Through Sale Latter) v. Chetan Sharma Son Of

Judgment

1. Chetan Sharma Son Of Shri Suresh Kumar Sharma, Aged About 28 Years, Resident Of Plot No. 12, Shankar Colony, Naya Kheda, Ambabari, Jaipur.

Ramphool Meena Son Of Shri Gopal Lal Meena, Aged About 21 Years, Resident Of Mukam Post Kodi Via Jobner, Tehsil Kishangarh Renwal, Jaipur (Driver Vehicle No. Rj- 02-Ca-8381)

3. Ramswaroop Kumawat Son Of Shri Buddharam, Aged About 29 Years, Resident Of Baberwalo Ki Dhani, Jobner, Tehsil Phulera, District Jaipur (Registered Owner Of The Vehicle No. Rj-02-Ca-8381) ----Respondents For Appellant(s) : Mr. Avi Airun for Mr. Jitender Mituka For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK KUMAR JAIN 05/02/2025 Order

1. Instant civil misc. appeal is preferred by appellant-non- claimant No.3, aggrieved from award dated 23.11.2017 in Claim Case No. 3/2016 passed by learned MACT (EC Act Cases), Jaipur in a petition filed under Section 166 of Motor Vehicles Act. [2025:RJ-JP:5260] (2 of 6) [CMA-2362/2022]

2. Office has pointed out a delay of 1588 days and to substantiate the reasons of delay, an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is filed.

3. Learned counsel for appellant has submitted that an ex-parte award was passed against the appellant. He further submits that the appellant came to know about award on 05.04.2021 and after knowledge, he immediately applied for copy and filed an application under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC but same was dismissed. He further submitted that the appellant is bona fide and delay was beyond control of appellant. He also submitted that due to Covid-19, Hon’ble Supreme Court has exempted period of limitation.

4. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the record.

5. A claimant-respondent Chetan Sharma has filed a petition to claim compensation for injuries sustained in accident on

18.05.2015 from car No. RJ-02-CA-8381. A perusal of record indicate that all three non-claimants have appeared through counsel before Tribunal, but afterward they remained absent and ex-parte proceedings were ordered. Ultimately, an ex-party award was passed on 23.11.2017

6. Present appellant has filed a civil misc. application No. 06/2021 under Order IX Rule 13 read with Section 151 CPC and Section 5 of Limitation Act before the Tribunal to set aside award dated 23.11.2017, but this application was dismissed on

29.10.2021. After dismissal of application under Order IX Rule 13 [2025:RJ-JP:5260] (3 of 6) [CMA-2362/2022] CPC on 29.10.2021, the instant appeal is preferred on

28.06.2022.

7. A period from 23.03.2020 to February, 2022 is exempted due to Covid-19. The appellant-non-claimant has failed to explain the reasons from 23.11.2017 to 22.03.2020. The appellant has also failed to explain reasons post Covid-19 till filing of instant appeal. When appellant has acquired knowledge in year 2021 after notice from SDO, Sambar even then the instant appeal is filed after a long delay by the appellant. A misc. application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC was dismissed on 29.10.2021 and afterwards also there was a delay of nearly 10 months. The entire circumstances shows that appellant is not a bona fide person and he deliberately remained absent from Tribunal after initial appearance. Considering the fact that the reasons assigned by appellant is not sufficient, therefore, delay cannot be condoned.

8. In case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Katiji AIR 1987 SC 1353, Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the following principles to allow application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act:-

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay. every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. [2025:RJ-JP:5260] (4 of 6) [CMA-2362/2022]

4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

9. In case of Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors. 2010 (8) SCC 685, Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering Section 5 of Limitation Act has referred the judgment in the case of Union of India Vs. Ram Charan AIR 1964 SC 215 and observed that the explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay. The larger benches as well as equi- benches of Hon’ble Supreme Court have consistently followed these principles and have either allowed or declined to condone [2025:RJ-JP:5260] (5 of 6) [CMA-2362/2022] the delay in filing such applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay.

10. In the case of Brijesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.: (2014) 13 SCC 291, while referring the judgment of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors.: (2013) 12 SCC 649, Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court further observed that the Court cannot condone the delay, if it is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, and a delay cannot be condoned on sympathetic grounds.

11. Very recently condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act was considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of P. Subba Reddy (died) by LRs. And Ors. Vs. Special Deputy Collector (LA) 2024 INSC 286 wherein also it was held that unless sufficient cause is shown the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act cannot be allowed. The underlying provisions after harmonious construction of provision of law were formulated in following manner:- (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; [2025:RJ-JP:5260] (6 of 6) [CMA-2362/2022] have to (iii) The provisions of the L imitation Act be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; liberal (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though justice-oriented approach, approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamount to disregarding the statutory provision.

12. Considering the aforesaid, the appellant has failed to show sufficient reasons, therefore, the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is liable to be dismissed.

13. As a result, the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act and consequently, the civil misc. appeal are hereby dismissed.

14. Misc. application, if any, stands disposed of. GAURAV /37 (ASHOK KUMAR JAIN),J