Bharu, Tehsil - Mandawa, District - Jhunjhunu (Raj.). vs State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary, Elementary on 25 Aug 2025

Judgment

1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary, Elementary Education Department, Government Secretariat, Jaipur.

2. Joint Secretary, Department Of Personnel (Ka-2),

4. Government Secretariat, Jaipur. Director, Primary Education Rajasthan, Bikaner. District Education Officer (Primary Education), Rajsamand (Raj.). ----Respondents For Petitioner(s)

: Mr. Ashwani Kumar Gupta For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA Order 25/08/2025

1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner for assailing order dated 19.12.2023 passed by the Assistant Secretary, Elementary Education, whereby application filed by the petitioner for seeking compassionate appointment in lieu of services rendered by his brother late Shri Mukesh Kumar, who died while in service, has been rejected.

2. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that late Shri Mukesh Kumar had expired on 01.12.2012 and immediately after his death, the petitioner who is brother of late Shri Mukesh Kumar submitted application for seeking compassionate appointment, however, same was rejected by the [2025:RJ-JP:33439] (2 of 10) [CW-7733/2024] respondent-Department on the ground that 'the brother' is not considered to be dependent of deceased Government servant, hence, compassionate appointment cannot be granted to him. Learned counsel further submits that thereafter, the respondent Government itself has made amendment in the Rajasthan Compassionate Appointment of Deceased Government Servant Rules, 1996 vide notification dated 28.10.2021 whereby unmarried brother has also bee included in the definition of dependent. Therefore, in view of above amendment, the petitioner again submitted application for seeking compassionate appointment however, the same has been rejected by the respondents vide order dated 19.12.2023 mentioning therein that the aforesaid amended Rules are not retrospective in nature as decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ashish Awasthi passed in S.B. Civil Appeal No.6903/2021.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Rules regarding granting of compassionate appointment are considered to be welfare and beneficial legislation meant to support the bereaved family, who went in deep financial crisis on account of sudden death of sole bread earner. Therefore, by giving narrow interpretation to the amended Rules, the respondents have deprived the petitioner of his legitimate rights. Learned counsel also relied upon the order dated 15.11.2022 passed by the Co- ordinate Bench of this Court at Principal Seat Jodhpur in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.5590/2022, Kamlesh Meghwal Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. [2025:RJ-JP:33439] (3 of 10) [CW-7733/2024]

4. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record.

5. It is settled proposition of law that compassionate appointment cannot be treated as regular source of recruitment and it is granted as a matter of concession in order to extend financial support to the family of deceased Government employee, who on account of sudden death of the sole breadwinner went into grave finance crisis. Thus, the sole purpose of the Rules of 1996 was to meet out the emergent situation. In the instant case, death of the deceased Shri Mukesh Kumar took place on 01.12.2012. Hence, under these circumstances, after a period of around 12 years, when the family has managed to tide over the emergent circumstances, compassionate appointment cannot be granted at this belated stage.

6. In the case of State of West Bengal Vs. Debabrata Tiwari & Ors., 2025 (5) SCC 712, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the objects of granting compassionate appointment in following manner:- "33. The object underlying a provision for grant of compassionate employment is to enable the family of the deceased employee to tide over the sudden crisis due to the death of the breadearner which has left the family in penury and without any means of livelihood. Out of pure humanitarian consideration and having regard to the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided, the family would not be in a position to make both ends meet, a provision is made for giving gainful appointment to one of the dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for such appointment. Having regard to such an object, it would be of no avail to grant compassionate appointment to the dependants of the deceased employee, after the crisis which arose on account of death of a breadwinner, has been overcome. Thus, there is also a compelling need to act with a sense of immediacy in matters concerning [2025:RJ-JP:33439] (4 of 10) [CW-7733/2024] compassionate appointment because on failure to do so, the object of the scheme of compassionate appointment would be frustrated. Where a long lapse of time has occurred since the date of death of the deceased employee, the sense of immediacy for seeking compassionate appointment would cease to exist and thus lose its significance and this would be a relevant circumstance which must weigh with the authorities in determining as to whether a case for the grant of compassionate appointment has been made out for consideration."

7. In the very same judgment, seeking and granting compassionate appointment at such belated stage has been deprecated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the following manner:- "35. Considering the second question referred to above, in the first instance, regarding whether applications for compassionate appointment could be considered after a delay of several years, we are of the view that, in a case where, for reasons of prolonged delay, either on the part of the applicant in claiming compassionate appointment or the authorities in deciding such claim, the sense of immediacy is diluted and lost. Further, the financial circumstances of the family of the deceased, may have changed, for the better, since the time of the death of the government employee. In such circumstances, courts or other relevant authorities are to be guided by the fact that for such prolonged period of delay, the family of the deceased was able to sustain themselves, most probably by availing gainful employment from some other source. Granting compassionate appointment in such a case, as noted by this Court in Hakim Singh [Haryana SEB v. Hakim Singh, (1997) 8 SCC 85 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 31] would amount to treating a claim for compassionate appointment as though it were a matter of inheritance based on a line of succession which is contrary to the Constitution. Since compassionate appointment is not a vested right and the same is relative to the financial condition and hardship faced by the dependants of the deceased government employee as a consequence of his death, a claim for compassionate appointment may not be entertained after lapse of a considerable period of time since the death of the government employee. [2025:RJ-JP:33439] (5 of 10) [CW-7733/2024]

36. Laches or undue delay, the blameworthy conduct of a person in approaching a Court of Equity in England for obtaining discretionary relief which disentitled him for grant of such relief was explained succinctly by Sir Barnes Peacock, in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd [Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, (1874) LR 5 PC 221] as under : (LR pp. 239-40) “Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation, in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.” 37. Whether the above doctrine of laches which disentitled grant of relief to a party by Equity Court of England, could disentitle the grant of relief to a person by the High Court in the exercise of its power under Article 226 of our Constitution, came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench of this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 117 : AIR 1967 SC 1450] . In the said case, it was regarded as a principle that disentitled a party for grant of relief from a High Court in the exercise of its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 38. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566] this Court restated the principle articulated in earlier pronouncements in the following words : (SCC pp. 594-95, para 24) [2025:RJ-JP:33439] (6 of 10) [CW-7733/2024]

24. … the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this Rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.

39. While we are mindful of the fact that there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, ordinarily, a writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time, vide Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana [Jagdish Lal v. State of Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1550] ; NDMC v. Pan Singh [NDMC v. Pan Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 278 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 398]. 40. Further, simply because the respondent-writ petitioners submitted their applications to the relevant authority in the year 2005-2006, it cannot be said that they diligently pursued the matter and had not slept over their rights. In this regard, it may be apposite to refer to the decision of this Court in State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari [State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 32] , wherein the following observations were made : (SCC p. 184, para 19) “19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the competent authority does not arrest time.” [2025:RJ-JP:33439] (7 of 10) [CW-7733/2024]

41. Applying the said ratio to the facts of the present case, we hold that the respondent-writ petitioners, upon submitting their applications in the year 2006-2005 did nothing further to pursue the matter, till the year 2015 i.e. for a period of ten years. Notwithstanding the tardy approach of the authorities of the appellant State in dealing with their applications, the respondent-writ petitioners delayed approaching the High Court seeking a writ in the nature of a mandamus against the authorities of the State. In fact, such a prolonged delay in approaching the High Court, may even be regarded as a waiver of a remedy, as discernible by the conduct of the respondent-writ petitioners. Such a delay would disentitle the respondent-writ petitioners to the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. Further, the order of the High Court dated 17-3-2015 [Debabrata Tiwari v. State of W.B., WPA No. 3243 of 2015, order dated 17-3-2015 (Cal)] , whereby the writ petition filed by some of the respondents herein was disposed of with a direction to the Director of Local Bodies, Government of West Bengal to take a decision as to the appointment of the respondent-writ petitioners, cannot be considered to have the effect of revival of the cause of action. 42. It may be apposite at this juncture to refer to the following observations of this Court in Malaya Nanda Sethy v. State of Orissa [Malaya Nanda Sethy v. State of Orissa, (2024) 15 SCC 766 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 684] , as to the manner in which the authorities must consider and decide applications for appointment on compassionate grounds : (SCC paras 14-16) “14. Before parting with the present order, we are constrained to observe that considering the object and purpose of appointment on compassionate grounds i.e. a family of a deceased employee may be placed in a position of financial hardship upon the untimely death of the employee while in service and the basis or policy is immediacy in rendering of financial assistance to the family of the deceased consequent upon his untimely death, the authorities must consider and decide such applications compassionate grounds as per the policy prevalent, at the earliest, but not beyond a period of six months from the date of submission of such completed applications. appointment

15. We are constrained to direct as above as we have found that in several cases, [2025:RJ-JP:33439] (8 of 10) [CW-7733/2024] appointment applications compassionate grounds are not attended in time and are kept pending for years together. As a result, the applicants in several cases have to approach the High Courts concerned seeking a writ of mandamus for the consideration of their applications. Even after such a direction is issued, frivolous or vexatious reasons are given for rejecting the applications. Once again, the applicants have to challenge the order of rejection before the High Court which leads to pendency of litigation and passage of time, leaving the family of the employee who died in harness in the lurch and in financial difficulty. Further, for reasons best known to the authorities and on irrelevant considerations, applications made for compassionate appointment are rejected. After several years or are not considered at all as in the instant case.

16. If the object and purpose of appointment on compassionate grounds as envisaged under the relevant policies or the rules have to be achieved then it is just and necessary that such applications are considered well in time and not in a tardy way. We have come across cases where for nearly two decades the controversy regarding the application made for compassionate appointment is not resolved. This consequently leads to the frustration of the very policy of granting compassionate appointment on the death of the employee while in service. We have, therefore, directed that such applications must be considered at an earliest point of time. The consideration must be fair, reasonable and based on relevant consideration. The application cannot be rejected on the basis of frivolous and for reasons extraneous to the facts of the case. Then and then only the object and purpose of appointment on compassionate grounds can be achieved.” (emphasis supplied)

43. In Malaya Nanda Sethy case [Malaya Nanda Sethy v. State of Orissa, (2024) 15 SCC 766 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 684] , the claim of the appellant- applicant therein for compassionate appointment was directed by this Court to be considered by the competent authority. This Court noted that in the said case, there was no lapse on the part of the appellant-applicant therein in diligently pursuing the [2025:RJ-JP:33439] (9 of 10) [CW-7733/2024] matter. The delay in considering the application of the appellant therein was held to be solely attributable to the authorities of the State, and no part of it was occasioned by the appellant-applicant. Further, in the said case, the appellant-applicant was prejudiced not only because of the prolonged delay in considering his application but also by the fact that in the interim, the policy of the State governing compassionate appointment had changed to his detriment. Therefore, the facts of the said case were distinct from the facts involved herein. In the present case, the conduct of the respondent- writ petitioners cannot be said to be blameless in that they did not pursue their matter with sufficient diligence. However, the observations made in the said case as to the manner in which applications for compassionate appointment are to be considered and disposed of are relevant to the present case. 44. As noted in Malaya Nanda Sethy case [Malaya Nanda Sethy v. State of Orissa, (2024) 15 SCC 766 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 684] , the operation of a policy/scheme for compassionate appointment is founded on considerations of immediacy. A sense of immediacy is called for not only in the manner in which the applications are processed by the authorities concerned but also in the conduct of the applicant in pursuing his case, before the authorities and if needed before the courts. 45. In the present case, the applications for compassionate appointment were made by the respondent-writ petitioners in the year 2005-2006. Admittedly, the first concrete step taken by the Chairman of Burdwan Municipality was in the year 2013, when the said authority forwarded a list of candidates to be approved by the Director of Local Bodies, Burdwan Municipality. The respondent-writ petitioners knocked on the doors of the High Court of Calcutta only in the year 2015 i.e. after a lapse of nearly ten years from the date of making the application for compassionate appointment. The respondent-writ petitioners were not prudent enough to approach the courts sooner, claiming that no concrete step had been taken by the appellant State in furtherance of the application by seeking a writ in the nature of mandamus. 46. The sense of immediacy in the matter of compassionate appointment has been lost in the present case. This is attributable to the authorities of the appellant State as well as the respondent- writ petitioners. Now, entertaining a claim which was made in 2005-2006, in the year 2023, would be of no avail, because admittedly, the respondent- writ petitioners have been able to eke out a living [2025:RJ-JP:33439] (10 of 10) [CW-7733/2024] even though they did not successfully get appointed to the services of the Municipality on compassionate grounds. Hence, we think that this are therefore not fit cases to direct that the claim of the respondent-writ petitioners for appointments on compassionate grounds, be considered or entertained."

8. In the light of foregoing discussion, no case of interference is made out. therefore, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is hereby dismissed. DIVYA /2 (ANAND SHARMA),J