Sirmaur, Police Station Ramgarh, Ditrict Alwar (Raj). vs State of Rajasthan, Through The Learned Public

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 5611/2025 Alli Khan Son Of Navab Khan, Resident Of Sirmaur, Police Station Ramgarh, Ditrict Alwar (Raj). Kala Khan Son Of Munshi Khan, Resident Of Sirmaur, Police Station Ramgarh, Ditrict Alwar (Raj). Jarjod Khan Son Of Bhukkad Khan, Resident Of Sirmaur, Police Station Ramgarh, Ditrict Alwar (Raj). Harnun Son Of Bhukkad, Resident Of Sirmaur, Police Station Ramgarh, Ditrict Alwar (Raj). Shaukin Khan Son Of Bhukkad Khan, Resident Of Sirmaur, Police Station Ramgarh, Ditrict Alwar (Raj). Versus ----Petitioners State of Rajasthan, Through The Learned Public Prosecutor. Jabradeen Son Of Ghotu, Resident Of Ghotu Ka Bas, Sirmaur, Police Station Ramgarh , District Alwar (Raj). Banesingh Son Of Chhotu Khan, Resident Of Ghotu Ka Bas, Sirmaur, Police Station Ramgarh , District Alwar (Raj). ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Petitioner in person For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rishi Raj Singh Rathore, PP Both respondents are present in person HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDESH BANSAL Order 12/09/2025

1. A joint prayer has been made to quash the criminal proceedings as a whole in Criminal Case No.18/2019 titled as 'State Vs. Alli & Ors.' arising out of FIR No.441/2018 registered at Police Station Ramgarh, District Alwar and pending before the Court of Additional District and Sessions Judge No.3, Alwar in respect of offence under Sections 341, 143, 323, 326 & 308 IPC as the criminal proceedings in respect of offences under Sections [2025:RJ-JP:37179] (2 of 5) [CRLMP-5611/2025] 323 & 341 of IPC have already been dropped in view of compromise submitted by the parties.

2. It has been submitted that both parties belongs to same village Sirmaur and on issue of minor quarrel, the impugned FIR came to be registered by the respondent No.2 in respect of injuries received to respondent No.3. After investigation and on submission of charge-sheet, during course of trial, complainant and victim have entered into compromise with the accused- petitioners and agreed to drop/quash the criminal proceedings. The compromise was produced before the trial Court which has been attested vide order dated 11.8.2025 in respect of offences under Sections 323 & 341, but has been declined in respect of offences under Sections 143, 324, 326 & 308 of IPC being non- compoundable. The certified copy of the trial Court dated

11.08.2025 has been placed on record.

3. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab[(2012) 10 SCC 303] observed as follows: “57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. 58. Where High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that dispute between the offender and victim has been settled although offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of [2025:RJ-JP:37179] (3 of 5) [CRLMP-5611/2025] criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrong doing that seriously endangers and threatens well- being of society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without permission of the Court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc; or other offences of mental depravity under Indian Penal Code or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between offender and victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to victim and the offender and victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or F.I.R if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard and fast category can be prescribed.” The above principles of law have been followed and reiterated by the Apex Court, recently, in case of Naushey Ali and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh [(2025) 4 SCC 78].

4. Following the analogy expounded by the Apex Court in case of Gian Singh (Supra), while dealing with the issue to allow settlement for offence under Section 307 IPC, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Narendra Singh Vs. State of Punjab: [(2014)6 SCC 466] observed that the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. may not be refused merely on a ground that the FIR/ [2025:RJ-JP:37179] (4 of 5) [CRLMP-5611/2025] Charge-sheet incorporate the offence under Section 307 IPC. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered observations made in case of Dimpey Gujral V. UT:[(2013)11 SCC 497] accepting the settlement between parties for offence under Section 307 IPC and observed as under:- “Having said so, we would hasen to add that though it is a serious offence as the accused person(s) attempted to take the life of another person/ victim, at the same time the court cannot be oblivious to hard realities that many times whenever there is a quarrel between the parties leading to physical commotion and sustaining of injury by either or both the parties, there is a tendency to give it a slant of an offence under Section 307 IPC as well. Therefore, only because FIR/ charge-sheet incorporates the provision of Section 307 IPC would not, by itself, be a ground to reject the petition under Section 482 of the Code and refuse to accept the settlement between the parties. We are, therefore, of the opinion that while taking a call as to whether compromise in such cases should be effected or not, the High Court should go by the nature of injury sustained, the portion of the bodies where the injuries were inflicted (namely, whether injuries are caused at the vital/ delicate parts of the body) and the nature of weapons used, etc. On that basis, if it is found that there is a strong possibility of proving the charge under Section 307 IPC, once the evidence to that effect is led and injuries proved, the Court should not accept settlement between the parties. On the other hand, on the basis of prima facie assessment of the aforesaid circumstances, if the High Court forms an opinion that provisions of Section 307 IPC were unnecessarily included in the charge-sheet, the Court can accept the plea of compounding of the offence based on settlement between the parties.”

5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court recently in case of State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi Narayan [(2019) 5 SCC 688], after discussing the ratio expounded in case of Narendra Singh (supra), has held as under:- “15.4. offences Under Section 307 Indian Penal Code and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence Under Section 307 Indian Penal Code and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers Under [2025:RJ-JP:37179] (5 of 5) [CRLMP-5611/2025] Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 Indian Penal Code in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 Indian Penal Code is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge Under Section 307 Indian Penal Code. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove”

6. In view of legal proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court in aforesaid cases, and the fact that the underlying dispute has been amicably settled between parties and complainant does not want to prosecute the petitioners further, this Court deems it just and proper to allow the present misc. petition.

7. As a final result, present criminal miscellaneous petition is allowed and proceedings of Criminal Case No.18/2019 titled as 'State Vs. Ali & Ors.' arising out of FIR No.441/2018 registered at Police Station Ramgarh, District Alwar, are hereby dropped/ quashed.

8. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. RONAK JAIMAN/35 (SUDESH BANSAL),J