CHANDIGARH I. RSA No. 4175 of 2025 25(O&M) Anil Kumar Amrik Singh & Ors. v. II. RSA No. 4231 of 2025 ( 25 (O&M) Parveen Rani Amrik & Ors.

PTA N’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA Mr. Piyush Setia, Advocate Argued by:- Mr. For the appellant in RSA 4175 of 202 For t f 2025. Mr. Rajesh Narang, Advocate and Mr. Mr. Mr. Abhinav Narang, Advocate 25. For appellant in RSA 4231 of 2025. For a Mr. Mr. Sandeep Jasuja, Advocate For the respondents. For t DEEPAK GUPTA, TA, J. This order shall dispose of two Re This o Regular Second Appeals, as both arise out of the the same judgment & decree da e dated 11.09.2025 passed by the learned First App Appellate Court, whereby the suit f uit filed by the plaintiffs for recover of damages/com compensation was decreed, after r ter reversing the dismissal recorded by the learned t ed trial Court on 27.07.2023. For For the sake of clarity, parties ar s are referred to as pe s per their status before the trial Co l Court. YOGESH MEHTA 2026.02.16 14:36 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page N: 1 of 5 Pages RSA Nos. 4175 & 423 4231 of 2025

Trial court record called & perused. Trial sed. To avoid confusion, parties sha be referred as pe urt. s per their status before trial court.

The admitted factual position is The is that the plaintiffs purchased agricultural land and measuring 66 kanals 18 marlas 2012 s vide sale deed dated 12.03.2012 and further land and measuring 112 kanals vide sale 2012 sale deed No.303 dated 27.08.2012 from their respe espective vendors. It is equally u lly undisputed that at the time o e of purchase, the de e defendants were in possession of n of the suit land. The grievance o ce of the plaintiffs w s was that despite having purch urchased the land for a valuabl consideration, th n, they were unable to enjoy posses rs on ssession thereof for several years on account of the d e defendants’ continued occupatio ation and the pendency of litigation initiated at their heir instance. Possession was ultim

ultimately delivered on 22.01.2018 Alleging that the they had been wrongfully deprived ltural rived of cultivating their agricultura land and had thu thus suffered financial loss, the pla plaintiffs instituted the present sui t suit on 19.03.2019 se 9 seeking compensation along with ith interest.

The defendants contested the suit p The t the uit primarily on the ground that the Civil Court lacke acked jurisdiction in view of Sect Sections 14 and 77 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 188 , 1887, the dispute being one relati ltural elating to occupation of agricultura land and recove covery of money for use and occ occupation thereof. It was furthe pleaded that eve ven otherwise the claim was ba s barred by limitation as prescribed under Section 77 n 77(5) of the Act.

Upon framing of issues and appreci Upo rties, reciation of evidence led by parties the learned tria trial Court held that the claim laim, in substance, was one fo compensation fo n for use and occupation of ag s in f agricultural land by persons in unauthorized pos possession. Relying upon Section 1 Third ion 14 read with Section 77(3), Third Group clause (n) (n) of the Punjab Tenancy Act, it w it was concluded that such a claim i im is exclusively triabl riable by the Revenue Court and t nd that the jurisdiction of the Civ Civil Court is express ressly barred. The trial Court al t also noticed that the limitation prescribed for su r such a claim before the Revenue nue Court is one year and observed that even on tha that count the claim appeared to ntly, d to be time-barred. Consequently the suit was dism dismissed. YOGESH MEHTA 2026.02.16 14:36 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page N: 2 of 5 Pages RSA Nos. 4175 & 423 4231 of 2025

In appeal, the learned First Appella In ap pellate Court reversed the aforesaid finding by observ serving that the plaintiffs were not not claiming batai or share in crop but compensatio sation for monetary loss and me mental harassment. Holding tha Section 77 had b ad been wrongly interpreted by th y the trial Court, it decreed the sui partly and award arded compensation at the rate of e of ₹20,000/- per killa with interes num. @ 6% per annum

Having considered submissions of Havi of learned counsel for the partie and perusing the the record, this Court is of the con considered view that the approach adopted by the the trial Court was in consonance nce with the statutory scheme and binding preceden edent, whereas the First Appellate C te Court misdirected itself in law.

Section 14 of the Punjab Tenan Sect n in nancy Act makes any person in possession of lan f land without the consent of the la e use he landlord liable to pay for the use or occupation o n of that land at the rate of r of rent payable in the precedin agricultural year year, or at such rate as the Court ourt may determine. Section 77(3 77(3) categorically pro provides that the suits mentioned t ed therein shall be instituted in and heard by Revenu venue Courts and that no other Co r Court shall take cognizance of an f any dispute with resp respect to which such suit might b ht be instituted. Third Group clause (n) specifically inc ly includes suits for sums recoverabl rable under Section 14.

The language employed in Section The ion 77(3) is peremptory and create an express bar o ar on the jurisdiction of the Civil Co il Court in respect of matters fallin alling within its ambit. bit. The determinative factor, ther f the therefore, is the true nature of the relief claimed.

A reading of the plaint makes it ev A re it evident that the plaintiffs sough compensation o n on account of their inability to y to cultivate the agricultural land during the period eriod of the defendants’ occupation on. The foundation of the claim i im is deprivation of of use and occupation of agr agricultural land. Though durin arguments, it wa t was suggested that damages wer l and were also claimed for physical and mental loss, the the relief clause does not disclose a se any independent cause of action in tort divorced f ed from the occupation of agricultu ultural land. The claim is intrinsicall ically linked to wrongfu ngful possession and loss of agricult icultural use. YOGESH MEHTA 2026.02.16 14:36 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page N: 3 of 5 Pages RSA Nos. 4175 & 423 4231 of 2025

The question whether a suit for m The for mesne profits or compensation against a person son in unauthorized possession of a y the of agricultural land is triable by the Civil Court is no l no longer res integra. A Division Ben Singh Bench of this Court in Pritam Singh v. Mehal Singh ngh, 1986 RRR 574 has authorita ritatively held that the expression “landlord” in Sec Section 14 must be understood in t in the sense of landowner and tha a suit by an own owner for recovery of mesne prof profits against a person in wrongfu possession is cov covered by Section 14 and conseq nsequently triable exclusively by th y the Revenue Court u rt under Section 77(3)(n). The earl earlier contrary view was expressl overruled. The s he same principle has been reitera iterated in Mandir Maharaj Jagan Nath Puri, Ladw adwa v. Man Singh;S. Palwinder ahib, der Singh Vs. Guru Granth Sahib 2010(11) RCR(Civ R(Civil) 66; and Ram Karan Vs. The Ors. The Financial Commissioner & Ors 1980 PLJ 295.

In view of the above authoritati In v itative pronouncements, the mer characterization ion of the claim as “damages” can cter. cannot alter its essential character What cannot be be done directly cannot be permit rmitted to be achieved indirectly b ly by clever drafting. I ng. If the substance of the claim is m is recovery of money for use and occupation of a of agricultural land, the jurisdict diction of the Civil Court stand excluded.

The learned First Appellate Court, The ourt, urt, while reversing the trial Court did not advert ert to the binding Division Bench ench judgment nor examined the statutory bar in i r in its correct perspective. The reve reversal thus rests on an erroneou understanding of g of the scope of Sections 14 and to a and 77 of the Act and amounts to a substantial misap is application of law.

It m may be observed that the questio estion of jurisdiction under a specia statute, once set settled by binding precedent of a D f a Division Bench, leaves little room for interpretative ative deviation. The Hon’ble Supre upreme Court has repeatedly held that interference ence with concurrent or well-foun founded findings is not warranted unless such find findings are shown to be perve erverse or based on a substantia misapplication of n of law. YOGESH MEHTA 2026.02.16 14:36 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page N: 4 of 5 Pages RSA Nos. 4175 & 423 4231 of 2025

In the present case, the trial Co In t l Court had correctly applied th statutory bar as r as interpreted by binding author thority. The First Appellate Court’ urt’s departure theref erefrom was legally unsustainable. T le. This Court, therefore, has merel restored the posi position in accordance with settled tled law, and no substantial question of law survives be es beyond the jurisdictional issue ad e addressed herein.

For the foregoing reasons, the For judgment and decree dated

11.09.2025 passe assed by the learned First Appellate llate Court cannot be sustained and are hereby set as et aside. The judgment and decree y the ree dated 27.07.2023 passed by the learned trial Cou Court dismissing the suit are rest restored. Both the Regular Second Appeals are acco accordingly allowed. Misc. Applications, if any stand dispo Misc disposed of. (DEEPAK GUPTA) JUDGE

16.02.2026 Jiten Whe Whe hether speaking/reasoned hether reportable : Yes/No : Yes/No Uploaded on : February 16, 2026 Uplo YOGESH MEHTA 2026.02.16 14:36 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page N: 5 of 5 Pages