In case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji AIR

Judgment

1. Goldy Singh S/o Harvansh Singh, R/o Flat No.01 Rajshree Apartment, Gali No.4, Rajapark, Jaipur Owner/employer Truck No. Rj-14-Gb-4526

2. New India Insurance Company Limited, Having Its Re- gional Office At Nehru Palace, Tonk Road, Jaipur, Through Its Regional Manager. Insured Truck No.rj-14-Gb-4526 ----Respondents For Appellant(s)

: Mr. Vinay Mathur For Respondent(s) : Mr. Ayush Gupta Mr. Ram Singh Rathore HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK KUMAR JAIN Order 06/02/2025

1. Instant civil misc. appeal is preferred aggrieved from dis- missal of claim petition No. ECC/F-11/2011 by the Commissioner, Employees’ Compensation Act, Jaipur City, Jaipur on 11.04.2015.

2. Office has pointed out a delay of 988 days and to substanti- ate the reasons of delay an application under Section 5 of Limita- tion Act is filed.

3. Learned counsel for appellant while referring the grounds has submitted that appellant-claimants are poor rustic villagers and [2025:RJ-JP:5471] (2 of 6) [CMA-1217/2018] not aware about legal procedure, therefore, they could not take steps to file appeal on time. He also submitted that after death of Ramkaran the appellants were busy in their livelihood and could not take steps to file appeal on time against impugned order. At last, he submitted that appellants are poor persons and if delay is not condoned then they will have to suffer adversely.

4. Considered submission of learned counsel for both the par- ties and perused the entire record.

5. For the incident of 17.10.2010, a claim petition under the Employees Compensation Act was filed on 04.01.2011 by the claimants-appellants for claiming compensation on death of Ram Karan during rest time but during the course out of employment, under Section 3 of the Employees Compensation Act, 1923. Learned Commissioner has dismissed the claim petition on

11.04.2015 and the instant appeal is preferred on 22.02.2018.

6. The grounds and the reasons as assigned by the claimants were not supported by any document. Herein delay is of 988 days and same is almost three years which itself is not a normal or rou- tine. The reasons assigned by the counsel are not convincing. Herein, the claim petition was dismissed as the Commissioner found that the death of Ram Karan was not due to an accident rather it is a natural death may be due to heart-attack or brain haemorrhage etc. 7. Section 5 of the Limitation Act prescribes that any appeal or revision or an application may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the petitioner satisfies the Court on suf- ficient cause for not preferring an appeal or revision or making an application within prescribed period. [2025:RJ-JP:5471] (3 of 6) [CMA-1217/2018]

8. In case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Katiji AIR 1987 SC 1353, Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the following principles to allow application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act:-

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to ben- efit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being de- feated. As against this when delay is con- doned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hear- ing the parties. 3. "Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay. every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense prag- matic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done be- cause of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is oc- casioned deliberately, or on account of culpa- ble negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resort- ing to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is re- spected not on account of its power to legal- ize injustice on technical grounds but be- cause it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.

9. In case of Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors. 2010 (8) SCC 685, Hon’ble Supreme Court while consider- ing Section 5 of Limitation Act has referred the judgment in the case of Union of India Vs. Ram Charan AIR 1964 SC 215 and observed that the explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one [2025:RJ-JP:5471] (4 of 6) [CMA-1217/2018] of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court. In ad- dition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belat- edly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, should be re- jected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay. The larger benches as well as equi-benches of Hon’ble Supreme Court have consistently followed these principles and have either allowed or declined to condone the delay in filing such applica- tions. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine man- ner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredi- ents; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay.

11. In the case of Brijesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.: (2014) 13 SCC 291, while referring the judgment of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors.: (2013) 12 SCC 649, Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion by the Court for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court further observed that the Court cannot condone the delay, if it is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, and a delay cannot be condoned on sympathetic grounds.

12. Very recently condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limita- tion Act was considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of P. Subba Reddy (died) by LRs. And Ors. Vs. Special Deputy [2025:RJ-JP:5471] (5 of 6) [CMA-1217/2018] Collector (LA) 2024 INSC 286 wherein also it was held that un- less sufficient cause is shown the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act cannot be allowed. The underlying provisions after harmonious construction of provision of law were formulated in following manner:- (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeit- ing the right to remedy rather than the right it- self; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exer- cised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the L imitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented ap- proach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discre- tionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negli- gence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in simi- lar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not sat- isfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be con- sidered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be de- cided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tanta- mount to disregarding the statutory provision. [2025:RJ-JP:5471] (6 of 6) [CMA-1217/2018]

13. In case of H. Guruswamy & Ors. Vs. A. Krishnaiah Since Deceased by LRs (Civil Appeal no. 317/2025) reported as 2025 INSC 53 Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: “13. We are at our wits end to understand why the High Court overlooked all the aforesaid aspects. What was the good rea- son for the High Court to ignore all this? Time and again, the Supreme Court has re- minded the District judiciary as well the High courts that the concepts such as “lib- eral approach”, “Justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” should not be em- ployed to frustrate or jettison the substan- tial law of limitation. 17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time.”

14. Having considered the law over the point, I am of the considered view the reasons assigned by appellants-claimants is not sufficient to condone the delay, therefore, application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is liable to be dismissed.

15. As a result, the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act and also the civil misc. appeal is hereby dismissed with pending application(s), if any. MONU /07 (ASHOK KUMAR JAIN),J