Distt. Sawaimadhopur v. State Of Rajasthan, Through P.P
Case Details
Acts & Sections
Cited in this judgment
Judgment
2. Versus State Of Rajasthan, Through P.P. Banti S/o Shri Kaduram, R/o Peepalda Police Station Khandar Distt. Sawaimadhopur.
3. Asharam S/o Shri Kishanlal, R/o Peepalda Police Station Khandar Distt. Sawaimadhopur. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s)
: Mr. Teeka Ram Meena For Respondent(s) : Mr. Devi Singh, PP with Mr. Gaurav Gupta, AAAG Mr. Tarun Jain HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK KUMAR JAIN 16/05/2025 Order
1. Instant S.B. Criminal Revision Petition is preferred by petitioner complainant aggrieved from judgment dated
20.05.2019 in criminal appeal no. 25/2019 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Sawai Madhopur whereby a criminal appeal preferred by complainant aggrieved from judgment of acquittal dated 12.11.2018 in criminal case no. 53/2013 was dismissed as is time barred.
2. Learned counsel for petitioner complainant submits that on the basis of Parcha Bayaan of complainant injured Hanuman FIR was registered by police and after investigation a charge-sheet was filed under Sections 324 and 326 IPC and 10 witnesses were [2025:RJ-JP:20866] (2 of 7) [CRLR-1778/2019] examined with documents to support the case of prosecution but the trial court has acquitted the respondent accused only on unconvincing reasons. He further submitted that the complainant has preferred an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. before the sessions court but same was dismissed on the ground that the appeal was barred by law of limitation as appeal filed after delay of five months. He further submitted that after acquittal on 12.11.2018 a copy of order was received on
26.11.2019 and appeal was filed on 27.04.2019 whereas 90 days or three months is statutory time available to file appeal, which means there was a delay of only two months but the appellate court without considering that appellant is an agriculturist and was busy in cultivating the crops has not considered the grounds in right spirit and dismissed the appeal only on technical ground. The further submitted that the instant revision petition is preferred to challenge the order of appellate court.
3. Aforesaid contentions were opposed by learned Public Prosecutor and learned counsel for respondent nos. 2 and 3 and he submitted that the appellate court has rightly dismissed the appeal as the complainant was negligent and he was unable to show sufficient cause for condonation of delay. He also submitted that the trial court after considering the evidence on record has acquitted the respondents accused.
4. Heard learned counsel for parties and learned Public Prosecutor. Perused the record.
5. On the basis of Parcha Bayaan of petitioner complainant Hanuman (PW-2) FIR no. 19/2013 was registered at P.S. Khandar, District Sawai Madhopur and after investigation a charge-sheet [2025:RJ-JP:20866] (3 of 7) [CRLR-1778/2019] was filed against Bunti and Asha Ram under Sections 323, 341, 324, 326 and 34 IPC. After framing the charge the prosecution has examined 10 witnesses and exhibited 10 documents. The accused were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and they have not submitted any defence evidence but one document was exhibited by them. The trial court has acquitted the respondent nos. 2 and 3, from all the charges.
6. The complainant has filed an appeal under the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. with an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act for condonation of delay. The facts mentioned in order clearly indicate that after order of acquittal on 12.11.2018 an application for copy was filed on 22.11.2018 and a copy was received on 26.11.2018, but the appeal was filed on 27.04.2019. As per appellate court there was prescribed period of limitation of 90 days to file an appeal from judgment of acquittal. If we consider this period then the period of delay is around 2 months and according to appellant he was busy in agricultural work. We have consider the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act filed for condonation of delay, supported with affidavit of Hanuman but on the contrary there is no affidavit of respondents accused.
7. Section 5 of Limitation Act allows for extension of prescribed period for filing appeal even after the period of limitation has expired. The extension is normally granted if appellant can satisfy the Court that he has a sufficient cause for not filing appeal within a prescribed period. The sufficient cause was described as a cause beyond the control of the party and not attributable to negligence or lack of deligence. The Court has discretion to accept or reject [2025:RJ-JP:20866] (4 of 7) [CRLR-1778/2019] the application for condonation of delay but it is duty of the Court to consider the reasons of delay.
8. Very recently condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act was considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of P. Subba Reddy (died) by LRs. And Ors. Vs. Special Deputy Collector (LA) 2024 INSC 286 wherein also it was held that unless sufficient cause is shown the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act cannot be allowed. The underlying provisions after harmonious construction of provision of law were formulated in following manner: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, [2025:RJ-JP:20866] (5 of 7) [CRLR-1778/2019] where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.
9. In case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Katiji AIR 1987 SC 1353, Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down following principles:
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. "Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay. every seconds delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in [2025:RJ-JP:20866] (6 of 7) [CRLR-1778/2019] injustice being done because of a non-deliberate
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.
10. Till date consistently it was held that the sufficient cause should not be narrowly construed rather they should be applied liberally to advance the ends of justice.
11. Herein this case, after charge-sheet before the trial court the prosecution was contacted by a Public Prosecutor, appointed by State, though the counsel for petitioner was present before the trial court but normally the complainant is not an active participant in the State sponsored litigation. The delay mentioned by complainant clearly indicate that he was an agriculturist and was busy in agricultural activities. The grounds appears to be justifiable in view of period of delay, therefore, the appellate court has committed serious error while dismissing the appeal only on technical grounds. A person cannot be deprived to ventillate his grievances only on technical grounds, when delay is not exorbitant, therefore, the instant revision petition is liable to be allowed.
12. In view of discussion made hereinabove, the instant revision petition is hereby allowed and judgment dated
20.05.2019 in criminal no. 25/2019 is set aside and criminal [2025:RJ-JP:20866] (7 of 7) [CRLR-1778/2019] appeal no. 25/2019 is remitted to the appellate court after revival. The appellate court is directed to condone the delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act and after restoration of criminal appeal no. 25/2019, decide the same on merits after opportunity of hearing to both the parties.
13. The parties are directed to appear before the appellate Court on 16.06.2025. (ASHOK KUMAR JAIN),J CHETNA BEHRANI /62