State of Rajasthan v. Raghunathgarh, District Sikar

: Mr. Jeetendra Singh Rathore, P.P. For Respondent(s) : Mr. Tanmay Dhand with Mr. Suraj K. Dixit HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AVNEESH JHINGAN HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BALJINDER SINGH SANDHU Judgment 13/08/2025 AVNEESH JHINGAN, J:

1. The State of Rajasthan is in appeal against the judgment dated 31.10.2002 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track, Sikar in Sessions case No.09/2002 acquitting the accused-respondents for the offences under Sections 302/34 and 201 IPC.

2. The facts as per the prosecution are that on complaint dated

25.10.2001 given by Bodu Singh- father of deceased (hereinafter referred to as ‘complainant’), FIR No.197/2001 was registered at Police Station Raghunathgarh, District Sikar under Sections 302, 201 & 34 IPC. The complainant stated that his son Vikram Singh (hereinafter referred to as ‘deceased’) was in relationship with Jamna Kanwar (respondent No.1) resident of the same village. [2025:RJ-JP:31668-DB] (2 of 7) [CRLA-554/2003] She was also having relationship with Dalip Singh, Gopal Singh and Raghuveer Singh- respondent Nos.2 to 4 respectively (hereinafter referred to as ‘respondents’). Respondents had thrice altercation with the deceased threatening him not to visit respondent No.1. In the evening of 11.10.2001, the complainant went to the house of respondent No.1 to bring deceased back, who refused to do so. As per the allegations, respondent Nos.1 to 4 killed the deceased on the night of 11.10.2001 and took the dead body in Jeep bearing registration number RJ-21C-4116 and hid it. On the basis of complaint, an FIR was registered. The respondents were arrested and at their instance four lathis including three having blood stains were recovered. After filing of the chargesheet, charges were framed u/s 302 & 201 read with Section 34 IPC. The prosecution examined twenty three witnesses and exhibited thirty four documents. In the statement recorded u/s 313 Cr.P.C., the respondents claimed it to be a case of false implication and respondent No.1 denied having relationship with the deceased. In defence, eighteen documents were exhibited. The trial Court considering the facts and appreciating the evidence adduced acquitted the respondents. Hence, the present appeal.

3. During pendency of the appeal, respondent No.3- Gopal Singh died and appeal qua him was abated.

4. Learned Public Prosecutor contends that the deposition of PW-17 Bodu Singh (complainant) and the recovery of blood stained lathis at the instance of respondent Nos.1 to 4 proved that the deceased was killed by them and thereafter, body was thrown in river. Further reliance is placed upon Ex.P.30 notice issued u/s 133 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 to contend that the owner of [2025:RJ-JP:31668-DB] (3 of 7) [CRLA-554/2003] the jeep used in the incident replied that on the day of incident, the jeep was in possession of Dalip Singh (respondent No.2).

5. Learned counsel for the respondents defends the impugned judgment and contends that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.

6. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record with their able assistance.

7. The FIR was registered on the complaint dated 25.10.2001. The alleged incident is of 11.10.2001. The dead body of the deceased was recovered from the river side on 28.10.2001. The cause of death was not determined in the postmortem report and it was mentioned that there were external injury marks on the body.

8. It would be apposite to note that recovery of one lathi at the instance of respondent No.1- Jamna Kanwar had no blood stains and three lathis recovered at the instance of respondent Nos.2 to 4 had blood stains but as per the FSL report, the sample was inconclusive. Similar was the position of the blood stained soil sample taken from the house of Jamna Kanwar- respondent No.1.

9. Another aspect is that one of the witnesses to the recovery of blood stained soil deposed that the soil sample having residue like pan spat on it, was sealed. In other words, the recovery of the blood stained soil sample from the house of respondent No.1 Jamna Kanwar was doubtful.

10. The law is well settled that for conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence, the chain is to be completed and a missing link shall prove fatal to the case of prosecution. Reference be made to the decision of Supreme Court in Sharad [2025:RJ-JP:31668-DB] (4 of 7) [CRLA-554/2003] Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116, wherein it was held: “152. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra 1973CriLJ1783 where the following observations were made: Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a Court can convict, and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 153. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.” [2025:RJ-JP:31668-DB] (5 of 7) [CRLA-554/2003]

11. In the case in hand apart from the complainant having met his son on evening of 11.10.2001 at the house of respondent No.1 and the evidence that the jeep bearing registration No.RJ-21-C- 4116 on 11.10.2001 was in possession of Dalip Singh. No evidence worth acceptance completing the chain of circumstances connecting the accused with the body recovered of the deceased was produced.

12. Another angle to be considered is that as per the testimony of the complainant, the deceased was killed at the house of respondent No.1- Jamna Kanwar by inflicting lathi blows. The basis of testimony was eroded by the PMR wherein, it was stated that there were no external injury marks on the dead body of the deceased.

13. The scope of interference in the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar Vs. State of Karnataka reported in [(2024) 8 SCC 149] held:- “40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 Cr.PC as follows: “8. xxx xxx xxx 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to re-appreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, [2025:RJ-JP:31668-DB] (6 of 7) [CRLA-554/2003] after re-appreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”

41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:

41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

14. The well reasoned judgment of acquittal passed after appreciating the evidence and considering the facts suffers from no factual or legal error much less perversity calling for interference by this Court. The view taken by the trial Court is plausible one. [2025:RJ-JP:31668-DB] (7 of 7) [CRLA-554/2003]

15. The appeal is dismissed. (BALJINDER SINGH SANDHU),J (AVNEESH JHINGAN),J Simple Kumawat/29 Whether Reportable: Yes/No