✦ Rajasthan High Court · 18 Sep 2012

Roshan Lal Saini v. Raj. Housing Board Jaipur

S.B. CIVIL MISC. APPLICATION No. 231 of 2011ALOK SHARMA4 min read

Case at a glance

Judgment

Mr. A.K. Gupta ] for respondent. Mr. Rinesh Gupta] This application has been filed for recall of the order dated 4- 1-2006 and the order in review dated 12-10-2006 passed by this court in writ petition No.4551/2004. Vide order dated 4-1-2006 this court held that as the petitioner had an efficacious alternative remedy by way of raising an industrial dispute before appropriate forum, no interference was called for under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Vide order dated 12-10-2006 the review petition against the order dated 4-1- 2006 was dismissed. Counsel for the petitioner submits that even though the Rajasthan Housing Board (herein after `the Board') has taken a stand before the Single Bench and Division Bench of this court as also before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the petitioner is a workman, yet in the proceedings before the Assistant Labour Commissioner cum Conciliation Officer, where the industrial dispute was sought to 2 be raised, the Board took a stand that the petitioner was not a workman.

It is submitted that the Conciliation Officer was thereupon pleased to refer the matter to the Government recording the objection of the Board to the petitioner being treated as a workman entitled to raise an industrial dispute, whereupon the State Government has made a reference of the dispute under Section 10 (2) A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the Labour Court. Counsel submits that the reference made to Labour Court is as to whether the petitioner Roshan Lal Saini falls within the meaning of workman under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and if so whether his removal from service under order dated 3-1-2003 was legal and valid? Counsel for the petitioner has emphatically argued that in view of the contradictory stand of the Board before this court and Supreme Court on the one hand and before the Conciliation Officer on the other, the orders dated 4-1-2006 and 12-1-2006 be recalled and the matter be addressed by this court on the question of the legality of the petitioner's termination dated 3-1-2003.

Learned counsel for the respondent Board has opposed the application filed by the petitioner. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the Misc. application, I am of the view that the application for recall of the orders dated 4-1-2006 and 12-10-2006 is liable to be dismissed only on the ground it has been filed belatedly after about 3 five years. In the meantime the order dated 4-1-2006 passed by the learned Single Judge has been considered by the Division Bench of this court and thereafter in proceedings against dismissal of a review petition, also by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. All along the respondent Board has taken a stand that the petitioner was a workman. Merely on the Board taking a different stand before the Conciliation Officer under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and potentially before the Labour Court it is doubtful whether the Board will be allowed to renege on its stand before this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

But that is a matter to be considered by the Industrial Tribunal/ Labour Court as and when it becomes seized of the matter. It is for the petitioner to agitate the doctrine of estoppel against the Board on this count before the competent Court on the reference made by the State Government. Thereupon law will take its own course. In view of above, I find no force in the misc. application and the same is dismissed. However, it is apparent that the respondent Board has taken contradictory stands before this court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the one hand and before the Conciliation Officer on the other and has acted as a sleazy litigant and not as a fair and model employer as it should as a State Corporation, quite clearly only to harass the petitioner, who is present in court and bewildered at the blatant misuse of judicial process by the Board to non suit the 4 petitioner before different forums by agitating contradictory defences, I would thus in the exercise of this court's extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India direct the Rajasthan Housing Board to pay costs of Rs.10,000/- to the petitioner for the costs of the application within a period of sixty days from today.

Quite apparently the present application even though belated as it is, has been an outcome of the petitioner's frustration with the shenanigans of the Board in cynically taking contradictory stands and delaying the adjudication of the petitioner's claim that he was illegally removed from service by the Board and is entitled to reinstatement and consequential benefits. I would therefore also again drawing on the equitable extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India direct the concerned Industrial Tribunal/ Labour Court to dispose of the reference made by the State qua the petitioner's termination dated 3– 1-2003 by the Board, for whatever its worth, within six months from the furnishing of a certified copy of this order. (Alok Sharma),J. arn/ 5 All corrections made in the order have been incorporated in the order being emailed. Arun Kumar Sharma, Private Secretary.

Questions this judgment answers

Which statutory provisions did this judgment involve?

Constitution of India — art. 226; Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Which court decided this case, and when?

Rajasthan High Court, on 18 Sep 2012. The bench was ALOK SHARMA.

Precedent status how later indexed judgments have treated this case

No known negative treatment found in the Courts & Cases corpus.

This is a result about the indexed corpus, not a finding that the judgment remains good law. Coverage may be incomplete.

Why is this linked?

This is the original judgment text, reproduced from the public court record. Always verify it against the official record before relying on it in a filing — check it on Rajasthan High Court or eCourts case status (search case no. S.B. CIVIL MISC. APPLICATION No. 231 of 2011). ← Search more judgments