Bas, Ronija Than, Alwar v. State of Rajasthan, through Public Prosecutor

: Mr. Intjar Ali Mr. Jitendra Kumar Meena Mr. Dinesh Yadav For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rishi Raj Singh Rathore, PP Mr. Girwar Singh, SI PS Ramnagariya, Jaipur (East) Mr. Kuldeep Verma HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUDESH BANSAL Order 20/09/2025

1. All five petitioners herein are accused in FIR No. 59/2025 registered at Police Station Ramnagaria, Jaipur City (East) for [2025:RJ-JP:39008] (2 of 12) [CRLMP-2015/2025] offences under Section 316(2) and 318(4) of the BNS, 2023 and by filing these two separate Criminal Misc. Petitions under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023 (erstwhile Section 482 Cr.P.C.) have prayed to quash the FIR at the investigation stage, fundamentally on the ground that contents of FIR as a whole give rise to a dispute of civil nature and do not disclose commission of any cognizable offence of Criminal Breach of Trust and Cheating, hence, registration of FIR itself is in misuse of process of law and to secure ends of justice, deserves to be quashed at nascent stage.

2. Heard counsel for accused-petitioners, counsel for complainant, learned Public Prosecutor and perused the impugned FIR as also other documents, including the progress report of investigation dated 20.09.2025, placed on record by the Public Prosecutor.

3. From a meaningful reading of the FIR as a whole, it appears that respondent No.2 complainant has made averments therein that he was in need to purchase a residential plot and in that connection, Lalluram Meena and his son Mithlesh Meena, who deals in sale and purchase of immovable properties, came in contact with the complainant and showed photostat papers of Plot No.A-71, Tapovan Vihar Scheme which belongs to Mr. Shivram Meena. Mr. Yogesh Kumar Meena is son of Mr. Shivram Meena and Mr. Bholuram Kumawat is a person, in whose name accused- petitioners prepared a false document dated 28.10.2024 to show deal of such plot with him and thereby all accused-petitioners, having connivance with each other and with an intention to deceive complainant since inception, have dishonestly [2025:RJ-JP:39008] (3 of 12) [CRLMP-2015/2025] misappropriated huge amount of complainant to the tune of Rs.

76.80 lacs, received by Mr. Lalluram Meena, his son Mr. Mithlesh Meena and Mr. Shivram Meena & his son Mr. Yogesh Kumar Meena in various installments on the pretext of agreeing to sell plot in question to complainant, but fraudulently in order to cheat and defraud the complainant and to digest the advance amount of Rs.

76.80 lacs paid by the complainant, have prepared a false and fabricated receipt of such plot in the name of Mr. Bholuram Kumawat. In FIR, complainant has alleged that against such plot, Mr. Lalluram Meena received Rs. 11 lacs in cash on 26.10.2024 and issued receipt, on next day i.e. 27.10.2025 Rs. 38 lacs were received and receipt was issued by Mithlesh Meena along with receipt of cheque amount of Rs.5,80,000/-. Complainant states to have issued cheque of Rs.5,80,000/- of his firm M/s Ritika Air Cooling and Electrical in the name of Mr. Shivram Meena, which got cleared in his account. Later on Mr. Yogesh Kumar Meena received Rs. 12,50,000/- through RTGS in his account and an amount of Rs. 9,50,000/- was transferred through RTGS in the name of his father Mr. Shivram Meena. The RTGS amount was transferred through the Bank account of complainant’s mother Smt. Santosh Devi, thus, the accused persons received a total of Rs. 76,80,000/- through various installments by way of cash, cheque and RTGS from the complainant in order to sell the plot to complainant, but later on created a false receipt dated 28.10.2024 to show the deal of such plot in favour of one Bholuram Kumawat and thereby all accused persons having an intention to cheat and deceive the complainant since inception, duped him and dishonestly misappropriated his amount, which was entrusted to [2025:RJ-JP:39008] (4 of 12) [CRLMP-2015/2025] them under belief, as an advance amount for purchase of plot in question. The copy of FIR has been placed on record.

4. The contention of counsel for accused-petitioners is that after registration of impugned FIR on 31.01.2025, complainant and his mother have jointly file a civil suit for specific performance in the month of July, 2025 against Mr. Shivram Meena, Yogesh Kumar Meena, Lalluram Meena and Mithlesh Meena and in that civil suit, interim stay order dated 20.08.2025 against sale of plot in question has been passed by the Court of Additional District and Sessions Judge No. 11, Jaipur Metropolitan I, Headquarter Sanganer, Jaipur and civil suit is pending for adjudication. The copy of complaint and interim stay order have been placed on record. It has been contended that perusal of contents of FIR as a whole reveals that it is a case of breach of an agreement/ contract to sell immovable property, which is essentially a dispute of civil nature; there is no criminal act of any of the accused person, yet a civil dispute has been tried to given a cloak of criminal offences to create pressure upon the petitioners, hence, the registration of impugned FIR is in sheer misuse of process of criminal law and same deserves to be quashed.

5. In support of such contention, counsel for petitioners have relied upon the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court delivered in case of Shailesh Kumar Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1462]. In this judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has relied upon its previous pronouncement in case of Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh [(2024) 10 SCC 690]. [2025:RJ-JP:39008] (5 of 12) [CRLMP-2015/2025]

6. Per contra, counsel for complainant, in his counter submissions argued that prima facie case of Criminal Conspiracy, Cheating and Criminal Breach of Trust, exists wherein all accused petitioners are involved and his submission is that once a prima facie case exists, constituting occurrence of cognizable offences by the accused persons, then merely on account of pendency of a civil proceedings on the same subject matter involving the same persons, criminal proceedings may not be allowed to be quashed because it is an established law, settled by way of judicial precedents in large number of cases, that criminal law and civil law can run side by side and the two remedies are mutually exclusive and can co-exist since both of them essentially defers in their content and consequence. Hence, their submission is that merely because the complainant and his mother have also availed civil remedy, it may not be held at this stage that the FIR impugned does not disclose commission of any cognizable offence and for that purpose, investigation in the impugned FIR be continued. Reliance has been placed on the recent judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Kathyayini Vs. Sidharth P.S. Reddy & Ors. delivered in Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 1105/2024 on 14.07.2025. That apart reliance has also been placed on the celebrated judgment of State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335], M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra [(2021) 19 SCC 401] and N. Soundaram vs. P.K. Pounraj [(2014) 10 SCC 616].

7. Learned Public Prosecutor has also opposed both the petitions and states that in the preliminary investigation of the [2025:RJ-JP:39008] (6 of 12) [CRLMP-2015/2025] allegations made in the FIR, Investigating Officer has found involvement of accused petitioners in commission of offences under Sections 316(2), 318(4) and 61(2) of the BNS, 2023. However, in the present petitions, interim order against arrest of petitioners is operating and petitioners have not cooperated with the investigation nor has produced the original receipts for FSL, and investigation is yet pending. The progress report of investigation dated 20.09.2025, produced by Public Prosecutor has been taken on record.

9. Heard. Considered. In case of Shailesh Kumar Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the order dated 07.03.2025 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Allahabad wherein in the writ petition filed for quashing of FIR, Hon’ble High Court directed the parties to go for mediation and simultaneously also directed the appellant and petitioner to handover the Demand Draft of Rs. 25 lakhs for the purpose of mediation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in para No. 11 observed that the High Court instead of looking into the matter on its merits, travelled on wrong track in undertaking the exercise of directing the parties to go for mediation as also to direct the appellant-petitioner to pay Rs. 25 lakhs for the purpose of mediation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court having adverted to the facts of that case and taking note of the fact that there is an oral agreement between parties and the complainant-respondent No.4 might have parted with some money in accordance with the oral agreement, observed that to constitute an offence of cheating, there has to be something more than prima facie averment on record to undertake that the intention of accused was to cheat [2025:RJ-JP:39008] (7 of 12) [CRLMP-2015/2025] with the complainant right from institution. The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that the High Court seems to have forgotten well settled principles as enunciated in the decision of this Court in case of Bhajan Lal (supra) that when the FIR does not disclose any element of criminality, rather the entire dispute between parties is of civil nature, the High Court erred in not quashing the FIR, rather directing the parties for mediation. Hence, in such backdrop, the approach of High Court was deprecated and order of High Court was quashed. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Shailesh Kumar Singh (supra) held and observed that as per the facts of that case, same is covered by the recent pronouncement in case of Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. (supra) wherein the Supreme Court has deal with the essential ingredients to constitute offence of Criminal Breach of Trust under Section 406 IPC (Now Section 316 of BNS, 2023) and Cheating under Section 420 IPC (Now Section 318(4) of BNS, 2023). The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para No. 36, 37 and 40 held and observed as under:- “36. What can be discerned from the above is that the offences of criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC) and cheating (Section 420 IPC) have specific ingredients. In order to constitute a criminal breach of trust (Section 406 IPC): - 1) There must be entrustment with person for property or dominion over the property, and 2) The person entrusted: - a) dishonestly misappropriated or converted property to his own use, or b) dishonestly used or disposed of the property or willfully suffers any other person so to do in violation of: i. any direction of law prescribing the method in which the trust is discharged; or ii. legal contract touching the discharge of trust (see: S.W.P. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar [(2002) 1 SCC 241]. [2025:RJ-JP:39008] (8 of 12) [CRLMP-2015/2025] Similarly, in respect of an offence under Section 420 IPC, the essential ingredients are: - 1) deception of any person, either by making a false or misleading representation or by other action or by omission; 2) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to deliver any property, or 3) the consent that any persons shall retain any property and finally intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit (see: Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab, [(2009) 7 SCC 712: (2009) Cr.L.J. 3462 (SC)]

37. Further, in both the aforesaid sections, mens rea i.e. intention to defraud or the dishonest intention must be present, and in the case of cheating it must be there from the very beginning or inception.

40. To put it in other words, the case of cheating and dishonest intention starts with the very inception of the transaction. But in the case of criminal breach of trust, a person who comes into possession of the movable property and receives it legally, but illegally retains it or converts it to his own use against the terms of the contract, then the question is, in a case like this, whether the retention is with dishonest intention or not, whether the retention involves criminal breach of trust or only a civil liability would depend upon the facts of each case.”

10. In the impugned FIR, from perusal of its contents as a whole and on its face value without adding and subtracting anything more, the essential ingredients to constitute offence of criminal breach of trust and cheating, exists. There are allegations against the petitioners to have a dishonest intention since inception to deceive the complainant and to induce him to pay huge amount of Rs. 76.80 lakhs by way of installment in cash, through cheque and RTGS, against the purchase of plot whereas later on such amount has been dishonestly misappropriated and false receipt dated

28.10.2024 has been prepared to show the deal of such plot in the name of accused Bholuram Kumawat. In the preliminary [2025:RJ-JP:39008] (9 of 12) [CRLMP-2015/2025] investigation of the allegations made in the FIR, all five accused petitioners have been found involved to enter into connivance and to cheat/dupe the complainant. Thus, it is not that case, wherein the FIR does not disclose any element of criminality.

11. In case of Kathyayini (supra) on the issue of commencing the civil and criminal proceedings simultaneously the Hon’ble Supreme Court clearly held and observed that no bar exists in law to stay criminal action in motion along with or during pendency of civil suit, if the offences punishable under criminal law are made out. The Supreme Court referred to previous judgment delivered in case of K. Jagadish Vs. Udaya Kumar G.S. & Anr. [(2020) 14 SCC 552] wherein in Para No. 8, the Supreme Court held as under:- It is thus well settled that in certain cases the “8. very same set of facts may give rise to remedies in civil as well as in criminal proceedings and even if a civil remedy is availed by a party, he is not precluded from setting in motion the proceedings in criminal law.” Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also relied upon and referred its two previous judgments in case of Pratibha Rani Vs. Suraj Kumar & Anr. [(1985) 2 SCC 370] and Kamaladevi Agarwal v. State of W.B. [(2002) 1 SCC 555, the relevant extract is being reproduced herein:- “20….. “21. … There are a large number of cases where criminal law and civil law can run side by side. The two remedies are not mutually exclusive but clearly coextensive and essentially differ in their content and consequence. The object of the criminal law is to punish an offender who commits an offence against a person, property or the State for which the accused, on proof of the offence, is deprived of his liberty and in some cases even his life. This does not, however, affect the civil remedies at all for suing the [2025:RJ-JP:39008] (10 of 12) [CRLMP-2015/2025] wrongdoer in cases like arson, accidents, etc. It is an anathema to suppose that when a civil remedy is available, a criminal prosecution is completely barred. The two types of actions are quite different in content, scope and import. It is not at all intelligible to us to take the stand that if the husband dishonestly misappropriates the stridhan property of his wife, though kept in his custody, that would bar prosecution under Section 406 IPC or render the ingredients of Section 405 IPC nugatory or abortive. To say that because the stridhan of a married woman is kept in the custody of her husband, no action against him can be taken as no offence is committed is to override and distort the real intent of the law.”

21. The aforesaid view was reiterated in Kamaladevi Agarwal v. State of W.B. and others, “17. In view of the preponderance of authorities to the contrary, we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings initiated by the appellant against the respondents. We are also not impressed by the argument that as the civil suit was pending in the High Court, the Magistrate was not justified to proceed with the criminal case either in law or on the basis of propriety. Criminal cases have to be proceeded with in accordance with the procedure as prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the pendency of a civil action in a different court even though higher in status and authority, cannot be made a basis for quashing of the proceedings.”

12. Coming back to the facts of the present matters, FIR clearly discloses commission of cognizable offences and involvement of each petitioner in such offences and in the preliminary investigation, petitioners have been found involved but have been found to be non-cooperative with further investigation, taking benefit of interim protection granted in their favour, hence, merely [2025:RJ-JP:39008] (11 of 12) [CRLMP-2015/2025] on the ground that complainant and his mother have also availed civil remedy, petitioners may not take benefit of same to escape from their acts, leading to commission of criminal offences. Thus, the investigation in the impugned FIR and criminal proceedings in furtherance thereof, in accordance with law, can be continued simultaneously with the proceedings in the civil suit, filed subsequently by the complainant and his mother.

13. Testing the impugned FIR on the anvil of principles as enunciated in the celebrated judgment of Bhajan Lal (supra), the impugned FIR is not fit to be quashed at the initial stage of investigation. It is well established that the power and jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (Now 528 of the BNSS, 2023), is wide enough, yet same has to be exercised with due care, circumspection and strangely in rarest of rare cases. It has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (supra) that when a prayer for quashing of FIR is made by the accused, the Court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. only has to consider whether or not the allegations in the FIR discloses the commission of cognizable offence and is not required to consider on merits whether the allegations make out a cognizable offence or not and the Court has to permit the investigating agency/ Police to investigate the allegations in the FIR. The principles enunciated in case of M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. (supra) has again been followed and re-affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of State represented by Inspector of Police Vs. M. Maridoss & Anr. [(2023) 4 SCC 338], decided on

09.01.2023. [2025:RJ-JP:39008] (12 of 12) [CRLMP-2015/2025]

14. In case of N. Soundaram (supra) as well, the Hon’ble Supreme Court suggested not to exercise the inherent extra ordinary jurisdiction by the High Court to stop a legitimate investigation in the FIR/ Criminal Complaint which discloses commission of criminal offences.

15. In view of above discussion, in the opinion of this Court, the impugned FIR does not warrant any interference by the High Court at this stage of investigation and same is not liable to be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023, hence, the Criminal Misc. Petitions are hereby dismissed.

16. Interim orders of protection dated 08.04.2025 & 11.02.2025 granted in favour of petitioners in these petitions hereby comes to an end.

17. The Investigating Officer may proceed with the investigation and conclude the same, obviously in accordance with law.

18. Stay applications and other pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. NITIN /168-169 (SUDESH BANSAL),J