Khetri, District- Jhunjhunu, Rajasthan v. State of Rajasthan, through Superintendent of Police

Judgment

1. State of Rajasthan, through Superintendent of Police, Bhiwadi, Rajasthan, Alwar.

2. Inspector General of Police, Jaipur Range, Jaipur, Rajasthan. For Petitioner(s) ----Respondents : Mr. Ajatshatru Mina Mr. Movil Jeenwal Mr. Himanshu Kala Mr. Nripraj Bhati For Respondent(s)

: Ms. Karishma Soni for Mr. Vinod Kumar Gupta, AGC HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA Order 07/05/2025

1. By way of filing the instant writ petition, the petitioner has assailed legality and validity of order dated 23.03.2021 passed by the Superintendent of Police, District Bhiwadi, Rajasthan, whereby in exercise of powers under Rule 19 of The Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (hereinafter as referred to be as, "Rules, 1958"), the petitioner has been dismissed from his services. Petitioner has also challenged the order dated 09.09.2021 passed by Inspector General of Police, Jaipur range, Jaipur, whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner against the penalty order dated 23.03.2021 has been rejected. [2025:RJ-JP:19324] (2 of 9) [CW-2442/2022]

2. Mr. Ajatshatru Mina, learned counsel for the petitioner has stated that on account of alleged incident of outraging modesty of a woman, one F.I.R. No.32/2021 was lodged at Mahila Police Thaana, Bhiwadi on 23.03.2021 for committing an offence under Sections 456, 354, 506 & 509 of IPC. On the same day charge- sheet was filed by the Police Authorities before the Competent Court. Only on account of the fact that the aforesaid FIR No.32/2021 was lodged against the petitioner, quite abruptly by dispensing with regular disciplinary inquiry and without affording any opportunity of hearing, petitioner has been dismissed from his services.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the aforesaid F.I.R. No.32/2021 was put to challenge by the petitioner by way of filing S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 3245/2021 before this Court, which has been decided vide order dated 02.07.2021 on the basis of compromise entered into between the petitioner-accused and the complainant. The aforesaid order dated 02.07.2021 was passed by presence of learned counsel for the complainant and the F.I.R. No.32/2021 has been quashed.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that feeling dissatisfied with the order dated 23.03.2021, the petitioner preferred appeal under Rule 23 of the Rules, 1958 before the Inspector General of Police-cum-Appellate Authority, where fact with regard to quashing of F.I.R No.32/2021 by this Court vide order dated 02.07.2021 was also disclosed before the Appellate Authority, however, his appeal has been decided in quite cryptic manner without dealing with the grounds raised by the petitioner- [2025:RJ-JP:19324] (3 of 9) [CW-2442/2022] appellant in his memo of appeal and in quite mechanical manner, appeal has been rejected.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that merely, on the allegations leveled against the petitioner in the aforesaid FIR, the respondents have erroneously assumed that the petitioner had committed the alleged heinous offence and without there being in trial pursuant to the aforesaid FIR and any judgment of Competent Criminal Court, only on the basis of such fake assumption, decision was taken to dispense with regular inquiry under Rule 16 of the Rules, 1958 and quite abruptly, without affording any opportunity of hearing whatsoever, in most arbitrary and illegal manner, harshest penalty of dismissal from service has been awarded to the petitioner.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that in view of the fact that the alleged FIR has already been quashed by this Court vide order dated 02.07.2021, the assumption derived by the respondent stands falsified and this fact was brought to the knowledge of the Appellate Authority, yet without considering the grounds raising in the appeal the Appellate Authority has simply relied upon the unbounded and baseless observations made in the penalty order passed by the disciplinary authority and has wrongly rejected the appeal filed by the petitioner. Petitioner has prayed for quashing of order dated 23.03.2021 and appellate order dated

09.09.2021 with all consequential benefits.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment delivered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Tarsem Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Ors.: (2006) 13 SCC 581 as well as the judgment of this Court in case of Satyendra Singh Vs. [2025:RJ-JP:19324] (4 of 9) [CW-2442/2022] State of Rajasthan & Ors.: S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1373/2008 decided on 17.05.2017.

8. In order to oppose the prayer made by the petitioner, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the misconduct committed by the petitioner was of such a heinous nature that it had maligned the reputation of entire Department. The allegations of outraging a modesty of a woman comes within the purview of 'moral turpitude'. It is not expected from a Government official to indulge in such activities, therefore, after taking into consideration all these facts and gravity of allegations, the disciplinary authority has rightly taken the decision to dispense with regular inquiry and to impose penalty of dismissal so as to convey the message to all other employees for keeping their conduct in order.

9. I have heard the arguments raised at the Bar and considered the record of the writ petition.

10. Rule 19 of the Rules, 1958 reads as under: lending and bor "19. Invest (1) No Government servant shall speculate in any stock, share or other investment. Explanation: Frequent purchase or sale or both of shares, securities or other investments shall be deemed to be speculation within the meaning of this sub-rule. (2) No Government servant shall make, or permit any member of his family or any person acting on his behalf to make any investment which is likely to embarrass or influence him in the discharge of his official duties. (3) If any question arises whether any transaction is of the nature referred to in sub-rule (1) or sub- rule (2), the decision of the Government thereon shall be final. (4) (i) No Government servant shall, save in the ordinary course of business with a Bank or a firm of standing duly authorised to conduct banking [2025:RJ-JP:19324] (5 of 9) [CW-2442/2022] business, either himself or through any member of his family or any other person acting on his behalf: (a) lend or borrow money, as principal or agent, to or from any person within the local limits of his authority or with whom he is likely to have official dealings or otherwise place himself under any pecuniary obligation to such person, or (b) lend money to any person on interest or in a manner whereby return in money or in kind is charged or paid: Provided that a Government servant may, give to, or accept from, a relative or a personal friend, a purely temporary loan of a small amount with or without interest, or operate a credit account with a bonafide tradesman or make an advance of pay to his private employees. (ii) When a Government servant is appointed or transferred to a post of such nature as would involve him in the breach of any of the provisions of sub-rule (2) or sub-rule (4), he shall forthwith report the circumstances to the prescribed authority and shall thereafter act in accordance with such orders as may be made by such authority. [(5) Every Government servant shall report within a period of one month to the authority prescribed in explanation (2) under rule 21, every loan advance or received by him, whether in his own name or in the name of a member of his family, if the amount of such loan exceeds Rs.5,000/-.]"

11. Bare perusal of the aforesaid Rule would reveal that in the cases where after a full-fledged trial, employee is convicted by a Competent Criminal Court, the disciplinary authority can dispense with a regular inquiry. It has also got power not to follow the regular procedure of departmental inquiry, where the disciplinary authority satisfied for the reasons to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonable/practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in the said Rules and after recording such reasons, can exercise it's power to impose penalty under Rule 19.

12. In the instant case, the reasons assigned by the disciplinary authority in impugned order dated 23.03.2021 are here under: [2025:RJ-JP:19324] (6 of 9) [CW-2442/2022] "izdj.k ds gkykr ds vuqlkj vkj{kd }kjk jkf= esa nks efgykvksa ds ?kj esa ckonhZ vukf/kd`r izos'k dj mudh yTtk Hkax djus dk nq"d`R; fd;k x;k gSA vkj{kd }kjk fd;s x;s mDr nq"d`R; ls iqfyl foHkkx 'keZlkj gqvk gS ,oa vketu esa iqfyl dh Nfo /kwfey gqbZ gSA bl izdj.k esa v/kksgLrk{kjdrkZ dks fo'oluh; lw=ksa ls xksiuh; :i ls laKku esa yk;k x;k gS] fd Jh ujs'kiky Msokfu;k iq= Jh ckcwyky vkj{kd ua- 308 }kjk viuh inh; ,oa foHkkxh; fLFkfr dk iz;ksx dj efgykvksa dks vius dFkuksa ls i{knzksgh vFkok dFku cnyus gsrq vuqfpr ncko Mkydj izrkfMr fd;k tk ldrk gSA iqu'p foHkkxh; tkap ds uke ij efgykvksa dks vuko';d :i ls ckj&ckj tkap gsrq cqyokdj iqu% 'keZlkj fLFkfr esa Mkyk tk ldrk gSA vr% efgyk lEeku dks n`f"Vxr izdj.k esa vkj{kd ds fo:) fu;e&16 lhlh, ,.M :Yl 1958 dh fu/kkZfjr izfdz;k dk ikyu djuk vO;ogk;Z ,oa vlk/; gSA vkj{kd }kjk fd;k x;k d`R; laiw.kZ iqfyl foHkkx dks 'keZlkj djus okyk gSA vkj{kd dk vkpj.k ,d yksd lsod dh vis{kk esa vuqi;qDr ,oa v'kksHkuh; gS blfy;s bl iqfyl deZpkjh dks jkT; lsok esa fujarj j[kuk vokaNuh; gS rFkk yksd fgr esa ugha gSA"

13. The aforesaid order dated 23.03.2021 itself would reveal that FIR was lodged on 23.03.2021 and on the same day, in quite hot haste decision was taken to dispense with the regular inquiry and penalty order has also been passed on the same day i.e. on

23.03.2021. This very fact would make it clear that the disciplinary authority, instead of applying its independent mind, was swayed away by the fact that FIR involving allegations of committing crime with a woman has been lodged and merely on lodging the FIR a presumption was drawn that the accused implicated in the FIR for committed the alleged crime.

14. The reasons recorded in order dated 23.03.2021 would also reveal that a disciplinary authority has prejudged the guilt of the petitioner even before the trial has taken place. Thus, it is clear that the decision for dispensing with the inquiry is based upon mere surmises and conjectures; and cannot be said to be a judicious decision. [2025:RJ-JP:19324] (7 of 9) [CW-2442/2022]

15. More so, under the circumstances, where the complainant herself has entered into a compromise with the petitioner and appeared before this Court through her counsel in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No.3245/2021. Only on the basis of no objection tendered by her, the FIR in question was quashed by this Court. Thus, it was clear that the allegations leveled in FIR could not have been taken at its face value to take such a drastic action of dismissing the petitioner from services without holding the regular departmental inquiry.

16. It is a settled proposition of law that the allegations of committing crime may be howsoever heinous in nature, yet the accused/delinquent has constitutional rights to defend himself and such defence can be put forward by him only in regular inquiry. But in the instant case, in quite arbitrarily and illegal manner, ignoring the relevant Rules, the respondents have deprived the petitioner of his legitimate and valuable right of hearing and putting forward his defense.

17. In the case of Tarsem Singh (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under: "10. It is now a well-settled principle of law that a constitutional right conferred upon a delinquent cannot be dispensed with lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motive or merely in order to avoid the holding of an enquiry. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has taken us through certain documents for the purpose of showing that ultimately the police on investigation did not find any case against the appellant in respect of the purported FIR lodged against him under Section 377 IPC. However, it may not be necessary for us to go into the said question. 14. In view of the fact that no material had been placed by the respondents herein to satisfy the Court that it was necessary to dispense with a formal enquiry in terms of proviso (b) appended [2025:RJ-JP:19324] (8 of 9) [CW-2442/2022] to Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, we are of the opinion that the impugned orders cannot be sustained and they are set aside accordingly. The appellant is directed to be reinstated in service. However, in view of our aforementioned findings, it would be open to the respondents to initiate a departmental enquiry against the appellant if they so desire. Payment of back wages shall abide by the result of such enquiry. Such an enquiry, if any, must be initiated as expeditiously as possible and not later than two months from the date of communication of this order."

18. This Court in the case of Satyendra Singh (supra) has dealt with the extent of subjective satisfaction under Rule 19(2) of the Rules, 1958 and has held as under: "(7) Having taken note of the facts and law as above,, this Court is satisfied that the order has been passed without subjective satisfaction and there was no independent material to justify for dispensing with the regular enquiry as envisaged under Rule 19(2) of the Rules of 1958. The dispensation of the regular enquiry could not be done on the whims and fancies of the officers, special when preliminary enquiry has been made a basis for passing of the order impugned. In view of the above, this writ petition is allowed. The punishment order impugned dt. 31.01.2007 as well as the appellate order dt. 03.10.2007 are hereby quashed & set aside and it is directed that the petitioner shall be reinstated in service forthwith with all monetary benefits as to pay and allowances etc. applicable to him from the date of his dismissal. Needless to say that it would be open for the department, if so advised, notwithstanding the lapse of time to proceed further. The compliance of this order shall be made by the respondents within one month from the date of submission of certified copy of this order in their office. No costs."

19. This Court is satisfied that the Appellate Authority has also failed to properly consider the grounds of appeal whereas, as per Rule 30 of Rules, 1958, the Appellate Authority is under an obligation to consider each and every relevant ground raised by [2025:RJ-JP:19324] (9 of 9) [CW-2442/2022] the delinquent in his memo of appeal and to pass speaking order after considering such grounds; but in the instant case, although the fact with regard to quashing of FIR in question was placed on record before the Appellate Authority by the petitioner and such fact has also been taken note of by the Appellate Authority in its order dated 09.09.2021, yet for no justified reason, the Appellate Authority has not given any finding in the appellate order in this regard.

20. In the light of above discussion and in view of the consistent view taken earlier by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court, this Court finds that the impugned order dated 23.03.2021 and the appellate order dated 09.09.2021 are arbitrary and illegal, hence, are hereby quashed and set aside. The petitioner is entitled for reinstatement as well as continuity in services and for other consequential benefits, however, actual monetary benefits shall not be given to him and the respondents would grant him notional benefits of fixation etc., for the intervening period between date of dismissal to date of reinstatement.

21. It is made clear that mere quashing of aforesaid orders would not preclude the respondent-Government from conducting a regular inquiry under the provisions of Rules, 1958.

22. In view of above discussions, the writ petition stands allowed. DAKSH/247 (ANAND SHARMA),J