Ramchandra Ji Ki, Ramganj Bazar, Jaipur v. Sabeela Khatoon Wife Of

Judgment

1. Sabeela Khatoon Wife Of Shri Gulam Rasool, Resident Of House No. 2754-A, Mohall Chabuk Sawaran, Chokadi Ramchandra Ji Ki, Ramganj Bazar, Jaipur Through Her Legal Representative. 1/1. Gulam Rasool Khan S/o Shri Muneer Khan, (Died During Pendency Of Eviction Application) 1/1/1. Mohammad Iqbal Khan S/o Shri Gulam Rasool Khan, Resident Of House No. 3940-A, Neendar Rao Ji Ka Rasta, Nageene Walon Ka Mohalla, Near Chistiyan Manzil, Jaipur (Rajasthan) 1/1/2. Mohammad Yusuf Khan S/o Shri Gulam Rasool Khan, Resident Of House No. 3940-A, Neendar Rao Ji Ka Rasta, Nageene Walon Ka Mohalla, Near Chistiyan Manzil, Jaipur (Rajasthan)

1/1/3. Rahan D/o Shri Gulam Rasool Khan, Resident Of House No. 3940-A, Neendar Rao Ji Ka Rasta, Nageene Walon Ka Mohalla, Near Chistiyan Manzil, Jaipur (Rajasthan) 1/1/4. Rizwana D/o Shri Gulam Rasool Khan, Resident Of House No. 3940-A, Neendar Rao Ji Ka Rasta, Nageene Walon Ka Mohalla, Near Chistiyan Manzil, Jaipur (Rajasthan) 1/1/5. Rukshana D/o Shri Gulam Rasool Khan, Resident Of House No. 3940-A, Neendar Rao Ji Ka Rasta, Nageene Walon Ka Mohalla, Near Chistiyan Manzil, Jaipur (Rajasthan) ----Landlords/Eviction Petitioners/Non-Petitioners For Petitioner(s) : Mr. H.V. Nandwana with Mr. Prem Chand Sharma For Respondent(s) : Mr. R.K. Daga with Ms. Khushi Kabra Ms. Laveena Agarwal Mr. Pankaj Soni and [2025:RJ-JP:11323] (2 of 10) [CW-719/2020] Mr. Rahul Chauhan HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MAHENDAR KUMAR GOYAL 11/03/2025 Order This writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order dated 30.11.2019 passed by the learned Rent Tribunal, Jaipur (for brevity, “learned Rent Tribunal”) in rent application No.688/2015 whereby, an application filed by the respondents/applicants (for brevity, “applicants”) under Order 6 Rule 17 and Section 151 CPC and read with Section 21 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 (for brevity, “the Act of 2001”), has been allowed. The relevant facts in brief are that Sabeela Khatoon- predecessor-in-interest of the applicants, filed an application against the petitioner/non-applicant/tenant (for brevity, “non- applicant”) under Section 9 of the Act of 2001 seeking eviction from the suit premises on the grounds, inter alia, her reasonable and bona fide necessity. During its pendency, she expired whereupon, her legal representatives were taken on record. After their impleadment, they filed an application as aforesaid which came to be allowed by the learned Rent Tribunal vide order impugned dated 30.11.2019. At the threshold, learned counsel for the applicants submits that he does not press their application except to the extent the amendment pertains to their reasonable and bona fide necessity for the suit premises. [2025:RJ-JP:11323] (3 of 10) [CW-719/2020] Assailing the order, learned counsel for the non-applicant submits that the order is non-speaking one inasmuch as it does not assign any reason for allowing the application. He further submits that although, issues were framed on 05.08.2004, Sabeela Khatun had expired way back in the year 2009, the applicants had filed the application as late as in the month of August, 2009 and therefore, is hit by the proviso of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC. He, in support of his submissions relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of M. Revanna vs. Anjanamma and Others: 2019 SCC 332. He, therefore, prays that the writ petition be allowed, the order impugned dated 30.11.2019 be quashed and set aside and the application filed by the applicants be dismissed. Per contra, learned counsel for the applicants submits that although, Sabeela Khatoon had expired in the year 2009 but, after allowing their application filed under Order 22 Rule 3 CPC, the amended cause title was taken on record vide order dated

25.09.2018 and therefore, there was no delay on their part in filing the subject application. He submits that evidence of the parties was yet to begin when the application was allowed. Learned counsel further submits that since, in the rent application, the reasonable and bona fide need only of Sabeela Khatoon was pleaded and the need of the premises for her family continued even after her death, the amendment was necessitated. He, in support of his submissions, relies upon a co-ordinate Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Kedar Nath Methi vs. Mitthal: 2009(1) WLC Rajasthan 400. He, therefore, prays that the writ petition be dismissed. [2025:RJ-JP:11323] (4 of 10) [CW-719/2020] Heard. Considered. The application filed by the applicants seeking amendment in the memo of the original application was allowed by the learned Rent Tribunal vide order dated 30.11.2019 on the premise that the amendment appeared to be relevant for just and effective disposal of the controversy involved in the matter and evidence of the parties was yet to begin. As already observed, learned counsel for the applicants has not pressed their application qua other amendments except the amendment pertaining to the ground of reasonable and bona fide necessity. Indisputably, after framing of the issues and before the evidence could begin, the applicant- Sabeela Khatoon has expired. In the rent application filed by her, only her reasonable and bona fide necessity was pleaded. After her death, the applicants came to be impleaded as her legal representatives and they sought to introduce, by way of amendment, their reasonable and bona fide necessity for the rented premises. Indisputably, they could bring a fresh application on this count. A coordinate Bench of this Court has, in almost identical factual context, in the case of Kedar Nath Methi (supra), held as under: “9. In Pradeep Kumar Paliwal Vs. LRs. of Mithan Lal and another: 2008 (1) DNJ (Raj) 68, this Court in similar circumstances allowed the amendment in the plaint Para 9 of the judgment is reproduced as under: “When a fresh petition can be filed by the party to the suit, than normally the suit or the petition cannot be [2025:RJ-JP:11323] (5 of 10) [CW-719/2020] dismissed on the ground that fresh petition or suit be filed in that situation, normally amendments are allowed to avoid the multiplicity proceedings. In view of the above reasons also, after the the original death of applicant, if the cause accrued in favor of the successor or hairs or deceased for seeking same relief against the same party, then the amendment can be allowed and, therefore that was rightly allowed by the Rent Tribunal.”

10. In Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal and Ors. Vs. K.K. Modi and Ors.: (2006) 4 SCC 385, Hon’ble Supreme Court held the courts should allow all amendments that may be necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the parties, provided it does not cause injustice or prejudice to the other side. Para 17 of the judgment is reproduced as under : “In our view, since the cause of action arose during the the suit pendency of proposed amendment ought to have been granted because the basic structure of the suit has not changed and that there was merely change in the nature of relief claimed. We understand permissible appellants file an independent suit, why the same relief which could be [2025:RJ-JP:11323] (6 of 10) [CW-719/2020] prayed for in the new suit cannot be permitted to be incorporated in the pending suit.”

11. In Usha Balasaheb Swami and Ors. Vs. Kiran Appaso Swami and Ors.: (2007) 5 SCC 602, the Hon’ble Apex Court while interpreting the provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, held that from a bare perusal of Order 6 Rule 17, it is clear that the court is conferred with power, at any stage of the proceedings, to allow alteration and amendments of the pleadings if it is of the view that such amendments may be necessary for determining the real question in controversy between the parties. The courts should be liberal in granting the prayer for amendment of pleadings unless serious injustice or irreparable loss is caused to the other side or on the ground that the prayer for amendment was not a bona fide one. Para 17 and 18 of the above judgment are reproduced as under : “17. From a bare perusal of Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is clear that the court is conferred with power, at any stage of the proceedings, to allow alteration and amendment of the pleadings if it is of the view that such amendments may be necessary for determining in controversy question between the parties. The proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code, however, provides that no application for [2025:RJ-JP:11323] (7 of 10) [CW-719/2020] amendment shall be allowed commenced unless the court comes to a conclusion that in a spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of trial. However, proviso to Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code would not be applicable in the present case, as the trial of the suit has not yet commenced.

18. It is now well settled by various decisions of this Court as well as those by the High Courts that the courts should be liberal in granting the prayer for amendment of pleadings unless serious injustice or irreparable loss is caused to the other side or on the ground that the prayer for amendment was not a bona fide one. In this connection, the observation of the Privy Council in Ma Shwe Mva V. Maung Mo Hnaung may be taken note of. The Privy Council observed : “All rules of court are nothing but provisions intended to secure proper administration of justice, and it is therefore essential that there should be made to serve and be subordinate to that purpose so that full powers of amendment must be enjoyed and should always be liberally exercised but nonetheless no power has yet been given to enable one distinct cause of action [2025:RJ-JP:11323] (8 of 10) [CW-719/2020] to be substituted for another nor to change by means of amendment, the subject- matter of the suit.”

13. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, there is no dispute in between both the parties that present suit for eviction was filed way back in the year 1998 by sole- plaintiff Mithan Lal. The suit remained pending for about 8 Years when Mithan Lal died in December 2006. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal’s case (supra) has categorically held that we fail to understand if it is permissible for the appellants to file an independent suit, why the same relief which could be prayed or in the new suit cannot be permitted to be incorporated in the pending suit. (Emphasis mine)

14. In view of above discussion, I do no find any force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. I do not find any illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error in the impugned order so as to interfere with the same while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. There is no merit in this writ petition and the same is, accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs. “ Thus, in the aforesaid judgment, a challenge to the order passed by the learned trial Court allowing an application filed by the legal representatives of deceased landlord seeking to [2025:RJ-JP:11323] (9 of 10) [CW-719/2020] introduce their reasonable and bona fide necessity after the death of the landlord, was negated by this Court on the premise, inter alia, that since, the legal representatives could have brought another suit on this ground, the amendment deserved to be allowed to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. In the instant case as well, similar facts obtain and in view thereof, in the considered opinion of this Court, the learned Rent Tribunal did not err in allowing the application filed by the applicants. This Court finds no substance in the submissions raised by the learned counsel for the non-applicant. Although, the learned Rent Tribunal has not referred the facts of the case in the order impugned dated 30.11.2019 but, for the reasons stated hereinabove, this Court does not find it proper to interfere in the same. Further, this Court is in respectful agreement with the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of M Revanna (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the non- applicant wherein, it was held that amendment in pleadings should not be allowed once the trial has commenced unless the Court comes to the conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before the commencement of the trial. However, in the same breath, their Lordship also held that normally, amendments are allowed in the pleadings to avoid multiplicity of litigation and the Courts are required to examine whether the application for amendment is bona fide or mala fide. However, in the instant case, the same is of little assistance to [2025:RJ-JP:11323] (10 of 10) [CW-719/2020] him. As already held, the original landlord Sabeela Khatoon has expired after framing of the issues and the application seeking amendment has been allowed by the learned Rent Tribunal before evidence of the parties could begin. It is noteworthy that pursuant to the order allowing the application filed under Order 22 Rule 3 CPC, the amended cause title impleading applicants was taken on record by the learned Rent Tribunal vide order dated 25.09.2018 and thereafter, there was not much delay in filing the application. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no such illegality of perversity in the order impugned so as to warrant interference under its limited supervisory jurisdiction vide Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Resultantly, this writ petition is dismissed being devoid of merit. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of accordingly. GAURAV/81 (MAHENDAR KUMAR GOYAL),J