Nayagaon Tehsil Bijoliya District Bhilwara. vs The State of Rajasthan, through the Joint Secretary to the

Judgment

1. The State of Rajasthan, through the Joint Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan, Mines, Department, Jaipur.

2. The Additional Director, Mines and Geology Department, Kota.

3. The Mining Engineer, Mines and Geology Department Bundi-IInd, Rajasthan.

4. The Superintendent Mining Engineer, Mines and Geology Department, Kota.

5. Director, Mines And Geology Department, Udaipur. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s)

: Mr. Ajay Shukla For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rahul Lodha-Addl.G.C. JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR DHAND Order 12/08/2025

1. A challenge has been led to the impugned order dated

04.04.2023 passed by the Additional Director (Mines), by which the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the mining lease cancellation order dated 25.01.2001 issued by the respondent No.3 has been rejected on the ground of delay.

2. Against the aforesaid order, the petitioner submitted a second appeal, however the same was also rejected by the respondent No. 1 vide impugned order dated 20.02.2024. (2 of 5) [CW-8355/2025]

3. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was holding a mining lease granted vide allotment letter dated

01.09.1998 and the same was cancelled by the respondent No. 3 vide impugned order dated 25.01.2001 but this fact was never communicated to the petitioner and the petitioner was paying the dead rent. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the moment the petitioner came to know about the impugned order dated

25.01.2001, an appeal was preferred before the Additional Director (Mines), however the same was rejected vide impugned order dated 04.04.2023 by treating the same as time barred under Section 63(4) of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2017 against which second appeal was preferred. However, the second appeal was also rejected on this count alone by the respondent vide impugned order dated 20.02.2024. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the delay in filing the appeal was bona fide as the petitioner was not aware about the initial cancellation order dated 25.01.2001. Counsel submits that there were no dues, and all the dues were deposited by the petitioner on

02.02.2001, hence under these circumstances, the Appellate Court should have decided the appeal on its merits but instead of doing so, rejected the same on a technical count of delay in filing the same, hence interference of this Court is warranted. In support of his contentions, he has placed reliance upon the order passed by Principal Seat, Jodhpur in the case of M/s Sojat Lime Company Vs. The State of Rajasthan and Ors. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14717/2016, decided 06.11.2017)

4. Per contra, counsel for the respondents opposed the arguments raised by counsel for the petitioner and submitted that (3 of 5) [CW-8355/2025] the impugned cancellation order dated 25.01.2001 was communicated to the petitioner but he was sitting over the same and did not bother to assail the same inspite of passing of more than twenty two years, hence this fact was appreciated by both Appellate Courts and the first as well as second appeal submitted by the petitioner was rejected by treating the same as barred by limitation. Counsel submits that under these circumstances, interference of this Court is not warranted. In support of his contentions, he has placed reliance upon the order passed by Co- ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Prachin Choudhry Vs. State of Rajasthan in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12729/2020 decided on 23.07.2024.

5. Heard and considered the submissions made at Bar and perused the material available on record.

6. Perusal of the record indicates that the lease deed issued in favour of the petitioner was cancelled by the respondent No.3 on

25.01.2001 and the appeal against the said order was preferred by the petitioner on 01.03.2023 i.e. after a delay of more than twenty two years. The said appeal preferred by the petitioner was rejected vide impugned order dated 04.04.2023 on the ground of limitation against which the second appeal was preferred by the petitioner before the second Appellate Authority, however the same was also rejected vide impugned order dated 20.02.2024 on the same count. This Court finds that no valid reason has been given by the petitioner for the inordinate delay of twenty two years in filing the appeal against the impugned cancellation order dated 25.01.2001. (4 of 5) [CW-8355/2025]

7. It is settled proposition of law that a person cannot be granted liberty to sleep over his rights for a considerable amount of time and he cannot be allowed to wake up after inordinate delay.

8. Instant case is a classic example where the petitioner was slept over his rights for more than twenty two years and without giving any justified reasons he approached the first and second Appellate Authority challenging the impugned cancellation order dated 25.01.2001 which was passed more than two decades ago.

9. The Supreme Court in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and Anr. reported in 2010 (5) SCC 459 has held as under:- “We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. The expression "sufficient cause" employed in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate.” [emphasis] (5 of 5) [CW-8355/2025]

10. Further the Supreme Court in Pundlik Jalam Patil (D) by LRs. vs. Exe. Eng. Jalgaon Medium Project and another reported in 2008 (17) SCC 448, has held as under:- “It was its duty to prefer appeals before the Court for consideration which it did not. There is no explanation forthcoming in this regard. The evidence on record suggest neglect of its own right for long time in preferring appeals. The court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The court helps those who are vigilant and ‘do not slumber over their rights.”

11. In the case in hand, the petitioner apart from making a bald statement that petitioner was mentally upset and not aware of the proceedings and has failed to produce any evidence. The delay cannot be condoned mechanically in the absence of sufficient cause. Considering that there is an inordinate delay of more than twenty two years and there is no explanation worth acceptance for condoning the delay, no interference is called for in the impugned orders.

12. The writ petition is dismissed, accordingly. Stay application and all pending application(s), if any, also stand dismissed. Ashu/47 (ANOOP KUMAR DHAND),J