BENCH AT JAIPUR vs Regional Manager, the Bank of Baroda, Regional Office, Bal

Order Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal Vs. Union of India & Anr. reported in (2003) 2 SCC 45 has held that the Court is under an obligation to hear and decide the case brought before it and it cannot shirk that obligation only because the lawyers have decided to abstain from the judicial work. Looking to the short controversy involved in this petition, this Court thought it proper to peruse the file and decide the matter on its merits. This writ petition has been filed against award dated

14.11.2014 passed by Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota (hereinafter referred as the ‘Tribunal’) by which the learned Judge has dismissed the claim petition filed by the petitioner. [2023/RJJP/004157] (2 of 5) [CW-1334/2015] The facts necessary to be noted herein are that the petitioner was engaged as Class-IV temporary employee on daily wages on 09.01.1984. The services of the petitioner were terminated in the year 1993. Therefore, in the claim petition being preferred by the petitioner following reference was made to the Tribunal: through its Regional “Whether the action of officers of the Bank of Baroda Manager, Swaimadhopur in terminating the services of Sh. Lalchand Jindal S/o Hanuman Prasad from 21/11/93, and not re-employing him in 1997, is legal and justified? If not, what relief the said workman is entitled to and from what date?” The learned Tribunal adjudicated the reference and vide award dated 14.11.2014 rejected the claim petition of the petitioner. Contents of the writ petition indicates that the petitioner submitted a statement of claim before the Tribunal indicating therein that he was appointed as Class-IV employee on daily wages on temporary basis vide order dated 09.01.1984 and his services were terminated without notice vide order dated

21.11.1993. Contents of the writ petition further indicates that there was violation of Section 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (for short ‘the Act of 1947’). Contents of the petition further indicates that without following mandatory provisions under Section 25 of the Act of 1947, the services of the petitioner were terminated. Contents further indicates that a prayer was made by the petitioner in the claim petition that after quashing the [2023/RJJP/004157] (3 of 5) [CW-1334/2015] impugned order, directions be issued to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner back in service. Perusal of the impugned order indicates that the Tribunal scanned the entire record made available to it and came to the conclusion that the petitioner was an employee with the respondent in the year 1984 purely on temporary basis on daily wages. But the petitioner had failed to produce the muster rolls and other documentary evidence in support of his contention that he worked and continued on the said post w.e.f. 09.01.1984 till

21.11.1993. Learned Tribunal relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of R.M. Yellatti vs. Assistant Executive Engineer reported in 2006 (108) FLR 213 (SC), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has dealt with the identical situation in para No.17 as under: “Analyzing the above decisions of this court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms do not apply to the proceedings under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this court has repeatedly taken the view that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily waged earner, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce before the court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any, the wage [2023/RJJP/004157] (4 of 5) [CW-1334/2015] register, the attendance register etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend thereafter on facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-serving statements made by the claimant/workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the Tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the labour court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon facts of each case.” In the above judgment Hon’ble Apex Court laid down mere non-production of the muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the Tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the management. Referring the authoritative pronouncement of Hon’ble Apex Court, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the petitioner has failed to prove that he worked with the respondents continuously for more than 240 days in a calendar year i.e. with effect from 09.01.1984 till 21.11.1993. The findings recorded by the Tribunal does not suffer from any infirmity. Therefore, no interference is warranted by this Court in the impugned award dated 14.11.2014. [2023/RJJP/004157] (5 of 5) [CW-1334/2015] The writ petition being devoid of merit and the same is hereby dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand dismissed. (ANOOP KUMAR DHAND),J KuD/13

Order Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal Vs. Union of India & Anr. reported in (2003) 2 SCC 45 has held that the Court is under an obligation to hear and decide the case brought before it and it cannot shirk that obligation only because the lawyers have decided to abstain from the judicial work. Looking to the short controversy involved in this petition, this Court thought it proper to peruse the file and decide the matter on its merits. This writ petition has been filed against award dated

14.11.2014 passed by Industrial Tribunal (Central), Kota (hereinafter referred as the ‘Tribunal’) by which the learned Judge has dismissed the claim petition filed by the petitioner. [2023/RJJP/004157] (2 of 5) [CW-1334/2015] The facts necessary to be noted herein are that the petitioner was engaged as Class-IV temporary employee on daily wages on 09.01.1984. The services of the petitioner were terminated in the year 1993. Therefore, in the claim petition being preferred by the petitioner following reference was made to the Tribunal: through its Regional “Whether the action of officers of the Bank of Baroda Manager, Swaimadhopur in terminating the services of Sh. Lalchand Jindal S/o Hanuman Prasad from 21/11/93, and not re-employing him in 1997, is legal and justified? If not, what relief the said workman is entitled to and from what date?” The learned Tribunal adjudicated the reference and vide award dated 14.11.2014 rejected the claim petition of the petitioner. Contents of the writ petition indicates that the petitioner submitted a statement of claim before the Tribunal indicating therein that he was appointed as Class-IV employee on daily wages on temporary basis vide order dated 09.01.1984 and his services were terminated without notice vide order dated

21.11.1993. Contents of the writ petition further indicates that there was violation of Section 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (for short ‘the Act of 1947’). Contents of the petition further indicates that without following mandatory provisions under Section 25 of the Act of 1947, the services of the petitioner were terminated. Contents further indicates that a prayer was made by the petitioner in the claim petition that after quashing the [2023/RJJP/004157] (3 of 5) [CW-1334/2015] impugned order, directions be issued to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner back in service. Perusal of the impugned order indicates that the Tribunal scanned the entire record made available to it and came to the conclusion that the petitioner was an employee with the respondent in the year 1984 purely on temporary basis on daily wages. But the petitioner had failed to produce the muster rolls and other documentary evidence in support of his contention that he worked and continued on the said post w.e.f. 09.01.1984 till

21.11.1993. Learned Tribunal relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of R.M. Yellatti vs. Assistant Executive Engineer reported in 2006 (108) FLR 213 (SC), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has dealt with the identical situation in para No.17 as under: “Analyzing the above decisions of this court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms do not apply to the proceedings under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this court has repeatedly taken the view that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of daily waged earner, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or proof of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (claimant) can only call upon the employer to produce before the court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or termination, if any, the wage [2023/RJJP/004157] (4 of 5) [CW-1334/2015] register, the attendance register etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately would depend thereafter on facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere affidavits or self-serving statements made by the claimant/workman will not suffice in the matter of discharge of the burden placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. The above judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the Tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle, namely, that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the labour court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon facts of each case.” In the above judgment Hon’ble Apex Court laid down mere non-production of the muster rolls per se without any plea of suppression by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the Tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the management. Referring the authoritative pronouncement of Hon’ble Apex Court, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the petitioner has failed to prove that he worked with the respondents continuously for more than 240 days in a calendar year i.e. with effect from 09.01.1984 till 21.11.1993. The findings recorded by the Tribunal does not suffer from any infirmity. Therefore, no interference is warranted by this Court in the impugned award dated 14.11.2014. [2023/RJJP/004157] (5 of 5) [CW-1334/2015] The writ petition being devoid of merit and the same is hereby dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand dismissed. (ANOOP KUMAR DHAND),J KuD/13