HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Second Appeal No v. Om Prakash Mochi s/o

: Mr. M. K. Dhakar on behalf of Mr. R. A. Katta For Respondent(s) : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANEESH SHARMA 09/07/2025 Order

1. The present second appeal has been filed by the defendants/appellants under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, against the judgment and decree dated 28.07.1999, passed by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge No.8, Jaipur City, in Civil Regular Appeal No.303/1996, whereby the learned Appellate Court dismissed the appeal preferred by the defendants/appellants against the judgment and decree dated

01.11.1991 in Civil Suit No.816/1988 (693/86) passed by the learned Additional Munsif and Judicial Magistrate No.3, Jaipur City, whereby the learned Court below had decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff/respondent. [2025:RJ-JP:25351] (2 of 6) [CSA-86/2000]

2. Brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiff/respondent-Om Prakash filed a suit for declaration on

30.08.1986, and contended that he was appointed as a Conductor by the respondent-roadways, and during his employment, the appellants/defendants issued order No.155 dated 10.12.1983. Thereby with holding two annual increments and part salary without initiating a proper inquiry. The plaintiff/respondent further asserted that he was not provided with copies of documents, copy of the charge-sheet, and was not accorded a personal hearing. Consequently, he filed a suit challenging the order dated

10.12.1983, on the grounds of violation of principles of natural justice.

3. After service was effected on the defendant/appellant- roadways, their counsel sought time to file a written statement on

19.12.1987. However, despite many opportunities, the defendant/appellant failed to file a written statement therefore, their right to file a written statement was closed on 27.10.1987.

4. Based on the pleadings before it, the learned Trial Court fixed the case for evidence. During the trial, the plaintiff/respondent examined himself as PW-1, and accepted the appointment order (Ex-1) dated 10.12.1983. The appellant examined Suresh Kumar Purohit (DW-1), who produced a copy of the charge-sheet (Ex-1) and a copy of the response given by the plaintiff/respondent to the same as Ex-2.

5. After hearing arguments from both the parties, and considering the evidence available on record. The learned trial Court decreed the suit while holding that the plaintiff/respondent [2025:RJ-JP:25351] (3 of 6) [CSA-86/2000] was not afforded an opportunity to plead his case in the Inquiry proceedings and that necessary documents were not provided to him. The learned Trial Court also considered that despite being granted an opportunity, the defendant/appellant had not filed any written statement to the plaintiff/respondent, and their right to file a written statement was closed on 27.10.2007 Therefore, the learned Trial Court decreed the suit for declaration, declaring the Order No.155 dated 10.12.1983, to be null and void due to the violation of principles of natural justice. However, the learned trial Court granted liberty to the defendant/appellant to initiate a fresh inquiry if desired. The suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent was decreed vide judgment and decree dated 01.11.1991.

6. Aggrieved by this judgment and decree, defendant/appellant preferred a regular civil appeal under Order 41 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Appellate Court, after considering the facts and the objections raised by the defendant/appellant, and also considering the judgments cited, held that the plaintiff/respondent had both the option either to approach the Industrial Tribunal or to approach the Civil Court to assail the order dated 10.12.1983. The learned Appellate Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order dated 01.11.1991. Feeling aggrieved by these findings, the defendant/appellant preferred the instant second appeal.

7. This second appeal was admitted on 22.03.2006, upon framing of the following substantial question of law: "Whether the controversy involved in the matter is an Industrial Dispute and the Civil Court did not have any [2025:RJ-JP:25351] (4 of 6) [CSA-86/2000] jurisdiction to hear the present matter?."

8. During the pendency of this second appeal, vide order dated

11.08.2008, it was noted that the controversy involved in the present matter had already been referred to a larger Bench by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Anr. Vs. Bal Mukund Bairwa", reported in 2009 (4) SCC 299. Therefore, the hearing of the second appeal was postponed until the judgment of larger Bench was pronounced.

9. The question of law formulated by this Court dated

22.03.2006, has since been answered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Bal Mukund Bairwa (supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the paragraphs 37 and 38 of its judgment, held as under: "37. If the infringement of Standing Order or other provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act are alleged, the civil court's jurisdiction may be held to be barred but if the suit is based on the violation of principles of common law or constitutional provisions or on other grounds, the civil court's jurisdiction may not be held to be barred. If no right is claimed under a special statute in terms whereof the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred, the civil court will have jurisdiction.

38. Where relationship between the parties as employer and employee is contractual, right to enforce the contract of service depending on personal volition of an employer, is prohibited in terms of [2025:RJ-JP:25351] (5 of 6) [CSA-86/2000] Section 14(1)(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. It has, however, four exceptions, namely, (1) when an employee enjoys a status, i.e., his conditions of service are governed by the rules framed under the proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India or a statute and would otherwise be governed by Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India; (2) where the conditions of service are governed by statute or statutory Regulation and in the event mandatory provisions thereof have been breached; (3) when the service of the employee is otherwise protected by a statute; and (4) where a right is claimed under the Industrial Disputes Act or sister laws, termination of service having been effected in breach of the provisions thereof."

10. If we examine the facts of the case, in light of the pronouncement passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bal Mukund Bairwa (supra), we find that the present suit was filed under the general law for violation of principles of natural justice. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Civil Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The argument concerning jurisdiction raised in this appeal is consequently settled by the verdict of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The learned counsel for the appellant failed to draw any infirmity in the impugned judgment and decree.

11. Furthermore, a bare perusal to the impugned judgment and decree reveals that the learned trial Court, after declaring the order dated 10.12.1983, as null and void, had granted liberty to the appellant to initiate a fresh inquiry if desired. However, the appellant has not placed any documents on record to substantiate [2025:RJ-JP:25351] (6 of 6) [CSA-86/2000] whether any subsequent inquiry was initiated or concluded against the plaintiff-respondent after the decision of the learned trial Court.

12. From the record of the case, it is also revealed that the suit was filed back in on 30.08.1986 and the plaintiff-respondent might have retired by now. Thus, taking into consideration the totality of facts and circumstances, especially the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the substantial question of law formulated is answered in favour of the plaintiff-respondent.

13. The present second appeal fails and the same is hereby dismissed, and the pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of. Seema/6 (MANEESH SHARMA),J