Rajasthan v. Home and Justice, Govt. of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur

Judgment

1. By way of instant writ petition, the petitioner has assailed order dated 30.01.1999, whereby, penalty of dismissal from service has been imposed upon the petitioner. The petitioner has also challenged order dated 17.06.1999 passed by the appellate authority in departmental appeal as well as order dated

03.09.2001 passed by the reviewing authority, whereby review petition filed by the petitioner has been rejected.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was appointed as Constable in RAC and after completion

of probation period, he was confirmed in service. After getting sanctioned Privilege Leave (PL) for one month for the period commencing from 06.06.1997 to 05.07.1999, the petitioner [2025:RJ-JP:34272] (2 of 15) [CW-3970/2002] proceeded for his native place. However, he was implicated in a criminal case lodged vide FIR No. 11/1997 followed by charge sheet under Sections 302 and 201 IPC. In the said case, the petitioner, his father and one another person were arrested and prosecuted before the competent criminal court. It is submitted that after undergoing trial in the aforesaid case, the petitioner was acquitted of the charges under Sections 302, 120B and 201 IPC vide judgment dated 03.12.1999 passed by the Additional District Judge, Jhunjhunu.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that in the meanwhile, Respondent No. 4 initiated departmental enquiry against the petitioner by issuing a charge sheet under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the Rules of 1958’). The petitioner was also placed under suspension vide order dated

17.07.1997. Pursuant to aforesaid charge sheet, enquiry officer conducted enquiry and ultimately, disciplinary authority dismissed the petitioner from service vide order dated 30.01.1999. Appeal filed by the petitioner against such dismissal order was rejected by the appellate authority vide order dated 17.06.1999 and thereafter, even review petition has also been dismissed vide order dated

03.09.2001.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was dismissed only on account of his alleged involvement in the criminal case, in which the petitioner has already been acquitted. The charges and allegations in the criminal case as well as in disciplinary proceedings were similar, therefore, after acquittal of the petitioner by the competent criminal court, charges levelled [2025:RJ-JP:34272] (3 of 15) [CW-3970/2002] against the petitioner in departmental enquiry have lost their significance. Therefore, punishment of dismissal from service based upon such charges, fundamentally criminal in nature, is arbitrary and liable to be quashed and set aside. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that appellate authority also failed to examine that the charge sheet in departmental enquiry and charges in the criminal case were similar, however, the appellate authority rejected appeal filed by the petitioner vide order dated 17.06.1999. Even after acquittal of the petitioner in criminal case, the Reviewing authority has also failed to exercise its jurisdiction in proper manner. In the aforesaid circumstances, learned counsel for the petitioner prayed for allowing the writ petition by quashing the penalty order with direction to reinstate the petitioner along with all consequential benefits.

5. Reply to writ petition was filed by the respondents categorically denying the averments made in the memo of writ petition. It was submitted that there were serious allegations against the petitioner with regard to killing his own wife and two children and setting his house on fire. It was submitted that Tehsildar, Udaipurwati enquired into the matter under the directions of Sub Divisional Magistrate, Nawalgarh and on the basis of report submitted by Tehsildar, Udaipurwati, criminal case under Sections 302 and 201 IPC was registered against the petitioner and after investigation, the petitioner along with three other accused persons was arrested. Consequently, prosecution was launched by way of filing charge sheet against the petitioner and others under Sections 302, 201 and 120B IPC. [2025:RJ-JP:34272] (4 of 15) [CW-3970/2002]

6. Learned counsel for the respondents further submits that acquittal of the petitioner is not an honourable acquittal and is rather based upon the benefit of doubt. It has been submitted that standard of proof in criminal case and in departmental enquiry is altogether different. Criminal case is conducted on the fundamental principal that the prosecution is required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, whereas in the departmental enquiry is conducted on the principle of preponderance of probabilities. Hence, merely failure of the prosecution to prove charges against the petitioner may lead to his acquittal in a criminal case by the criminal court, but in the departmental enquiry, the delinquent himself was required to prove that he was not guilty of the charges.

7. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that after serving charge sheet to the petitioner with specific and defined charges, he was granted opportunity to file reply to charge sheet. Thereafter, he was also afforded complete opportunity of hearing and defence before the enquiry officer. Enquiry officer recorded statements of witnesses and also examined the documents. After analysis of evidence and material on record, the enquiry officer held the petitioner guilty of the charges levelled against him. Thereafter, copy of enquiry report was served upon the petitioner in order to grant him opportunity to file representation against the findings recorded by the enquiry officer. Further, on the basis of evidence on record, the disciplinary authority has passed the impugned order of dismissal of the petitioner from service. Under these circumstances, no fault can be attributed to the enquiry proceedings, which have been conducted strictly in accordance with the rules. Appellate authority has also properly considered the grounds raised by the [2025:RJ-JP:34272] (5 of 15) [CW-3970/2002] petitioner in the appeal and has dismissed the appeal after considering all the grounds in proper manner. The reviewing authority has also passed order for rejecting review petition by giving cogent reasons. In view of above, no case of interference is made out in the instant writ petition.

8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

9. Fundamental question involved in the instant writ petition is as to whether the petitioner has been dismissed from service on the similar allegations as levelled against him in criminal case lodged against him or not?, and if answer is in affirmative, then what would be the effect of judgment of acquittal dated

03.12.1999 passed by the competent criminal court acquitting the petitioner from all the charges?

10. In order to examine the question of similarity between the charges and allegations in the criminal case and departmental enquiry, the charges levelled in the charge sheet issued under Rule 16 of the Rules of 1958 were examined which revealed that no allegation of committing any misconduct, while discharging any official duties has been levelled against the petitioner and the charge sheet is solely based upon criminal case lodged against the petitioner for committing offence punishable under Sections 302 and 201 IPC. Charge no. 1 refers to such criminal act and Charge no. 2 is specific that while the petitioner was on leave, he had murdered his wife and two children and in order to destroy the evidence, he set his house on fire, but somehow, dead bodies could be recovered and the petitioner was arrested, which amounts to [2025:RJ-JP:34272] (6 of 15) [CW-3970/2002] grave misconduct and the same is punishable under the Rules of

11. Reference of facts of criminal case are apparent by perusing the judgment dated 03.12.1999, which are also in relation to the same criminal case and allegation of committing of murder of his own wife and two children against the petitioner. Thus, a bare reading of both the documents suggests that departmental enquiry as well as criminal trial was in respect of similar charges.

12. While passing the judgment dated 03.12.1999, the competent criminal court framed two questions. First question was as to whether wife of the petitioner and his two children have been murdered and second question was as to whether the prosecution has proved the offence of commission of murder by the accused (including the petitioner) beyond reasonable doubt. After appreciating the evidence, the criminal court, in respect of question no. 1 came to the conclusion that wife and children of the petitioner were murdered. However, while giving finding in respect of question no. 2 that as to whether the prosecution has proved the allegation of murder against the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt or not, after analysing the evidence in this regard, a finding has been recorded by the criminal court that it was a case of circumstantial evidence and from the evidence on record, it could indeed be inferred that there was strong probability of involvement of the petitioner in the said offence, however, such suspicion does not come within the definition of legal evidence and while recording such finding, the criminal court came to the conclusion that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove the charges against the petitioner. [2025:RJ-JP:34272] (7 of 15) [CW-3970/2002]

13. Before the aforesaid judgment of acquittal of the petitioner could be delivered by the competent criminal court, enquiry was already conducted and concluded by the enquiry officer and even penalty order dated 30.01.1999 was passed by the disciplinary authority and appeal filed by the petitioner was also dismissed by the appellate authority vide order dated 17.06.1999. Thus, the disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority had got no occasion whatsoever to examine the effect and impact of judgment of acquittal dated 03.12.1999.

14. The record reflects that judgment of acquittal dated

03.12.1999 was placed by the petitioner before the reviewing authority and order dated 03.09.2001 was passed by the reviewing authority also reveals that the effect of judgment dated 03.12.1999 had been considered by the reviewing authority. The reviewing authority has recorded a finding that even as per the judgment delivered by the competent criminal court, there was strong suspicion of committing criminal offence against the petitioner and the evidence, which was placed before the enquiry officer has been examined in detail by the reviewing authority in order to arrive at a finding that even the suspicion against the petitioner would come within the purview of misconduct. The reviewing authority has further recorded a finding that since the petitioner was acquitted only by giving benefit of doubt, therefore, such decision could not have any impact over the disciplinary proceedings conducted on the basis of evidence independently recorded by the enquiry officer.

15. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan & Others, (2024) 1 SCC 175, wherein the [2025:RJ-JP:34272] (8 of 15) [CW-3970/2002] Hon’ble Apex Court has compared the expressions, “benefit of doubt’ and “honourably acquitted” as under: “28. Expressions like “benefit of doubt” and “honourably acquitted”, used in judgments are not to be understood as magic incantations. A court of law will not be carried away by the mere use of such terminology. In the present case, the Appellate Judge has recorded that Ext. P-3, the original marksheet carries the date of birth as 21-4-1972 and the same has also been proved by the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution. The conclusion that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge can only be arrived at after a reading of the judgment in its entirety. The Court in judicial review is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment and not go by the form of expression used.

29. We are satisfied that the findings of the Appellate Judge in the criminal case clearly indicate that the charge against the appellant was not just, “not proved”—in fact the charge even stood “disproved” by the very prosecution evidence. As held by this Court, a fact is said to be “disproved” when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes that it does not exist or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist. A fact is said to be “not proved” when it is neither “proved” nor “disproved” (see Vijayee Singh v. State of U.P. (1990) 3 SCC 190).”

16. Learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance upon recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Maharana Pratap Singh Vs. State of Bihar & Others, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 890, wherein after considering the decisions in the cases of Sawai Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1986 SC 995 and G.M. Tank Vs. State of Gujarat & Another, AIR 2006 SC 2129, in para 25 of the report, following issue no. (ii) was framed: “(ii) Whether, in light of the facts, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances of the case, the charges in the criminal proceedings are substantially identical to those in the departmental proceedings, such that an acquittal in the criminal case would render the findings in the disciplinary proceedings vulnerable?” Findings on the aforesaid issue no. (ii) were recorded by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as under: “47. While an acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle the accused to have an order of setting aside of his dismissal from public service following disciplinary [2025:RJ-JP:34272] (9 of 15) [CW-3970/2002] proceedings, it is well-established that when the charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in both the departmental inquiry and the criminal proceedings are identical or substantially similar, the situation assumes a different context. In such cases, upholding the findings in the disciplinary proceedings would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive. This is a position settled by the decision in G. M. Tank (supra), since reinforced by a decision of recent origin in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan.

48. To assess the degree of similarity between the charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in the disciplinary and criminal proceedings, it is indeed crucial to review the materials placed before the Court where such an issue arises. However, we regret, absence of the departmental file has disabled us from looking into the same.

49. Notwithstanding the above, a plain reading of the materials available on record only reveals that charge no. 1 in the disciplinary closely resembled the allegations in the criminal proceedings. In fact, the disciplinary proceedings were initiated based on the written complaint of the informant.

50. The judgment acquitting the appellant reveals that the prosecution “miserably failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt” as both the informant and PW-2 refused to identify the appellant in court. This discussion confirms that the appellant's acquittal was based not on mere technicalities. In Ram Lal (supra), this Court held that terms like “benefit of doubt” or “honourably acquitted” should not be treated as formalities. The Court's duty is to focus on the substance of the judgment, rather than the terminology used.

51. That apart, it is noteworthy that in course of the inquiry PW-2 had also declined to identify the appellant during cross- examination, and the informant was not called as a witness in the disciplinary proceedings. This sort of creates a parallel between the circumstances in both the criminal and disciplinary proceedings.

52. Besides, the appellant's case is strengthened by the principle of adverse inference. It can be reasonably inferred that the respondents deliberately withheld the scanned copy of the departmental file, which was essential for us to assess whether the charges, witnesses, evidence, and circumstances in both the criminal and departmental proceedings were substantially similar or identical, likely due to concerns over the potential adverse consequences.

53. In light of the preceding discussion and the adverse presumption that is available to be drawn, we hold that the finding of the appellant being guilty of charge no. 1 cannot be sustained following his acquittal in the criminal proceedings, which seem to have involved substantially similar or identical charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances.”

17. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has placed heavy reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation [2025:RJ-JP:34272] (10 of 15) [CW-3970/2002] Limited Represented by Managing Director (Administration & HR) Vs. C. Nagaraju & Another, (2019) 10 SCC 367, where, in para 13, the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “13. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the appellant and Respondent 1, we are of the view that interference with the order of dismissal by the High Court was unwarranted. It is settled law that the acquittal by a criminal court does not preclude a departmental inquiry against the delinquent officer. The disciplinary authority is not bound by the judgment of the criminal court if the evidence that is produced in the departmental inquiry is different from that produced during the criminal trial. The object of a departmental inquiry is to find out whether the delinquent is guilty of misconduct under the conduct rules for the purpose of determining whether he should be continued in service. The standard of proof in a departmental inquiry is not strictly based on the rules of evidence. The order of dismissal which is based on the evidence before the inquiry officer in the disciplinary proceedings, which is different from the evidence available to the criminal court, is justified and needed no interference by the High Court.”

18. In addition to above, learned counsel for the respondents also relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bank of India & Others Vs. P. Zadenga, (2023) 10 SCC 675, wherein it was observed as under: “24. The next aspect we must consider is whether an acquittal in one of the proceedings entails an acquittal in the other.

25. In Nelson Motis v. Union of India (1992) 4 SCC 711, it was observed that the question whether departmental proceedings could have continued in the face of acquittal in criminal proceedings had no force as: (SCC p. 714, para 5) “5. … The nature and scope of a criminal case are very different from those of a departmental disciplinary proceeding and an order of acquittal, therefore, cannot conclude the departmental proceeding.”

26. In C. Nagaraju [Karnataka Power Transmission Corpn. Ltd. v. C. Nagaraju, (2019) 10 SCC 367, it was observed: (SCC p. 371, para 9) “9. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising the power to conduct departmental proceedings in accordance with the rules and regulations. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives. Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2005) 7 SCC 764. In the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment, as the case may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings, the question is whether the offences registered against him under [2025:RJ-JP:34272] (11 of 15) [CW-3970/2002] the PC Act are established, and if established, what sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of inquiry and the rules governing inquiry and trial in both the cases are significantly distinct and different. [State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena, (1996) 6 SCC 417.” (emphasis supplied)

27. This observation was quoted with profit in State of Karnataka v Umesh [State of Karnataka v Umesh, (2022) 6 SCC 563.”

19. Next decision cited by learned counsel for the respondents is of the case of Airports Authority of India Vs. Pradip Kumar Banerjee, (2025) 4 SCC 111, where, in para 34 of the judgment, it was observed as under: “37. In our considered view, the Division Bench fell into grave error in substituting the standard of proof required in a criminal trial vis-à-vis the disciplinary enquiry conducted by the employer. It is a settled principle of law that the burden laid upon the prosecution in a criminal trial is to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. However, in a disciplinary enquiry, the burden upon the department is limited and it is required to prove its case on the principle of preponderance of probabilities.

38. In this regard, we are benefitted by the judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur, (1972) 4 SCC 618], wherein this Court held as follows : (SCC p. 623, para 15) “15. … A disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial. The standard proof required is that of preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the inference that Nand Kumar was a person likely to have official dealings with the respondent was one which a reasonable person would draw from the proved facts of the case, the High Court cannot sit as a court of appeal over a decision based on it. Where there are some relevant materials which the authority has accepted and which materials may reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not the function of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 to review the materials and to arrive at an independent finding on the materials. If the enquiry has been properly held the question of adequacy or reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed before the High Court….”

20. Learned counsel for the respondents has also relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Deputy Inspector General of Police & Another Vs. S. Samuthiram, AIR 2013 SC 14, wherein it has been held as under: [2025:RJ-JP:34272] (12 of 15) [CW-3970/2002] “21. The meaning of the expression 'honourable acquittal' came up for consideration before this Court in Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal (1994) 1 SCC 541: (AIR 1994 SC 552 : 1993 AIR SCW 4044). In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions ‘honourable acquittal', 'acquitted of blame', 'fully exonerated' are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression 'honourably acquitted'. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.

22. In R.P. Kapoor v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 787, it was held even in the case of acquittal, departmental proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable. In State of Assam and another v. Raghava Rajgopalachari reported in 1972 SLR 44, this Court quoted with approval the views expressed by Lord Williams, J. in (1934) 61 ILR Cal. 168 : (AIR 1933 Cal 800) which is as follows: "The expression "honourably acquitted" is one which is unknown to court of justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in courts martial and other extra-judicial tribunals. We said in our judgment that we accepted the explanation given by the appellant believed it to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted by the Government authorities and by the Magistrate. Further, we decided that the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably, this is equivalent to what Government authorities term 'honourably acquitted’".

23. As we have already indicated, in the the absence of any provision in the service rule for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by a Criminal Court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and the enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. In a criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused is on the prosecution and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in a disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases where a person is acquitted for technical reasons or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since few of the other witnesses turned hostile etc. In the case on hand the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. We are not [2025:RJ-JP:34272] (13 of 15) [CW-3970/2002] prepared to say in the instant case, the respondent was honourably acquitted by the criminal court and even if it is so, he is not entitled to claim reinstatement since the Tamil Nadu Service Rules do not provide so.”

21. Upon thoughtful consideration of the facts of the case, material on record, rival submissions and the guidelines given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, this court observes that the departmental enquiry and the criminal case against the petitioner were founded upon substantially similar allegations. The criminal court, though holding that the wife and children of the petitioner were indeed murdered, acquitted the petitioner of the charge of commission of murder, observing that there was no legally admissible evidence to connect him with the crime. However, such acquittal was not a clean exoneration, but only on account of benefit of doubt.

22. In the departmental proceedings, the enquiry officer has held the charges proved on the basis of preponderance of probabilities and the disciplinary authority has passed the order of dismissal. It is also true that a member of the disciplined force is expected to maintain unimpeachable conduct both on and off duty. At the same time, it cannot be ignored that the foundation of departmental enquiry was not any official misconduct, but the criminal allegations, in which the petitioner ultimately stood acquitted.

23. In such a scenario, while the finding of guilt recorded in departmental enquiry cannot be outrightly nullified, the extreme penalty of dismissal from service, even after acquittal in criminal case involving similar charges, appears to be harsh and disproportionate. [2025:RJ-JP:34272] (14 of 15) [CW-3970/2002]

24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Others, (1995) 6 SCC 749 has held that in judicial review, the High Court can interfere with the quantum of punishment in exceptional cases where the penalty shocks the conscience of the Court.

25. In Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Another v. Ashok Kumar Arora, (1997) 3 SCC 72, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering the question as to whether the High Courts can, in exercise of their powers of judicial review, interfere with the punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority, pointed out :- "20. At the outset, it needs to be mentioned that the High Court in such cases of departmental enquiries and the findings recorded therein does not exercise the powers of appellate court/Authority. The jurisdiction of the High Court in such cases is very limited for instance where it is found that the domestic enquiry is vitiated because of non-observance of principles of natural justice, denial of reasonable opportunity; findings are based on no evidence and or the punishment is totally disproportionate to the proved misconduct of an employee...."

26. This principle has consistently been applied by this Court as well. In Ramesh Chand Arya v. State of Rajasthan & Others, 2001 (2) RLR 520, this Court, while upholding the findings of guilt, substituted the punishment of dismissal with compulsory retirement, holding that the ends of justice would be met by such modification. This Court can interfere with the quantum of punishment by holding that even if misconduct was proved, the punishment of dismissal appears to be harsh and disproportionate, and would shock the conscience of the Court and compulsory retirement would be more appropriate.

27. Considering the totality of facts, and following the principles laid down in the above decisions, this Court finds it [2025:RJ-JP:34272] (15 of 15) [CW-3970/2002] appropriate to modify the penalty. Accordingly, order dated

30.01.1999 passed by the disciplinary authority, as affirmed by the appellate authority vide order dated 17.06.1999 and order dated

03.09.2001 passed by the reviewing authority are modified to the extent that the penalty of dismissal from service shall stand substituted with the penalty of compulsory retirement w.e.f.

30.01.1999 under the Rules of 1958. The petitioner shall be entitled to retiral/pensionary benefits if admissible under law, but shall not be entitled to back wages for the period intervening between the date of dismissal and this judgment.

28. With the aforesaid modification in penalty, the writ petition stands partly allowed.

30. No order as to costs. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. MANOJ NARWANI (ANAND SHARMA),J