Nanta, Tehsil Ladpura, District Kota (Rajasthan). vs State Of Rajasthan, Through Principal Secretary,

Judgment

4. State Of Rajasthan, Through Principal Secretary, Department Of Mines And Geology, Secretarait, Jaipur. Joint Secretary, Govt Of Rajasthan, Department Of Mines, Secretariat, Jaipur. Additional Director, Mines (E And M), Directorate Of Mines And Geology, Rajasthan, Udaipur. Mining Engineer, Department Of Mines And Geology, Bundi-II. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s)

: Mr. Ashwani Kumar Chobisa For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rahul Lodha, Addl. GC JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR DHAND Order 09/09/2025

1. By way of filing this writ petition, a challenge has been led to the impugned order dated 18.11.2020 passed by the Additional Director (Mines) whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the impugned order dated 07.02.2020 has been rejected not on merits but on the ground of delay.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Mining Engineer passed the impugned order dated 07.02.2020, which was assailed by the petitioner by way of filing an appeal under Rules 63 & 65 of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2017 (for short “the Rules of 2017”) on 03.09.2020 along-with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for [2025:RJ-JP:36363] (2 of 6) [CW-12080/2025] condoning the delay in filing the appeal. Learned counsel submits that under the Rules of 2017, the period of limitation of filing an appeal is three months and the appellate authority has further power to condone three months additional delay. Learned counsel submits that a specific ground was taken by the petitioner in application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 that the order dated 07.02.2020 was not communicated to the petitioner and that was the precise reason for the delay in filing an appeal before the appellate authority. Learned counsel submits that these facts were not considered or appreciated by the appellate authority and the appeal has been rejected on a technical ground of delay without deciding the same on its merits. Learned counsel submits that, under these circumstances, the order impugned passed by the appellate authority is not sustainable in the eyes of law and is liable to be quashed and set-aside.

3. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgments passed by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court at Principal Seat at Jodhpur in the case of Mohan Ram Vs. The State of Rajasthan & Ors. while deciding S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.9092/2021 and Madan Lal Vs. The State of Rajasthan while deciding S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.14920/2017.

4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents opposed the arguments raised by learned counsel for the petitioner, but he is not in a position to controvert the submissions made by counsel for the petitioner.

5. Heard and considered the submissions made at the Bar and perused the material available on the record. [2025:RJ-JP:36363] (3 of 6) [CW-12080/2025]

6. Perusal of the record indicates that against the order dated

07.02.2020 passed by the Mining Engineer, an appeal was preferred by the petitioner under Rules 63 & 65 of the Rules of 2017 along-with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay on the ground that aforesaid order was not communicated to the petitioner.

7. It is worthy to note here that the date of impugned order passed by the Mining Engineer is 07.02.2020 while the appeal was preferred on 03.11.2020. The Appellate Authority without deciding the application submitted by the petitioner under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and without considering the reasons of delay, the appeal has been rejected on the ground of delay. The co- ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Mohan Ram (supra) has dealt with the identical situation, wherein it has held in Paras 9 to 18 as under:- “9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the material on record, this Court finds that the impugned order passed by the Appellate Authority is unreasoned besides being contrary to statutory provision of Rule 63 (4) of the Rules of 2017, which is being reproduced herein under:- “63. Appeal. - (1) Any person aggrieved by any order of the Superintending Mining Engineer, Superintending Mining Engineer (Vigilance), Mining Engineer, Mining Engineer (Vigilance), Assistant Mining Engineer or Assistant Mining Engineer (Vigilance) passed under these rules shall have the right of appeal to the Additional Director Mines authorized by the Government. (2) Any person aggrieved by any order passed in appeal under sub-rule (1) or any other order passed by the Director or Additional Director [2025:RJ-JP:36363] (4 of 6) [CW-12080/2025] Mines under these rules shall have the right of appeal to the Government. (3) Every appeal shall be made in Form -29 in duplicate and shall be accompanied by a fee of rupees five thousand. (4) An appeal shall be filed within three months of the date of communication of the order appealed against: Provided that an appeal may be admitted after the said period if the appellate authority is satisfied that the appellant has sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the said period but the appeal shall not be admitted after expiry of six month from the date of order appealed against.”

10. It is to be noted that the proviso to sub rule (4) of Rule 63 provides the Appellate Authority possesses the power to admit an appeal even after expiry of the period of three months from the date of communication of the order, however, before the expiry of the period of six months.

11. A look at the impugned order reveals that the Appellate Authority has rejected the appeal by simply observing that more than six months’ period has since passed, from the date of impugned order (05.09.2018), without ascertaining as to when the order under appeal was served.

12. In the opinion of this Court, the statutory provisions, so also judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Madan Lal (supra), clearly provides that the Appellate Authority is required to reckon the limitation period from the date of communication of the impugned order. But, in the instant case the Appellate Authority has not even examined or recorded the finding as to when the order under appeal was served/communicated.

13. This being the position, writ petition is allowed. Impugned order dated 16.04.2021 is hereby quashed and set aside. [2025:RJ-JP:36363] (5 of 6) [CW-12080/2025]

14. The Courts often come across such instances where the appellants plead in their condonation applications under Rule 63(4) of the Rules of 2017 read with Section 5 of Limitation Act that the order impugned was not served upon them. It is intriguing to note that neither the appellants indicate the specific date as to when the order under appeal was received/served nor does the Appellate Authority record a finding about the date of service. And, appeals without seeking condonation of delay are rejected cursorily while simply observing that the appeal has been filed after six months of the date of impugned order.

15. Therefore, the Appellate Authority while deciding the application under rule 63(4) of the Rules of 2017 shall at the first instance record a finding about the date of communication or receipt of the order, then proceed to decide the application for condonation of delay in accordance with law.

16. For the purpose aforesaid, the Appellate Authority will be required to either call for the requisite record from the authority concerned or take a categorical affidavit in relation to service of the order from the concerned parties.

17. Upon the date of communication being ascertained, the Appellate Authority shall calculate the period of three/six months, commencing from such date. In case the delay is not beyond the maximum period of delay which can be condoned in terms of proviso to Rule 63(4) of the Rules of 2017, he/she would condone the delay, of course, if sufficient reasons have been shown.

18. The appeal before the Appellate Authority is restored. It will be required of the petitioner to place a copy of the instant order before the Appellate Authority within a period of four weeks, on receipt of a copy of the order the Appellate Authority in turn shall issue a notice to the petitioner indicating the date of hearing, whereafter [2025:RJ-JP:36363] (6 of 6) [CW-12080/2025] application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal shall be considered and decided in accordance with law and in terms of the directions given hereinabove.”

8. Since the controversy involved in this writ petition has already been set at rest by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Mohan Ram (supra), wherein it has been specifically held that if the order is not communicated and if any delay occurs, on that count alone the matter is required to be heard on its merits, but the same should not be rejected on the ground of delay.

9. Considering the above proposition of law as laid down by the co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Mohan Ram (supra), this writ petition deserves acceptance.

10. Accordingly, the order impugned passed by the Appellate Authority dated 18.11.2020 stands quashed and set-aside. The matter is remitted to the appellate authority for fresh decision and adjudication on its merits.

11. Needless to observe that fresh orders would be passed by the appellate authority after providing due opportunity of hearing to both respective parties strictly in accordance with law by passing a reasoned and speaking order.

12. The petitioner would be at liberty to file stay application. In case, any such stay application is submitted, the same would be decided strictly in accordance with law.

13. Accordingly, the writ petition, stay application as well as all applications (pending, if any) also stand disposed of. Karan/10 (ANOOP KUMAR DHAND),J