnership firm is dealing with the business and they require the developed land for their business purposes. If the respondents/ defendants are allowed to alienate the property in question or to alter the use of same by raising any kind of construction over it, the appellants/ plaintiffs may not be adequately compensated because they have intended to purchase the property in question for establishing their business. As regards the issue of adequate damages as an alternative remedy, the Court has also taken into consideration the judgments cited by the Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants/ plaintiffs and so also the judgment delivered in the case of Ramakant Ambalal Choksi (supra) cited by the Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent/ defendant No1.. [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (28 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024]

31. The plaintiff-firm deals in the business of sale and for purchase of Orthopedic Implants, Medical & Surgical Equipment & other related equipment and / or such other business or businesses as the partners hereto may from time to time mutually agreed upon. The agreement to sale has been signed by the plaintiff- partnership firm with the respondent/ defendant for sale of the developed land which they require for the purposes of the business of the firm. The main purpose of the agreement executed in between the parties as regards the developed land to be allotted to the defendant is for acquisition of his land for establishing the business. The purpose of purchase of land as envisaged from the object of the plaintiff- partnership firm is concerned, cannot be compensated merely on monetary terms. Hence, taking into consideration the judgments cited by the Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants / plaintiffs, there would be irreparable loss to the appellants/ plaintiffs, if the respondents/ defendants are not restrained from alienating the property in question or changing the land use by any other manner including raising of any kind of construction.

32. In view of the discussion made above, the misc. appeal filed by the appellants/ claimants succeeds. The order dated

30.08.2024 passed by the Court of learned Additional District Judge No.10, Jaipur Metropolitan-I (Headquarter Sanganer) in temporary injunction Application No.36/2020, titled as M/s Surgitech Partnership Firm & Anr. vs. Nanagram & Ors., is quashed and set aside. [2025:RJ-JP:21332] (29 of 29) [CMA-3910/2024] The application for temporary injunction filed by the appellants/ plaintiffs is allowed. The land in question which was to be allotted to the respondent/ defendant No.1 Nanag Ram and later-on for which the reservation letter has been issued on

18.10.2024 by the Jaipur Development Authority, the respondents/ defendants shall maintain status quo as regards the land and record.

33. In view of the judgment passed in the main misc. appeal, the stay application and pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. (GANESH RAM MEENA),J Sharma NK/Dy. Registrar