In case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji AIR

Bhawan, Tilak Marg, C-Scheme, Jaipur Through B, Shri C.l. Jewariya Branch Office 239, Krishna Nagar, Bharatpur.

4. Kaptan Singh S/o Shri Tulsi, R/o Sinsini District Bharatpur. Sarwati W/o Tulsi, R/o Sinsini District Bharatpur. M/s Shyam Udhyog, G-1-123, Riico Braj Industrial Area, Bharatpur Through Proprietor Raman Lal S/o S, R/o Kothi ,guljar Bag Colony, New Collectorate, Bharatpur. ----Respondents For Appellant(s) : Mr. Asgar Khan For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK KUMAR JAIN 03/01/2025 Order

1. Instant Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is preferred by appellants non-claimants from judgment dated 28.05.2007 in misc. case No. 2/2003 passed by learned additional District judge No.2, Bharatpur under Section 31(1)(a)(aa) of State Financial Corporation Act, 1951.

2. Office has pointed out a delay of 2478 days and to substantiate the reasons of delay an application under Section 5 of [2025:RJ-JP:734] (2 of 6) [CMA-2127/2017] limitation act is filed on the ground that appellants are illiterate females and they are resident of rural area of neighboring state. Learned counsel for appellants submits that appellants were not aware about the order dated 28.05.2007 in a petition filed by respondent No.1, therefore, they could not pursue and defend the case before the trial court. He also submits that after knowledge of execution proceedings they have approached the Hon’ble Court to challenge the order. He also submits that appellants are rustic villagers and not aware about the legal proceedings.

3. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the material available on record.

4. A perusal of order dated 28.05.2007 reflects that the judgment was passed in absence of present appellants, but the record clearly indicate that after filing of misc. case before the trial court, appellant herein were served notice and they have filed reply before the Trial Court. On 03.08.2006 when they remained absent, an ex-parte proceeding was initiated. Herein, the appellants were served notice and they have filed reply before the trial court, therefore, they were aware about the proceedings instituted against them before the trial court.

5. There is a substantial delay of 2478 days and same is abnormal delay. A simple ground like rustic villager or female is not sufficient to condone the delay. The appellants-non-claimants have failed to show any reason for condonation of delay. There is no material on record to indicate that the reasons were beyond control of appellant-non-applicants, therefore, the application under section 5 of limitation act sans reasons and same is liable to be dismissed. [2025:RJ-JP:734] (3 of 6) [CMA-2127/2017]

6. Section 5 of the Limitation Act prescribes that any appeal or revision or an application may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the petitioner satisfies the Court on sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal or revision or making an application within prescribed period. 7. In case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Katiji AIR 1987 SC 1353, Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the following principles to allow application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act:-

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay. every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. [2025:RJ-JP:734] (4 of 6) [CMA-2127/2017]

8. In case of Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors. 2010 (8) SCC 685, Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering Section 5 of Limitation Act has referred the judgment in the case of Union of India Vs. Ram Charan AIR 1964 SC 215 and observed that the explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay. The larger benches as well as equi- benches of Hon’ble Supreme Court have consistently followed these principles and have either allowed or declined to condone the delay in filing such applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay.

9. In the case of Brijesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.: (2014) 13 SCC 291, while referring the judgment of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors.: (2013) 12 SCC 649, Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion [2025:RJ-JP:734] (5 of 6) [CMA-2127/2017] by the Court for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court further observed that the Court cannot condone the delay, if it is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, and a delay cannot be condoned on sympathetic grounds.

10. Very recently condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act was considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of P. Subba Reddy (died) by LRs. And Ors. Vs. Special Deputy Collector (LA) 2024 INSC 286 wherein also it was held that unless sufficient cause is shown the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act cannot be allowed. The underlying provisions after harmonious construction of provision of law were formulated in following manner:- (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the L imitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; liberal (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though justice-oriented approach, approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are [2025:RJ-JP:734] (6 of 6) [CMA-2127/2017] also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamount to disregarding the statutory provision.

11. Considering aforesaid, the counsel has failed to show sufficient reasons for delay, therefore, the civil misc. appeal is liable to be dismissed.

12. Consequently, the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is hereby dismissed along with civil misc. appeal.

13. Misc. application(s), if any, stands disposed of.

14. No order as to costs. MONU /13 (ASHOK KUMAR JAIN),J

Bhawan, Tilak Marg, C-Scheme, Jaipur Through B, Shri C.l. Jewariya Branch Office 239, Krishna Nagar, Bharatpur.

4. Kaptan Singh S/o Shri Tulsi, R/o Sinsini District Bharatpur. Sarwati W/o Tulsi, R/o Sinsini District Bharatpur. M/s Shyam Udhyog, G-1-123, Riico Braj Industrial Area, Bharatpur Through Proprietor Raman Lal S/o S, R/o Kothi ,guljar Bag Colony, New Collectorate, Bharatpur. ----Respondents For Appellant(s) : Mr. Asgar Khan For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK KUMAR JAIN 03/01/2025 Order

1. Instant Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is preferred by appellants non-claimants from judgment dated 28.05.2007 in misc. case No. 2/2003 passed by learned additional District judge No.2, Bharatpur under Section 31(1)(a)(aa) of State Financial Corporation Act, 1951.

2. Office has pointed out a delay of 2478 days and to substantiate the reasons of delay an application under Section 5 of [2025:RJ-JP:734] (2 of 6) [CMA-2127/2017] limitation act is filed on the ground that appellants are illiterate females and they are resident of rural area of neighboring state. Learned counsel for appellants submits that appellants were not aware about the order dated 28.05.2007 in a petition filed by respondent No.1, therefore, they could not pursue and defend the case before the trial court. He also submits that after knowledge of execution proceedings they have approached the Hon’ble Court to challenge the order. He also submits that appellants are rustic villagers and not aware about the legal proceedings.

3. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the material available on record.

4. A perusal of order dated 28.05.2007 reflects that the judgment was passed in absence of present appellants, but the record clearly indicate that after filing of misc. case before the trial court, appellant herein were served notice and they have filed reply before the Trial Court. On 03.08.2006 when they remained absent, an ex-parte proceeding was initiated. Herein, the appellants were served notice and they have filed reply before the trial court, therefore, they were aware about the proceedings instituted against them before the trial court.

5. There is a substantial delay of 2478 days and same is abnormal delay. A simple ground like rustic villager or female is not sufficient to condone the delay. The appellants-non-claimants have failed to show any reason for condonation of delay. There is no material on record to indicate that the reasons were beyond control of appellant-non-applicants, therefore, the application under section 5 of limitation act sans reasons and same is liable to be dismissed. [2025:RJ-JP:734] (3 of 6) [CMA-2127/2017]

6. Section 5 of the Limitation Act prescribes that any appeal or revision or an application may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the petitioner satisfies the Court on sufficient cause for not preferring an appeal or revision or making an application within prescribed period. 7. In case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Katiji AIR 1987 SC 1353, Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down the following principles to allow application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act:-

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every days delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay. every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. [2025:RJ-JP:734] (4 of 6) [CMA-2127/2017]

8. In case of Balwant Singh (dead) Vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors. 2010 (8) SCC 685, Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering Section 5 of Limitation Act has referred the judgment in the case of Union of India Vs. Ram Charan AIR 1964 SC 215 and observed that the explained delay should be clearly understood in contradistinction to inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay. The larger benches as well as equi- benches of Hon’ble Supreme Court have consistently followed these principles and have either allowed or declined to condone the delay in filing such applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must essentially satisfy the above stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone the delay.

9. In the case of Brijesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.: (2014) 13 SCC 291, while referring the judgment of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors.: (2013) 12 SCC 649, Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of discretion [2025:RJ-JP:734] (5 of 6) [CMA-2127/2017] by the Court for condonation of delay. The Supreme Court further observed that the Court cannot condone the delay, if it is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, and a delay cannot be condoned on sympathetic grounds.

10. Very recently condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act was considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of P. Subba Reddy (died) by LRs. And Ors. Vs. Special Deputy Collector (LA) 2024 INSC 286 wherein also it was held that unless sufficient cause is shown the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act cannot be allowed. The underlying provisions after harmonious construction of provision of law were formulated in following manner:- (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the L imitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; liberal (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though justice-oriented approach, approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are [2025:RJ-JP:734] (6 of 6) [CMA-2127/2017] also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamount to disregarding the statutory provision.

11. Considering aforesaid, the counsel has failed to show sufficient reasons for delay, therefore, the civil misc. appeal is liable to be dismissed.

12. Consequently, the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act is hereby dismissed along with civil misc. appeal.

13. Misc. application(s), if any, stands disposed of.

14. No order as to costs. MONU /13 (ASHOK KUMAR JAIN),J