The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Committee of Raghunatpur Nafar Academy and others

: Mr. Hanish Khan For Respondent(s) : Mr. Praveen Kumar Jain HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANEESH SHARMA 24/07/2025 Order

1. The present appeal has been filed on behalf of the claimant/ appellant under Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, against the award dated 30.03.2012 passed by learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kishangarhbas, District Alwar in Motor Accident Claims No.199/2008, whereby the learned Tribunal has dismissed the claim petition filed by the claimant/appellant.

2. The present appeal has been filed on behalf of the claimant/ appellant after an inordinate delay of 437 days.

3. The submission of learned counsel for the appellant is that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause as narrated in the application for condonation of delay, therefore, the application for condonation of delay may kindly be allowed and 437 days in filing the present appeal may kindly be condoned. [2025:RJ-JP:27641] (2 of 4) [CMA-3685/2013]

4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposes the said submissions and submits that no sufficient explanation has been given by the appellant. He further submits that no documentary proof with regard to illness has been filed and in absence of the same, the present application cannot be accepted and accordingly, prayed for dismissal of the same.

5. Heard on application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay.

6. A bare perusal to the application for condonation of delay, it is revealed that the appellant has submitted that due to his illness, he could not file the present appeal in time, however, in the entire application, the nature of illness is not described further the appellant has failed to produce any supportive documents i.e. medical prescriptions, medical certificate, medical report etc regarding intervening period of 437 days. To substantiate the alleged ground for condonation of delay and in absence of such documentary evidence, a bald statement about the alleged illness cannot be accepted to condone inordinate delay of 437 days.

8. Apart from this, it is evident from the record that the claim petition of the claimant/appellant was dismissed vide order dated

30.03.2012 and the copy of the same was received by the appel- lant on 17.04.2012 and the present appeal has been filed on

09.09.2013 without any justified reason, further the reason nar- rated in the application for condonation of delay is quite vague and general in nature and not based on any sufficient cause duly supported by documentary proof, therefore, in my considered [2025:RJ-JP:27641] (3 of 4) [CMA-3685/2013] opinion, I find no justifiable reason for condoning the delay of 437 days in filing the miscellaneous appeal.

9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in " Esha Bhattacharjee v. Committee of Raghunatpur Nafar Academy and others " re- ported in [(2013) 12 SCC 649] held as under: "21.8 (viii) There is a distinction be- tween inordinate delay and a delay of short duration of a few days, for the former doctrine of prejudice is at- tracted, whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants a strict approach, whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

21.9 (ix) The conduct, behaviour, and attitude of a party relating to its inac- tion or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties, and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of a liberal approach"

10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Go. v. The Employees State Insurance Corpora- tion, reported in (1971) 2 SCC 860", has held as under: "That law does not assist a person who is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them when chal- lenged or disputed to remain dormant without asserting them in a Court of law. The principle which forms the ba- sis of this rule is expressed in the maximum vigilantibus, non dermien- tibus, jura subveniunt (the laws give help to those who are watchful and not to those who sleep). Therefore, the object of the statutes of limita- tions is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time as also to discourage and sup- press stale, fake or fraudulent claims." [2025:RJ-JP:27641] (4 of 4) [CMA-3685/2013] - 11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of " Rajneesh Ku mar & Anr. vs. Ved Prakash " reported in 2024 0 Supreme (SC) 1101, has held as under: It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advo- cate who was appearing for the peti- tioners in the trial court. We have no- ticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and care- lessness in attending the proceedings before the court. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to con- done long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial pro- ceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advo- cate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief.

12. In view of the above legal proposition of law and facts stated above, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay is hereby dismissed for want of any sufficient cause mentioned in the application.

13. Accordingly, the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act is dismissed as being devoid of merits.

14. The present civil miscellaneous appeal has also been dis- missed.

15. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of. DEEPA-26 (MANEESH SHARMA),J