Koteen Baijupara, Tehsil Baijupara, District Alwar (Driver and vs State of Rajasthan, through Public Prosecutor.

Judgment

2. State of Rajasthan, through Public Prosecutor. Rambali S/o Amar Singh, R/o Dundbas, P.S. Bahatukala (Devi Dholagarh), District Alwar. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s)

: Mr. Mohar Pal Meena For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rishi Raj Singh Rathore, PP Mr. Chaman Singh HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDESH BANSAL Order 11/09/2025

1. A joint prayer has been made to quash the criminal proceedings arising out of FIR No. 32/2025 registered at Police Station Bahtu Kalan (Devi Dholagarh) District Alwar, for offences under Sections 281, 125(a), 324(4), 109(1) of BNS, 2023 and Section 4/21 of the Mines and Mineral (Regulation of Development) Act, 1957 and Section 54/60 of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2017, in view of mutual settlement arrived at between parties.

2. It has, inter alia, been stated that FIR was registered by respondent No.2, levelling allegations against petitioner for driving a vehicle rashly and negligently and hitting him. It has been [2025:RJ-JP:36841] (2 of 5) [CRLMP-5502/2025] stated that complainant-injured received minor injuries but his motorcycle is damaged immensely.

3. From bare perusal of allegations in FIR and as per the nature of injuries received to complainant-injured, prima facie, this Court does not find that offence under Section 109(1) of the BNS, 2023 is made out. The manner in which the accident occurred, no mens rea, prima facie, has come on record. Moreover, complainant- injured has entered into compromise with the petitioner after receiving compensation for damages occurred to his bike and the original compromise signed by the complainant-injured Rambali dated 21.08.2025 has been placed on record.

4. The complainant-injured is present in person before this Court, who has been identified by his counsel and accepts the factum of compromise entered into between parties and agreeable to quash the FIR at this stage itself.

5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab[(2012) 10 SCC 303] observed as follows: “57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. 58. Where High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that dispute between the offender and victim has been settled although offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of [2025:RJ-JP:36841] (3 of 5) [CRLMP-5502/2025] criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrong doing that seriously endangers and threatens well- being of society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without permission of the Court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc; or other offences of mental depravity under Indian Penal Code or offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between offender and victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to victim and the offender and victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or F.I.R if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard and fast category can be prescribed.”

6. Following the analogy expounded by the Apex Court in case of Gian Singh (Supra), while dealing with the issue to allow settlement for offence under Section 307 IPC, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Narendra Singh Vs. State of Punjab: [(2014)6 SCC 466] observed that the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. may not be refused merely on a ground that the FIR/ Charge-sheet incorporate the offence under Section 307 IPC. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered observations made in case of Dimpey Gujral V. UT:[(2013)11 SCC 497] accepting the [2025:RJ-JP:36841] (4 of 5) [CRLMP-5502/2025] settlement between parties for offence under Section 307 IPC and observed as under:- “Having said so, we would hasten to add that though it is a serious offence as the accused person(s) attempted to take the life of another person/ victim, at the same time the court cannot be oblivious to hard realities that many times whenever there is a quarrel between the parties leading to physical commotion and sustaining of injury by either or both the parties, there is a tendency to give it a slant of an offence under Section 307 IPC as well. Therefore, only because FIR/ charge-sheet incorporates the provision of Section 307 IPC would not, by itself, be a ground to reject the petition under Section 482 of the Code and refuse to accept the settlement between the parties. We are, therefore, of the opinion that while taking a call as to whether compromise in such cases should be effected or not, the High Court should go by the nature of injury sustained, the portion of the bodies where the injuries were inflicted (namely, whether injuries are caused at the vital/ delicate parts of the body) and the nature of weapons used, etc. On that basis, if it is found that there is a strong possibility of proving the charge under Section 307 IPC, once the evidence to that effect is led and injuries proved, the Court should not accept settlement between the parties. On the other hand, on the basis of prima facie assessment of the aforesaid circumstances, if the High Court forms an opinion that provisions of Section 307 IPC were unnecessarily included in the charge-sheet, the Court can accept the plea of compounding of the offence based on settlement between the parties.”

7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court recently in case of State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi Narayan [(2019) 5 SCC 688], after discussing the ratio expounded in case of Narendra Singh (supra), has held as under:- “15.4. offences Under Section 307 Indian Penal Code and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence Under Section 307 Indian Penal Code and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers Under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 Indian Penal Code in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 [2025:RJ-JP:36841] (5 of 5) [CRLMP-5502/2025] Indian Penal Code is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge Under Section 307 Indian Penal Code. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove”

8. In view of legal proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court in aforesaid cases, and considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case in hand, where prima facie offence under Section 109 of BNS (erstwhile Section 307 IPC) does not make out and inherent powers can be exercised to quash the criminal proceedings of both the cases, in view of settlement arrived at between parties, this Court deems it just and proper to allow the present misc. petition.

9. As a final result, present criminal miscellaneous petition is allowed and FIR No. 32/2025 registered at Police Station Bahtu Kalan (Devi Dholagarh) District Alwar along with all consequential proceedings, are hereby dropped/ quashed.

10. All pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of. NITIN /183 (SUDESH BANSAL),J