Raj Kumar Gulati Son Of Late Shri Navratan Das Gulati, Resident v. Rajasthan High Court Jodhpur, Through Registrar General

Judgment

2. Rajasthan High Court Jodhpur, Through Registrar General Appellate Authority, Rajasthan High Court, Bench Jaipur, Through Registrar Admn. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s)

: Mr. Pradeep Singh For Respondent(s) : Mr. Tanveer Ahamad HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEET PUROHIT 16/09/2025 Order

1. The present writ petition has been filed challenging the validity and propriety of the order dated 10.11.2016, whereby the penalty of stoppage of ‘two annual grade increments with cumulative effect’ has been imposed upon the petitioner. The petitioner has further challenged the order dated 08.03.2017, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the penalty order was dismissed.

2. A prayer has been made by the petitioner for taking up the matter on an urgent basis, as petitioner’s retirement is due on

30.09.2025. The said prayer has not been objected to by the learned counsel for the respondent; hence, the matter was taken up for hearing. [2025:RJ-JP:37779-DB] (2 of 6) [CW-8264/2018]

3. The petitioner submitted that the order of penalty dated

10.11.2016 has been passed in relation to an incident that occurred on 10.08.2013, when the petitioner was on a visit with the Hon’ble Judge of this Court at Delhi. The charge against the petitioner was that, at around 10:30 p.m. on 10.08.2013, he took the vehicle without the permission of the Hon’ble Judge to Khan Market, Delhi, and on returning back to guest house while entering through the gate, he collided with another motor vehicle, thereby causing damage to the car. It was also alleged that at that time, the petitioner was smelling of alcohol.

4. The petitioner submitted that in his reply to the chargesheet, he stated that since he had to take the vehicle back in the early hours of the next day, therefore, he took the vehicle for checking the air pressure and, while returning to the Rajasthan House where the Hon’ble Judge was staying, a motorcycle struck the car from the rear left side. The petitioner further submitted that in fact the motorcyclist while driving rashly and negligently, hit the car driven by the petitioner and that the said motorcyclist was in a drunken state, which was confirmed by his medical report. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that his own medical examination was conducted at a later point of time after the accident, wherein it was found that he had consumed alcohol only after the incident. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that this was the sole incident that occurred during the petitioner’s entire service career as a driver and that he has been driving the vehicles of Hon’ble Judges for a long period without any such incident having taken place at any time during his service. [2025:RJ-JP:37779-DB] (3 of 6) [CW-8264/2018]

5. Per contra, the counsel for the respondents argued that the enquiry was conducted strictly in accordance with law and after affording due opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. It was contended that, on the basis of the evidence recorded during the enquiry, and particularly on the strength of the medical report, it was proved that the petitioner was in a drunken state. It was also come on record that the delinquent employee had taken the vehicle outside the Rajasthan House, where the Hon’ble Judge was staying during his visit to New Delhi, without obtaining prior permission from the Hon’ble Judge. It was further contended that the punishment imposed upon the petitioner is justified and commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct found proved against him.

6. We have gone through the record of the present case, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the departmental proceedings, particularly when the conclusions are based upon facts proved on the basis of evidence available on record and the petitioner was afforded ample opportunity of hearing during the enquiry. We find that the findings with regard to proof of guilt are justified and thus not liable to be interfered with. Alternatively, learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the penalty of stoppage of two annual grade increments with cumulative effect, which is a major penalty, is highly disproportionate.

7. The scope of judicial interference by this Court in matters of departmental enquiry is very limited. In case of Union of India [2025:RJ-JP:37779-DB] (4 of 6) [CW-8264/2018] vs. P. Gunasekaran (2015)2 SCC 610, the Supreme Court held as under: “13.Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based; (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.

8. In case of Union of India v. Subrata Nath, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1617, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: - “14.It is well settled that courts ought to refrain from interfering with findings of facts recorded in a departmental inquiry except in circumstances where such findings are patently perverse or grossly incompatible with the evidence on record, based on no evidence. However, if principles of natural justice have been violated or the statutory regulations have not been adhered to or there are malafides attributable to the Disciplinary Authority, then the courts can certainly interfere.

21. To sum up the legal position, being fact finding authorities, both the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority are vested with the exclusive power to examine the evidence forming part of the inquiry report. On finding the evidence to be adequate and reliable during the departmental inquiry, the Disciplinary Authority has the discretion to impose appropriate punishment on the delinquent employee keeping in mind the gravity of the misconduct. However, in exercise of powers of judicial review, the High Court or for that matter, the Tribunal cannot ordinarily reappreciate the evidence to arrive at its own conclusion in respect of the penalty imposed unless and until the punishment imposed is so disproportionate to the offence that it would shock the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal or is found to be flawed for other reasons, as enumerated in Union of India vs. P. Gunasekaran (2015) 2 SCC 610 . If the punishment imposed on the delinquent employee is such that [2025:RJ-JP:37779-DB] (5 of 6) [CW-8264/2018] shocks the conscience of the High Court or the Tribunal, then the Disciplinary/Appellate Authority may be called upon to re-consider the penalty imposed. Only in exceptional circumstances, which need to be mentioned, should the High Court/Tribunal decide to impose appropriate punishment by itself, on offering cogent reasons therefore.

9. Furthermore, the Apex Court in the matter of Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611 while dealing with the sentence imposed by the Court Martial and elaborating upon the extent of judicial review, observed as under: - “25. Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed against a decision, but is directed against the “decision- making process.” The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court-martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the court-martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review.”

10. Taking guidance from the said settled proposition of law, we considered that the incident in question is the sole incident which has occurred during the entire service career of the petitioner. The petitioner has been diligently driving the vehicles of the Hon’ble Judges for a long period, and no such incident has occurred except the present one. Also taking into account the admitted fact emerging from the evidence on record that the motorcycle driver himself was in a drunken state and had hit the car from behind on the left side, the imposition of a major penalty is found to be [2025:RJ-JP:37779-DB] (6 of 6) [CW-8264/2018] shockingly disproportionate and not commensurate with the misconduct alleged against the petitioner.

11. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that while the findings recorded in the departmental enquiry with respect to the proof of misconduct are not required to be interfered with, however the punishment imposed vide order dated 10.11.2016 deserves to be modified. Accordingly, the penalty imposed vide order dated 10.11.2016 is converted into a minor penalty, i.e., stoppage of two annual increments ‘without cumulative effect’. The stoppage of increments shall be confined only to the years 2016–2017 and 2017–2018.

12. In view of the observations made above, the writ petition is partly allowed. The punishment imposed upon the petitioner vide order dated 10.11.2016 is modified as directed hereinabove. Consequential orders shall be passed in favour of the petitioner.

13. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of. (SANJEET PUROHIT),J (SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA),J ANIL SHARMA/157