All residents of Pragati Path, Shivaji Colony, Niwari, District Tonk v. Panchayati Raj Department, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur

Order

: 07/08/2025 14/08/2025

1. Present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by petitioner, Murari Lal Gupta against order dated 20.03.1999 passed by Respondent No. 2, whereby, penalty of withholding of three annual grade increments with cumulative effect has been imposed upon the petitioner. The petitioner has also

challenged order dated 28.02.2001 passed by Director, Panchayati Raj Department, whereby, departmental appeal filed by the [2025:RJ-JP:30687] (2 of 19) [CW-3047/2004] petitioner against the aforesaid penalty order dated 20.03.1999 has been dismissed.

2. At this stage, it is pertinent to mention here that during pendency of writ petition, petitioner Murari Lal Gupta (hereinafter to be referred as ‘the petitioner-employee) died on 29.07.2006 and vide order dated 14.09.2006, this Court had ordered to take on record the legal heirs of deceased-petitioner.

3. The facts of the case, in brief, are that the petitioner Murari Lal Gupta was appointed as L.D.C. in Panchayat Samiti, Niwai on 28.12.1960. Thereafter, he was promoted to the post of U.D.C. on 02.05.1978. It has been averred in the writ petition that on a complaint made by Development Officer, Panchayat Samiti Niwai, the petitioner-employee was arrested by the police authorities on

04.03.1979 and on account of such arrest, he was placed under suspension. However, suspension order was revoked in July, 1980.

4. Thereafter, vide judgment and order dated 29.09.1995 passed by the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Niwai, District Tonk (for short ‘the trial court’), petitioner-employee was convicted and sentenced in the criminal case lodged by the Development Officer. The petitioner-employee unsuccessfully challenged the aforesaid judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 29.09.1995 before the Court of Special Judge (Communal Riotts Cases) and Additional Sessions Judge, Tonk (for short ‘the appellate court’) where vide judgment and order dated

09.09.1999, judgment and order passed by the trial court was confirmed. Against the aforesaid judgments and orders passed by the courts below, the petitioner-employee filed S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 630/1999 before this Court. It has been [2025:RJ-JP:30687] (3 of 19) [CW-3047/2004] informed by learned counsel for the petitioners that aforesaid revision petition was allowed by this Court vide order dated

03.09.2009, whereby, judgments and orders passed by the trial court and appellate court on 29.09.1995 and 09.09.1999 respectively were quashed and set aside and the petitioner- employee was acquitted of the charges framed against him.

5. It has been alleged that on account of malicious complaint lodged by local leaders of erstwhile ruling political party in the State, one charge sheet under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (for short ‘the Rules of 1958’) was issued on 12.06.1997 to the petitioner- employee, wherein as many as seven charges were framed against the petitioner-employee relating to incidents of the years 1967, 1974, 1977 and 1984-85. As per petitioner-employee, such charge sheet was issued without conducting any preliminary enquiry whatsoever.

6. Charge No. 1 contained in the aforesaid charge sheet dated 12.06.1997 was in respect of some advance amount availed by the petitioner-employee in the years 1967, 1974 and 1977 which was not repaid by the petitioner and was considered as misuse of the government money and misappropriation of the same.

7. Charge No. 2 framed against the petitioner-employee was in respect of non-deposit of Rs. 6,310/-, for which aforesaid criminal case was lodged by the Development Officer in which ultimately, the petitioner-employee has been acquitted of the charges by this Court vide order dated 03.09.2009 passed in S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 630/1999. [2025:RJ-JP:30687] (4 of 19) [CW-3047/2004]

8. Charge No. 3 was in relation to not repaying the House Building Allowance. Charge No. 4 was in respect of not handing over charge of Library of Panchayat Samiti, Niwai. Charge No. 5 was in respect of furnishing wrong information regarding pendency of departmental enquiry and conviction by the criminal court while granting benefit of selection grade. Charge No. 6 was in respect of overstaying on leave and Charge No. 7 was with regard to preparing false receipt of Rs. 1,750/-.

9. Reply to the charge sheet was filed by the petitioner- employee denying all the charges. Thereafter, being not satisfied with the reply submitted by the petitioner-employee, Enquiry Officer was appointed to conduct enquiry in respect of the aforesaid charge sheet. The Enquiry Officer conducted the enquiry and submitted his report on 21.04.1998 wherein Charge No. 1 was found partially proved. Charge No. 3, 4, 5 and 6 were found not proved. Charge No. 7 was also held to be partially proved. As regards Charge No. 2, no final finding was recorded and it was left to be governed by the order of the criminal court. Copy of the enquiry report was supplied to the petitioner-employee and he was required to submit his representation against the enquiry report. As per petitioner- employee, he submitted representation dated 08.06.1998 pointing out serious procedural defects and lacuna in the enquiry report. However, without considering the same in an objective manner, Disciplinary Authority passed order dated 20.03.1999 to penalise the petitioner-employee with penalty of withholding of three annual grade increments with cumulative effect. As per the petitioner- employee, as the penalty order was passed only 20 days before his [2025:RJ-JP:30687] (5 of 19) [CW-3047/2004] date of retirement, i.e., 31.03.1999, in order to prejudice his retiral benefits.

10. It has also been contended that the petitioner-employee filed appeal against the penalty order by raising legitimate grounds to assail the penalty order. However, the Appellate Authority also dismissed the appeal vide order dated 28.02.2001. Hence, finding no alternative remedy, this writ petition has been filed by the petitioner-employee.

11. Reply to writ petition was filed by the respondents categorically denying the facts mentioned in the writ petition and it has been submitted that impugned penalty order has been passed after determining and serving specific charge sheet to the petitioner- employee. Petitioner-employee was granted full opportunity to file reply to charge sheet and thereafter, during enquiry, he was afforded complete opportunity to defend himself. On the basis of the report of Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority has properly applied its mind and in the facts and circumstances of the case and on the basis of the evidence on record, penalty of withholding of three annual grade increments with cumulative effect has been imposed upon the petitioner-employee. Appeal filed by the petitioner- employee has properly been examined by the Appellate Authority and finding no ground to interfere with the penalty order, appeal of the petitioner-employee has also been rejected. Thus, a prayer has been made to dismiss the writ petition filed by the petitioner- employee.

12. Mr. Gaurav Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that bare perusal of the charge sheet would reveal that the charges with regard to stale incidents which took place in the years [2025:RJ-JP:30687] (6 of 19) [CW-3047/2004] 1967, 1974, 1977 and 1984-85 have been levelled against the petitioner by way of issuing charge sheet in the year 1997. Thus, admittedly, there is delay of 12-13 years in issuance of the charge sheet. An employee cannot be expected to explain his conduct which took place decades earlier and imposing major penalty in respect of stale charges is totally arbitrary and liable to be quashed. In support of his arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court n the cases of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Bani Singh & Another, 1990 (Suppl.) SCC 738; UCO Bank & Others Vs. Rajendra Shankar Shukla, (2018) 14 SCC 92; M.V. Bijlani Vs. Union of India & Others, (2006) 5 SCC 88, P.V. Mahadevan Vs. M.D., T.N. Housing Board, (2005) 6 SCC 636; State of A.P. Vs. N. Radhakishan, (1998) 4 SCC 154; decision of Division Bench of this Court in the case of Union of India & Others Vs. Satpil Antil & Another (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11747/2012 decided on 19.08.2014) and decision of Co- ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Rajendra Gupta Vs. State of Rajasthan & Others, 2015 (4) RLW 3352 (Raj.).

13. It has also been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that the enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Officer suffers from violation of principles of natural justice as copies of relevant documents which were necessary for defending the enquiry were not provided to the petitioner-employee. Hence, without providing copies of relevant documents, no penalty whatsoever, could be imposed upon the petitioner-employee. [2025:RJ-JP:30687] (7 of 19) [CW-3047/2004]

14. It has also been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that the impugned enquiry proceedings are actuated with malice as the same is influenced by the political interference.

15. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also indicted that the Appellate Authority has not properly examined the grounds of appeal, as specifically raised by the petitioner-employee and without considering the grounds of appeal, in quite mechanical and cryptic manner, appeal filed by the petitioner-employee was dismissed, which is a material illegality in the proceedings. Hence, penalty order as well as order passed by the Appellate Authority are liable to be quashed.

16. Per contra, Mr. Kapil Prakash Mathur, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the respondents has supported impugned orders by submitting that there was no delay in issuing charge sheet to the petitioner-employee and as soon as the irregularities and misconduct committed by the petitioner-employee came to surface, charge sheet was issued to him. The charges levelled against the petitioner-employee are interlinked and interwoven and part of long series of facts. Hence, due to the fact that some of the charges related to earlier period, it cannot be said that the departmental enquiry cannot be instituted against the petitioner in respect of such charges. It has been submitted by learned Additional Advocate General that enquiry has been conducted strictly in accordance with the procedure contemplated under the Rules of 1958. The petitioner-employee was granted complete opportunity of defending the charges and entire material was supplied to him. 17. Learned Additional Advocate General would also submit that the allegations of impugned proceedings being influenced by [2025:RJ-JP:30687] (8 of 19) [CW-3047/2004] political interference are totally misconceived and not entertainable by this Court. Such allegations of mala fides are easy to level, but difficult to establish. The petitioner-employee has not placed any material on record in support of such allegations. Hence, grounds raised by the petitioner-employee in this regard are liable to be rejected at the outset.

18. It has also been submitted by learned Additional Advocate General that the Appellate Authority has properly examined each and every ground raised by the petitioner-employee and it cannot be said that the order passed by the Appellate Authority is either vague or non-speaking.

19. I have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and meticulously examined the record.

20. Bare perusal of the Enquiry Report would reveal that as regards Charge Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 are concerned, they have not been found proved against the petitioner-employee. The Enquiry Officer did not record any finding in respect of Charge No. 2 and it was made subject to decision of criminal case and admittedly, the petitioner-employee has been acquitted in the criminal case by this Court vide order dated 03.09.2009 passed in S.B. Criminal Revision No. 630/1999.

21. So far as Charge No. 1 is concerned, it is clear from perusal of the charge sheet that aforesaid charge relates to advance amount availed by the petitioner in the years 1967, 1974 and 1977. Charge No. 7 was also relating to a pretty old incident. It is regular feature that in government departments, audit takes place every year and on the basis of report of audit party, any financial [2025:RJ-JP:30687] (9 of 19) [CW-3047/2004] irregularity can be exposed and appropriate action can be taken in that regard. However, in the instant case, no explanation whatsoever has come on record on behalf of the respondents to justify their delay in taking any action with regard to alleged advance amount availed by the petitioner-employee in the years 1967, 1974 and 1977 and the charge sheet was conveniently issued after lapse of 20 to 30 years after availing such advance amount. Even otherwise, merely availing advance amount and causing delay in repayment thereof cannot be brought in the category of embezzlement. Hence, this Court finds strength in the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioners that charge sheet was issued to the petitioner- employee in respect of old and stale charges for which there was no justification on record. As such on the basis of such stale charges, the petitioner-employee could not have been penalised with a major penalty of withholding of three annual grade increments with cumulative effect.

22. The view taken by this Court as above is further strengthened by decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which will be referred hereinafter. In the case of State of Madhya Praesh Vs. Bani Singh & Another (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the aspect of delay and laches in the conduct of departmental enquiry, held as under: "4. The appeal against the order dated December 16, 1987 has been filed on the ground that the Tribunal should not have quashed the proceedings merely on the ground of delay and laches and should have allowed the enquiry to go on to decide the matter on merits. We are unable to agree with this contention of the learned counsel. The irregularities which were the subject matter of the enquiry is said to have taken place between the years 1975-77. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities, if any, and came to know it only in 1987. According to them even in April 1977 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were [2025:RJ-JP:30687] (10 of 19) [CW-3047/2004] going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage. In any case there are no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal's orders and accordingly we dismiss this appeal."

23. In the case of UCO Bank & Others Vs. Rajendra Shankar Shukla (supra), while dealing with question of inordinate and unexplained delay in issuance of charge sheet, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: "12. We do not find any reason to interfere with the judgment and order passed by the High Court. However, it is necessary for us to highlight a few facts which were brought to our notice during the course of submissions made by the learned counsel. The first issue of concern is the enormous delay of about 7 years in issuing a charge-sheet against Shukla. There is no explanation for this unexplained delay. It appears that some internal discussions were going on within the Bank but that it took the Bank 7 years to make up its mind is totally unreasonable and unacceptable. On this ground itself, the charge-sheet against Shukla is liable to be set aside due to the inordinate and unexplained delay in its issuance."

24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M.V. Bijlani Vs. Union of India & Others (supra) held as under: “16. So far as the second charge is concerned, it has not been shown as to what were the duties of the appellant in terms of the prescribed rules or otherwise. Furthermore, it has not been shown either by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority as to how and in what manner the maintenance of ACE-8 Register by way of sheets which were found attached to the estimate file were not appropriate so as to arrive at the culpability or otherwise of the appellant. The Appellate Authority in its order stated that the appellant was not required to prepare ACE-8 Register twice. The appellant might have prepared another set of register presumably keeping in view the fact that he was asked to account for the same on the basis of the materials placed on records. The Tribunal as also the High Court failed to take into consideration that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated after six years and they continued for a period of seven years and, thus, initiation of the disciplinary proceedings as also continuance thereof after such a long time evidently prejudiced the delinquent officer.

17. In State of M.P. v. Bani Singh [1990 Supp SCC 738] this Court has clearly held: (SCC p. 740, para 4) “The irregularities which were the subject-matter of the enquiry are said to have taken place between the years 1975-77. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities, if any, and came to know it only in 1987. According to them even in April 1977 there was doubt about the [2025:RJ-JP:30687] (11 of 19) [CW-3047/2004] involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage.”

18. xxxxxxx

19. It is really a matter of great surprise that a disciplinary proceeding was initiated five years after the appellant handed over charge. At that time he was admittedly not having possession of any documents. The enquiry officer furthermore took a period of seven years to complete the enquiry. The Appellate Authority also took seven years in disposing of the appeal. Even then, the Appellate Authority did not go into the question as to whether the procedures laid down for holding the disciplinary proceedings had been followed or not. He did not go into the contentions of the appellant herein minutely. The memo of appeal filed by the appellant was very elaborate. He raised a number of contentions therein. The enquiry officer was charged with bias. He was also charged with unfair conduct. He was said to have committed a large number of irregularities in the departmental proceeding. The memo of appeal of the appellant was in about 65 typed pages. It was subdivided into five parts. He made all endeavours to deal with each and every finding of the enquiry officer and dealt with almost all the documents relied upon by the department. He also dealt with the deposition of the witnesses examined on behalf of the parties.”

25. In the case of State of A.P. Vs. N. Radhakishan (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: "19. It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path [2025:RJ-JP:30687] (12 of 19) [CW-3047/2004] he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations."

26. In the case of P.V. Mahadevan Vs. M.D., T.N. Housing Board (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court propounded the law on the subject of inordinate delay in issuance of charge sheet as under: “4. In the first case of Bani Singh, an OA was filed by the officer concerned against initiation of departmental enquiry proceedings and issue of charge-sheet on 22-4-1987 in respect of certain incidents that happened in 1975-76 when the said officer was posted as Commandant, 14th Battalion, SAF, Gwalior. The Tribunal quashed the charge memo and the departmental enquiry on the ground of inordinate delay of over 12 years in the initiation of the departmental proceedings with reference to an incident that took place in 1975-76. The appeal against the said order was filed in this Court on the ground that the Tribunal should not have quashed the proceedings merely on the ground of delay and laches and should have allowed the enquiry to go on to decide the matter on merits. This Court rejected the contention of the learned counsel. While dismissing the appeal this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 740, para 4) “The irregularities which were the subject-matter of the enquiry are said to have taken place between the years 1975-77. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities, if any, and came to know it only in 1987. According to them even in April 1977 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage. In any case there are no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal's orders and accordingly we dismiss this appeal.”

5. In the second case of N. Radhakishan [(1998) 4 SCC 154], the respondent was appointed as Assistant Director of Town Planning in the year 1976. A report dated 7-11-1987 was sent by the Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad to the Secretary to the Government, Housing, Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad about the irregularities in deviations and unauthorised constructions in multi-storeyed complexes in the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad in collusion with Municipal Authorities. On the basis of the report, the State issued two memos both dated 12- 12-1987 in respect of three officials including the respondent Radhakishan, the then Assistant City Planner. In this case, till 31-7-1995 the articles of charges had not been served on the [2025:RJ-JP:30687] (13 of 19) [CW-3047/2004] respondent. The Tribunal, however, held that the memo dated 31-7-1995 related to incidents that happened ten years or more prior to the date of the memo and that there was absolutely no explanation by the Government for this inordinate delay in framing the charges and conducting the enquiry against the respondent and that there was no justification on the part of the State now conducting the enquiry against the respondent in respect of the incidents at this late stage. This Court, in para 19, has observed as follows: (SCC p. 165) “19. It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations.” This Court held that there was hardly any explanation worth consideration as to why the delay occurred. In the circumstances, this Court held that the Tribunal was justified in quashing the charge memo dated 31-7-1995 and directing the State to promote the respondent as per recommendation of the DPC ignoring memos dated 27-10-1995 and 1-6-1996. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the State of Andhra Pradesh was dismissed.

10. Section 118 specifically provides for submission of the abstracts of the accounts at the end of every year and Section 119 relates to annual audit of accounts. These two statutory provisions have not been complied with at all. In the instant case the transaction took place in the year 1990. The expenditure ought to have been considered in the accounts of [2025:RJ-JP:30687] (14 of 19) [CW-3047/2004] the succeeding year. In the instant case the audit report was ultimately released in 1994-95. The explanation offered for the delay in finalising the audit account cannot stand scrutiny in view of the above two provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 17 of 1961. It is now stated that the appellant has retired from service. There is also no acceptable explanation on the side of the respondent explaining the inordinate delay in initiating departmental disciplinary proceedings. Mr R. Venkataramani, learned Senior Counsel is appearing for the respondent. His submission that the period from the date of commission of the irregularities by the appellant to the date on which it came to the knowledge of the Housing Board cannot be reckoned for the purpose of ascertaining whether there was any delay on the part of the Board in initiating disciplinary proceedings against the appellant has no merit and force. The stand now taken by the respondent in this Court in the counter-affidavit is not convincing and is only an afterthought to give some explanation for the delay.

11. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer.

12. We, therefore, have no hesitation to quash the charge memo issued against the appellant. The appeal is allowed. The appellant will be entitled to all the retiral benefits in accordance with law. The retiral benefits shall be disbursed within three months from this date. No costs."

27. Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, in the case of Rajendra Gupta Vs. State of Rajasthan & Others (supra), was dealing with a case wherein charge sheet was issued with a gap of 12 years. Relying upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of State of A.P. Vs. N. Radhakishan (supra) and M.V. Bijlani Vs. Union of India & Others (supra), it was held as under: [2025:RJ-JP:30687] (15 of 19) [CW-3047/2004] “10. Similarly in the case of State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan reported in 1998 AIR (SCW) 1629, the order setting aside the disciplinary proceedings was upheld by the Apex Court holding therein that normally the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that said delay is on account of delinquent employee or the officer. Para 19 & 20 of the same reads thus: “19. It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse consideration.

20. In the present case we find that without any reference to records merely on the report of the Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau, charges were framed against the respondent and ten others, all in verbatim and without particularizing the role played by each of the officers charged. There were four charges against the respondent. With three of them he was not concerned. He offered explanation regarding the fourth charge but the disciplinary authority did not examine the same nor did it choose to appoint any inquiry officer even assuming that action was validly being initiated under 1991 Rules. There is no explanation whatsoever for delay in concluding the inquiry proceedings all these years. The case depended on records of the Department only and Director [2025:RJ-JP:30687] (16 of 19) [CW-3047/2004] General, Anti Corruption bureau had pointed out that no witnesses had been examined before he gave his report. The Inquiry Officers, who had been appointed one after the other, had just to examine the records to see if the alleged deviations and constructions were illegal and unauthorised and then as to who was responsible for condoning or approving the same against the bye-laws. It is nobody's case that respondent at any stage tried to obstruct or delay the inquiry proceedings. The Tribunal rightly did not accept the explanations of the state as to why delay occurred. In fact there was hardly any explanation worth consideration. In the circumstances the Tribunal was justified in quashing the charge memo dated July 31, 1995 and directing the state to promote the respondent as per recommendation of the DPC ignoring memos dated 27.10.1995 and 1.6.1996, the Tribunal rightly did not quash these two later memos.”

11. In the case of M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India reported in 2006 (2) JLJ 260, Hon'ble the Supreme Court after relying on the law laid down in the case of State of A.P. v. Bani Singh (supra) set aside the charge sheet and in no uncertain terms held that the appellant had suffered a lot due to the pendency of the proceedings for so long which was only seven years in the said case. Para 16 of the said judgement reads as under: “16. So far as the second charge is concerned, it has not been shown as to what were the duties of the Appellant in terms of the prescribed rules or otherwise. Furthermore, it has not been shown either by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority as to how and in what manner the maintenance of ACE-R Register by way of sheets which were found attached to the estimate file were not appropriate so as to arrive at the culpability or otherwise of the Appellant. The appellate authority in its order stated that the Appellant was not required to prepare the ACE-R Register twice. The Appellant might have prepared another set of register presumably keeping in view the fact that he was asked to account for the same on the basis of the materials placed on records. The Tribunal as also the High Court failed to take into consideration that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated after six years and it continued for a period of seven years and, thus, initiation of the disciplinary proceedings as also continuance thereof after such a long time evidently prejudiced to the delinquent officer.”

12. The case of the petitioner is on a better footing. In this case, the allegation was that the petitioner was absent from duty in the year 1992. He was allowed to join after he returned back. Nothing was done for almost 12 years and the very charge sheet was issued after almost 12 years. No explanation for the delay in issuing the charge sheet is forthcoming. There is no allegation that the said delay was on account of the fault of the petitioner or that he was to be blamed in any manner for the delay in initiating the said enquiry. The delay if at all is on the part of the respondents."

28. Although, the petitioner-employee placed Annexure-2 on record in order to contend that charge sheet has been issued under [2025:RJ-JP:30687] (17 of 19) [CW-3047/2004] political influence and at the instance of local leaders of erstwhile ruling party, yet in the absence of any specific allegations against the concerned officer issuing charge sheet and in the absence of impleadment of such officer by name, allegation of mala fides cannot be entertained by this Court.

29. The petitioner has also submitted that complete documents relied upon by the respondent-department in the charge sheet and during enquiry were not supplied to the petitioner- employee. In this regard, representation submitted by the petitioner-employee against the enquiry report has been perused, in which, it was submitted by him that Enquiry Officer continued to accept letters and documents produced by the Presenting Officer on behalf of the department and copies thereof were not supplied to the petitioner. Disciplinary Authority, while passing impugned penalty order dated 20.03.1999, has not given any finding over such objection raised in the representation submitted by the petitioner- employee against the enquiry report.

30. This Court has also examined memo of departmental appeal filed by the petitioner-employee against penalty order dated

20.03.1999 and finds that in ground (d) of the memo of appeal, by raising an objection with regard to not supplying the documents relied upon by the Presenting Officer was specifically raised by the petitioner-employee. However, while passing the order in appeal, the Appellate Authority has also not recorded any finding in this regard. Thus, it is clear that although specific objections were raised by the petitioner-employee at the relevant time with regard to not furnishing copies of relevant documents relied upon by the [2025:RJ-JP:30687] (18 of 19) [CW-3047/2004] Presenting Officer on behalf of the department, yet the relevant documents were not supplied to the petitioner-employee, which is a material flaw in the departmental enquiry and it is settled proposition of law that non-furnishing copies of documents amounts to violation of principles of natural justice as also violation of provisions relating to conduct of departmental enquiry. Hence, enquiry proceedings are also vitiated on this ground.

31. Last ground raised by the petitioner is that order dated

28.02.2001 passed by the Appellate Authority is a non-speaking order. This Court examined order dated 28.02.2001 and found that the Appellate Authority has not given any finding, much less, a cogent finding with regard to issuance of charge sheet in respect of stale charges, non-supply of relevant documents as well as other grounds specifically raised by the petitioner-employee in his memo of appeal. It would be relevant to refer that as per Rule 30 of the Rules of 1958, Appellate Authority is under a legal obligation to consider each and every objection raised by delinquent employee and to give finding thereupon. However, the Appellate Authority, in the present case, has failed to apply its judicious mind and on account of non consideration of grounds and not recording any finding thereon, it is held that order dated 28.02.2001 passed by the Appellate Authority is a non-speaking order and liable to be quashed and set aside.

32. In the light of aforesaid analysis as well as in view of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as by this Court in its earlier decisions, writ petition filed by petitioner- employee is allowed. Penalty order dated 20.03.1999 as well as [2025:RJ-JP:30687] (19 of 19) [CW-3047/2004] order dated 28.02.2001 passed by the Appellate Authority are, hereby, quashed and set aside. Petitioner-employee is held entitled to all the consequential benefits including monetary benefits which shall be granted and released by the respondents in favour of legal heirs of the petitioner-employee within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.

33. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of. MANOJ NARWANI / (ANAND SHARMA),J