HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No v. 1. The Board of Revenue, Rajasthan, Ajmer. 2. The Revenue Appellate Authority, Sawai Madhopur

: Mr. Nirbhay Tiwari with Mr. Ashwani Bhargava for Mr. Manu Bhargava For Respondent(s) : Mr. Neeraj Batra, GC Mr. Rahul Lodha, AGC HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AVNEESH JHINGAN 20/01/2025 Order

1. This petition is filed seeking quashing of order dated

07.05.1957 passed by the District Collector (for short ‘ the D.C.’), Sawai Madhopur and orders dated 12.01.2000 dismissing the [2025:RJ-JP:2743] (2 of 5) [CW-3265/2008] appeal as time barrred and 18.03.2006 of the Board of Revenue (for short ‘the Board’) dismissing second appeal.

2. The brief facts are that the land situated in Khasra No. 175/351 Rakba 44 Bigha was entered in the name of Mehmood Haq in the revenue records. Shri Abdulla Khan the father of the petitioner No.1 and grandfather of the petitioner No.2 purchased the land in two portions. On half of land-in-question purchased on

05.01.1955 and second half on 01.01.1958. The D.C. vide order dated 07.05.1957 ordered that the land in question be recorded in the name of the Forest Department. The appeal filed by the petitioner on 13.01.1994 challenging the order of the D.C. accompanied by an application for condoning the delay of thirty seven years was dismissed by the Revenue Appellate Authority (for short ‘the RAA’) as time barred. The order of the RAA was upheld in appeal by the Board hence, the present petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the order passed by the D.C. came to knowledge of the petitioners in the year 1994 and the appeal was filed thereafter.

4. As per contra, the petitioners had not filed the copy of the impugned order dated 07.05.1957 either in appeal or in writ. The contention is that while issuing notice of motion on 30.07.2008, the learned counsel for the petitioner was directed to place the documents on record alongwith affidavits but needful has not been done for last sixteen years. It is argued that apart from bald statement being made of gaining knowledge of order of the D.C. in 1994, no details have been mentioned that as to how the petitioner gained knowledge. [2025:RJ-JP:2743] (3 of 5) [CW-3265/2008]

5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings.

6. From the perusal of the order dated 30.07.2008, it is evident that petitioner took a stand that as per communication dated

02.08.1984 received from the Tehsildar there was no order dated

07.05.1957 available on record. The counsel was directed to place the document on record but till date no document has been placed on record.

7. The law is well settled that a liberal approach be adopted for condoning the delay but a strict approach is to be adopted where the delay is inordinate. The Supreme Court in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and Anr. reported in 2010 (5) SCC 459 held:- “We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the [2025:RJ-JP:2743] (4 of 5) [CW-3265/2008] delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. The expression "sufficient cause" employed in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice. Although, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate.” (emphasis)

8. The challenge in the appeal was to the D.C. order dated

05.05.1957 and the copy of the order which was sought to be quashed in the appeal was not attached with the appeal.

9. Apart from making a bald statement that the petitioner gained knowledge of the order of the D.C. in the year 1994, no details are pleaded substantiating that the petitioner gained knowledge of the order in the year 1994.

10. It would be appropriate to note that while arguing the matter on 30.07.2008, learned counsel for the petitioners stated that in a communication of the Tehsildar dated 02.08.1984, it was stated that there is no order dated 07.05.1957 available on record. The [2025:RJ-JP:2743] (5 of 5) [CW-3265/2008] contention is in contradiction to the stand taken that in 1994, the petitioners gained knowledge of the order of D.C.

11. There is an another angle to be considered that half of the portion of the land-in-question was purchased by Shri Abdulla Khan on 01.01.1958 i.e. after passing order of the D.C. directing recording of the land as forest land, this fact brings down the plea on the face of it. In other words Shri Abdulla Khan was aware of the land being forest land and yet he purchased it.

12. There is no factual or legal error in the impugned order in dismissal of the appeal as time barred.

13. The writ petition is dismissed. (AVNEESH JHINGAN),J RIYA/40 Whether Reportable : Yes