Jhalarapatan Road, Jhalawar District Jhalawar vs Imami S/o Mangilal, R/o Village Richwa, Tehsil Bakani Tehsil

Judgment

1. Land Acquisition Officer Water Resources, Circle Jhalawar, Irrigation Department Office, Jhalrapatan Road, Jhalawar District Jhalawar

2. Executive Engineer, Water Resources Circle Kalisindh Project Jhalawar, Irrigation Department Office, Jhalrapatan Road, Jhalawar District Jhalawar Rajasthan. ----Appellants Versus Mitthulal S/o Mangilal, R/o Village Richwa, Tehsil Bakani Tehsil Jhalrapatan, District Jhalawar. ----Respondent For Appellant(s)

: Mr. Basant Singh Chhaba, AAG assited by Mr. Hardik Singh, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Sanjay Mehrishi, Advocate assisted by Mr. Rakesh Saini, Advcoate HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK KUMAR JAIN 13/02/2025 Order [2025:RJ-JP:6756] (2 of 10) [CMA-1275/2021]

1. These two civil misc. appeals were preferred by appellant- non-claimants aggrieved and dis-satisfied from order dated

17.07.2019 in civil misc. case No. 23/2015 (30/17) and 22/2015 (29/12) passed by learned Senior Civil Judge, Jhalawar in a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

2. Office has pointed out a delay of 643 days in filing of both the appeals and to substantiate the reasons of delay an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is filed, in both the appeals.

3. An application No. 01/2025 (in both matters) is filed by appellant under Section 151 CPC for early listing and disposal of said petition.

4. Learned AAG appearing on behalf of appellants submits that Land Acquisition Officer after considering the entire material has rightly determined the compensation but learned Trial Court on a reference travelled beyond the record has enhanced the compensation resulting in a serious repercussion on State Exchequer. He further referred the chart and submits that only on account of interest the appellant has to incur a liability of ₹23.5 lacs in each case and same is against the public policy. He also submits that the Land Acquisition Officer has passed the award based on prevailing DLC rate and nature of land. He further referred the conduct of claimants and submits that there was no well on the land as claimed by the claimants, but the Court allowed compensation for well. He further referred the record and submits that the time consumed for procuring administrative sanction is required to be excluded and appellants have justified the reasons of delay, therefore, the application for condonation of [2025:RJ-JP:6756] (3 of 10) [CMA-1275/2021] delay may be allowed to afford an opportunity of hearing on merits.

5. Aforesaid contentions were opposed by learned counsel for respondent-claimant on the ground that the delay is an extra- ordinary delay and it is almost more than one and a half year. He further submits that the appellants have failed to show sufficient reasons for condonation of delay and without assigning the reasons of delay the appellants are not entitled for condonation of delay in ordinary course. He relied upon judgment in case of State of Rajasthan Vs. M/s Choudhary Constructions AIR 1998 Raj. 123. He further submits that the Land Acquisition Officer ignored the material placed on record but the Trial Court after considering the evidence on record has drawn a conclusion in favor of respondent-claimant. He further submits that there was no evidence on record to contradict the claim of respondent- claimant. He further submits that the Trial Court has discarded certain heads to assess the compensation but the respondent- claimant has not preferred any cross-objection or cross-appeal for enhancement. At last, he submits that as per provision of law 12% p.a. is minimum rate of interest which has to be awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer or the Reference Court, therefore, there is no perversity or illegality in the order passed by the Reference Court.

6. Heard learned AAG appearing for appellants and learned counsel appearing for respondent-claimant. Perused the material placed on record and also considered the judgment as referred by learned counsel for respondent. [2025:RJ-JP:6756] (4 of 10) [CMA-1275/2021]

7. The admitted facts of the case are that a Land Acquisition proceeding was initiated by Land Acquisition Officer (LAO) in public interest after issuance of notifications. After notice an award dated 03.06.2011 was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer in favor of claimants. The claimants have received the amount under protest and filed a reference under Section 18 of Land Acquisition Act, 1894. After notice to appellants and completion of proceedings issues were framed. The claimant has examined himself and exhibited 3 documents whereas one witness was examined by the appellants and exhibited 12 documents. The reference Court after considering the evidence has enhanced the award and found that the claimant is entitled for compensation at the rate of ₹1 lac per bigha with 30% solatium and 12% p.a. interest. Besides this, the claimant is entitled for additional payment in terms of order dated 19.07.2013.

8. Instant appeal is preferred after a delay of 643 days and in application under Section 5 of Limitation Act the appellants have stated that after order dated 17.07.2019 a time was consumed to seek opinion thereafter due to lock-down the appeal could be filed on 19.07.2021. An affidavit of Officer In-charge has been filed in support of application.

9. Having considered the facts that period from 23.03.2020 to

19.07.2021 is eligible for exemption from rigour of Limitation Act in wake of Covid-19, therefore the period from 23.03.2020 to

19.07.2021 is deductable from computation. Now, the appellants have to justify sufficient reasons of delay from 18.07.2019 to

22.03.2020. [2025:RJ-JP:6756] (5 of 10) [CMA-1275/2021]

10. Section 5 of the Limitation Act prescribes that any appeal or revision or an application may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the petitioner satisfies the Court on sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal or revision or making an application within prescribed period.

11. In case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Katiji AIR 1987 SC 1353, Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the following principles to allow application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act:-

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay. every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. [2025:RJ-JP:6756] (6 of 10) [CMA-1275/2021]

12. In case of Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors. 2010 (8) SCC 685, Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering Section 5 of Limitation Act has referred the judgment in the case of Union of India Vs. Ram Charan AIR 1964 SC 215 and observed that the explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay. The larger benches as well as equi- benches of Hon’ble Supreme Court have consistently followed these principles and have either allowed or declined to condone the delay in filing such applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay.

13. In the case of Brijesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.: (2014) 13 SCC 291, while referring the judgment of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors.: (2013) 12 SCC 649, Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion [2025:RJ-JP:6756] (7 of 10) [CMA-1275/2021] by the Court for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court further observed that the Court cannot condone the delay, if it is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, and a delay cannot be condoned on sympathetic grounds.

14. Very recently condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act was considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of P. Subba Reddy (died) by LRs. And Ors. Vs. Special Deputy Collector (LA) 2024 INSC 286 wherein also it was held that unless sufficient cause is shown the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act cannot be allowed. The underlying provisions after harmonious construction of provision of law were formulated in following manner:- (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the L imitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; liberal (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though justice-oriented approach, approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are [2025:RJ-JP:6756] (8 of 10) [CMA-1275/2021] also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamount to disregarding the statutory provision.

15. In case of H. Guruswamy & Ors. Vs. A. Krishnaiah Since Deceased by LRs (Civil Appeal no. 317/2025) reported as 2025 INSC 53 Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: “13. We are at our wits end to understand why the High Court overlooked all the aforesaid aspects. What was the good reason for the High Court to ignore all this? Time and again, the Supreme Court has reminded the District judiciary as well the High courts that the concepts such as “liberal approach”, “Justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” should not be employed to frustrate or jettison the substantial law of limitation. 17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time.”

16. No justification from July, 2019 to 22.03.2020 is offered by Officer-in-charge in its application under Section 5 of Limitation Act. At least, the Officer In-charge has to indicate that when this file is submitted for opinion and when they received the opinion and when final decision was taken to file the appeal. The reasons as assigned in the application is not enough to presume that the time consumed by the appellant is ordinarily be condonable. Herein, there is no reason assigned in the application for period [2025:RJ-JP:6756] (9 of 10) [CMA-1275/2021] from 20.07.2019 to 22.03.2020, therefore, in absence of sufficient reasons the application for condonation of delay cannot be allowed. The application is not meticulously drafted to include reasons of delay.

17. When we consider the matter on merits then the appellants are basically aggrieved from rate of interest which was awarded at the rate of 12% p.a. The total liability due to enhancement in basic price is ₹2.13 lacs but liability for interest is ₹23.5 lacs. We have considered principles of law laid down by a Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Sunder Vs. Union of India AIR 2001 SC 3516 while determination and assessment of compensation in the Land Acquisition Act of 1894.

18. Having considered that the appellants are liable to pay interest under the Land Acquisition Act and same shall be at 12% per annum under Section 23(1)(a) of the Act of 1894 and herein the Reference Court while considering the facts of the case has allowed interest of 12% till date of compensation, thus, rate of interest is not exorbitant looking to provision of law.

19. Having gone through the material on record, I am of the considered view that there is no perversity or illegality in the award and does not requires any interference by this Court, particularly looking to the fact that the land was acquired in the year 2008 and we are considering the appeal in 2025. It is not appropriate to entertain the instant appeal as there is no glaring mistake or perversity on face of record, thus, the appeal is not fit for admission.

20. In view of aforesaid, the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act in both the appeals are hereby dismissed and [2025:RJ-JP:6756] (10 of 10) [CMA-1275/2021] consequently, the misc. appeals are dismissed for delay and also on merits with pending application(s), if any. MONU /10-11 (ASHOK KUMAR JAIN),J