Jitendra Singh & Ors v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.) whereby entire criminal proceedings of Criminal Case N

Judgment

2. Versus State Of Rajasthan, Through PP Jitendra Singh Son Of Pratap Singh, Resident Of Phool Bagh Palace, Alwar, Rajasthan.

3. Vijendra Singh Son Of Harmohendra Singh, Resident Of 28, Sundar Nagar, Police Station Nizamuddin, New Delhi.

4. Sunil Chanana Son Of Avinash Chanana, Resident Of 3/35, Safdarganj Enclave, New Delhi, 110029.

5. Sameer Chanana Son Of Avinash Chanana, Resident Of 3/35, Safdarganj Enclave, New Delhi, 110029. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s)

: Mr. G.P. Sharma, for applicant For Respondent(s) : Ms. Arti Sharma, PP HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR UPMAN 20/02/2025 Order

1. This misc. application has been filed on behalf of the applicant Brigadier Bhupesh Singh for recalling of the order dated

22.04.2024 passed in S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.2349/2024 (Jitendra Singh & Ors. vs State of Rajasthan & Ors.) whereby entire criminal proceedings of Criminal Case No.2035/2021 before learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bundi, arising out of FIR No.601/2017, registered at Police Station Kotwali Bundi District Bundi were quashed and set aside on the basis of compromise [2025:RJ-JP:16929] (2 of 9) [CRLMA-376/2024] entered into between LRs of the complainant and accused persons.

2. The applicant herein claims himself to be one of the effected party, being Gaadipati of the Bundi Handa Rajvansh, whose rights has been infringed by illegal and dubious manner of transfer of properties of Bundi Estate by fabricating unauthorized and fraudulent documents. It is submitted by learned counsel for the applicant that the applicant was serving as a Brigadier in Indian Army at Kashmir. He resigned his services and on arrival to Bundi, he came to know that FIR No.601/2017 was lodged by one Avinash Chandra Chanana for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 120B of IPC. In the FIR, serious allegations regarding forgery of valuable document namely ‘Arpan Nama’ dated

08.05.2008 was alleged with an intent to grab properties of Hada Rajvansh Bundi which as per Covenant and other statutes are inalienable. Learned counsel further contends that in a civil suit No.105/2010 (Kuldevi Ashapura Mataji vs Avinash Chandra Chanana & Ors. for declaration and injunction, pending in the court of District Judge, Bundi, the applicant filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC for his impleadment. The application filed on behalf of the applicant was allowed vide order dated

02.07.2024 and the compromise application filed by the parties to the aforesaid suit was disallowed holding that the compromise submitted in the said suit was against the public policy being contrary to law and being in contravention to the centuries old customs, government policy letters, Rajasthan Covenant, Hindu Succession Act, 1956, law of Primogeniture and Article 372 of the Constitution of India. [2025:RJ-JP:16929] (3 of 9) [CRLMA-376/2024]

3. Learned counsel for the applicant argues that during pendency of the proceedings before the learned trial court, arising out of the aforesaid FIR, compromise was done for monitory benefits by two out of three legal representatives of the complainant. Similar compromise submitted before learned District Court, Bundi in the Civil Suit No.105/2010 was dismissed as it involved the properties belonging to the public at large wherein the applicant has acquired rights of the Custodian of the said estate. He further argues that the fact regarding his appointment of Gaadipati of the Hada Rajvansh of Bundi was not brought to the notice of the Court and therefore, the applicant was not provided an opportunity of hearing to oppose the compromise. The accused persons also concealed the fact that on 12.04.2024, the applicant had moved an application before the trial court under the provisions of Section 311 Cr.P.C. It is thus, contended that without impleading applicant as party respondent, the accused persons produced compromise and on the strength thereof, succeeded in quashing the criminal proceedings. The compromise was illegal and against public policy. He thus, prays that the order dated 22.04.2024 passed in S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.2349/2024 may be recalled.

4. Learned Public Prosecutor submits that order dated

22.04.2024 being final order cannot be reviewed/recalled as it is barred by Section 362 of the Code. She submits that Section 362 of the Code operates as bar to any alteration or review of the cases disposed of by the Court. The singular exception to the said statutory bar is correction of clerical or arithmetical error by the Court. She argues that recalling the order dated 22.04.2024 [2025:RJ-JP:16929] (4 of 9) [CRLMA-376/2024] passed by this Court tantamounts to review of the order passed by this Court, which as a matter of fact, is barred by Section 362 of the Code.

5. I have heard and considered the submissions advanced at bar and perused the material available on record.

6. By way of misc. petition (No.2349/2024) filed on behalf of the accused Jitendra Singh and Vijendra Singh, prayer was made to quash entire proceedings of criminal case (No.2035/2021), pending before learned Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bundi arising out of FIR No.601/2017 PS Kotwali Bundi on the ground of compromise. After registration of FIR in the year 2017, investigation agency conducted investigation and filed negative final report before the concerned magistrate but same was disproved by the learned Magistrate and cognizance was taken against the accused persons. During trial, on 09.04.24, LRs of the complainant and the accused persons filed an application under Section 320 CrPC to permit compounding of the aforesaid offences. Vide order dated 09.04.2024, the trial court partly allowed the application and permitted to compound/attest offence under Section 420 IPC but prayer for attestation/compounding in respect of other offences under Sections 467, 468, 471 and 120B IPC was refused being non-compoundable. Thereafter, the misc. petition was filed and on 22.04.2024, in presence of complainant Sunil Chanana and Sameer Chanana, criminal proceedings, were ordered to be quashed on the basis of compromise. The application for impleadment was filed by the applicant herein on

12.04.2024, almost after more than six years of registration of FIR. Further, the said application was also filed subsequent to [2025:RJ-JP:16929] (5 of 9) [CRLMA-376/2024] filing of application for attestation before the learned trial court on

09.04.2024. Thus, definitely, there was delay in filing of the application by the applicant herein before the learned trial court. Be that as it may. The arguments advanced by counsel for the applicant cannot be dealt with and considered at this stage after passing of the final order by this Court and as such same are of no avail to the applicant. This Court is not inclined to pass any comment at this stage as the criminal misc. petition has already been decided by this Court and by effect of provisions of Section 362 Cr.P.C. this Court cannot review or recall its final order.

7. Law is well settled that final judgment and order cannot be reviewed/recalled by the Court passing such judgment and order in absence of any express provision in the Code for the same. Section 362 of the Code operates as bar to any alteration or review of the cases disposed of by the Court. The singular exception to the said statutory bar is correction of clerical or arithmetical error by the Court. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Basit versus Abdul Kadir reported [2014] 10 SCC 754 has also held that since no express provision for review/recall of order exists under the Code, a criminal court becomes functus officio and Section 362 of the Code applies barring the review of judgment and order of the Court. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced hereinbelow for the sake of ready-reference:- “16. Since the submission made by the parties center round the interpretation to be placed upon Section 362 of the Code, it may be necessary to have a glance at the same. The heading of Section 362 of the Code provides for the "Court not to alter judgment" and the provision operates as a bar for the court to alter or review its decisions once pronounced. It reads as under: [2025:RJ-JP:16929] (6 of 9) [CRLMA-376/2024] Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error.

17. XX XX XX

18. XX XX XX

26. In Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa, (2001) 1 SCC 169 a criminal miscellaneous petition was filed by the Petitioner therein in a Writ Petition disposed of by the High Court. The High Court had not only entertained the said petition but also issued directions. In appeal, this Court annulled the judgment and order passed by the High Court on grounds that practice of filing miscellaneous petitions after the disposal of the main case and issuance of fresh directions in such miscellaneous petitions by the High Court are unwarranted, not referable to any statutory provision and in substance the abuse of the process of the court as no review of a final order passed by the High Court is contemplated under the Code. This Court has observed as under: “9. There is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure authorising the High Court to review its judgment passed either in exercise of its appellate or revisional or original criminal jurisdiction. Such a power cannot be exercised with the aid or under the cloak of Section 482 of the Code.

10. Section 362 of the Code mandates that no court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or an arithmetical error. The section is based on an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a court, the said court in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio and disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by law. The court becomes functus officio the moment the official order disposing of a case is signed. Such an order cannot be altered except to the extent of correcting a [2025:RJ-JP:16929] (7 of 9) [CRLMA-376/2024] clerical or an arithmetical error. The reliance of the Respondent on Talab Haji Hussain case is misconceived. Even in that case it was pointed that inherent powers conferred on High Courts Under Section 561-A (Section 482 of the new Code) has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only where such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is not disputed that the petition filed Under Section 482 of the Code had been finally disposed of by the High Court on 7-1-

1999. The new Section 362 of the Code which was drafted keeping in view the recommendations of the 41st report of the Law Commission and the Joint Select Committees appointed for the purpose, has extended the bar of review not only to the judgment but also to the final orders other than the judgment.

11. The impugned orders of the High Court dated 30-4-1999 and 21-7-1999 which are not referable to any statutory provisions, having been passed apparently in a review petition in a criminal case are without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed.”

27. This Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 has extended the bar Under Section 362 as a necessary check on inherent powers of the High Court Under Section 482. This Court has opined that the inherent power of the Court is not contemplated by the saving provision contained in Section 362 and, therefore, the attempt to invoke that power can be of no avail. This Court has observed as under: “5. Section 362 of the Code expressly provides that no court when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error save as otherwise provided by the Code. Section 482 enables the High Court to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The inherent powers, however, as much are controlled by principle and precedent as are its express powers by statute. If a matter is covered by an express letter of law, the court cannot give [2025:RJ-JP:16929] (8 of 9) [CRLMA-376/2024] a go-by to the statutory provisions and instead evolve a new provision in the garb of inherent jurisdiction.”

28. This Court in paragraph 30 of its decision in Central Bureau of Investigation v. V. Vijay Sai Reddy, (2013) 7 SCC 452 has cautioned that cancellation of bail necessarily involves the review of a decision already made, it should always be exercised very sparingly by the court of law.

29. It is a well settled proposition of law what cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly. While exercising a statutory power a Court is bound to act within the four corners of the Statute. The statutory exercise of the power stands on a different pedestal than the power of judicial review vested in a Court. The same has been upheld by this Court in Bay Berry Apartments (P) Ltd. and Anr. v. Shobha and Ors., (2006) 13 SCC 737, U.P. State Brass-ware Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. Uday Narain Pandey (2006) 1 SCC 479 and Rashmi Rekha Thatoi and Anr. v. State of Orissa and Ors., (2012) 5 SCC 690. It is the duty of the superior courts to follow the command of the statutory provisions and be guided by the precedents and issue directions which are permissible in law.

30. In the instant case, the order for bail in the bail application preferred by the accused Petitioners herein finally disposes of the issue in consideration and grants relief of bail to the applicants therein. Since, no express provision for review of order granting bail exists under the Code, the High Court becomes functus officio and Section 362 of the Code applies herein barring the review of judgment and order of the Court granting bail to the accused- Petitioners. Even though the cancellation of bail rides on the satisfaction and discretion of the Court Under Section 439(2) of the Code, it does not vest the power of review in the Court which granted bail. Even in the light of fact of misrepresentation by the accused-Petitioners during the grant of bail, the High Court could not have entertained the Respondent/informant's prayer by sitting in review of its judgment by entertaining miscellaneous petition.

31. Herein, the High Court has assigned an erroneous interpretation to the well settled position of law, assumed expanded jurisdiction onto itself and passed an order in [2025:RJ-JP:16929] (9 of 9) [CRLMA-376/2024] contravention of Section 362 of the Code cancelling the bail granted to the Petitioners herein. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the High Court is not justified in reviewing its earlier order of grant of bail and thus, the impugned judgment and order requires to be set aside.”

8. Thus, in view of the aforesaid factual position and applicability of bar on review/recall of the final judgment and order of the Court under Section 362 Cr.P.C as also law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Abdul Basit (supra), no ground is made out to accept the instant application seeking recalling/review of the order dated 22.04.2024. The misc. application stands dismissed accordingly. CHARU SONI /12 (ANIL KUMAR UPMAN), J