Caritas Infra Consulting Pvt. Ltd., Having Its Corporate Office At v. Rajasthan State Road Development And Construction

: Mr.Rakesh Choudhary with Mr.Siddharth Jain & Mr.Naveen For Respondent(s) : Mr.Jaivardhan Singh Shekhawat JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR DHAND Order 14/08/2025

1. Since common question of facts and law are involved in these applications, hence, with the consent of parties, arguments have been heard together and these applications are being decided by this common order.

2. These arbitration applications have been submitted under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, “the Act of 1996”) for appointment of Arbitrator for adjudicating of dispute arises between the parties.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that four different agreements were executed between the parties with regard to preparation of Detailed Project Report (DPR) for the development of certain highways, the names of the respective highways have [2025:RJ-JP:31983] (3 of 21) [ARBAP-76/2024] been mentioned in the respective agreements executed between the parties.

4. Counsel submits that as per Clause-2.4 of the Agreement, the agreement shall expire when the services have been completed and a period of 90 days have elapsed after all payments due under the agreement have been made. Counsel submits that as per Clause-12 of the Agreement, a complete description with regard to the stages of payment has been provided whereby, 10% amount of payment was to be paid on submission of the Insception Report, 20% on submission of Draft Detailed Project Report, Bidding Documents Land Acquisition Report, 30% on approval of Final Detailed Project Report and Bidding Document and 30% of the amount was to be paid on submission of the required Project Clearance from the concerned agencies and remaining 10% payment was to be made on completion of the project. Counsel submits that till date, the respondents have not issued any letter/ document indicating therein that the project has been completed. Counsel submits that when the required payment was not made by the respondents, a registered legal notice was served in the Office of the respondents for payment of the Arbitrator for resolving the dispute that had occurred between the parties and in spite of receipt of the aforesaid notice, no steps were taken for resolving the dispute between the parties by the respondents by way of giving consent for payment of the Arbitrator.

5. Counsel submits that there is no delay in filing these applications under Section 11(6) of the Act of 1996, as per Section 18 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, “the Act of [2025:RJ-JP:31983] (4 of 21) [ARBAP-76/2024] 1963”), since there is acceptance of juror relationship between the parties. Counsel submits that even the issue regarding Extension of Time (EOT) was raised on 05.03.2017 and the final EOT was thereby allowed, but the said issue was later dropped and thereafter, no correspondence was made from the end of the respondents, hence, under these circumstances, the dispute which has arisen between the parties with regard to non-payment of dues is required to be resolved by way of arbitration, therefore, these applications submitted by the petitioner may be allowed and the matter be referred to the Arbitrator.

6. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of J.C. Budhraja Vs. Chairman, Orissa Mining Corporation Ltd. and Anr. reported in AIR 2008 SC 1363. Counsel submits that even the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation while deciding the Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No.3 of 2020 has extended the limitation period of approaching the Court on account of spread of the global pandemic COVID-19. Counsel submits that in the instant case as well, the application could not be submitted within the intervening period, since the pandemic COVID-19 was prevailing in the country.

7. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents opposed the arguments raised by counsel for the petitioner and submits that the preparation of DPR work for Dabok-Mavli-Fatehnagar-Kapasan- Chittorgarh Road Project, Pali (Ramasiya)-Busi-Nadol-Desuri- Gomti Ka Chouraha Road Project Road Highway and for Hanumangarh-Pilibanga-Suratgarh Highway Road, the date of [2025:RJ-JP:31983] (5 of 21) [ARBAP-76/2024] commencement of project was 12.03.2010, 07.05.2010 &

14.05.2010 respectively and the date of completion of the aforesaid work was 29.07.2010, 23.11.2010 & 23.11.2010 respectively. Counsel further submits that for preparation of DPR for Kota-Kaithoon-Sangod-Bapawer Road (SH-51) from 9/600 to 72/0 highway, the date of commencement of project was

07.08.2012 and the date of completion of the aforesaid work was

02.04.2014. Counsel submits that the period of limitation for invoking the arbitral jurisdiction of this Court has expired after three years of the date of completion of the contract. Counsel submits that as per Section 43 of the Act of 1996, the period of limitation would apply in such like matters, as per the provisions contained under Article 137 of the Act of 1963. Counsel submits that as per Article 137 of the Act of 1963, the period of of limitation for filing an application is three years from the date when the right to apply accrues. Counsel submits that the right to apply in three matters accrued in the year 2010 and in one of the matters, accrued in the year 2014. Last payment for Dabok-Mavli- Fatehnagar-Kapasan-Chittorgarh Road Project was made in the year 2015, but the petitioner remained silent for a considerable time and even the legal notice was sent by the petitioner only on

22.06.2021 and in spite of that the instant applications have not been submitted within three years of the date of issuance of the aforesaid notice rather these applications have been filed after expiry of the said period, hence, under these circumstances, these applications are barred by limitation and are liable to be rejected on this count alone. [2025:RJ-JP:31983] (6 of 21) [ARBAP-76/2024]

8. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of B and T AG. Vs. Ministry of Defence reported in (2024) 5 SCC 358 and Arif Azim Company Limited Vs. Aptech Limited reported in (2024) 5 SCC 313.

9. Heard and considered the submissions made at the Bar and perused the material available on record.

10. Perusal of the record indicates that four different agreements were executed between the parties for preparation of four different DPRs, i.e., one for Kota-Kaithoon-Sangod-Bapawer Road (SH-51) from 9/600 to 72/0 highway and the date of commencement of the contract was 07.08.2012 and the date of completion was 02.04.2014.

11. For preparation of DPR for Hanumangarh-Pilibanga-Suratgarh Highway Road, the date of commencement of the contract was

14.05.2010 and the date of completion was 23.11.2010 and for Dabok-Mavli-Fatehnagar-Kapasan-Chittorgarh Road Project, the date of commencement of the contract was 12.03.2010 and the date of completion was 29.07.2010 and for Pali (Ramasiya)-Busi- Nadol-Desuri-Gomti Ka Chouraha Road Project Roadh Highway, the date of commencement of the contract was 07.05.2010 and the date of completion was 23.11.2010.

12. Now, the question remains for consideration of this Court as to whether the instant applications have been submitted within the period of limitation or the same have been preferred beyond the period prescribed under Section 43 of the Act of 1996 and under Article 137 of the Act of 1963. The similar issue involved in these applications came before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case [2025:RJ-JP:31983] (7 of 21) [ARBAP-76/2024] of Arif Azim Company Limited (supra), where the following questions was formulated – when does the right to apply under Section 11(6) of the Act of 1996 accrue?

13. This question was dealt and decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Para-53 to 58 as follows:- “53. It has been held in a catena of decisions of this Court that the limitation period for making an application seeking appointment of arbitrator must not be conflated or confused with the limitation period for raising the substantive claims which are sought to be referred to an Arbitral Tribunal. The limitation period for filing an application seeking appointment of arbitrator commences only after a valid notice invoking arbitration has been issued by one of the parties to the other party and there has been either a failure or refusal on the part of the other party to make an appointment as per the appointment procedure agreed upon between the parties.

54. O.P. Malhotra in The Law and Practice of Arbitration and Conciliation, 3rd Edn., pp. 688-89 has summarised the position of law on the limitation period for a Section 11(6) petition thus: “There is no specific period of limitation prescribed for making the request under Section 11(6) to the Chief Justice or his designate, to take the necessary measure for appointing an arbitrator. Therefore, Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which provides the limitation period of three years for filing any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the third division of the Schedule to the Act from the day when the right to apply accrues. It is the residuary [2025:RJ-JP:31983] (8 of 21) [ARBAP-76/2024] article in regard to the applications, and it can only be applied if no other article is applicable. It would only apply to an application where it is required by law to be made. It is restricted to applications for the exercise of the Acts and powers which the Court is not bound to perform suo motu. Therefore, the period of limitation for making a request under Section 11(6) is three years, and the limitation is to be counted from the date on which 30 days from the date of notice by one party to the other for appointing arbitrator expires. The question whether the claims/disputes made in reference to arbitration was valid is a question to be decided by the arbitrator, and not by the appointing authority of the arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Act. The appointing authority is certainly required to ascertain whether the application under Section 11(6) of the Act was barred by time.” (emphasis supplied)

55. Dr P.C. Markanda in Law Pertaining to Arbitration and Conciliation, 9th Edn., LexisNexis, pp. 550-51 has discussed on the applicability of law of limitation to a petition under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act as follows: “For the purpose of examining the right of the petitioner to apply under sub-section (6) for calculating the period of limitation, it is necessary to establish, in the first instance, the relevant date when the right to apply accrued in favour of the petitioner. It is the date on which the right to apply accrues that determines the starting point. The starting point does not coincide with the date on which the cause of action for filing a suit arises. Whether the claims of a party are barred by limitation or not is for the arbitrator to see, but it is [2025:RJ-JP:31983] (9 of 21) [ARBAP-76/2024] the duty of the Court to see whether the application filed in the Court is within limitation or not. Limitation for filing application under sub- section (4) would commence only from the expiry of 30 days from the receipt of request mentioned in sub-section (4)(a) or (b) and the limitation for an application under sub-section (6) would commence contingencies mentioned in sub-clauses (a) or (b) or (c) thereof. The procedure prescribed under this section is mandatory and Article 137, Limitation Act providing for limitation shall apply. from the happening of * * * It would be entirely wrong to mix the two aspects, namely, whether there was any valid claim and secondly the claim to be adjudicated by the arbitrator was barred by time. As for the second matter, it is for the arbitrator to see whether the claim was within limitation or not and the Court should confine itself to see whether the application made to the Court is within limitation. An application made more than three years after the accrual of cause of action is palpably time-barred and liable to be dismissed. Article 137 of the Limitation Act makes it obligatory for claims to be filed within 3 years of the rescission/termination of the contract. The right of action for the department starts from the date when the work is rescinded and not from the date when the balance work is got completed through another agency. If the petitioner delays invocation of arbitration clause for months together for no justifiable cause after the period prescribed in the arbitration agreement had elapsed, the Court would not come to the rescue of such a party seeking appointment of arbitrator and the abnormal delay of more than a year cannot be condoned.” (emphasis supplied)

56. This Court in BSNL v. Nortel Networks (India) (P) Ltd. [BSNL v. Nortel Networks (India) (P) Ltd., (2021) 5 SCC 738] held thus : (SCC p. 752, paras 15-16) “15. It is now fairly well settled that the limitation for filing an application under Section 11 would arise upon the failure to make the appointment of [2025:RJ-JP:31983] (10 of 21) [ARBAP-76/2024] the arbitrator within a period of 30 days from issuance of the notice invoking arbitration. In other words, an application under Section 11 can be filed only after a notice of arbitration in respect of the particular claim(s)/dispute(s) to be referred to arbitration [as contemplated by Section 21 of the Act] is made, and there is failure to make the appointment.

16. The period of limitation for filing a petition seeking appointment of an arbitrator(s) cannot be confused or conflated with the period of limitation applicable to the substantive claims made in the underlying commercial contract. The period of limitation for such claims is prescribed under various Articles of the Limitation Act, 1963. The limitation for deciding the underlying substantive disputes is necessarily distinct from that of filing an application for appointment of an arbitrator. This position was recognised even under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Reference may be made to the judgment of this Court in J.C. Budhraja v. Orissa Mining Corpn. Ltd. [J.C. Budhraja v. Orissa Mining Corpn. Ltd., (2008) 2 SCC 444 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 582] wherein it was held that Section 37(3) of the 1940 Act provides that for the purpose of the Limitation Act, an arbitration is deemed to have commenced when one party to the arbitration agreement serves on the other party, a notice requiring the appointment of an arbitrator. Para 26 of this judgment [J.C. Budhraja v. Orissa Mining Corpn. Ltd., (2008) 2 SCC 444 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 582] reads as follows : ‘26. Section 37(3) of the Act provides that for the purpose of the Limitation Act, an arbitration is deemed to have been commenced when one party to the arbitration agreement serves on the other party thereto, a notice requiring the appointment of an arbitrator. Such a notice having been served on 4-6-1980, it has to be seen whether the claims were in time as on that date. If the claims were barred on 4-6-1980, it follows that the claims had to be rejected by the arbitrator on the ground that the claims were barred by limitation. The said period has nothing to do with the period of limitation for filing a [2025:RJ-JP:31983] (11 of 21) [ARBAP-76/2024] petition under Section 8(2) of the Act. Insofar as a petition under Section 8(2) is concerned, the cause of action would arise when the other party fails to comply with the notice invoking arbitration. Therefore, the period of limitation for filing a petition under Section 8(2) seeking appointment of an arbitrator cannot be confused with the period of limitation for making a claim. The decisions of this Court in Inder Singh Rekhi v. DDA [Inder Singh Rekhi v. DDA, (1988) 2 SCC 338], Panchu Gopal Bose v. Port of Calcutta [Panchu Gopal Bose v. Port of Calcutta, (1993) 4 SCC 338] and Utkal Commercial Corpn. v. Central Coal Fields Ltd. [Utkal Commercial Corpn. v. Central Coal Fields Ltd., (1999) 2 SCC 571] also make this position clear.’ ”(emphasis supplied)

57. The other way of ascertaining the relevant point in time when the limitation period for making a Section 11(6) application would begin is by making use of Hohfeld's analysis of jural relations. It is a settled position of law that the limitation period under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will commence only after the right to apply has accrued in favour of the applicant. As per Hohfeld's scheme of jural relations, conferring of a right on one entity must entail the vesting of a corresponding duty in another. When an application under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act is made before this Court without exhausting the mechanism prescribed under the said sub-section, including that of invoking arbitration by issuance of a formal notice to the other party, this Court is not duty-bound to appoint an arbitrator and can reject the application for being premature and non- compliant with the statutory mandate. However, once the procedure laid down under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act is exhausted by the applicant and the application passes all other tests of limited judicial scrutiny as have been evolved by this Court over the [2025:RJ-JP:31983] (12 of 21) [ARBAP-76/2024] years, this Court becomes duty-bound to appoint an arbitrator and refer the matter to an Arbitral Tribunal. Thus, the “right to apply” of the applicant can be said to have as its jural corelative the “duty to appoint” of this Court only after all the steps required to be completed before instituting a Section 11(6) application have been duly completed. Thus, the limitation period for filing a petition under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act can only commence once a valid notice invoking arbitration has been sent by the applicant to the other party, and there has been a failure or refusal on part of that other party in complying with the requirements mentioned in such notice.

58. This Court in Utkal Commercial Corpn. v. Central Coal Fields Ltd. [Utkal Commercial Corpn. v. Central Coal Fields Ltd., (1999) 2 SCC 571] while determining a similar question in relation to the Arbitration Act, 1940 held thus : (SCC pp. 572-73, paras 6-9) “6. Therefore, the time for the purposes of limitation begins to run from the date when the right to make an application under Section 8 accrues. Section 8 of the Arbitration Act, which is relevant for our present purposes, is reproduced below: ‘8. Power of court to appoint arbitrator or umpire.—(1) In any of the following cases— (a) where an arbitration agreement provides that the reference shall be to one or more arbitrators to be appointed by consent of the parties, and all the parties do not, after differences have arisen, concur in the appointment or appointments; or (b)-(c) * * * any party may serve the other parties or the arbitrators, as the case may be, with a written notice to concur in the appointment or appointments or in supplying the vacancy. [2025:RJ-JP:31983] (13 of 21) [ARBAP-76/2024] (2) If the appointment is not made within fifteen clear days after service of the said notice, the court may, on the application of the party who gave the notice and after giving the other parties an opportunity of being heard, appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as the case may be, who shall have like power to act in the reference and to make an award as if he or they had been appointed by consent of all parties.’

7. Therefore, under Section 8, before an application can be made to the court under that section, the following requirements should be satisfied: (1) The arbitration agreement should provide for appointment of arbitrator(s) by consent. (2) Parties do not concur in the appointment of an arbitrator. (3) One party serves notice on the other party to concur in the appointment. (4) No appointment is made within 15 days of the service of the notice.

8. Thereupon the court may, on the application of the party who gave the notice and after giving the other party an opportunity of being heard, appoint an arbitrator.

9. In view of the express language of Section 8, it is quite clear that unless a party who desires to apply has resorted to the process set out in Section 8, and has failed to secure the concurrence of the other party to the appointment of an arbitrator within the prescribed period, the court will not intervene under Section 8. The right to apply under Section 8, therefore, would accrue when, within 15 clear days of the notice, the other parties do not concur in the appointment of an arbitrator.”” [2025:RJ-JP:31983] (14 of 21) [ARBAP-76/2024]

14. Likewise, the second question formulated was – when does the cause of action arise? This issue was considered and decided in Paras-79 to 87 as under:- “79. We are not impressed with the submission canvassed on behalf of the respondent that the cause of action for raising the claims arose on 1-11-2017 and thus the limitation period for invoking arbitration should commence from the said date. The petitioner has alleged that the respondent received the payment for the course from ICCR on 3-10-2017. However, the perusal of the communication exchanged between the parties indicates that it is only on 28-3-2018 that the right of the petitioner to bring a claim against the respondent could be said to have been crystallised. The position of law is settled that mere failure to pay may not give rise to a cause of action. However, once the applicant has asserted its claim and the respondent has either denied such claim or failed to reply to it, the cause of action will arise after such denial or failure.

80. In B & T AG [B & T AG v. Union of India, (2024) 5 SCC 358] three principles of law came to be enunciated by this Court regarding the manner in which the point in time when the cause of action arose may be determined. First, that the right to receive the payment ordinarily begins upon completion of the work. Secondly, a dispute arises only when there is a claim by one side and its denial/repudiation by the other and thirdly, the accrual of cause of action cannot be indefinitely postponed by repeatedly writing letters or sending reminders. It was further emphasised by this Court that it was important to find out the “breaking point” at which any reasonable party would have abandoned [2025:RJ-JP:31983] (15 of 21) [ARBAP-76/2024] the efforts at arriving at a settlement and contemplated referral of the dispute to arbitration. Such breaking point would then become the date on which the cause of action could be said to have commenced.

81. This Court in Inder Singh Rekhi v. DDA [Inder Singh Rekhi v. DDA, (1988) 2 SCC 338] held as follows : (SCC p. 340, para 4) “4. Therefore, in order to be entitled to order of reference under Section 20, it is necessary that there should be an arbitration agreement and secondly, difference must arise to which this agreement applied. In this case, there is no dispute that there was an arbitration agreement. There has been an assertion of claim by the appellant and silence as well as refusal in respect of the same by the respondent. Therefore, a dispute has arisen regarding non-payment of the alleged dues of the appellant. The question is for the present case when did such dispute arise. The High Court proceeded on the basis that the work was completed in 1980 and, therefore, the appellant became entitled to the payment from that date and the cause of action under Article 137 arose from that date. But in order to be entitled to ask for a reference under Section 20 of the Act there must not only be an entitlement to money but there must be a difference or dispute must arise. It is true that on completion of the work a right to get payment would normally arise but where the final bills as in this case have not been prepared as appears from the record and when the assertion of the claim was made on 28-2-1983 and there was non-payment, the cause of action arose from that date, that is to say, 28-2-1983. It is also true that a party cannot postpone the accrual of cause of action by writing reminders or sending reminders but where the bill had not been finally prepared, the claim made by a claimant is the accrual of the cause of action. A dispute arises where there is a claim and a denial and repudiation of the claim. The existence of dispute is essential for appointment of an arbitrator under Section 8 or a [2025:RJ-JP:31983] (16 of 21) [ARBAP-76/2024] reference under Section 20 of the Act. See Law of Arbitration by R.S. Bachawat, Ist Edn. p. 354. There should be dispute and there can only be a dispute when a claim is asserted by one party and denied by the other on whatever grounds. Mere failure or inaction to pay does not lead to the inference of the existence of dispute. Dispute entails a positive element and assertion of denying, not merely inaction to accede to a claim or a request. Whether in a particular case a dispute has arisen or not has to be found out from the facts and circumstances of the case.”

82. In Geo Miller [Geo Miller & Co. (P) Ltd. v. Rajasthan Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd., (2020) 14 SCC 643] , this Court held thus : (SCC p. 652, paras 28- 29) “28. Having perused through the relevant precedents, we agree that on a certain set of facts and circumstances, the period during which the parties were bona fide negotiating towards an amicable settlement may be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of limitation for reference to arbitration under the 1996 Act. However, in such cases the entire negotiation history between the parties must be specifically pleaded and placed on the record. The Court upon careful consideration of such history must find out what was the “breaking point” at which any reasonable party would have abandoned efforts at arriving at a settlement and contemplated referral of the dispute for arbitration. This “breaking point” would then be treated as the date on which the cause of action arises, for the purpose of limitation. The threshold for determining when such a point arises will be lower in the case of commercial disputes, where the party's primary interest is in securing the payment due to them, than in family disputes where it may be said that the parties have a greater stake in settling the dispute amicably, and therefore delaying formal adjudication of the claim. 29. Moreover, in a commercial dispute, while mere failure to pay may not give rise to a cause of action, once the applicant has asserted their claim [2025:RJ-JP:31983] (17 of 21) [ARBAP-76/2024] and the respondent fails to respond to such claim, such failure will be treated as a denial of the applicant's claim giving rise to a dispute, and therefore the cause of action for reference to arbitration. It does not lie to the applicant to plead that it waited for an unreasonably long period to refer the dispute to arbitration merely on account of the respondent's failure to settle their claim and because they were writing representations and reminders to the respondent in the meanwhile.”

83. The petitioner completed the course sometime in April and a letter to this effect was issued on 30-7- 2017 by EoI, Kabul. Allegedly, ICCR made payment to the respondent on 3-10-2017. However, the right of the petitioner to raise the claim could only be said to have accrued after the petitioner made a positive assertion in March 2018 which was denied by the respondent vide email dated 28-3-2018. Another reminder through email was given by the petitioner on 29-12-2018, however, mere giving reminders and sending of letters would not extend the cause of action any further from 28-3-2018 on which date the rights of the petitioner could be said to have been crystallised.

84. Thus, in ordinary circumstances, the limitation period available to the petitioner for raising a claim would have come to an end after an expiry of three years, that is, on 27-3-2021. However, in March 2020, the entire world was taken under the grip of the deadly COVID-19 Pandemic bringing everyday life and commercial activity to a complete halt across the globe. Taking cognizance of this unfortunate turn of events, this Court vide order dated 23-3-2020 passed in Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, (2020) 19 SCC 10 : (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 801] directed the period commencing from 15-3-2020 to be excluded [2025:RJ-JP:31983] (18 of 21) [ARBAP-76/2024] for the purposes of computation of limitation. The said extension of limitation was extended from time to time by this Court in view of the continuing pandemic. As a result, the period from 15-3-2020 to 28-2-2022 was finally determined to be excluded for the computation of limitation. It was provided that the balance period of limitation as available on 15-3- 2020 would become available from 1-3-2022.

85. The operative part of the order dated 10-1-2022 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, (2022) 3 SCC 117 : (2022) 2 SCC (Civ) 46 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2022) 1 SCC (L&S) 501] is extracted hereinbelow : (Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re case [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, (2022) 3 SCC 117 : (2022) 2 SCC (Civ) 46 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 580 : (2022) 1 SCC (L&S) 501] , SCC pp. 119-20, para 5) “5. Taking into consideration the arguments advanced by the learned counsel and the impact of the surge of the virus on public health and adversities faced by litigants in the prevailing conditions, we deem it appropriate to dispose of MA No. 21 of 2022 with the following directions:

5.1. The order dated 23-3-2020 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, (2020) 19 SCC 10 : (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 801] is restored and in continuation of the subsequent orders dated 8-3- 2021 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, (2021) 5 SCC 452 : (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 40 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 615 : (2021) 2 SCC (L&S) 50] , 27-4-2021 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, (2021) 17 SCC 231] and 23-9-2021 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, (2021) 18 SCC 250] , it is directed that the period from 15-3-2020 till 28-2-2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. [2025:RJ-JP:31983] (19 of 21) [ARBAP-76/2024]

5.2. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 3-10-2021, if any, shall become available with effect from 1-3-2022.

5.3. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15-3-2020 till 28-2-2022, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 1-3-2022. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 1-3-2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply.

5.4. It is further clarified that the period from 15-3- 2020 till 28-2-2022 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23(4) and 29-A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12-A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings.”

86. The operation and effect of the aforesaid order was considered and explained by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Prakash Corporates v. Dee Vee Projects Ltd. [Prakash Corporates v. Dee Vee Projects Ltd., (2022) 5 SCC 112 : (2022) 3 SCC (Civ) 121 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 290 : (2022) 1 SCC (L&S) 771] as follows : (SCC p. 141, para 28) “28. As regards the operation and effect of the orders passed by this Court in SMWP No. 3 of 2020, noticeable it is that even though in the initial order dated 23-3-2020 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, (2020) 19 SCC 10 : (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 801] , this Court provided that the period of limitation in all the proceedings, irrespective of that prescribed under general or special laws, whether condonable or not, shall stand extended w.e.f. 15-3-2020 but, while concluding the matter on 23-9-2021 [Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, (2021) 18 SCC 250] , this Court specifically provided for exclusion of the period from 15-3-2020 till 2-10-2021. A look at the [2025:RJ-JP:31983] (20 of 21) [ARBAP-76/2024] scheme of the Limitation Act, 1963 makes it clear that while extension of prescribed period in relation to an appeal or certain applications has been envisaged under Section 5, the exclusion of time has been provided in the provisions like Sections 12 to 15 thereof. When a particular period is to be excluded in relation to any suit or proceeding, essentially the reason is that such a period is accepted by law to be the one not referable to any indolence on the part of the litigant, but being relatable to either the force of circumstances or other requirements of law (like that of mandatory two months' notice for a suit against the Government [ Vide Section 15 of the Limitation Act, 1963.] ). The excluded period, as a necessary consequence, results in enlargement of time, over and above the period prescribed.” (emphasis supplied)

87. The effect of the abovereferred order of this Court in the facts of the present case is that the balance limitation left on 15-3-2020 would become available w.e.f. 1-3-2022. The balance period of limitation remaining on 15-3-2020 can be calculated by computing the number of days between 15-3- 2020 and 27-3-2021, which is the day when the limitation period would have come to an end under ordinary circumstances. The balance period thus comes to 1 year 13 days. This period of 1 year 13 days becomes available to the petitioner from 1-3- 2022, thereby meaning that the limitation period available to the petitioner for invoking arbitration proceedings would have come to an end on 13-3-

2023.”

15. The crux of the aforesaid judgment is that the position of law is settled vis-a-vis the proposition that mere violation of payment of dues may not give any rise to cause of action and only once the applicant has asserted its claim and the respondents have either [2025:RJ-JP:31983] (21 of 21) [ARBAP-76/2024] denied such claim or failed to reply to it, the cause of action will arise after such denial or failure.

16. When the work assigned to the petitioner was completed way back in the year 2010 and 2014 and payment of certain projects was made to him in the year 2015 and thereafter, no payment was made, the petitioner remained silent from 2015 till 2021 and all of a sudden, he woke up in the year 2021 and sent a legal notice to the respondents for resolving the dispute arising between the parties by way of appointment of Arbitrator. Even thereafter, the petitioner kept silent and slept over his rights again for a period of more than three years and these applications have been finally filed in the year 2024, i.e., on 29.06.2024, even after expiry of limitation period. The petitioner cannot be granted liberty to sleep over his rights for a considerable amount of time and he cannot be allowed to wake up after an inordinate delay of a decade. Delay defeats equality. The Court helps those who are vigilant and do not slumber over their rights.

17. In the considered opinion of this Court, these applications miserably suffer from violation of the period of limitation as prescribed under Section 43 of the Act of 1996 and Article 137 of the Act of 1963.

18. On this count alone, all these applications are liable to be and hereby rejected. All other pending application, if any, also stand dismissed. Aayush Sharma /127-130 (ANOOP KUMAR DHAND),J