✦ High Court of India · 14 Aug 2025

BENCH AT JAIPUR v. Department, Government of Rajasthan, Government Secretariat

Case Details High Court of India · 14 Aug 2025

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA Date of Reserve Date of Pronouncement Order : : 07/08/2025 14/08/2025

1. Petitioner has assailed order dated 25.07.2002 passed by Deputy Director (Secondary), Jaipur Region, Jaipur, whereby, on account of having been convicted by the criminal court, petitioner was dismissed from service.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was initially appointed as Lab Boy on 04.12.1970 in the Department of Primary and Secondary Education. Thereafter, he was promoted to the post of LDC vide order dated 22.02.1983. Later on, the petitioner was promoted as UDC in the year 1995. [2025:RJ-JP:31264] (2 of 7) [CW-5081/2002]

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that charge sheet dated 03.07.1996 was issued to the petitioner under Rule 17 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958, levelling charges of embezzlement of Rs.

1964.80 relating to stationery.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner draws attention of this Court towards order dated 03.08.1996 passed by the disciplinary authority, whereby, pursuant to aforesaid charge sheet issued under Rule 17 of the Rules of 1958, the petitioner was penalised with penalty of withholding of two annual grade increments without cumulative effect. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has already undergone the rigor of aforesaid penalty and did not opt to challenge the same.

5. Thereafter, in respect of same allegations, as levelled in the charge sheet issued under Rule 17 of the Rules of 1958, one criminal case was registered for committing offences punishable under Section 409 IPC and Sections 13(1)(c)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Act of 1988’). In the aforesaid criminal case, after trial, the petitioner was convicted vide judgment dated

18.08.2001 passed by Special Judge (Printing and Stationery Embezzlement Matters), Jaipur and consequently, sentence of two years rigorous imprisonment along with fine was imposed upon the petitioner.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that feeling aggrieved by conviction and sentence awarded vide judgment dated 18.08.2001, the petitioner filed S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 636/2001 along with an application for suspension of sentence, [2025:RJ-JP:31264] (3 of 7) [CW-5081/2002] wherein, vide order dated 07.09.2001, this Court suspended the sentence awarded to the petitioner vide judgment dated

18.08.2001.

7. Thereafter one order dated 25.07.2002 has been passed by the Deputy Director (Secondary), Jaipur Region, Jaipur, whereby only on account of conviction of the petitioner vide judgment dated 18.08.2001, the petitioner has been dismissed from service.

8. While assailing order dated 25.07.2002, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner has been subjected to double jeopardy in the manner that earlier in respect of self same charges, charge sheet under Rule 17 of the Rules of 1958 was issued and penalty of withholding of two annual grade increments without cumulative effect was imposed upon the petitioner and, thus, the petitioner has already suffered on account of said charges of embezzlement of Rs. 1964.80. Thereafter, in respect of alleged embezzlement, the petitioner was tried by the criminal court and criminal court has also penalised the petitioner with sentence and fine. Now, again for the same allegations, the petitioner has been dismissed from service vide order dated 25.07.2002 which is nothing, but penalising a person many a times for the same misconduct. Learned counsel for the petitioner would also submit that as per Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India, nobody can be punished twice for the same offence.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted that order dated 25.07.2002 is quite vague inasmuch as it does [2025:RJ-JP:31264] (4 of 7) [CW-5081/2002] not reveal that the petitioner has been dismissed from service under which provision of law.

10. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that aforesaid order dated 25.07.2002 is causing grave prejudice and miscarriage of justice to the petitioner as it has snatched the only means of earning and livelihood of the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his arguments, has placed reliance upon the decision of Madras High Court in the case of D. Narayanan Vs. District Revenue Officer, Virudhunagar, Virudhunagar District & Others, 2009 Supreme(Mad) 576; and decision of Kerala High Court in the case of P.M. Sethu Madhavan Nair Vs. Commissioner for Government Examinations & Another, 1978 LIC 1434.

11. Per contra, learned Deputy Government Counsel appearing for the respondents defends order dated 25.07.2002 and submits that the aforesaid order dated 25.07.2002 has been issued by the competent authority in exercise of powers under Rule 19 of the Rules of 1958. She submits that mere omission to mention any provision of law would not vitiate the impugned order, more so, when the language of the order is quite clear that the dismissal order has been issued only on the basis of conviction of the petitioner by competent criminal court vide judgment dated

18.08.2001 for committing offence punishable under Section 409 IPC and Sections 13(1)(c)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act of

12. Learned Deputy Government Counsel submits that Rule 19 of the Rules of 1958 carves out an exception and empowers the disciplinary authority to pass penalty order after [2025:RJ-JP:31264] (5 of 7) [CW-5081/2002] dispensing with the regular enquiry contemplated under the Rules of 1958. It has been specified in aforesaid Rule 19 that in the cases where the employee has been convicted by the criminal court in a criminal case, the competent authority, without conducting any enquiry, can pass order of penalty. In the instance case, where the charges against the petitioner were of serious nature, questioning his integrity and he was also convicted under the provisions of IPC and the Act of 1988, it was in the public interest to discontinue his services and accordingly, impugned order dated 25.07.2002 has been passed.

13. Learned Deputy Government Counsel would also submit that principles of double jeopardy would not be attracted in the instant case for the reason that impugned order dated 25.07.2002 has not been issued in respect of any charge sheet whatsoever and the only reason for passing order of dismissal is conviction of the petitioner in a criminal case involving allegations of embezzlement and corruption. Cause to pass order dated

25.07.2002 has arisen only on 18.08.2001 after conviction of the petitioner, therefore, any action taken by the department prior to that in respect of any earlier charge sheet cannot be compared with impugned action of dismissal of the petitioner from service.

14. Learned Deputy Government Counsel also submits that this Court in the criminal appeal has simply suspended sentence awarded to the petitioner and, therefore, only on the basis of suspension of sentence, the petitioner cannot be absolved from consequential departmental action. She prayed for dismissal of the writ petition filed by the petitioner. [2025:RJ-JP:31264] (6 of 7) [CW-5081/2002]

15. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

16. The petitioner has challenged his dismissal order dated

25.07.2002 mainly on the ground that the aforesaid order is hit by the principles of double jeopardy. I have examined earlier penalty order dated 03.08.1996 and compared the same with impugned order dated 25.07.2002. I find that the foundation and basis of both the orders are altogether different. Merely submitting that the petitioner has already been punished with a penalty of withholding two annual grade increments for the same embezzlement, he cannot be penalised again for the same offence, in the opinion of this Court, is totally inconceivable in the facts of the instant case. Order dated 25.07.2002 clearly reflects that the sole reason for passing the said order is not charge sheet allegedly issued to the petitioner in the year 1996, nor does it amount to recalling or reviewing the earlier penalty order dated

03.08.1996. The reason for passing order dated 25.07.2002 accrued only on conviction of the petitioner vide judgment dated

18.08.2001, whereby, the petitioner has been convicted for committing offence pertaining to embezzlement as well as for committing offences punishable under the provisions of the Act of

1988. No such cause was earlier available to the respondent- department. Hence, it cannot be said that the order impugned is causing double jeopardy to the petitioner.

17. It is also admitted fact that the conviction recorded by the competent criminal court vide judgment dated 18.08.2001 has not yet been stayed. Merely sentence awarded pursuant to such conviction has been suspended. It is settled proposition of law that [2025:RJ-JP:31264] (7 of 7) [CW-5081/2002] suspension of sentence does not absolve a person from the consequences of conviction and it merely defers the execution of proceedings till the disposal of the criminal appeal. Hence, in the considered opinion of this Court, suspension of sentence by this Court in criminal appeal is of no help to the petitioner and he cannot be allowed to raise a plea that after suspension of sentence on the basis of conviction by the criminal court, powers under Rule 19 of the Rules of 1958 cannot be exercised by the disciplinary authority.

18. I have also gone through the judgments cited by learned counsel for the petitioner. However, the same are totally distinguishable on the facts of the instant case and principles laid down therein are not at all attracted.

19. In my considered opinion, the disciplinary authority has committed no illegality or arbitrariness in passing impugned order dated 25.07.2002, dismissing the petitioner from service. Hence, writ petition filed by the petitioner is, hereby, dismissed.

20. Pending application, if any, stand disposed of. MANOJ NARWANI / (ANAND SHARMA),J

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