Dausa (Raj). vs State Of Rajasthan, Through Public Prosecutor.

Judgment

2. [2025:RJ-JP:36933] (2 of 6) [CRLMP-5222/2025] For Petitioner(s)

: Mr. Poonam Chand Sharma with For Respondent(s) Mr. Vishwas Saini for respondent No.2 (in CRLMP No.5498/2025) : Mr. Rishi Raj Singh Rathore, PP Mr. Bhawani Singh Saini for petitioners (in CRLMP No.5498/2025) HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDESH BANSAL Order 11/09/2025

1. In Criminal Misc. Petition No. 5222/2025, a prayer has been made to quash FIR No. 294/2025 registered at Police Station Sikandra, District Dausa for offences punishable under Sections 115(2), 126(2), 189(2) and 352 of BNS and in Criminal Misc. Petition No. 5498/2025, a prayer has been made to quash FIR No. 292/2025, registered at Police Station Sikandra, District Dausa, for offences punishable under Sections 189(2), 115(2), 126(2), 333, 303(2) and 74 of BNS in view of compromise entered into between the parties.

2. It has inter alia been stated that cross FIRs came to be registered, due to accrual of a dispute and quarrel between the parties, on the issue of land in question and in the scuffle, grievous injury on head was received by one Banwari Lal. Injuries to other injured have been stated to be simple in nature.

3. It has inter alia been stated that due to head injury to injured Banwari Lal, during investigation, police added offence under Section 109(1) in FIR No.294/2025, but Banwari Lal has produced his affidavit that such injuries is not attributable to any of the accused, rather in the scuffle, he fell down on the ground and received head injury from stone lying on the ground. [2025:RJ-JP:36933] (3 of 6) [CRLMP-5222/2025]

4. Separate original compromise, entered into between the parties, have been placed on record in both the files.

5. It has inter alia been stated that once both the parties have entered into compromise and do not want to prosecute each other further in the present matters and both the impugned FIRs were registered on account of their personal and private dispute, which has been resolved amicably, it would be in the interest of justice to quash both the FIRs and all proceedings arising therefrom.

6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab[(2012) 10 SCC 303] observed as follows: “57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. 58. Where High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that dispute between the offender and victim has been settled although offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrong doing that seriously endangers and threatens well- being of society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without permission of the Court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc; or other offences of mental depravity under Indian Penal Code or [2025:RJ-JP:36933] (4 of 6) [CRLMP-5222/2025] offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between offender and victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to victim and the offender and victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or F.I.R if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard and fast category can be prescribed.”

7. Following the analogy expounded by the Apex Court in case of Gian Singh (Supra), while dealing with the issue to allow settlement for offence under Section 307 IPC, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Narendra Singh Vs. State of Punjab: [(2014)6 SCC 466] observed that the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. may not be refused merely on a ground that the FIR/ Charge-sheet incorporate the offence under Section 307 IPC. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered observations made in case of Dimpey Gujral V. UT:[(2013)11 SCC 497] accepting the settlement between parties for offence under Section 307 IPC and observed as under:- “Having said so, we would hasen to add that though it is a serious offence as the accused person(s) attempted to take the life of another person/ victim, at the same time the court cannot be oblivious to hard realities that many times whenever there is a quarrel between the parties leading to physical commotion and sustaining of injury by either or both the parties, there is a tendency to give it a slant of an offence under Section 307 IPC as well. Therefore, only [2025:RJ-JP:36933] (5 of 6) [CRLMP-5222/2025] because FIR/ charge-sheet incorporates the provision of Section 307 IPC would not, by itself, be a ground to reject the petition under Section 482 of the Code and refuse to accept the settlement between the parties. We are, therefore, of the opinion that while taking a call as to whether compromise in such cases should be effected or not, the High Court should go by the nature of injury sustained, the portion of the bodies where the injuries were inflicted (namely, whether injuries are caused at the vital/ delicate parts of the body) and the nature of weapons used, etc. On that basis, if it is found that there is a strong possibility of proving the charge under Section 307 IPC, once the evidence to that effect is led and injuries proved, the Court should not accept settlement between the parties. On the other hand, on the basis of prima facie assessment of the aforesaid circumstances, if the High Court forms an opinion that provisions of Section 307 IPC were unnecessarily included in the charge-sheet, the Court can accept the plea of compounding of the offence based on settlement between the parties.”

8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court recently in case of State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi Narayan [(2019) 5 SCC 688], after discussing the ratio expounded in case of Narendra Singh (supra), has held as under:- “15.4. offences Under Section 307 Indian Penal Code and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence Under Section 307 Indian Penal Code and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers Under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 Indian Penal Code in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 Indian Penal Code is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge Under Section 307 Indian Penal Code. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove” [2025:RJ-JP:36933] (6 of 6) [CRLMP-5222/2025]

9. In view of legal proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court in aforesaid cases, and considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case in hand, where prima facie offence under Section 109 of BNS (erstwhile Section 307 IPC) does not make out and inherent powers can be exercised to quash the criminal proceedings of both the cases, in view of settlement arrived at between parties, this Court deems it just and proper to allow the present misc. petitions.

10. As a final result, present criminal miscellaneous petitions are allowed and FIR Nos. 294/2025 & 292/2025 registered at Police Station Sikandra, District Dausa along with all consequential proceedings qua petitioners, are hereby dropped/ quashed.

11. All pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of. pcg/200-201 (SUDESH BANSAL),J