Aata Chakki, Sonipat, Adarsh Nagar, Sonipat, Haryana v. Department, Government Secretariat, Jaipur

Judgment

1. The present writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, assailing the dismissal order dated 26.09.1994 issued by the Development Officer, Panchayat Samiti, Baseri, Distt.-Dholpur, whereby the petitioner was terminated owing to submission of forged Marksheet by the petitioner.

Brief facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that, [2025:RJ-JP:34712] (2 of 9) [CW-5827/2002] the petitioner was selected for the post of Teacher Grade-III vide order dated 04.11.1988 issued by the District Establishment Committee, Dholpur; subsequent to which, vide order dated

18.11.1988 issued by the Development Officer, Panchayat Samiti, Baseri, Distt.-Dholpur, the petitioner was appointed to the post of Teacher Grade-III; and after completion of the probation period of two years, the petitioner was confirmed to the said post vide order dated 04.01.1993 (Annexure-1). Thereafter, the Development Officer, Panchayat Samiti, Baseri, Distt.-Dholpur, issued two (2) Show Cause Notices (SCN): SCN dated

04.03.1993 (Annexure-2) and SCN dated 12.08.1993 (Annexure- 3), based on the suspicion that the Higher Secondary Examination Marksheet produced by the petitioner, allegedly issued by the Secondary Education Board, Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, were forged (hereinafter referred to as the “Marksheet”).

3. After the petitioner received the aforesaid SCNs calling upon him to show cause as to why his services should not be terminated, the petitioner replied to the aforesaid SCNs vide letter dated 21.08.1993 (Annexure-4), wherein the petitioner refuted the allegations posed in the SCNs (Annexure-2 and 3), contending that he had not committed any fraud and prayed for withdrawal of the proceedings as well as revocation of the suspension. Subsequently, a charge-sheet was issued, and after holding an inquiry, the petitioner was dismissed from service vide order dated 26.09.1994 (Annexure-7).

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was not afforded an opportunity to be heard, and that the petitioner was acquitted vide order dated 21.03.2002 [2025:RJ-JP:34712] (3 of 9) [CW-5827/2002] (Annexure-8) passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bari, in Criminal Case No. 369/1994 for the offences under Sections 420, 467, 468 & 471 of the Code1. Therefore, the impugned order (Annexure-7) is unsustainable in the eyes of law.

5. Per Contra, the learned counsel for the respondent has supported the impugned dismissal order (Annexure-7) and vehemently opposes the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner. He rebutted the petitioner's case by contending that as soon as the respondent-Panchayat Samiti became suspicious about the forged Marksheet submitted by the petitioner, SCNs were issued to the petitioner on 04.03.1993 (Annexure-2) and

12.08.1993 (Annexure-3) to show cause as to why his services should not be terminated and to prove the genuineness of the forged Marksheet; however, despite affording such opportunities, the petitioner failed to respond to the said SCNs within the time stipulated. Subsequently, the petitioner was served with a charge sheet under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Service Rules2. Upon conclusion of the departmental inquiry, it was established that the petitioner had submitted a forged Marksheet, purportedly issued by the Board of Secondary Education, Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, at the time of his appointment. It further emerged on record that the Roll Number mentioned in the said Marksheet actually pertained to another person and that the alleged Marksheet had not been issued by the said Board. Learned counsel further contended that an adequate opportunity of hearing had been afforded to the petitioner. It was also contended that mere acquittal in the criminal case does not, ipso facto, confer a right upon the petitioner to seek quashing of the impugned order. Therefore, he is not entitled to claim any relief 1 Indian Penal Code, 1860 2 Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 [2025:RJ-JP:34712] (4 of 9) [CW-5827/2002] in the present writ petition and prays that the present writ petition may kindly be dismissed.

6. Heard the submissions made at bar and also perused the material available on record.

7. From the record, it is revealed that: (i) contrary to the petitioner's assertions, the record clearly establishes that, in the inquiry, proper procedure was followed in accordance with the Rajasthan Civil Service Rules3. The petitioner was served with a charge sheet, a departmental inquiry was conducted, and he was afforded every opportunity to defend himself. The principles of natural justice mandate only that a reasonable opportunity be provided, and the same was duly accorded to the petitioner; (ii) the departmental inquiry has conclusively established that the Higher Secondary Examination Marksheet purportedly issued by the Board of Secondary Education, Bhopal, M.P., submitted by the petitioner, was indeed forged. The inquiry further revealed the damning fact that the Roll Number mentioned in the said certificate actually pertained to another person entirely, and that no such marksheet had ever been issued by the said Board.

8. This Court is also of the considered view that the petitioner's reliance upon his acquittal in Criminal Case No.369/1994 vide order dated 21.03.2002 is entirely misplaced and legally untenable. It is well-settled that the standard of proof required in criminal proceedings is "beyond reasonable doubt" whereas in departmental inquiries, the standard is that of "preponderance of probabilities". The acquittal in criminal proceedings does not, ipso facto, exonerate the petitioner from the civil and service law consequences of his misconduct, nor does it invalidate the findings of the departmental inquiry 3 Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 [2025:RJ-JP:34712] (5 of 9) [CW-5827/2002] conducted under the service rules.

9. This position of law is further fortified in view of the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Ajit Kumar Nag Vs. G.M. Indian Oil Corporation and Ors.4 where the three-judge bench held as under: “11………The two proceedings - criminal and departmental - are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with service Rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar. In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused 'beyond reasonable doubt', he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of 'preponderance of probability' ” (Emphasis supplied)

10. It is trite law that fraud and justice do not dwell together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant), this pristine maxim has never lost its temper over the centuries and it continues to dwell in spirit and body of service law jurisprudence. It is settled law that no legal right in respect of appointment to a post vests in a candidate who has obtained the employment by fraud, mischief, misrepresentation or mala-fide; the same is based upon the reasoning that a person appointed erroneously on a post must not reap the benefits of wrongful appointment jeopardising the interests of the meritorious and worthy candidates.

11. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of R. Vishwanatha Pillai Vs. State of Kerala and Ors.5 observed that an 4 2005 INSC 425 5 2004 INSC 23 [2025:RJ-JP:34712] (6 of 9) [CW-5827/2002] appointment based upon fraud is non-est in law, and there exists no standing in law to claim benefits out of such appointment, the ratio therein has been re-produced as under: “15. This apart, the appellant obtained the appointment in the service on the basis that he belonged to a Scheduled Caste community. When it was found by the Scrutiny Committee that he did not belong to the Scheduled Caste community, then the very basis of his appointment was taken away. His appointment was no appointment in the eyes of law. He cannot claim a right to the post as he had usurped the post meant for a reserved candidate by playing a fraud and producing a false caste certificate. Unless the appellant can lay a claim to the post on the basis of his appointment he cannot claim the constitutional guarantee given under the Article 311 of the Constitution. As he had obtained the appointment on the basis of false caste certificate he cannot be considered to be a person who holds a post within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, Finding recorded by the Scrutiny Committee that the appellant got the appointment on the basis of false caste certificate has become final. The position, therefore, is that the appellant has usurped the post which should have gone to a member of the Scheduled Caste. In view of the finding recorded by the Scrutiny Committee and upheld upto this Court he has disqualified himself to hold the post. Appointment was void from its inception. It cannot be said that the said void appointment would enable the appellant to claim that he was holding a civil post within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, As appellant had obtained the appointment by playing a fraud he cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own fraud in entering the service and claim that he was holder of the post entitled to be dealt with in terms of Article 311 of the Constitution of India or the Rules framed thereunder. Where an appointment in a service has been acquired by practising fraud or deceit such an appointment is no appointment in law, in service and in such a situation Article 311 of the Constitution is not attracted at all.

12. A co-ordinate bench of this Court in the matter of Krishna Gopal Vs. State of Rajasthan6 while dealing with a similar case pertaining to termination owing to forged marksheets unequivocally upheld the maxim (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant) while referring to the Hon’ble Apex Court’s decision in 6 2014 (1) SCT 685 (RH) [2025:RJ-JP:34712] (7 of 9) [CW-5827/2002] R. Vishwanatha Pillai (Supra) holding as under: “…. Upon examining the matter with objectivity and on the anvil of pristine maxim, in my opinion, the impugned order of termination is a just order and the same cannot be categorized as infirm from any stretch of imagination.”

13. Further, more recently, in the matter of Parul Vs. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited and Ors.7, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has applied this well settled position of law to a similarly placed controversy, where the petitioner therein had secured appointment on the basis of a fraudulent course completion certificate, and has held as under: “11. From a perusal of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is evident that the appellant sought to seek appointment on the post of Lower Divisional Clerk on the strength of a false 'O' Level certificate and, therefore, attempted to obtain appointment by playing a fraud. It is settled law that where any benefit is obtained by a person by playing fraud then such benefit cannot be sustained in the eyes of law as fraud vitiates everything. The Supreme Court in Meghmala and others v. G. Narasimha Reddy and others, 2010 (8) SCC 383, while laying down the consequences of fraud by a party, has held as under: "28. It is settled proposition of law that where an applicant gets an order/office by making misrepresentation or playing fraud upon the competent Authority, such order cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. "Fraud avoids all judicial acts ecclesiastical or temporal." (Vide S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. Vs. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. AIR 1994 SC 853. In Lazarus Estate Ltd. Vs. Besalay 1956 All. E.R. 349), the Court observed without equivocation that "no judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud, for fraud unravels everything." 29. In Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation Vs. M/s. GAR Re-Rolling Mills & Anr. AIR 1994 SC 2151; and State of Maharashtra & Ors. Vs. Prabhu (1994) 2 SCC 481, this Court observed that a writ Court, while exercising its equitable jurisdiction, should not act as to prevent perpetration of a legal fraud as the courts are obliged to do justice by promotion of good faith. "Equity is, also, known to prevent the law from the crafty evasions and subtleties invented to evade law." 7 2023 (4) SLR 879 [2025:RJ-JP:34712] (8 of 9) [CW-5827/2002]

30. In Smt. Shrisht Dhawan Vs. M/s. Shaw Brothers. AIR 1992 SC 1555, it has been held as under: "20. Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilised system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct."

31. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Rajendra Singh & Ors. AIR 2000 SC 1165, this Court observed that "Fraud and justice never dwell together" (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant) and it is a pristine maxim which has never lost its temper over all these centuries.

32. The ratio laid down by this Court in various cases is that dishonesty should not be permitted to bear the fruit and benefit to the persons who played fraud or made misrepresentation and in such circumstances the Court should not perpetuate the fraud. (See District Collector & Chairman, Welfare Vizianagaram Social Residential School Society, Vizianagaram & Anr. Vs. M. Tripura Sundari Devi :(1990) 3 SCC 655; Union of India & Ors. Vs. M. Bhaskaran: (1995) Suppl. 4 SCC 100; Vice Chairman, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Anr. Vs. Girdharilal Yadav: (2004) 6 SCC 325; State of Maharashtra v. Ravi Prakash Babulalsing Parmar: (2007) 1 SCC 80; Himadri Chemicals Industries Ltd. Vs. Coal Tar Refining Company: AIR 2007 SC 2798; and Mohammed Ibrahim & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Anr.:(2009) 8 SCC 751).

33. Fraud is an intrinsic, collateral act, and fraud of an egregious nature would vitiate the most solemn proceedings of courts of justice. Fraud is an act of deliberate deception with a design to secure something, which is otherwise not due. The expression "fraud" involves two elements, deceit and injury to the person deceived. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. (Vide Dr. Vimla Vs. Delhi Administration: AIR 1963 SC 1572; Indian Bank Vs. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd.: (1996) 5 SCC 550; State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. T. Suryachandra Rao: AIR 2005 SC 3110; K.D. Sharma Vs. Steel Authority of India Ltd. & Ors.: (2008) 12 SCC 481; and Regional Manager, Central Bank of India Vs. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahir & Ors.: (2008) 13 SCC 170). …………

13. The cancellation of appointments obtained by producing false/forged caste certificates, and by playing a fraud, has also been upheld by the Supreme Court in Chief Regional Officer, Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Pradip and another: 2020 (11) SCC 144; Chandrabhan v. State of Maharashtra and others: 2021 (9) SCC 804; and Chief Executive Officer, Bhilai Steel Plant, Bhilai v. Mahesh Kumar Gonnade and others. [2025:RJ-JP:34712] (9 of 9) [CW-5827/2002] …………

18. It would be travesty of justice to force the respondents to retain a person like the appellant in service when they have lost all faith and trust in her on account of the fraud committed by her. The appellant cannot invoke or claim any relief even on account of equity and sympathy because of her act of fraud.” (Emphasis supplied) Thus, this Court is in respectful agreement with the above view taken by the Punjab and Haryana High Court.

14. In the light of the facts at hand, the foregoing discussions and observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and a co- ordinate bench of this Court in the aforesaid cases, this Court does not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order dated 26.09.1994 (Annexure-7). Hence, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is hereby dismissed as being devoid of merit.

15. Pending application(s), if any, also stand dismissed. (MANEESH SHARMA),J Seema/17 Whether Reportable: Yes/No