In case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji AIR

Judgment

1. Angad Kumar Meena S/o Shankar Lal, Aged About 40 Years, R/o Village Bilota, Tehsil Uniyara District Tonk (Rajasthan) - Driver Of Vehicle Car Bearing Registration No. R.j.-28-U.a. - 0462

2. Kamlesh S/o Bhairu Lal, Aged About 37 Years, R/o Village Maanraj Pura, Post Pancholaas, Tehsil And District Sawai Madhopur (Rajasthan)- Owner Of Vehicle Mahindra Bolero Car Bearing Registration No. R.j.-28-U.a. - 0462

3. The New India Insurance Company Limited, Through Branch Manager, Branch Office, Civil Line, Bajriya, Sawai Madhopur (Rajasthan) - Insurer Of Vehicle Car Bearing Registration No. R.j.-28-U.a. - 0462 ----Respondents For Appellant(s)

: Mr. Girish Khandelwal For Respondent(s) : Mr. Ravindra Kumar Tomar HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK KUMAR JAIN Order [2025:RJ-JP:2422] (2 of 6) [CMA-90/2021] 15/01/2025

1. Instant S.B. CMA is preferred dissatisfied from award dated

19.05.2017 in MAC case no. 398/2015 (35/2015) passed by learned Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, Sawai Madhopur in a petition under Section 166 and 140 of MV Act.

2. Office has pointed out a delay of 1219 days in filing the present civil misc. appeal and to substantiate reasons of delay, an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is filed.

3. Learned counsel for appellant applicant submits that the appellants are bona fide rustic villagers and they were not aware about the legal process but when they came to know about right of appeal they have approached this Hon’ble Court. He submits that the reasons as mentioned in application are sufficient to condone delay.

4. Section 5 of the Limitation Act prescribes that any appeal or revision or an application may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the petitioner satisfies the Court on sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal or revision or making an application within prescribed period. 5. In case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Katiji AIR 1987 SC 1353, Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the following principles to allow application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act:-

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. [2025:RJ-JP:2422] (3 of 6) [CMA-90/2021]

3. "Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay. every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

6. In case of Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors. 2010 (8) SCC 685, Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering Section 5 of Limitation Act has referred the judgment in the case of Union of India Vs. Ram Charan AIR 1964 SC 215 and observed that the explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown [2025:RJ-JP:2422] (4 of 6) [CMA-90/2021] for condonation of delay. The larger benches as well as equi- benches of Hon’ble Supreme Court have consistently followed these principles and have either allowed or declined to condone the delay in filing such applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay.

7. In the case of Brijesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.: (2014) 13 SCC 291, while referring the judgment of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors.: (2013) 12 SCC 649, Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court further observed that the Court cannot condone the delay, if it is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, and a delay cannot be condoned on sympathetic grounds.

8. Very recently condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act was considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of P. Subba Reddy (died) by LRs. And Ors. Vs. Special Deputy Collector (LA) 2024 INSC 286 wherein also it was held that unless sufficient cause is shown the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act cannot be allowed. The underlying provisions after harmonious construction of provision of law were formulated in following manner:- (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by [2025:RJ-JP:2422] (5 of 6) [CMA-90/2021] forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the L imitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; liberal (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, justice-oriented approach, though approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamount to disregarding the statutory provision.

9. For accidental death of Kanhaiya Lal on 11.11.2014 a claim petition was filed by his legal heirs before the MACT. The accident has reported and registered as FIR no. 233/2014 P.S. Malarana Dungar, District Sawai Madhopur. The tribunal has allowed claim of Rs.8,57,120/- against respondent(s) non-claimants. A perusal clearly reflect that for accident of 25.11.2014 a claim petition was filed on 30.01.2015. There was no delay in filing claim petition before the Tribunal. [2025:RJ-JP:2422] (6 of 6) [CMA-90/2021]

10. Herein, there is delay of more than 3.5 years and same is extra-ordinary delay. The reasons as assigned by the counsel and also in application, are not sufficient for condoning the delay of 1219 days and without a sufficient cause, delay cannot be condoned.

11. In view of aforesaid, the application for condonation of delay and also instant civil misc. appeal are hereby dismissed.

12. Misc. application, if any, stands disposed of. CHETNA BEHRANI /51 (ASHOK KUMAR JAIN),J

: Mr. Girish Khandelwal For Respondent(s) : Mr. Ravindra Kumar Tomar HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK KUMAR JAIN Order [2025:RJ-JP:2422] (2 of 6) [CMA-90/2021] 15/01/2025

1. Instant S.B. CMA is preferred dissatisfied from award dated

19.05.2017 in MAC case no. 398/2015 (35/2015) passed by learned Motor Accident Claim Tribunal, Sawai Madhopur in a petition under Section 166 and 140 of MV Act.

2. Office has pointed out a delay of 1219 days in filing the present civil misc. appeal and to substantiate reasons of delay, an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is filed.

3. Learned counsel for appellant applicant submits that the appellants are bona fide rustic villagers and they were not aware about the legal process but when they came to know about right of appeal they have approached this Hon’ble Court. He submits that the reasons as mentioned in application are sufficient to condone delay.

4. Section 5 of the Limitation Act prescribes that any appeal or revision or an application may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the petitioner satisfies the Court on sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal or revision or making an application within prescribed period. 5. In case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Katiji AIR 1987 SC 1353, Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the following principles to allow application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act:-

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. [2025:RJ-JP:2422] (3 of 6) [CMA-90/2021]

3. "Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay. every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

6. In case of Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors. 2010 (8) SCC 685, Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering Section 5 of Limitation Act has referred the judgment in the case of Union of India Vs. Ram Charan AIR 1964 SC 215 and observed that the explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown [2025:RJ-JP:2422] (4 of 6) [CMA-90/2021] for condonation of delay. The larger benches as well as equi- benches of Hon’ble Supreme Court have consistently followed these principles and have either allowed or declined to condone the delay in filing such applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay.

7. In the case of Brijesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.: (2014) 13 SCC 291, while referring the judgment of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors.: (2013) 12 SCC 649, Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court further observed that the Court cannot condone the delay, if it is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, and a delay cannot be condoned on sympathetic grounds.

8. Very recently condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act was considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of P. Subba Reddy (died) by LRs. And Ors. Vs. Special Deputy Collector (LA) 2024 INSC 286 wherein also it was held that unless sufficient cause is shown the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act cannot be allowed. The underlying provisions after harmonious construction of provision of law were formulated in following manner:- (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by [2025:RJ-JP:2422] (5 of 6) [CMA-90/2021] forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the L imitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; liberal (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, justice-oriented approach, though approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamount to disregarding the statutory provision.

9. For accidental death of Kanhaiya Lal on 11.11.2014 a claim petition was filed by his legal heirs before the MACT. The accident has reported and registered as FIR no. 233/2014 P.S. Malarana Dungar, District Sawai Madhopur. The tribunal has allowed claim of Rs.8,57,120/- against respondent(s) non-claimants. A perusal clearly reflect that for accident of 25.11.2014 a claim petition was filed on 30.01.2015. There was no delay in filing claim petition before the Tribunal. [2025:RJ-JP:2422] (6 of 6) [CMA-90/2021]

10. Herein, there is delay of more than 3.5 years and same is extra-ordinary delay. The reasons as assigned by the counsel and also in application, are not sufficient for condoning the delay of 1219 days and without a sufficient cause, delay cannot be condoned.

11. In view of aforesaid, the application for condonation of delay and also instant civil misc. appeal are hereby dismissed.

12. Misc. application, if any, stands disposed of. CHETNA BEHRANI /51 (ASHOK KUMAR JAIN),J