Dhingpur, Tehsil Dantaramgarh, District Sikar Raj. vs Sharwan Kumar Gurjar S/o Shri Chandraram, R/o Gilo Ki

Judgment

1. Sharwan Kumar Gurjar S/o Shri Chandraram, R/o Gilo Ki Dhani, Via Khatushyamji, Tehsil - Dantaramgarh, Sikar, District Sikar Raj. Registered Owner Vehicle Tractor No. Rj-23-Rb-3059

2. The New India Insurance Company Ltd. Through Its Man- ager, In Front Of Court, Sikar Raj. Insurance Company Of Vehicle Tractor No. Rj-23-Rb-3059 ----Respondents Connect With S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 4414/2015 New India Assurance Company Ltd., Sikar (Raj) through Re- gional Manager, Nehru Place, Tonk Road, Jaipur. ----Appellant Versus

1. Jayesh Kumawat S/o Gopal Lal, Resident of Dheegpur, Tehsil Dantaramgarh, District, Sikar (Raj)

2. Sharwan Singh Gurjar S/o Shri Chandaram, resident of Gillo Ki Dhani, via Khatushya Mazi, Tehsil Dantaramgarh, District Sikar (Raj.) (Registered Owner vehicle Tractor No.RJ-23-RB- 3059) ----Respondents For Appellant(s)

: Mr. Amit Singh Shekhawat Mr. Praveen Kumar Jain with Mr. Avinash Dhanju(in 4414/2015) For Respondent(s) : Mr. Amit Singh Shekhawat(in 4905/2015) Mr. Praveen Kumar Jain with Mr. Avinash Dhanju Mr. Aditya Kiran Mathur Mr. R.K. Mathur with Mr. Aayush Goyal [2025:RJ-JP:20229] (2 of 12) [CMA-4905/2015] HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANEESH SHARMA 07/05/2025 Order In S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 4905/2015

1. The present appeal has been filed by the claimant under Sec- tion 30 of the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923, challenging the judgment dated 24.09.2015 passed by the Commissioner, Work- men Compensation Act, Sikar in W.C.C./NF/05/2014 titled Jayesh Vs. Sharwan Kumar and Anr., whereby the claim petition filed by the claimant-appellant has been partly allowed and compensation of Rs.5,97,699/- has been awarded in favour of the claimants.

2. Brief facts of the case are that the claimant-Jayesh Kumawat was employed as a driver over the tractor bearing No.RJ-23-RB- 3059 owned by the respondent No.1 and the said tractor was insured with the respondent No.2.

3. Counsel for the claimant submitted that on 21.04.2014 at about 9:00 A.M., appellant and the respondent No.1 took a tractor along with thresher in the agricultural fields of Prabhu Dayal and when the tractor and thresher were in process of chafing the wheat and appellant was working under the directions of the em- ployer-respondent No.1, the right hand of the appellant rolled in the thresher which resulted into the amputation of right hand from elbow. It was further pleaded that at the time of the accident, the claimant was earning Rs.8,000/- per month and age of the injured was 22 years. Therefore, the claimant filed claim petition and prayed accordingly.

4. The said claim petition was contested by the non-petitioner No.1-employer, wherein he has admitted the fact that the injured [2025:RJ-JP:20229] (3 of 12) [CMA-4905/2015] sustained injuries during the course of employment and submitted that since the vehicle in question was insured with the Insurance Company, therefore, it is for the Insurance Company to indemnify the loss.

5. The Insurance Company also filed reply to the claim petition and refuted the averments made in the claim petition and submit- ted that the thresher is not part of tractor and it is not insured by the Insurance Company. It was also pleaded that there is a viola- tion of policy, therefore, the Insurance Company is not liable to make payment.

6. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the learned Court framed following issues:- ^^1- vk;k et:c t;s'k dqekor foi{kh la[;k 1 ds okgu VzsDVj la[;k vkj-ts- 23 vkjch 3059 ij cjoDr nq?kZVuk crkSj pkyd fu;ksftr Fkk \ 2- vk;k et:c t;s'k dqekj dk foi{kh la[;k 1 ds fu;kstu esa funsZ'kkuqlkj ,oa fgrkFkZ dk;Z djrs gq, mldk nkfguk gkFk dksguh rd dV x;k \ 3- vk;k izkFkhZ foi{khx.k ls izfrdj ysus dk gdnkj gS \ ;fn gka] rks fdlls o fdruk&fdruk \ 4- vk;k foi{kh chek dEiuh vius tokc nkos esa mBkbZ xbZ vkifRr;ksa ds vk/kkj ij izfrdj vnk;xh gsrq mRrjnk;h ugha gS \ 5- vuqrks"kA**

7. In order to substantiate the pleas and averments of the claim, the claimant examined himself as AW-1 and AW-2 Jainarayan and produced documents Ex.1 to Ex.5A.

8. The Insurance company in order to convert the averments of the claim petition and the evidence so adduced examined DW-1 Kaushal Arora and produced documents Ex.NA1-Insurance Policy.

9. After hearing the arguments of the respective parties, the learned Commissioner, while deciding the issues in favour of the claimant and while treating the permanent disability of the claimant to be 75% and while considering the income of the de- [2025:RJ-JP:20229] (4 of 12) [CMA-4905/2015] ceased to be Rs.6,000/- per month awarded a compensation of Rs.5,97,699/-.

10. That the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Commissioner erred in awarding inadequate amount of the compensation while assessing the income of the injured to be Rs.6,000/- per month only, whereas the income of the deceased at the relevant point of time was Rs.8,000/- per month. He further submits that functional disability of the deceased ought to have been assessed as 100% instead of 75%. Therefore, he submits that the compensation amount may kindly be enhanced.

11. Per contra, learned counsel for the Insurance Company sup- ported the impugned award qua assessing the income @ Rs.6,000/- while submitting that no documentary evidence has been produced by the appellant.

12. Heard learned counsel for both parties and perused the record.

13. A bare perusal to the record reveals that there is no docu- mentary proof produced by the claimant to substantiate the fact that at the time of the accident the income of the injured was Rs.8,000/- and in the absence of any cogent evidence, the learned Commissioner while taking into account the prevalent salaries of the driver, rightly awarded compensation of Rs.5,97,699/-. While treating the income of the deceased to be of Rs.6,000/-, further in the opinion of this Court, it cannot be said that functional disability of the injured ought to have been assessed as 100%, because the reason for treating the permanent disability of the injured to be 75% is based on oral as well as documentary evidence and such [2025:RJ-JP:20229] (5 of 12) [CMA-4905/2015] approach of the learned Commissioner appears to be justified and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.

14. Therefore, the appeal preferred by the claimant being devoid of merits is liable to be dismissed. In S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 4414/2015

1. The present appeal has been filed by the Insurance Company under Sections 30(1)(a) and 30(1)(aa) of the Employee Compen- sation Act, 1923, challenging the judgment dated 24.09.2015 passed by the Employee Compensation Commissioner, Sikar in W.C.C./NF/05/2014 titled Jayesh Kumawat Vs. Sharwan Kumar and Anr., whereby the claim petition filed by the claimant-appel- lant has been allowed and compensation of Rs.5,97,699/- has been awarded in favour of the claimants.

2. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the thresher is not part of the tractor, therefore, the Insurance Company is not liable to make payment. He further submits that as per the evi- dence available on record, the injured was working as a labour and he was doing another work which has no proximity or nexus with his nature of employment, therefore, the Insurance Company is not liable to pay compensation.

3. Per contra, the learned counsel for the claimant submits that the claimant was driver over the tractor owned by the respondent No.2 and he was working under the instructions of the employer and while performing his part of the duty when he was trying to pull out grain from the thresher his right hand was rolled in the thresher which resulted into amputation of his right hand from el- [2025:RJ-JP:20229] (6 of 12) [CMA-4905/2015] bow. Therefore, he further submitted that the accident occurred during the course of employment while vehicle was in operation.

4. Learned counsel for the employer also supported the im- pugned judgment and submitted that after the judgment in the matter of Gopali Vs. Bhanwar Singh and Anr. decided on

21.10.2016 passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court, the objections of the Insurance Company that the thresher attached to the tractor is not a vehicle and same was not insured, it was answered in para 11 which runs as follows:- "In that view of the matter and taking into consideration the over all view taken by all other Courts, we are of the opinion that the if the Thrasher is attached with the tractor, then it will in- clude as a vehicle. In that view of the matter, we answer the question accordingly. However, we make it clear that if the Thrasher is attached with the trac- tor, only then it is a motor vehicle and not other- wise, subject to fulfilling other requisite conditions of the Motor Vehicles Act."

5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

6. It is not disputed that the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Gopali (supra), while answering the reference, has de- cided "that if the thresher is attached in the tractor, then it will in- clude as a vehicle".

7. Counsel for the appellant further submits that the injured was working as a labourer over the tractor and he was doing work other than driving, therefore, the nature of work had no proximity or direct connection with his employment. Thus, the Insurance Company is not liable to pay compensation. [2025:RJ-JP:20229] (7 of 12) [CMA-4905/2015]

8. That a bare perusal of the evidence available on record it is evident that the injured was working under the instructions of the employer and the reason of accident has a connection with the vehicle and nature of his work because once thresher is held to be the part of the vehicle. Therefore, in the present case when the injured noticed an irregularity in the proper functioning of the thresher then in order to make it operational again or to resolve the said problem of machine he tried to pull the grain out of thresher and accidentally his right hand rolled into the thresher which happen to be the prime cause of accident. Since the vehicle was in operation, therefore, it can't be said that cause of the in- jury is remote or not having any connection with the nature of work assigned to the injured.

9. In the case of United India Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Pokhar mal Saini decided on 13.01.2022 while considering the identical situation, this Court observed that in view of the evidence available on record and finding of fact recorded by the learned Court below, the Insurance Company cannot be absolved from its liability.

10. Even otherwise, a bare perusal of the findings recorded by the learned Commissioner, it is evident that the injured was work- ing under the instructions of the employer and when he noticed an irregularity in the functioning of the thresher then he tried to pull out the grain from the thresher and accidentally his right hand was rolled in the thresher which resulted into amputation. [2025:RJ-JP:20229] (8 of 12) [CMA-4905/2015]

11. Therefore, the finding recorded by the Workmen Compensa- tion commissioner that injury sustained by the appellant during course of employment, does not suffer from any perversity.

12. That under the provision of Employee Compensation Act, the learned Commissioner is the last authority on facts and all the question so raised by the appellant-Insurance Company falls within the realms of the question of fact. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Golla Rajanna Etc. Vs. The Divisional Manager and anr. reported in 2017 (1) SCC 45, held as under :- "8. Section 30 of the Act provides for appeal to the High Court. To the extent, the provision reads as follows;

30. Appeals.-(1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commis- sioner, namely: (a) an order awarding as compensation a lump- sum whether by way of redemption of a half- monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum; [(aa) an order awarding interest or penalty Un- der Section 4A;] (b) an order refusing to allow redemption of a half-monthly payment; (c) an order providing for the distribution of compensation among the dependants of a de- ceased workman, or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependant; (d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under the provi- sions of Sub-section (2) of Section 12; or [2025:RJ-JP:20229] (9 of 12) [CMA-4905/2015] (e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or registering the same or provid- ing for the registration of the same subject to conditions: Provided that no appeal shall lie against any or- der unless a substantial question of law is in- volved in the appeal and in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in Clause (b),unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than three hundred rupees (Emphasis supplied)

10. Under the scheme of the Act, the work- men's Compensation Commissioner is the last authority on facts. The Parliament has thought it fit to restrict the scope of the appeal only to substantial question of law, being a welfare leg- islation. Unfortunately, the High Court has missed this crucial question of limited jurisdic- tion and has ventured to re appreciate the evi- dence and recorded its own findings on percent- age of disability for which also there is no basis. The whole exercise made by the High Court is not within the competence of the High Court under Section 30 of the Act.

13. Further, similar view has been expressed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of North East Karnatka Transport Cor- poration Vs. Smt. Sujatha reported in 2019 (11) SCC 514 as under: "9. At the outset, we may take note of the fact, being a settled principle, that the question as to whether the employee met with an accident, whether the accident occurred during the course of employment, whether it arose out of an employment, how and in what manner [2025:RJ-JP:20229] (10 of 12) [CMA-4905/2015] the accident occurred, who was negligent in causing the accident, whether there existed any relationship of employee and employer, what was the age and monthly salary of the employee, how many are the dependants of the deceased employee, the extent of disability caused to the employee due to injuries suf- fered in an accident, whether there was any insurance coverage obtained by the employer to cover the inci- dent etc. are some of the material issues which arise for the just decision of the Commissioner in a claim petition when an employee suffers any bodily injury or dies during the course of his employment and he/his LRs sue(s) his employer to claim compensation under the Act.

10. The aforementioned questions are essentially the questions of fact and, therefore, they are required to be proved with the aid of evidence. Once they are proved either way, the findings recorded thereon are regarded as the findings of fact.

11. The appeal provided under Section 30 of the Act to the High Court against the order of the Commis- sioner lies only against the specific orders set out in clauses (a) to (e) of Section 30 of the Act with a fur- ther rider contained in the first proviso to the section that the appeal must involve substantial questions of law.

12. In other words, the appeal provided under Section 30 of the Act to the High Court against the order of the Commissioner is not like a regular first appeal akin to Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which can he heard both on facts and law. The appel- late jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the appeal [2025:RJ-JP:20229] (11 of 12) [CMA-4905/2015] is confined only to examine the substantial questions of law arising in the case."

14. In "M/s Krishna Weaving Mills, Ajmer Vs. Smt. Chan- dra Bhaga Devi wife of Mool Chand & Anr.", reported in 1985(1) WLN 455, this Court while dealing with Workmen's Com- pensation Act has laid down law that unless there is as question of public importance and there is no final interpretation available while the substantial question of law is arising, the appeal under the Workmen's Compensation Act cannot been entertained. Rele- vant portion of the judgment reads as follows: "8. Moreover, under S. 30 of the Workmen Compensa- tion Act only substantial question of law can be agi- tated. In the present case, I am convinced that there is no substantial question of law involved.

9. The question of public importance and question on which no final interpretation is available are known as substantial question of law. Even if this definition is further extended, it will have to bear in mind that there is vast difference between the question of law and substantial question of law. It is only when the question of law is not well settled and it is of impor- tance, it would become a substantial questions of law."

15. It is the settled position of law that limited jurisdiction has been given to the High Court confined to the substantial question of law only and the High Court cannot venture and re appreciate the evidence and finding of fact recorded on the evidence led by both the parties. [2025:RJ-JP:20229] (12 of 12) [CMA-4905/2015]

16. This Court find no good ground to call for any interference on any of the factual findings. None of the factual findings are found to be either perverse or arbitrary or based on no evidence or against any provision of law. This Court accordingly upholds these findings.

17. Since the appeal is not qualifying to have a substantial ques- tion of law, which is mandatory under Section 30 of the Work- men's Compensation Act, 1923, therefore, no interference is called for in this appeal and the same is dismissed.

18. All pending application(s), if any, also stand dismissed. Seema /94-95 (MANEESH SHARMA),J