THE THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB ARH CHANDIGARH NJAB AND HARYANA AT v. **** & Ors.

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJ CORAM: HO HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE MEE HO SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA MEENAKSHI I. MEHTA vocate Mr. Amarjit Singh Virk, Advocate Present: M os.161 & 164 to 168 of 2020. for the appellants in LPA Nos.161 **** Mr. Ivneet Singh Pabla, Advocate M No.161 of 2020 and for the respondents in LPA No.161 and 8 in LPA No.166 of 2020. for respondents No.1, 2, 3, 7 and 8 vocate Mr. Tejpal Singh Dhull, Advocate M for the respondents in LPA No.164 164 of 2020. Mr. R.K. Malik, Senior Advocate M M Mr. Varun Veer Chauhan, Advoca for respondent No.1 in LPA No.16 ocate with dvocate No.165 of 2020. **** SANJEEV PR ral) V PRAKASH SHARMA, J.(Oral)

1. These a ese appeals arise out of the chall challenge to the judgment dated

24.07.20 .07.2018 passed by the Single Judg Judge wherein the learned Single Judge pa dge passed two directions; firstly, th d to tly, the appellants were directed to allow th ow the writ petitioners/respondents dents (herein) to work on contract basis till sis till regular selection is made, and e, and secondly, the writ petitioners MOHIT GOYAL 2025.04.25 11:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document LPA-161-2020 (O 20 (O&M) and connected cases were dire re directed to be granted minimum o r the um of the regular pay scale for the post they st they were working, keeping in view y the in view the judgment passed by the Supreme preme Court in Civil Appeal No.21 o.213 of 2013 titled as ‘State of Punjab a jab and others vs. Jagjit Singh and and others’, 2017 (1) SCC 148.

2. In review review, the learned Single Judge furth ay of e further clarified to re-fix the pay of the writ writ petitioners, keeping in view the w the judgment passed by the Apex Court in urt in Jagjit Singh (supra), and there thereafter pay arrears to them from the date date of their joining. The writ petit titled t petitioners were also held entitled only for ly for payment of minimum of the re the regular pay scale and no other conseque nsequential benefits. The pay was dir as directed to be re-fixed from the date of te of their initial appointment and a and arrears to be paid along with interest @ erest @6% per annum.

3. Against t ainst the said judgment, the National IT), tional Institute of Technology (NIT), Kuruksh rukshetra has filed present appeals bef als before us.

4. Learned arned counsel appearing for the NIT e NIT submits that the order passed by the le the learned Single Judge, so far as d rs to r as directing the writ petitioners to be allow allowed to continue on contract basis ade, t basis till regular selection is made, is not ob not objected to by the NIT. The prese e present appeals are only filed with regard to ard to the directions of granting mini g minimum of the regular pay scale to the wr the writ petitioners.

5. Learned arned counsel submits that the writ pet rit petitioners had applied with open eyes to j es to join as Guest Faculty Teachers achers on contract basis on a fixed salary. T lary. The mode of appointment was ot a t was walk-in interview and not a regular s ular selection method. In view thereto thereto, learned counsel submits that MOHIT GOYAL 2025.04.25 11:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document LPA-161-2020 (O 20 (O&M) and connected cases they wer y were not required to be granted the r pay ted the minimum of the regular pay scale.

6. He furth further submits that there were no p e no pleadings in the writ petitions relating t ating to grant of regular pay scale, an de in ale, and only a prayer was made in the writ writ petitions seeking minimum of d the m of the regular pay scale, and the learned S rned Single Judge ought not have gran e granted the said benefit to them.

7. Per cont contra, learned counsel appearing aring for the respondents submitted that in te t in terms of the judgment passed by sed by the Supreme Court in Jagjit Singh (s h (supra), the law has been sett g on n settled that persons working on contract ntract basis would be at least entitled ntitled to minimum of the pay scale which is ich is available for the post on which t hich they are working.

8. He subm submits that in another case bearin bearing No.LPA-696-2024 titled as National ional Institute of Technology, vs. gy, Kurukshetra, Haryana vs. Minaksh akshi, the Division Bench of this C this Court has passed the following order wh der which would apply to the present c nt case also: “1. Learned counsel for t or the appellant-Institute submits that since the responden ndent in this case was appointed after the date with effect f fect from which the revised pay scales, in terms of the 7th Pay Commission were implemented i.e. 01.01.2016 and and that for the grant of dearness allowance her case wou would be covered in her favour by the Resolution of the Boa Board of Governors of the appellant-Institute, the present appe appeal may be disposed of with the grant of reasonable time to e to the appellant-Institute to comply with the judgment of the le learned Single Judge.

2. In the light of the above st ve statement, as prayed for on behalf of the appellant-Institute, tute, the present appeal is disposed of by granting two mon months to the appellant- MOHIT GOYAL 2025.04.25 11:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document LPA-161-2020 (O 20 (O&M) and connected cases Institute to comply with the judgmen In ment of the learned Single Judge. Ju

3. All pending miscellaneous eous application(s), if any, shall also stands disposed of.” 9. He subm submits that a decision has also also been taken by the Board of Governo vernors, NIT to grant minimum of m of the pay scale plus dearness allowanc owance as admissible for the posts.

10. We have e have considered the submissions.

11. The me he method and manner of appointm /writ pointment of the respondents/writ petitione titioners was different from the metho method and manner of appointment of regula regular Assistant Professors. Howeve t the owever, it cannot be denied that the work and rk and teaching imparted by the writ p writ petitioners is the same as being imparted parted by the Assistant Professors, We appointed on regular basis. We find that d that so far as educational qualifica alifications are concerned, the draft Rules of les of Model Recruitment Rules for es for Faculty of NITs which were framed med in 2011 mentions of one ca ne category of post of Assistant Professo ofessors on contract basis to have educ , e educational qualification M.Tech., while ess essential qualification for Assistan ssistant Professors on regular basis is shown to own to have been Ph.D.

12. We also e also notice from one advertisement d y the ment dated 20.10.2022 issued by the Departm partment of Computer Engineering, N n the ring, NIT, Kurukshetra wherein the required uired qualification for Guest Facult Faculty on contract basis mentions first class st class both at UG and PG level with P Ph.D. l with Ph.D. in relevant branch (Ph.D. degree c gree candidates), or first class both a Tech both at UG and PG level (M.Tech degree ca gree candidates). MOHIT GOYAL 2025.04.25 11:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document LPA-161-2020 (O 20 (O&M) and connected cases

13. We also e also notice that so far as Model Ru is no del Rules are concerned, there is no documen cument placed before us to say that the tified. hat the said Rules have been notified.

14. Be that a e that as it may, we are satisfied that ap Ph.D. that apart from candidates with Ph.D. degree, e gree, even candidates with PG degree ve as egree have been allowed to serve as Assistant sistant Professors on contract basis.

15. The Sup he Supreme Court in the case of Jagji agjit Singh (supra), has discussed at length length the earlier law as laid down by se of wn by the Apex Court in the case of State of e of Haryana v. Jasmer Singh, (19 , (1996) 11 SCC 77, and thereafter proceede oceeded to distinguish the same relyin relying on law as laid down in other judgmen gment passed by the Supreme Court Court in State of Punjab vs. Surjit Singh, ( h, (2009) 9 SCC 514. It also cons v. o considered State of Karnataka v. Umadevi adevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1, to reach to ch to the following conclusion and set aside t aside the judgment passed by the Ful he Full Bench of this Court in Avtar Singh v. h v. State of Punjab & Ors. (CW (CWP no. 14796 of 2003), dated

11.11.201

1.2011, and held as under: “54. There is no room for for any doubt, that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal wo al work’ has emerged from an interpretation of different provisio visions of the Constitution. The principle has been expounded Th through a large number of judgments rendered by this Cour Court, and constitutes law declared by this Court. The same me is binding on all the courts in India, under Article 141 141 of the Constitution of India. The parameters of In he principle, have been the p summarized by us in paragraph aph 42 hereinabove. The principle of ‘equal pay for equal ual work’ has also been extended to temporary employees (d es (differently described as work-charge, daily-wage, casual, ad l, ad-hoc, contractual, and the like). The legal position, relating to temporary MOHIT GOYAL 2025.04.25 11:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document LPA-161-2020 (O 20 (O&M) and connected cases employees, has been summarized b d by us, in paragraph 44 hereinabove. The above legal posi position which has been repeatedly declared, is being reiterat r terated by us, yet again.

55. In our considered view view, it is fallacious to determine artificial parameters to de to deny fruits of labour. An employee engaged for the same wor work, cannot be paid less than another, who performs the same duties and responsibilities. Certainly not, in a n a welfare state. Such an action besides being demeaning, ing, strikes at the very foundation of human dignity. Any on y one, who is compelled to work at a lesser wage, does not do so do so voluntarily. He does so, to provide food and shelter to hi to his family, at the cost of his self respect and dignity, at the the cost of his self worth, and at the cost of his integrity. F y. For he knows, that his dependents would suffer immensely, sely, if he does not accept the lesser wage. Any act, of p f paying less wages, as compared to others similarly situate tuate, constitutes an act of exploitative enslavement, emerging ing out of a domineering position. Undoubtedly, the action is o n is oppressive, suppressive and coercive, as it compels involunta untary subjugation.

57. Having traversed the l he legal parameters with reference to the application of the p the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’, in relation to tempo mporary employees (daily- wage employees, ad-hoc appointees, tees, employees appointed on casual basis, contractual employ ployees and the like), the sole factor that requires our determ termination is, whether the concerned employees (before this C is Court), were rendering similar duties and responsibiliti bilities, as were being discharged regular mployees, holding same/corresponding posts. This exer s exercise would require the application of the parameters of the the principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ summarized by us in us in paragraph 42 above. However, insofar as the instant as Ho t aspect of the matter is concerned, it is not difficult for us r us to record the factual position. We say so, because it was f as fairly acknowledged by MOHIT GOYAL 2025.04.25 11:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document LPA-161-2020 (O 20 (O&M) and connected cases the learned counsel representing the g the State of Punjab, that all the temporary employees in t in the present bunch of appeals, were appointed against p st posts which were also available in the regular cadre/estab establishment. It was also accepted, that during the course of se of their employment, the concerned temporary employees w es were being randomly deputed to discharge duties and res responsibilities, which at some point in time, were assigned ned to regular employees. Likewise, regular employees holdi Li olding substantive posts, were also posted to discharge the sa the same work, which was assigned to temporary employees, fr s, from time to time. There is, therefore, no room for any doub is, doubt, that the duties and responsibilities discharged by the te e temporary employees in the present set of appeals, were th e the same as were being discharged by regular employees. It s. It is not the case of the appellants, that the respondent-emp employees did not possess the qualifications prescribed for ap r appointment on regular basis. Furthermore, it is not the case case of the State, that any of the temporary employees would uld not be entitled to pay parity, on any of the principles les summarized by us in paragraph 42 hereinabove. There ca e can be no doubt, that the principle of ‘equal pay for equal wor work’ would be applicable to all the concerned temporary emp employees, so as to vest in them the right to claim wages, at pa t par with the minimum of the pay-scale of regularly engaged G ed Government employees, holding the same post.”

16. It appea appears that subsequently, another S t has ther Single Bench of this Court has decided cided a bunch of writ petitions w wherein he has relied on the judgmen gment passed by the Single Judge wh ge which is impugned in the present appeals. peals. The said judgment is also ch lso challenged in separate appeals which sh ich shall be dealt with separately w ately while deciding the respective peals. appeals. MOHIT GOYAL 2025.04.25 11:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document LPA-161-2020 (O 20 (O&M) and connected cases

17. One asp ne aspect which remains common mmon with persons appointed on contract ntract basis is that they are appointe The pointed on fixed salary basis. The Supreme preme Court in Jagjit Singh (supra) a) has held that all the persons who are o are working on contract basis and es as s and performing the same duties as regularly ularly appointed persons would be en d be entitled to minimum of the pay scale of t ale of the said post on which they are ar as y are working. Admittedly, so far as the writ p writ petitioners are concerned, they w st of they were all working on the post of Assistant sistant Professors.

18. While w hile we have already examined their their qualifications and found that they too y too were eligible for performing the ssor, ing the duties of Assistant Professor, although hough on contract basis, it cannot be titled not be said that they are not entitled therefore refore to have minimum of the pay The he pay scale of the said post. The learned rned Single Judge in review has has clarified its order and has specifica ecifically directed to grant minimum imum of the pay scale and no other conseque nsequential benefits.

19. In view view thereto, we do not find any reas ns of y reason to accept the contentions of the coun counsel for the appellants that the re s are t the respondents/writ petitioners are not entitl t entitled to the relief as granted by the by the Single Judge.

20. So far a far as granting of prayer is concerne ncerned, it is now settled law as laid down by by Hon’ble the Supreme Court vs. ourt in J.Ganapatha and others vs. M/s N. S N. Selvarajalou Chetty Trust and and others, 2025 INSC 395, that even if th en if there is no specific prayer made urt is made in a writ petition, the Court is not preve t prevented from granting full relief fo lief for advancement of dispensation of justi justice. Pleadings in writ petitions are y are are not to be specific as they are MOHIT GOYAL 2025.04.25 11:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document LPA-161-2020 (O 20 (O&M) and connected cases to be exa be examined differently from pleading leadings in a civil case. In fact, latter petition tition can be entertained. However, s s are ver, so far as the present cases are concerne ncerned, there was a specific prayer prayer made by the writ petitioners praying f aying for minimum of the pay scale. scale. On that count too, we do not find any d any reason to interfere with the orde e order passed by the learned Single Judge.

21. In view view of above, the writ petitions s tions succeed, and accordingly, the appeals s peals stand dismissed.

22. All pend ll pending applications also stand dispo d disposed of accordingly. (SANJE ANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA) JUDGE MEENAKSHI I. MEHTA) (ME JUDGE

21.04.2025 Mohit goyal

1. Whether 2. Whether ther speaking/reasoned? ther reportable? Yes/No Ye Yes/No Ye MOHIT GOYAL 2025.04.25 11:50 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document