Station, Jaipur. vs State Of Rajasthan, Through Its Principal Secretary,

Judgment

1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Its Principal Secretary, Energy Department, Government Of Rajasthan, Government Secretariat, Jaipur.

2. Jaipur Vidhyut Vitaran Nigam Limited, Jaipur Through Its Chairman And Managing Director, Vidhyut Bhawan, Jan Path, Jaipur.

3. Chief Controller Of Accounts-I, Jaipur Vidhyut Vitaran Nigam Limited, Vidhyut Bhawan, Jan Path, Jaipur.

4. Chief Accounts Officer (Fm-W And M), Jaipur Discom, Jaipur.

5. Amit Saxena, Assistant Accounts Officer Ii, Now Posted In Place Of Petitioner In The Office Of Accounts Officer (Jcc North) Jpd, Jaipur Vidhyut Vitaran Nigam Limited, Vidhyut Bhawan, Jan Path, Jaipur. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s)

: Mr.Ashok Bansal with Mr.Pawan Sharma For Respondent(s) : Mr.Ankur Srivastava HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SAMEER JAIN Judgment Reserved on :: 05/03/2025 Pronounced on :: 11/

1. At the outset, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner had apprised the Court with the brief factual narrative of the instant petition along with the other germane facts that are relevant for efficacious adjudication of the matter in hand. The [2025:RJ-JP:10752] (2 of 11) [CW-3217/2025] primary contentions made by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, inter alia others, were as follows:

1.1 That the petitioner who is holding the post of Assistant Accounts Officer (Grade II); is at the verge of superannuation as merely one year of service is remaining in completion of his tenure with the respondent-department, was transferred vide impugned transfer order dated 15.01.2025 from Jaipur to Alwar and respondent no. 5 was posted in the petitioners’ place of posting i.e. at Jaipur, at his own request.

1.2 That it can be inferred that the respondents whilst acting arbitrarily with the settled position of law as even enunciated in a catena of judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, various other High Courts and the transfer policy of the respondent Jaipur Vidhyut Vitaran Nigam Limited (hereinafter referred to as ‘Nigam’) have passed the impugned transfer order.

1.3 That the present is second round of litigation as the erstwhile petition filed by the petitioner bearing no, SBCWP No. 1563/2025 titled as Jhabar Singh Jat vs. The State of Rajasthan and Ors. was disposed of vide order dated 06.02.2025 with the directions to the respondents therein to consider the representation filed by the aggrieved petitioner, within an upper limit period of fifteen days. However, the respondent-Nigam vide its reply/letter (Annexure-8) to the representation filed by the petitioner dated 07.02.2025 had upheld their decision and affirmed the petitioners’ transfer. [2025:RJ-JP:10752] (3 of 11) [CW-3217/2025]

1.4 That the respondents have issued the impugned transfer order dated 15.01.2025 and, in a perfunctory and arbitrary manner, rejected the representation submitted by the petitioner through their reply/letter dated 21.02.2025, merely for the purpose of accommodating the private respondent herein, without duly considering the respondents' own transfer policy, the medical condition of the petitioner, the period of service remaining for the petitioner to attain the age of superannuation, and other relevant factors and circumstances.

1.5 That the petitioner, being a diligent and compliant employee of the respondent-Nigam, has consistently performed his duties with the utmost sincerity and dedication. Throughout his service spanning approximately 26 years, the petitioner has demonstrated unwavering commitment to his responsibilities. During the course of his employment, the petitioner was transferred to Sawaimadhopur, where he joined and diligently rendered his services for a period of eight months. Subsequently, the petitioner was transferred back to Jaipur. These transfers, which reflect the petitioner’s compliance with the respondent’s administrative decisions, further illustrate the petitioner’s steadfastness in fulfilling his professional obligations under the respondent-Nigam's directions.

2. In light of the foregoing facts and circumstances, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that, given the petitioner’s imminent superannuation, coupled with the petitioner’s unblemished record throughout his entire service, the impugned transfer order passed by the respondents should be set [2025:RJ-JP:10752] (4 of 11) [CW-3217/2025] aside. It was contended that the transfer order was issued in a hasty and arbitrary manner, primarily aimed at accommodating the private respondent, without giving due consideration to the respondent-Nigam's established transfer policy. Furthermore, the petitioner’s impending retirement, his exemplary service record, and the lack of proper consideration of relevant factors such as the petitioner’s medical condition and the circumstances surrounding the transfer warrant the quashing of the said transfer order. The transfer, being issued without due regard for the established policies and the petitioner’s long and dedicated service, is in violation of principles of fairness and justice and, thus, should be annulled.

3. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents has vehemently argued that the petitioner’s transfer was carried out only after an assiduous consideration of the administrative exigencies and the broader public interest. It was further contended that the transfer order in question is devoid of any arbitrariness or illegality, as it was made in accordance with the respondent-Nigam's operational requirements. The respondents assert that service transfers are an inherent and integral part of the conditions of service, particularly when an employee holds a position that is subject to transfer. Such transfers, are a necessary component of the organizational framework and are made in the interest of ensuring the efficient functioning of the respondent- Nigam.

4. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents had placed reliance upon a catena of judgments, a few of which were, Sri [2025:RJ-JP:10752] (5 of 11) [CW-3217/2025] Pubi Lombi Vs. The State of Arunachal Pradesh & Ors. reported in (2024) 3 SCR, Shilpi Bose (Mrs.) and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar and Ors. reported in 1991 Supp. (2) SCC 659, Rajendra Singh Vs. State of U.P. reported in (2009) 15 SCC 178, National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Ltd. Vs. Shri Bhagwan reported in (2001) 8 SCC 574, Abani Kanta Ray Vs. State of Orissa & Ors. reported in 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 169, Union of India & Ors. Vs. S.L. Abbas reported in (1993) 4 SCC 357, Cipla Ltd. Vs. Jayakumar R. reported in (1999) 1 SCC 300 and Sk. Nausad Rahaman Vs. Union of India reported in (2022) 12 SCC 1, and had contended that the scope of judicial intervention in the transfer orders passed due to administrative exigencies is miniscule. Nevertheless, transfers are incidence of service and it is not an absolute right of an employee to remain at single place of posting and the employee can be rotated/transferred considering the administrative exigencies, public interest, history of posting etc. by the competent authority.

5. On the facts of the instant matter, learned counsel representing the respondents had contended that the private respondent was posted at the relieving place of the petitioner i.e. Jaipur on 16.01.2025 in the afternoon. Withal, the petitioner was relieved vide order dated 24.01.2025 and the said order is not assailed by the petitioner.

6. Consecutively, it was averred that the petitioner ever since

21.09.2016 was working at the Jaipur Branch of the respondent- department and in the office of Accounts Officer (JCC-North), JVVNL, Jaipur since 30.09.2019, thence considering the dire [2025:RJ-JP:10752] (6 of 11) [CW-3217/2025] urgency and administrative exigency, the petitioner was transferred to the vacant post of ARO in the Revenue Sub-Division of Asst. Engineer (O&M), JVVNL, Bagadmev (Alwar Circle), to fill up the vacant seat in the absolute interest of Nigam.

7. From the contentions made insofar, it can be concluded that the petitioner had remained posted in Jaipur for a total period of 26 years 11 months out of his total service period in JVVNL of 28 years 9 months and has worked in Jaipur for continuously 8 years.

8. In pursuance of the letter dated 21.02.2025 i.e. the rejection letter of the representation of the petitioner, it was contended that the said rejection was accorded only after considering the averments made by the incumbent during the personal hearing, and taking note of material facts like the history of posting of the petitioner, health of the petitioner, pleas made by the incumbent and allied factors.

9. Considering the aforementioned facts and circumstances of the case, taking note of the judgments cited at the Bar and the arguments averred by the learned counsel for the parties, and upon a perusal of the relevant documents, this Court is of the following view:

9.1 Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a plethora of judgments, has consistently reiterated that the scope of judicial review against transfer orders is limited and minimal. The rationale behind this circumscribed approach to judicial intervention in transfer matters, particularly when exercising writ jurisdiction, is grounded in the recognition that any unchecked interference by the courts could result in a disruptive and chaotic situation within the functioning of [2025:RJ-JP:10752] (7 of 11) [CW-3217/2025] government affairs. This is especially true if employees, upon being posted to locations as per administrative requirements, are permitted to refuse or challenge their postings based on personal preferences. Consequently, the only legitimate grounds for judicial interference exist in cases where the transfer orders are shown to have been issued on the basis of malafides or improper motives by the transferring authority, thereby rendering the order arbitrary, unjust, or capricious.

9.2 The determination of which employee should be posted to a particular location, and at what time, lies exclusively within the administrative domain of the competent authority or department. Such decisions are made with the objective of promoting the effective functioning of the department, ensuring optimal service delivery, and enhancing operational efficiency. In the absence of mala fides or a violation of any applicable statutory provisions, the Courts should refrain from interfering with transfer orders. Should the employee encounter any issues or grievances arising from such decisions, it is the appropriate course for the matter to be referred to the appellate authority for resolution, rather than judicial intervention at the initial stage.

9.3 The issue in hand is not newfangled and is already settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide its judgment encapsulated in Mrs. Shipli Bose (supra), the relevant extract from the said ratio is reproduced herein below: “3. After hearing learned Counsel for the parties and having considered the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the High Court committed serious error in interfering with the transfer Orders of primary school teachers. The [2025:RJ-JP:10752] (8 of 11) [CW-3217/2025] the District High Court held that the District Education Establishment Committee had no jurisdiction to transfer the Primary School teachers on their request. We find no justification for this conclusion. There is no dispute that the District Education Establishment Committee is competent to transfer Primary School teachers from one place to the other but merely because such transfers were made on the request of teachers, the committee is divested of its jurisdiction. The Director of the Primary Education had issued directions that lady teachers posted in distant areas or rural areas may be accommodated to the place of their request to avoid hardship to them. These directions are reasonable, Education Establishment Committee followed the same principles in transferring the appellants on their requests to avoid hardship with was being caused to them. The respondents challenged the validity of the transfer before the High Court on another ground also that Primary School teachers posted in the urban areas were not liable to be transferred to rural areas though the State Government had issued circular on March 30, 1984 permitting transfers from urban areas to rural areas. The High Court did not interfere with the Order of the transfer on this ground instead it held that the transfer Orders were without jurisdiction as the same had been made on the appellants' request with a view of accommodate them. We fail to appreciate the reasoning recorded by the High Court. If the competent authority issued transfer Orders with a view to accommodate a public servant to avoid hardship, the same cannot and should not be interfered by the Court merely because the transfer Order were passed on the request of the employees concerned. The respondents have continued to be posted at their respective places for the last several years, they have no vested right to remain posted at one place. Since they hold transferable posts they are liable to be transferred from one place to the other. The transfer Orders had been issued by the competent authority which did not violate any mandatory Rule, therefore the High Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the transfer Orders.

4. In our opinion, the Courts should not interfere with a transfer Order which are made in public interest and for administrative reasons unless the transfer Orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory Rule [2025:RJ-JP:10752] (9 of 11) [CW-3217/2025] or on the ground of malafide. A Government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other, he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer Orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights. Even if a transfer Order is passed in violation of executive instructions or Orders, the Courts ordinarily should not interfere with the Order instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the Department. If the Courts continue to interfere with day-to-day transfer Orders issued by the Government and its subordinate authorities, there will be complete chaos in the Administration which would not be conducive to public interest. The High Court over looked these aspects in interfering with the transfer Orders.” (Emphasis laid)

9.4 Nevertheless, in the present case, it is pertinent to note that in compliance with the directions issued by this Court during the first round of litigation, the respondent-Nigam has duly considered the matter and, in a fair and transparent manner, granted a personal hearing to the petitioner. Following such due process, the respondent-Nigam, after taking into account all relevant factors, including the petitioner’s health condition, the history of the petitioner’s postings, and other pertinent circumstances, has decided to uphold the transfer order. The petitioner, as a result, is assigned a 'desk job' at the new place of posting i.e. at Alwar, which reflects a balanced approach in addressing the petitioner’s concerns. For the sake of convenience, the relevant extract from the letter dated 21.02.2025 passed by the respondent-Nigam (rejecting the representation of the petitioner) is reproduced herein below: “In compliance to the directions ibid, the petitioner submitted his representation dated 7th February [2025:RJ-JP:10752] (10 of 11) [CW-3217/2025] 2025, praying for cancellation of his transfer made vide Order dated 15th January 2025 referred above. The incumbent was also called for personal hearing and heard on 21st February 2025. After having thoroughly gone through the representation dated 7th February and averments made by the incumbent during the personal hearing, it has been concluded that he was transferred from his present place of posting at Jaipur to the office of AEN (O&M) Bagadmev in Alwar circle to fill in the vacant post of ARO in revenue earning O&M sub-division. Further, the incumbent was one of the AAOs-II having the longest stint at Jaipur. He has remained posted at Jaipur for a total period of around 26 years and 11 months out of his total service of around 28 years and 6 months up to the date of transfer order referred above. The incumbent reiterated two primary grounds in his representation, first the alleged violation of transfer policy and his health grounds being suffering from diabetic and hypertension. As far as clause 3.6 of the transfer policy referred by the incumbent is concerned, it is worthy to recall that the same is one of the guiding principles only to be taken care of at the time of transfer of personnel. As such, this is not binding one overriding the administrative expediency. With regard to the other ground of health, the incumbent was performing the desk job in his present office and the similar desk job is to be performed by him at the new place of posting without any field assignments. Hence, the reported ailment of diabetic and hypertension with which he was carrying out his assignments at Jaipur is hardly supposed to come in the way, while performing at his new place of posting. In view of the above, the transfer of the incumbent has been made in the large interest of the Nigam to fill in the post lying vacant in the revenue earning sub-division. As such, there appears to be no convincing ground to review the transfer order dated 15th January 2025 referred above qua the incumbent. Hence, the incumbent is advised to resume his new assignment without any further delay so that the billing, collection and other day- to-day functions including timely redressal of the grievances of the consumers of the sub-division may not suffer anymore.” [2025:RJ-JP:10752] (11 of 11) [CW-3217/2025]

9.5 It is also noteworthy that the petitioner has not challenged the relieving order dated 24.01.2025, thereby tacitly accepting the administrative decision and the circumstances surrounding it. In this context, it is a settled principle that a party cannot approbate and reprobate (nemo debet bis vexari), i.e. the petitioner cannot both accept and challenge the decision at the same time.

9.6 Additionally, it would serve no useful purpose to disturb the position of the private respondent, who has already complied with the transfer order by joining his new post in Jaipur, as such disruption would amount to a waste of time and resources, which should be avoided by the Court.

10. In light of these considerations, it is evident that no valid grounds exist for revisiting or overturning the transfer order, and any attempt to do so would be contrary to established legal principles and judicial efficiency.

11. In light of the foregoing, the present petition is hereby dismissed. The petitioner is directed to report to the new place of posting within a period of five working days, from the date of pronouncement of this judgment. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of accordingly. Preeti Asopa (SAMEER JAIN),J