HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No v. 1. The Collector, District Jaipur Office At C

Judgment

1. The Collector, District Jaipur Office At Colectorate Banipark, Jaipur No. 2, Rajasthan.

2. Additional Collector And Magistrate, (Second Sanganer, Jaipur).

3. Panchayat Samiti Sanganer, District Jaipur Through Development Officer.

4. Gram Panchayat, Village Kheri Gokulpuri, Tehsil Sanganer, Jaipur Through Sarpanch.

5. Station House Officer (Sho), Police Station Sanganer, Sadar, Jaipur.

7. Tehsildar, Tehsil Sanganer Office Sanganer, Jaipur, Raj. Saroj Devi W/o Chetan Chouhan, R/o B-17, Madhuban Colony, Tonk Phatak, District Jaipur, Raj. ----Non-applicants/ Respondents For Appellant(s) : Mr. G.P. Sharma Mr. Mahesh Chand Gupta For Respondent(s) : Mr. Neeraj Batra, G.C. with Ms. Gunjan Chawla Mr. Ajeet Bhandari, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Jitendra Mishra Ms. Neetu Mathur for Ms. Suman Shekhawat, G.C. [2025:RJ-JP:21135] (2 of 23) [CMA-612/202 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GANESH RAM MEENA Judgment Reserved on Pronounced on ::: ::: May 19, 2025 May 28, 2025

1. By filing the present miscellaneous appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(r) read with order 41 Rule 1 CPC, the applicant-appellants have prayed to quash and set aside the order dated 20.01.2025 passed by the court of learned Additional District Judge No.10, Jaipur Metropolitan-I (Headquarter Sanganer) (for short 'the court below') in temporary injunction application No.150/2024, titled as Gramvasi Brahmpuri Ki Dhaani & Anr. vs. The Collector & Ors., whereby, the learned court below dismissed the application for temporary injunction filed by the applicants/appellants under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC.

2. The facts borne out from the pleadings are that the applicants/appellants filed a civil suit along with an application for temporary injunction in the public representative capacity in which they prayed to declare public way existing upon Khasra No.661, 666, 664/1035, 667, 679, 683, 686, 685 & 82 existed for a period about 70-75 years as Public Way wherein Cement Concrete Road (CC Road) was laid by Gram Panchayat, Village Kheri Gokulpura with prior approval from concerned Panchayat Samiti Sanganer in the [2025:RJ-JP:21135] (3 of 23) [CMA-612/202 year 2016 and also to maintain status quo as regards the existence of aforesaid CC Road.

3. In the application for temporary injunction the applicants/appellants prayed to restrain the respondents from removing/damaging the CC Road and closer of the public way and also prayed not to create any hurdle/hindrance in the use of aforesaid public way for movement of the villagers in any manner till decision of the aforesaid civil suit.

4. After effecting service of notices, the non- applicants/appellants filed written statements of denial.

5. The court below vide order dated 20.01.2025 dismissed the application for temporary injunction.

6. Before raising the arguments, counsel appearing for the applicants/appellants has drawn attention of the court to the Circular dated 17.09.2014 issued by the Rural Development and Panchayati Raj Department, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur along with administrative sanction, which is taken on record.

7. Learned counsel appearing applicants/appellants submitted that impugned order passed by the court below is liable to be quashed and set aside being contrary to pleadings, documents and law. Counsel submitted that the learned court below failed to appreciate the averments of the plaint and the relief sought therein. Perusal of the plaint would go to reveal that the civil suit for [2025:RJ-JP:21135] (4 of 23) [CMA-612/202 declaration and injunction has been filed in the representative capacity praying therein to declare the disputed way as public way because the alleged way was being used by the inhabitants of the village for a period about 70-75 years. Respondent No.7 claimed transfer of a part of the land from the erstwhile khatedar Sheojiram who was allotted the land of disputed khasara numbers interalia others in the year 1996. It is also evident from the document available on the suit that Sheojiram filed an affidavit wherein unequivocally stated that from the disputed khasara numbers along with others, the public way was in existence and the villagers were using said way for their ingress and outgress. Counsel submitted that in view of the aforesaid pleadings and documents, the case of

the plaintiff appellants has been the case of easement by prescription. To decide the aforesaid right from the pleadings there arose triable issues as to whether the existing way was in existence for a period about 70-75 years i.e. prior to the date of purchase by respondent No.7. Once there appeared a triable issue there was no occasions for the court below to dismiss the application for temporary but to rather protect the right of the plaintiffs till the aforesaid triable issue was decided with reference to the evidence of the parties, hence impugned order liable to be quashed and set aside being contrary to law and procedure. [2025:RJ-JP:21135] (5 of 23) [CMA-612/202 Counsel further submitted that the learned court below has himself misdirected to properly appreciate pleadings of the parties and has considered the case of the plaintiff to be the case of easement of necessity and quasi easement, therefore taking into consideration the only defence of defendant No.3 that there existed three ways available for the villagers for access to and from the village. The aforesaid misconception and misdirection has laid to the dismissal the application for Temporary Injunction, therefore the order being erroneous and illegal being based on misconception of law, hence liable to be quashed and set aside. Counsel further submitted that the learned court below has not drown correct inference from proponderance of evidence and has been much impressed from the revenue record. It is settled proposition of law that the entries in the revenue record do not confer any substantive rights but the same are fiscal entry entered into revenue record for the purposes of collection of revenue, as such the order impugned liable to be quashed and set aside being illegal. Counsel further submitted that the document on record and the admission made in the written statement by respondent No.7 that about existence of the public way and construction of CC Road over the way in existence, the respondent No.7 did not object rather she submitted [2025:RJ-JP:21135] (6 of 23) [CMA-612/202 application directly to CMO without the taking the recourse of law and procedure for declaration of rights with regard to khasara numbers she claimed to have been purchased. The status on the date of filing the suit was that there was Cement Concrete Road over the way which was inexistence for a period of about 70-75 years. In view of aforesaid legal submissions, the impugned judgment liable to be quashed and set aside regarding prima facie case. Counsel further submitted that so far as findings as regard balance of convenience irreparable injury are concerned the same are illegal, erroneous as the learned court below has utterly failed to correctly taken into consideration the legal point involved. It is respectfully submitted that plaintiff appellants filed a suit claiming the acquisition of easementary by prescription, as such the findings on the aforesaid issues are absolutely illegal and erroneous. Counsel further submitted that impugned order liable to be quashed and set aside as the impugned judgment has been passed in ignorance of the applications filed for seeking permission to submit a suit in the representative capacity. The application which was required to seek permission for filing a suit in the representative capacity is already in the record and in the wake of such application when the summons and notices of the application were issued [2025:RJ-JP:21135] (7 of 23) [CMA-612/202 to the respondents, there is a implied permission to maintain suit. The plaintiffs have not filed the suit n personal capacity but the suit has been filed in public representative capacity. Such an observation reflect non application of the mind of the court below while deciding the important civil suit wherein the right of way of public at large was involved, as such the order impugned liable to be quashed and set aside. Counsel further submitted that the learned court below failed to consider that with the public fund, the CC Road was constructed over the way which was already in existence prior to the date of purchase of land by respondent No.7. Further the construction of CC Road was never objected by respondent No.7 when it was constructed way back in the year 2016, therefore the law of estoppel and waiver comes into play and the plea raised by the respondent No.7 was not liable to be considered. Counsel further submitted that the impugned order passed by the court below suffers from non-reading non- consideration of the document on record. Further the impugned order suffers fom illegality of not considering the case of the plaintiffs in its legal perspective. Counsel further submitted that it is settled proposition of law that the learned court below was required to maintain status quo as regard the immovable property, existed on the date on filing the suit. The learned court below [2025:RJ-JP:21135] (8 of 23) [CMA-612/202 has not considered the aforesaid important aspect of, the case that the CC Road was existed in the year 2016, therefore there was no occasion for the court below to dismiss the application for Temporary Injunction.

8. To support the submissions, counsel for the applicants/appellants has placed reliance upon following orders:- (i) Mercy vs. Agnus Maria E.J. and Another reported in 2023 SCC Online Ker 11075 delivered by High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam. (ii) Hari Narayan vs. Saroj Devi (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.12237/2023) decided on 12.08.2024 by the Coordinate Bench of this Court.

9. Mr. Ajeet Bhandari, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Jitendra Mishra appearing for the respondent/ defendant No.7 Saroj Devi submitted that as per the averments made in the plaint, the suit is said to have been filed in the representative capacity. No leave as required under section 91 CPC has been obtained by the plaintiff from the Court so far and for want of the leave from the Court as required under section 91 CPC, the suit itself is not maintainable and therefore, the appellants/ plaintiffs have no case for grant of temporary injunction. Senior Advocate also submitted that no public notice has been issued as required under Order 1 Rule 8(2) CPC. It has also been submitted by the Senior Advocate that [2025:RJ-JP:21135] (9 of 23) [CMA-612/202 the road in question has been constructed by the Gram Panchayat. The State of Rajasthan has issued a Circular as regards the guidelines and procedure for construction of the road by the Gram Panchayat. There is a clear violation of the terms and conditions while constructing the road as the land under the khatedari of the respondent/ defendant No.7 is concerned, no objection was taken from the respondent/ defendant No.7. He also submitted that the road was constructed when the brother of the appellant/ plaintiff No.2 was the Up-Sarpanch.

10. Learned Senior Advocate also submitted that with regard to making construction of the road over the khatedari land of the respondent/ defendant No.7 Saroj Devi, she made a complaint to the authorities of the State and on her complaint, a Committee was constituted to make an inquiry and the Committee after thorough inquiry held guilty the Sarpanch, Village Development Officer and Junior Engineer in making illegal road construction and have also issued orders for recovery of the funds incurred in the construction of that illegal part of the road. Senior Counsel also submitted that the provisions of section 4 of the Easement Act,1882 are not at all applicable in the present case. Senior Counsel also submitted that the appellants/ plaintiffs are neither having any prima facie case in their favour nor balance of convenience also lies in their favour. He also submitted that [2025:RJ-JP:21135] (10 of 23) [CMA-612/202 as per the evidence available on the record, there are three alternative public ways through which the appellants/ plaintiffs could pass the way but in case any interim order is passed, the respondent / defendant No.7- Saroj Devi would be deprived from her right of cultivation as the land in question is in the khatedari of the respondent /defendant No.7- Saroj Devi.

11. Mr. Neeraj Batra, Government Counsel assisted by Ms. Gunjan Chawla, appearing for the State respondents submitted that they have filed a detailed reply to the memo of appeal and further submitted that after having demarcation of the land of the respondent/ defendant No.7 Saroj Devi’s khatedari and the complaint made by her, an inquiry was conducted and certain persons were held guilty for making illegal construction of the road over the khatedari land of the respondent/ defendant No.7- Saroj Devi.

12. In the rejoinder, counsel appearing for the appellants/ plaintiffs submitted that the appellants/ plaintiffs have filed an application for seeking permission/ leave of the Court. He also submitted that while considering the application for temporary injunction, neither such plea as regards the leave of the Court for filing the suit was raised nor said issue was decided by the court below.

13. E-converso, counsels appearing for the non- applicants/appellants have controverted the submissions [2025:RJ-JP:21135] (11 of 23) [CMA-612/202 advanced by the counsel appearing applicants/appellants, supported the impugned order passed by the court below and submitted that the court below after finding three settled propositions of temporary injunction, rightly dismissed the application for temporary injunction filed by the applicants/appellants. Thus, no interference is warranted by this Court in the impugned order passed by the court below.

14. Considered the submissions advanced by the counsels appearing for the respective parties, meticulously scanned and scrutinized the entire material made available to the Court including the referred Circular so also the record of the case.

15. The factual matrix borne out from the pleadings of both the parties is that the land in question was initially allotted to one Sheojiram in the year 1966 which has been later-on purchased by respondent / defendant No.7 Saroj Devi and admittedly there is no public way in the revenue records over the land in question. The land vests in the respondent/ defendant No.7- Saroj Devi.

16. The Gram Panchayat proceeded for constructing a CC Road through the khatedari land of the respondent/ defendant No.7 Saroj Devi on recommendations of the Member of the Legislative Assembly considering that the public is passing through the said land. The Gram Panchayat [2025:RJ-JP:21135] (12 of 23) [CMA-612/202 started construction of the cemented road upto the land in question and when the respondent / defendant No.7 Saroj Devi came to know of this fact that the Gram Panchayat is making construction of the road, she moved an application for demarcation of boundary of her land and when she found that the road is being constructed over her khatedari land, she made a complaint to the authorities and the authorities after making inquiry came to the conclusion that the road has been illegally constructed over the khatedari land of the respondent/ defendant No.7 Saroj Devi. The authorities also initiated proceedings for recovery of the money incurred in making such illegal construction of road. As per the Government guidelines also the Gram Panchayat could make construction of the road only through the undisputed land or the Government land. The Circular dated 17.09.2014 as regards the guidelines also clearly speaks that the Gram Panchayat shall ensure that there is no dispute over the site land for construction of the road.

17. On perusal of the material available on the record, this is an undisputed fact that the land in question is the khatedari land of the respondent / defendant No.7 Saroj Devi and there is no public way in the revenue records passing through the said land, meaning-thereby, it is the respondent/ defendant No.7 Saroj Devi who has the sole khatedari right over the land in question. [2025:RJ-JP:21135] (13 of 23) [CMA-612/202

18. The appellants/ plaintiffs have claimed that there is a public way passing through the land in question and is being used by the public for the last 70-75 years and easementary rights have been created in their favour.

19. The suit has been filed only for permanent injunction and there is no suit for declaration of the public way. The suit for permanent injunction can only be filed in a case where the plaintiff has clear title in his favour but when the relief of permanent injunction is being sought without there being any title then such suit has no force without there being any relief of declaration. In the present case, since the land in question vests in the khatedari of respondent/ defendant No.7-Saroj Devi and the appellants/ plaintiffs are claiming that there is a public way, though same is not in the revenue records, in such a situation it was for the appellants/ plaintiffs to seek a declaration for the public way.

20. The cardinal principles for grant of temporary injunction are (i) Whether the plaintiff has prima facie case?, (ii) Whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of the plaintiff? and (iii) Whether the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury if his prayer for interlocutory injunction is disallowed.

21. The High Court of Bombay after relying upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court delivered in the case of UTO Nederland B.V. & Anr. Vs. Tilaknagar Industries Limited, Appeal No.66 of 2012 decided along-with other connected [2025:RJ-JP:21135] (14 of 23) [CMA-612/202 matters on April 28, 2025 has observed in paras 10, 13 and 17 as under:- “10. Now we may advert to the scope and ambit of the trinity test on the basis of which the discretionary prayer for grant of injunction has to be dealt with. The expression 'prima facie case' is a Latin expression means 'at first sight or based on first impression or on the face of it'. The expression 'prima facie case' has a well settled meaning in legal parlance. The House of Lords in AMERICAN CYNAMID CO. AND ETHICON LTD., reported in 1975(1) ALL ER 504, while dealing with scope and ambit of expression ' prima facie case' held as under: "The use of such expressions as "a probability," "a prima facie case," or "a strong prima facie case" in the context of the exercise of a discretionary power to grant an interlocutory injunction leads to confusion as to the object sought to be achieved by this form of temporary relief. The court no doubt must be satisfied that the claim is not frivolous or vexatious, in other words, that there is a serious question to be tried. It is no part of the court's function at this stage of the litigation to try to resolve conflicts of evidence on affidavit as to facts on which the claims of either party may ultimately depend nor to decide difficult questions of law which call for detailed argument and mature considerations. These are matters to be dealt with at the trial. One of the reasons for the introduction of the practice of requiring an undertaking as to damages upon the grant of an interlocutory injunction was that "it aided the court in doing that which was its great object, viz. abstaining from expressing any opinion upon the merits of the case until the hearing":Wakefield v. Duke of Buccleugh (1865) 12 L.T. 628, 629. So unless the material [2025:RJ-JP:21135] (15 of 23) [CMA-612/202 available to the court at the hearing of the application for an interlocutory injunction fails to disclose that the plaintiff has any real prospect of succeeding in his claim for a permanent injunction at the trial, the court should go on to consider whether the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting or refusing the interlocutory relief that is sought." The aforesaid principle was reiterated in GARDEN COTTAGE FOODS LTD. VS. MILK MARKETING BOARD, reported in (1983) 2 All ER 770.

13. The Supreme Court elucidated the meaning of expression 'prima facie case' in GUJARAT BOTTLING CO. LTD. (SUPRA) to mean that the Court should be satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried at the hearing, and there is a probability that of plaintiff obtaining the relief at the conclusion of the trial on the basis of the material placed before the Court. The expression 'prima facie case' means a substantial question raised bona fide which needs investigation and decision on merits and the Court, at the initial stage, cannot insist upon a full proof case warranting an eventual decree. [See: ANAND PRASAD AGARWAL VS. TARKESHWAR PRASAD13, RAMAKANT AMBALAL CHOKSI (SUPRA) and STATE OF KERALA VS. UNION OF INDIA, reported in (2024) 7 SCC 183].

17. A party is not entitled to an order of injunction as a matter of right. The grant of interlocutory injunction is a remedy which is discretionary in nature. However, such a discretion has to be exercised on the touchstone of trinity test viz. prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. [See SHIV KUMAR CHADHA ETC. VS. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI, REPORTED IN 1993 scc(3) 161]. It is equally well settled legal proposition that the temporary injunction being equitable relief, the [2025:RJ-JP:21135] (16 of 23) [CMA-612/202 discretion to grant such relief will be exercised only when the plaintiff's conduct is free from blame and he approaches the Court with clean hands SEEMA ARSHAD ZAHEER VS. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER MUMBAI, REPORTED IN (2006) 5 SCC 282.”

22. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 13001 of 2024 (@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 252 of 2023, decided on 22.11.2024 has observed in para 34 as under:- “34. The burden is on the plaintiff, by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise, to prove that there is “a prima facie case” in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition precedent for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that noninterference by the court would result in “irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third [2025:RJ-JP:21135] (17 of 23) [CMA-612/202 condition also is that “the balance of convenience” must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject matter should be maintained in status quo, an injunction would be issued. Thus, the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit. (See: Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh reported in (1992) 1 SCC 719.)”

23. An issue has been raised by the Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent/ defendant No.7 that before filing a suit in the representative capacity, the appellants/ plaintiffs are required to seek leave of the Court for filing the civil suit as required under section 91 CPC and a public notice under Order 8 Rule 8(2) CPC. Counsel appearing for the appellants/ plaintiffs also submitted that the appellants/ plaintiffs have moved an application for leave of the Court but no order has been passed by the Court on the said application.

24. The High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur in the case of M/s. I Square Infrastructure & Developers Vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors., (C.R. No. 79 of 2018) decided on 15.09.2020 has observed in paras 9 and 10 as under:- [2025:RJ-JP:21135] (18 of 23) [CMA-612/202 “9. Before adverting to the aforesaid contention, it is necessary to examine the provision prescribed under Section 91 of the CPC, which reads as under:-

91. Public nuisances and other wrongful act affecting the public.- [(1) In the case of a public nuisance or other wrongful act affecting, or likely to affect, the public, a suit for a declaration and injunction or for such other relief as may be appropriate in the circumstances of the case, may be instituted,- (a) by the Advocate-General, or (b) with the leave of the Court, by two or more persons, even though no special damage has been caused to such persons by reason of such public nuisance or other wrongful act.] (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any right of suit which may exist independently of its provisions.

10. By virtue of the aforesaid provision, a suit for declaration and injunction or for such other relief as may be appropriate in the circumstances of the case with regard to the public nuisance or other wrongful act affecting or likely to affect the public may be instituted with the leave of the Court, by two or more persons, even though no special damage has been caused to such persons by reason of such public nuisance or other wrongful act. The provision, thus, deals with public nuisance or other wrongful act which affects a considerable number of people. Under the said provision, the Advocate General or two or more persons with the leave of the Court may bring a suit either for a declaration or injunction or for any other relief irrespective of any special damage. It, thus, appears from a bare perusal of the aforesaid provision that for the institution of a valid suit, leave of the Court is a condition precedent and there would be no properly instituted [2025:RJ-JP:21135] (19 of 23) [CMA-612/202 suit under the aforesaid provision before the leave is granted.”

25. A representative action or representative suit is not defined in the Code. However, explanation given to sub-rule (2) to Rule 3-B of Order XXIII CPC defines a representative suit thus:- “Explanation.- In this rule, “representative suit” means,- (a) a suit under Section 91 or Section 92, (b) a suit under rule 8 of Order I, (c) a suit in which the manager of an undivided Hindu family sues or is sued as representing the other members of the family, (d) any other suit in which the decree passed may, by virtue of the provisions of this Code or of any other law for the time being in force, bind any person who is not named as party to the suit.” The law on the point has been stated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in R. Venugopala Naidu and others v. Venkatarayulu Naidu Charities and others (AIR 1990 SC 444). According to the Apex Court, a representative suit binds not only the parties named in the suit title, but all those who are interested in the suit. It is for that reason that explanation VI to Section 11 of the Code constructively bars by res judicata the entire body of interested persons from re- agitating the matters directly and substantially in issue in an earlier suit under Section 92 of the Code.

26. A representative action or class action is comprised mainly under Sections 91, 92 and also under Order I, Rule 8 [2025:RJ-JP:21135] (20 of 23) [CMA-612/202 of the Code. Section 91 deals with a suit instituted by the Advocate General or with the leave of the court, by two or more persons, seeking reliefs of declaration or injunction or such other relief, in the case of a public nuisance or other wrongful act affecting, or likely to affect the public. Sub- clause (2) to Section 91 makes it clear that such a suit will lie even independently also. Both the suits under Sections 91(1) (b) and 92 CPC can be instituted only after obtaining leave of the court. These can generally be described as representative action. But there are difference in the procedure to be followed in both these types of actions on the one hand and the one under Order I, Rule 8 CPC on the other. From the wordings of Section 91(1)(b) and Section 92 itself it is evident that in the case of a suit filed under the provisions, leave of the court is a pre-condition for institution. In other words, the plaintiffs should first move the court with an application seeking leave and that application should precede the institution of the suit meaning that, prior to the grant of the leave, there cannot be any valid suit, that the court cannot pass interim orders in the suit before granting leave.

27. Counsel appearing for the appellants/ plaintiffs also submitted that the inquiry and further proceedings by the State Authorities is based on the order dated 16.02.2018 passed by the Sub Divisional Officer-II, Sanganer, Jaipur, whereby he has issued directions for ‘patthargadi’ after [2025:RJ-JP:21135] (21 of 23) [CMA-612/202 demarcation of the land of the respondent/ defendant No.7 Saroj Devi. He submitted that since the effect and operation of the order dated 16.02.2018 has been stayed by the High Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12237/2023, any kind of removal of road in furtherance of the said demarcation and inquiry after the interim order of the High Court is not sustainable or would be illegal.

28. The respondent / defendant No.7 Saroj Devi when came to know that the road is being constructed over her khatedari land, she immediately approached for demarcation of ‘Patthargadi’ of her land. On her application, the Sub Divisional Officer-II, Sanganer, Jaipur, vide order dated

16.02.2018 passed an order for demarcation and ‘Patthargadi’. In compliance of the order dated 16.02.2018, the demarcation and ‘Patthargadi’ proceedings were completed on 27.05.2024 and thereafter the inquiry proceedings were initiated as regards the illegal construction of the road by the Gram Panchayat and the Panchayat Samiti, Sanganer, issued the order dated 07.06.2024 holding certain persons as guilty and further ordered for recovery of the money.

29. The High Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12237/2023 has passed an interim order dated 12.08.2024 in clear words that the implementation of the judgment dated [2025:RJ-JP:21135] (22 of 23) [CMA-612/202

16.02.2018 shall remain stayed if has not been implemented.

30. Since the order dated 16.02.2018 was implemented and was given effect and further the inquiry was also concluded prior to passing of this interim order, it would not have any kind of effect over the proceedings conducted pursuant to the order dated 16.02.2018.

31. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the Court is of the firm opinion that the appellants/ plaintiffs have no prima facie in their favour for seeking any kind of temporary injunction.

32. Looking to the facts and the observations of this Court in the above paras, the balance of convenience also does not lie in favour of the appellants/ plaintiffs.

33. Since no prima facie case is made out in favour of the appellants/ plaintiffs and further as per the evidence available on the record, there are three other alternative public ways apart from the said land, no irreparable loss would be caused to the appellants/ plaintiffs if they are not allowed to pass through the land in question or the road which has been illegal construction, is demolished.

34. In view of the discussion made above, this Court finds no illegality or perversity in the impugned order passed by the court below. [2025:RJ-JP:21135] (23 of 23) [CMA-612/202

35. Accordingly, the misc. appeal filed by the appellants/ plaintiffs is bereft of merit and is dismissed.

36. Since the main appeal has been dismissed, the stay application and the pending application(s), if any also stand dismissed. (GANESH RAM MEENA),J Sharma NK/ Dy. Registrar