Deepak Jerath v. Ve State of Haryan aryana and others
Case Details
CWP No.24593 of CWP No.25344 of CWP No.25346 of 593 of 2025 344 of 2025 346 of 2025 IN THE H THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB A JAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CWP N WP NO.24593 OF 2025 (O&M) ) Deepak Kumar umar @ Deepak Jerath ...Petitioner Versus Ve State of Haryan aryana and others ...Respondents AND CWP NO P NO.25344 OF 2025 (O&M) Savita Garg Versus Ve State of Haryan aryana and others ...Petitioner ...Respondents CWP NO P NO.25346 OF 2025 (O&M) Mohinder Kum Kumar Garg ...Petitioner Versus Ve State of Haryan aryana and others ...Respondents The date w The date w The date w 1. 2. 3. 4. Whether date when the judgment is reserved date when the judgment is pronounce ounced aded date when the judgment is uploaded the judgment is ether only operative part of the ju is judgment jud ll the full nounced or whether nounced delay, if any of the pronounceme ment, and reasons thereof pronounce pronounce The delay judgment, 5. 16.10.2025 20.11.2025 21.11.2025 Full ncement of full Not applicable CORAM : HO HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEP HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE LAPIT HO DEEPAK SIBAL APITA BANERJI Present : Mr Mr. Shailender Jain, Senior Advoca Ms Ms. Dhivya Jerath, Advocate and Mr. Munish, Advocate, Mr for the petitioner (s). for dvocate with Mr. Ankur Mittal, Addl. Advocate, Mr Mr. Saurabh Mago, DAG, Haryana Mr ocate, Haryana with aryana. Ms Ms. Kushaldeep Kaur Manchanda, or respondent No.2-HSVP. for anda, Advocate, Page 1 of 22 SHALINI BHATIA 2025.11.21 13:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.24593 of CWP No.25344 of CWP No.25346 of 593 of 2025 344 of 2025 346 of 2025 LAPITA BANE ANERJI, J. By this common judgment, three By hree writ petitions, being CWP No.24593 of 20 of 2025 Deepak Kumar @ Deepak k Jerath v. State of Haryana and others, CW CWP No.25344 of 2025 Savita Ga a Garg v. State of Haryana and others and CW d CWP No.25346 of 2025 Mohinde inder Kumar Garg v. State of Haryana and o nd others, are being disposed of, as of, as common questions of fact and law arise t arise therein. For the sake of conven onvenience, the facts from CWP No.24593 of 20 of 2025 (Deepak Kumar @ Deepak epak Jerath v. State of Haryana and others) are b tion. ) are being taken into consideration. 2. The prayer in the present petition f The tition filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitut nstitution of India is for issuance of a e of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents ndents to de-notify the land of the pet he petitioner under Section 101-A of the Right to ght to Fair Compensation and Transpa ransparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation a tion and Resettlement Act, 2013 (he 13 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2013 Act”) and ”) and for issuance of a writ in the nat he nature of certiorari for setting- aside the notific notification dated August 27, 2007 007 (Annexure P-4) issued under Section 4 of the of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (he 94 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1894 Act”), dec , declaration dated August 28, 2007 ( 2007 (Annexure P-5) issued under Section 6 of t of the 1894 Act and Award No. d No.33 dated March 28, 2008 (Annexure P- -6) passed under Section 5 (1) 5 (1) of the 1894 Act and all consequential/in ntial/incidental proceedings qua acquis acquisition of petitioner’s land. 3. i)
Legal Reasoning
Brief facts of the case are as follow Bri follows: The petitioner was owner of the d The f the disputed land measuring 01 Bigha 09 Biswa Biswa in Khewat/Khatoni No.7/22, K /22, Khasra No.211 and Khewat/ Khatoni No.9/25 o.9/25, Khasra No.196 situated in Ma in Mauja Rampur Siyudi Hadbast No.106, Tehsil Tehsil Kalka, District Panchkula (Ha (Haryana). The said land was Page 2 of 22 SHALINI BHATIA 2025.11.21 13:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.24593 of CWP No.25344 of CWP No.25346 of 593 of 2025 344 of 2025 346 of 2025 purchased by th by the petitioner from one Surend nder Khurana vide sale deed No.1756 dated J dated January 11, 2005. ii) A notification under Section 4 of t A n 4 of the 1894 Act was issued on August 27, 200 7, 2007 for acquiring the land in q d in question for the purpose of development an ent and utilisation of land as a vital lin ital link (starting from NH-22 near Surajpur and m and meeting at Nalagarh road near A near Aviation Club) for providing proper access to cess to residential sectors 27, 28, 29, 3 , 29, 30 and 31, Pinjore. iii) The declaration under Section 6 The on 6 read with Section 17 of the 1894 Act was was made by the respondents the the very next day after the notification und n under Section 4 of the 1894 Act 4 Act was published. Citing the urgency provisi provisions, the petitioner was not gi not given an opportunity to file objections unde s under Section 5-A of the 1894 Act 4 Act. Pursuant to an Award for compensation p tion passed on March 28, 2008, the , the compensation amount was tendered by the by the authorities. iv) The petitioner had filed a previou The revious writ petition being CWP No.5392 of 201 2018 for release of his land under under Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act. Vide order order dated September 01, 2020 (A (Annexure P-9) a co-ordinate Bench of this C this Court permitted the petitioner to ner to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to rty to approach the competent author authority to invoke provisions of Section 101-A o A of the 2013 Act, for release of his e of his land. v) The petitioner filed a review applic The application in 2021 and the same was permitted to itted to be withdrawn vide order dated r dated October 06, 2023 by a Co- ordinate Bench Bench, after condoning the delay delay in filing of the review application. vi) Thereafter, the petitioner filed a r The ed a representation under Section 101-A of the 20 the 2013 Act on June 06, 2025 sent v sent vide e-mail dated August 10, SHALINI BHATIA 2025.11.21 13:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 3 of 22 CWP No.24593 of CWP No.25344 of CWP No.25346 of 593 of 2025 344 of 2025 346 of 2025 2025, pursuant suant to the liberty granted to him by by the Co-ordinate Bench on September 01, 2 r 01, 2020 for seeking release of his l f his land under the provisions of Section 101-A A of the 2013 Act. Immediately iately, thereafter the present writ petition has be s been filed on August 11, 2025, 2025, inter-alia, challenging the inaction on the p n the part of the authorities in not dec ot deciding the said representation itioner. of the petitioner 4.
Legal Reasoning
Mr. Jain, learned Senior advocate Mr vocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner submi submits that the respondent authoritie thorities have failed and neglected to consider the er the representation of the petitioner tioner under Section 101-A of the 2013 Act, whic , which they were legally bound to nd to do. The respondents were under an oblig obligation to de-notify and release elease the land of the petitioner primarily on t on the ground that urgency prov provision was arbitrarily and erroneously inv invoked under Section 17(1) of the of the 1894 Act. There was only one day’s gap gap between issuance of notificatio ification under Section 4 and the declaration unde n under Section 6 of the 1894 Act. By ct. By not allowing the petitioner to file objection jections under Section 5-A of the 1894 e 1894 Act, he had been deprived of his valuable r uable right of filing his objections and s and consideration of the same in violation of Arti Article 300A of the Constitution of ion of India. 5. It is vehemently argued on behalf o It i ehalf of the petitioner that despite passage of 17 f 17 years, the public purpose for se for which the land had been acquired remain remained unfulfilled and the land stil nd still remains vacant/unutilised. The possession ession of land is still with the peti e petitioner upon which he has constructed sho d shops. The photographs along with g with electricity bills of the said premises are re are relied upon as corroborative ev ive evidence of the fact that the petitioner is stil is still in authorised possession of the of the land in dispute. Therefore, it is contended nded that due to non-utilisation of the of the land for 17 years, the same SHALINI BHATIA 2025.11.21 13:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 4 of 22 CWP No.24593 of CWP No.25344 of CWP No.25346 of 593 of 2025 344 of 2025 346 of 2025 had become no me non-essential/unviable and theref therefore, should be released/de- notified. 6. Learned senior advocate relies o Lea lies on the decision of Brahma Singh and othe others v. Union of India and oth others passed in Writ Petition (Civil) No.59 o 59 of 2019 dated February 05, 202 , 2020 to argue that bar of ‘res judicata’ or Ord r Order II Rule 2 of CPC could not d not restrain a writ Court to grant reliefs in a petiti a petition filed under Article 226 of the of the Constitution of India. 7. Apex Court’s judgment in Band Ap anda Development Authority, Banda v. Moti oti Lal Agarwal and others reporte reported in 2011 (5) SCC 394 was relied upon in s in support of his contention that w that where a building or structure exists, merely v ly visiting the spot by the concerne ncerned authorities and drawing a Panchnama wou would not by itself be sufficient for ent for taking the possession of the land. Ordinarily inarily, in such cases the authority co rity concerned would have to give notice to the oc the occupier of the building/structure cture and have to take possession of the same in t e in the presence of an independent w ndent witness and also have to get the signatures tures of the owner/occupier on t n the Panchnama. Since the possession of t of the disputed land was not tak ot taken in the presence of an independent wit nt witness and the signatures of petit f petitioner were not obtained on the Panchnama, nama, the said possession was not l s not legally/validly taken by the authority concer concerned and it is the petitioner wh er who is in lawful possession of the land in dispu n dispute, till date. 8. Learned State counsel appeared on Lea on advance notice and filed a short affidavit d avit dated September 11, 2025 by the the Land Acquisition Collector, Urban Estate, Pa Panchkula, on behalf of responden pondents No.1 and 3. 9. Mr. Mittal, learned Additional A Mr nal Advocate General, Haryana, relying on the n the said affidavit, submits that the at the instant petition should be SHALINI BHATIA 2025.11.21 13:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 5 of 22 CWP No.24593 of CWP No.25344 of CWP No.25346 of 593 of 2025 344 of 2025 346 of 2025 dismissed in lim n limine as same has been filed afte ed after an inordinate delay of 17 years from the the date of passing of the Aw e Award on March 28, 2008. Furthermore, he ore, he submits that since the earlie earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner being being CWP No.5392 of 2018 was d was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated Sep ed September 01, 2020, the issues sues raised therein cannot be re- opened as the sa the same are hit by the principles of ‘ es of ‘res judicata/constructive res judicata’. He re He relies on the decision of Supreme reme Court in M. Nagabhushana v. State of Karn Karnataka and others reported in 20 2011 (3) SCC 408, to buttress his argument th ent that the principles of ‘constructiv uctive res judicata’ as explained in Section 11 of 11 of the CPC are applicable to the w
Decision
the writ petitions. 10. Mr. Mittal also relies on a decisio Mr decision passed by this Bench on September 24, 2 24, 2025 in CWP No.22413 of 202 2025 ‘Raj Singh and others v. State of Harya aryana and others’, to submit tha it that a litigant should not be permitted again again and again to re-open the issue e issues which have already been settled between tween the parties in a previous litigatio itigation. Next he argues that once the land is acqu s acquired by the State and vests in i ts in it, it is of no concern of the land owner whe er whether the said land was being use ing used for the purpose for which it was acquired quired or any other purpose. In sup support of his contention, the judgment in V. V. Chandrasekaran v. Administ inistrative Officer, reported in 2012 (4) RCR ( R (Civil) 588, is relied upon. Unde Under Section 101-A of the 2013 Act, a right has ht has been conferred on the State t State to de-notify the land, if the same is found u ound unviable. No right has been con en conferred on the land owner to seek de-notifica otification by urging/pleading unsustai sustainability. 11. Further relying on the layout p Fur out plan of Sector-29, Pinjore, Panchkula, he s a, he submits that the land in questi question i.e Khasra No.211 was required for mai maintaining 60 metre wide road (N (NH-5), 30 metres wide green SHALINI BHATIA 2025.11.21 13:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 6 of 22 CWP No.24593 of CWP No.25344 of CWP No.25346 of 593 of 2025 344 of 2025 346 of 2025 belt along with with the National Highway and 24 m d 24 metres wide internal service road of Sector ector-29, Pinjore-Kalka Urban Com Complex and therefore, was an integral part of t art of the utilisation plan by the State. State. Considering the essentiality of the land, the d, the same could not be treated as ed as unviable or be released/de- notified under S Act. nder Section 101-A of the 2013 Act. 12. It is contended that the possession It i ession of land had been taken by the State vide R vide Rapat Roznamcha No.930 dated d March 28, 2008 and handed over to the Nati e National Highways Authority of Ind of India (NHAI) and the said land is absolutely tely necessary for development/prov roviding access to residential Sectors 27 to 31 7 to 31, Pinjore, as vital link from NH m NH-22. The petitioner who is in illegal possess ossession of the land has raised unauthorised/temporary raise constructions alo ons along with the National Highway. hway. 13. Learned State counsel relies on de Lea on decision of Supreme Court in “Indore Develo velopment Authority v. Manohar L ar Lal and others” reported in (2020) 8 SCC CC 129, to submit that once the the possession was taken by the State Governme ernment by drawing up of Rapat R pat Roznamcha/Memorandum of Possession it w would amount to taking of physi physical possession by the State and the title of tle of land owner would cease therefr therefrom. After vesting, the State becomes absolu absolute owner of the land and no con contention with regard to non- utilisation of t of the land for challenging the the title of the State can be entertained. The The land owner would cease to hav to have control over the land and retention of pos of possession of the disputed land by by him would be only in the capacity of a tr a trespasser. Therefore, the conten ontention raised on behalf of the petitioner that that since he is still in possession of ion of the acquired land, the same should be releas released, is frivolous and devoid of an d of any merit. SHALINI BHATIA 2025.11.21 13:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 7 of 22 CWP No.24593 of CWP No.25344 of CWP No.25346 of 593 of 2025 344 of 2025 346 of 2025 14. This Court has heard learned co Thi ned counsel for the parties and perused the mat e material on record. 15. t The petitioner has sought The to challenge to the purported acquisition for t n for the first time by filing CWP No.5 P No.5392 of 2018 approximately ten years after p after passing of the Award on March March 28, 2008. In the said writ petition, the pet he petitioner prayed for release of the of the land under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. T . The violation of petitioner’s val r’s valuable right to file objection under Section 5 n 5-A of the 1894 Act by invoking oking provisions of Section 17 (1) of the 1894 A 94 Act and the ground of the peti petitioner being in continuous possession of th n of the disputed land have been urged urged therein. 16. It has also been pleaded that large t It h large tracts of land have remained unused and unu d unutilized. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of C CWP No.5392 of 2018 are set after: out hereinafter: “xxx “xx That a bare perusal of Ann 7. 7. wou would show that the Notification un 27.08.2007 whereas immediately o 27. under Section 6 was issued and a und given to the Petitioner to file his ob giv Annexure P-4 & Annexure P-5 n under Section 4 was issued on ely on the next day declaration nd as such no opportunity was is objections. That it is the submission of th 8. 8. fac fact that the acquisition proceed Award No.33 on 2.03.2008 but till Aw the respondents qua the present Pe the and and unused by the respondents and the the present Petitioner. That it is petitioner has never received any pet res respect to the compensation amo pas passing award and providing co wash. A copy of Award dated 28.0 was as Annexure P-6. as A of the Petitioner that despite the ceedings have culminated into till date the land so acquired by nt Petitioner is lying unoccupied and the same is in possession of it is pertinent to mention that any notice or intimation with amount. The entire exercise of g compensation is a mere eye 28.03.2008 is annexed herewith xxx xx” 17. Since CWP No.5392 of 2018 was Sin 8 was not entertained by the Co- ordinate Bench Bench vide order dated September 0 ber 01, 2020 the petitioner had SHALINI BHATIA 2025.11.21 13:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 8 of 22 CWP No.24593 of CWP No.25344 of CWP No.25346 of 593 of 2025 344 of 2025 346 of 2025 prayed for withd withdrawal of the said writ petition tition. However, the petitioner was granted the libe e liberty to only pray for relief under under Section 101-A of the 2013 Act by the Co- -ordinate Bench. 18. Instead of making a representation Ins tation under Section 101-A of the 2013 Act, the p , the petitioner filed a review applicat pplication in 2021. The same was “dismissed as w as withdrawn” on October 06, 2023 , 2023 after condonation of delay in filing of the r f the review petition. Thereafter, the r, the petitioner waited for almost 01 year 08 mon 8 months before filing the representat esentation under Section 101-A of the 2013 Act Act vide e-mail dated August 10, 2 t 10, 2025 before the respondent authorities. No a s. No attempt was made by the petitio petitioner to explain such delay in filing of the rep he representation after the dismissal o issal of writ petition on September 01, 2020. Fin Finally in August 2025, imme immediately after sending the representation the instant writ petition has bee been filed to again agitate the issues raised in sed in the previous writ petition along along with the added ground for release of land u land under Section 101-A. 19. After analyzing the facts of the ca Aft the case, this Court is of the view that the instan instant writ petition is clearly hit ly hit by the principles of res judicata/constru nstructive res judicata. On the issue issue of applicability of principles of res judicata cata/constructive res judicata, a b a beneficial reference may be made to the jud he judgment of Apex Court’s in Dary Daryao and others v. The State of U.P and othe others, 1961 SCC OnLine SC 21. T . The relevant extract thereof is reproduced here d hereinafter: “xxx “xx The same question can be co of of view. If a judgment has been com competent jurisdiction it is binding it is reversed or modified by it pro procedure prescribed by law. Th been pronounced by the High Cour bee e considered from another point een pronounced by a court of ding between the parties unless by appeal, revision or other Therefore, if a judgment has Court in a writ petition filed by a Page 9 of 22 SHALINI BHATIA 2025.11.21 13:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.24593 of CWP No.25344 of CWP No.25346 of 593 of 2025 344 of 2025 346 of 2025 party rejecting his prayer for the i par on on the ground either that he ha pleaded by him or there has been n ple proved or that the contravention is pro its itself, it must remain binding bet attacked by adopting atta the proc itself. The binding Constitution Co pro pronounced by courts of compete essential part of the rule of law, a ess is the basis of the administratio is Co Constitution lays so much emphasi "su "subject to appeal and to being judgment is conclusive as between jud and and is conclusive evidence aga exi existence, date and legal cons statement of the law in Corpus Jur sta by by judgment does not rest on an cou court rendering the judgment, and bar to an action between the same bar in in the same court or in another c con concurrent or other jurisdiction. limitation that the judgment in th lim bee been rendered by a Court o jur jurisdiction”. “It is, however, esse been a judicial determination of r bee fina final decision thereon". In other wo a w a writ under Art. 32 cannot take th the order passed by the High Cour the it under Art. 226. There can be littl it u of t of this Court to entertain applicati original cannot be confused or ori appel1ate jurisdiction of this C app inv invoked for correcting errors in th pronounced in writ petitions under pro considerations of public policy th con wh why the rule of res judicata should or' irrelevant in dealing with petitio or' Constitution. It is true that the g Co onl only in cases where a dispute be ref referred to a court of competent ju contest between the parties before con has has been given to both of them to end end the court has pronounced its ju decision pronounced by a court o dec bin binding between the parties unless ado adopting a procedure prescribed opinion, therefore, the plea that the opi should not be allowed to be invoked sho the issue of an appropriate writ had no fundamental right as een no contravention of the right n is justified by the Constitution between the parties unless it is procedure prescribed by the judgments ding character of petent jurisdiction is itself an w, and the rule of law obviously ration of justice on which the hasis. As Halsbury has observed eing amended or set aside a een the parties and their privies, against all the world of its consequences". Similar is the s Juris: "the doctrine of estoppel n any superior authority of the and a judgment of one court is a same parties for the same cause er court, whether the latter has ion. This rule is subject to the in the former action must have rt or tribunal of competent essential that there should have of rights in controversy with a er words, an original petition for ke the place of an appeal against Court in the petition filed before e little doubt that the jurisdiction ications under Art. 32 which are or mistaken or used for the is Court which alone can be in the decisions of High Courts nder Art. 226. Thus, on general y there seems to be no reason hould be treated as inadmissible etitions filed under Art. 32 of the he general rule can be invoked e between the parties has been nt jurisdiction, there has been a fore the court, a fair opportunity to prove their case, and at the its judgment or decision. Such a urt of competent jurisdiction is less it is modified or reversed by bed by the Constitution. In our t the general rule of res judicata oked cannot be sustained. xxx” xxx SHALINI BHATIA 2025.11.21 13:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document [emphasis supplied] Page 10 of 22 CWP No.24593 of CWP No.25344 of CWP No.25346 of 593 of 2025 344 of 2025 346 of 2025 20. The same view is taken by the c The the constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court Court in Direct Recruit Class II Engg Engg. Officers’ Assn. v. State of Maharashtra reported in 1990(2) SCC 715, wh , which laid down the following principle: “an adjudication is conclusive an “an actual matter determined but as t act the the parties might and ought to h dec decided as incidental or essentia matter of the litigation and eve ma leg legitimate purview of the original a ma matters of claim and defence. constructive res judicata underlyin con 11 11 of the Civil Procedure Code w acc accordingly hold that the writ case ground of res judicata.” gro e and final not only as to the as to every other matter which to have litigated and have had entially connected with subject every matter coming into the nal action both in respect of the ence. Thus, the principle of rlying Explanation IV of Section e was applied to writ case. We case is fit to be dismissed on the 21. The case of Brahma Singh (supra) The pra) does not come to the aid of petitioner since since the same was passed on the pec he peculiar facts of the case where the petitioners oners who were as employees of s of Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee and e and as employees of Supreme Cour Court Legal Services Committee prior to the pro promulgation of Supreme Court Court Legal Services Committee Rules, 2000 we were held to be eligible for retiral retiral benefits by calculating the period of their their service before promulgation of tion of the rules. In that peculiar circumstance, S nce, Supreme Court held that though though it was correct that in the previous writ pe writ petition, a general claim was made s made for grant of all the benefits under Rule 6 of le 6 of 2000 Rules but in the later wr ter writ petition only the issue of calculation of n of qualifying period for retiral b tiral benefits was agitated. The contention of n of the Union of India that petition petitioners’ claim was hit by the provisions of O s of Order II Rule 2 CPC could not be not be accepted as it was a hyper technical ground ground. 22. This Court fails to appreciate how Thi e how provisions of Order II Rule 2 are applicable licable to the present petition as the co the co-ordinate Bench allowed the SHALINI BHATIA 2025.11.21 13:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 11 of 22 CWP No.24593 of CWP No.25344 of CWP No.25346 of 593 of 2025 344 of 2025 346 of 2025 writ petitioner t ioner to invoke the only provisions of ons of Section 101-A of the 1894 Act before the re the appropriate authority. Since th ince the petitioner despite Rapat Roznamcha bein ha being drawn on March 28, 2008 by 08 by the State authorities, is still in possession, sion, this Court has no hesitation tation to hold that the same is unauthorized an zed and the petitioner’s status is no mo no more than that of a trespasser. 23. Reliance on the Apex Court judgm Rel judgment in Banda Development Authority’s cas case (supra) does not come to th e to the aid of petitioner in any manner. Banda anda Development Authority’s cas case (supra) is considered in paragraph 263 o 263 of Indore Development’s case case (supra), which is set out for rence: ready reference: “xxx “xx 263 263. In Banda Development Aut pre preparing a Panchnama is sufficie Court has laid down thus: Cou Authority, this Court held that fficient to take possession. This xxx i) No hard-and-fast rule Act would constitute ta acquired land. rule can be laid down as to what te taking of possession of the ii) If the acquired land is authority concerned to g Panchanama will ordina to constitute taking of pos nd is vacant, the Act of the State to go to the spot and prepare a dinarily be treated as sufficient f possession. iii) If crop is standing building/structure exists, the authority concerne sufficient for taking poss cases, the authority co notice to the occupier of person who has cultiv possession in the presen and get their signature course, refusal of the ow structure may not lead possession of the acquire ing on the acquired land or ists, mere going on the spot by erned will by itself, be not possession. Ordinarily, in such concerned will have to give r of the building/structure or the cultivated the land and take esence of independent witnesses atures on the Panchnama. Of e owner of the land or building/ ead to an interference that the uired land has not been taken. iv) If the acquisition is of not be possible for acqui take physical possession is of a large tract of land, it may cquiring/designated authority to sion of each and every parcel of Page 12 of 22 SHALINI BHATIA 2025.11.21 13:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.24593 of CWP No.25344 of CWP No.25346 of 593 of 2025 344 of 2025 346 of 2025 the land and it will b possession taken b document in the presen and getting their signatur ill be sufficient that symbolic n by preparing appropriate esence of indepedent witnesses atures on such documents. is v) If beneficiary of the instrumentality of the S compensation is deposit (3A) and substantial port been utilized in furthera purpose, then the Cour that possession of the acq the acquisition is an agency/ he State and 80% of the total posited in terms of Section 17 portion of the acquired land has herance of the particular public ourt may reasonably presume e acquired land has been taken. Xxx” [Emphasis Supplied] 24. After consideration of A he said the judgment in Indore Development’s nt’s case (supra) the directions wit ns with regard to taking over the possession was n was set out by the Constitution Benc Bench. Relevant extract from the Indore Develop elopment’s case (supra) is reproduce roduced herein below: “xxx “xx indicates 245 245. The expression used in Se awa award under Section 11 has proceedings shall continue” under pro 1894 Act as if the said Act ha 189 exp expression “proceedings shall proceedings are pending at the ti pro tense and envisages that proceedi ten the the date on which the 2013 Act c apply to concluded proceedings app which it becomes functus officio. whi doe does not confer benefit in the conc legality if questioned has to be leg proceedings. It is only in the p pro awa award has been passed and posses com compensation has been paid, it is a in case possession has been taken in dep deposited with respect to majority o pro proceeding, higher compensation follow under the proviso to Section foll is to any othe is not applicable com compensation has been sought by under the 1894 Act or where the und pro proceedings have been questione con concluded. Such case has to be d and the provisions of Section 24(2 and cases. cas in Section 24(1)(b) is “where an as been made”, then “such nder the provisions of the said t has not been repealed. The all continue” that he time; it is a present perfect eedings must be pending as on ct came into force. It does not ngs before the Collector after cio. Section 24 of the 2013 Act, concluded proceedings, of which o be seen in the appropriate he pending proceedings where ssession has not been taken nor t is applicable. There is no lapse taken, but amount has not been rity of landholdings in a pending tion under the 2013 Act would ction 24(2). Thus, the provision other case in which higher t by way of seeking a reference the validity of the acquisition tioned, though they have been be decided on their own merits 24(2) are not applicable to such SHALINI BHATIA 2025.11.21 13:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 13 of 22 CWP No.24593 of CWP No.25344 of CWP No.25346 of 593 of 2025 344 of 2025 346 of 2025 246. Section 16 of the 1894 Act 246 lan land may be taken by the State Gov award and thereupon land vest fre awa the State Government. Similar are the cas case of urgency in Section 17(1). been used in the 1894 Act, wher bee 2013 Act, the expression “physica 201 sub submitted that drawing of panch possession is not enough when the pos remained with the landowner and S rem phy physical possession to be taken, no form form. When the State has acquire been passed, land vests in the Stat bee enc encumbrances. The act of vesting wit with possession, any person thereafter, has to be treated as tre the pos possess the land which vests in enc encumbrances. xxx xxx Act provided that possession of Government after passing of an t free from all encumbrances in are the provisions made in the (1). The word “possession” has hereas in Section 24(2) of the ysical possession” is used. It is anchnama for taking over the n the actual physical possession nd Section 24(2) requires actual , not the possession in any other quired the land and award has State Government free from all ting of the land in the State is on retaining the possession, s trespasser and has no right to ts in the State free from all 272 272. The decision in Velaxan K Union of India, (2015) 4 SCC 325 Un dow down the law correctly. The Court also also to hold that the possession w cannot evidence as to whether po can Dra Drawing of a panchnama is an pos possession. Even after re-entry, a equally, it can be taken after equ documents cannot prevail over the doc whe whether possession is taken, of la little use, much less can they be a p littl may re-enter for a short period o ma Tha That would not impinge adversely o pos possession by drawing panchnama recognised and settled mode of taki rec an Kumar [Velaxan Kumar v. 325 ] cannot be said to be laying ourt considered the photographs on was not taken. Photographs r possession was taken or not. an accepted mode of taking y, a photograph can be taken; ter committing trespass. Such the established mode of proving f lands. Photographs can be of e a proof of possession. A person od or only to have photograph. sely on the proceedings of taking nama, which has been a rarely f taking possession. 273. In the decision in Raghbir 273 Haryana [Raghbir Singh Sehrawat Ha 1 S 1 SCC 792] , the observation mad to to take the possession of entire la award was declared, cannot be a awa law law correctly and the same is con pre precedents. The decision in State o Andolan [State of M.P. v. Narmada And SCC SCC 639], is confined to particu Com Commissioner was appointed to spot. DVDs and CDs were seen t spo wer were in possession. The District J stat statements of the tenure-holder. We of determining the possession by ap of d or or by DVDs and CDs as an accept of possession. The drawing of pan of p bir Singh Sehrawat v. State of awat v. State of Haryana, (2012) made was that it is not possible ire land in a day on which the be accepted as laying down the contrary to a large number of ate of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao mada Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 rticular facts of the case. The to find out possession on the en to hold that the landowners ict Judge, Indore, recorded the r. We do not approve the method by appointment of Commissioner ceptable mode of proving taking panchnama contemporaneously Page 14 of 22 SHALINI BHATIA 2025.11.21 13:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.24593 of CWP No.25344 of CWP No.25346 of 593 of 2025 344 of 2025 346 of 2025 is sufficient and it is not open to is s det determine the factum of possession 27 Rule 9 CPC. Whether possessio 27 not a matter that a court appoi not opi opine. However, drawing of panchn is a proof of the fact that possession is a n to a Court Commissioner to sion within the purview of Order ession has been taken, or not, is ppointed Commissioner cannot nchnama by itself is enough and ssion has been taken. 274 274. It was submitted on behalf Section 24 the expression used is Sec possession. In our opinion, un pos pos possession is taken after award is und under Section 17 before the pa absolutely vests in the State on abs tak taking possession, which is the m The Thereafter, any re-entry in po possession is wholly illegal and tr pos for for the benefit of the owner and ev pos possession is deemed to be that of vacant and is lying open, it is presu vac by by this Court as held in Kashi Bai 195 1958 SC 434]. Mere re-entry on acquired and vests absolutely in th acq doe does not confer any right to it and the effect of divesting the land once the ehalf of landowners that under d is not possession but physical , under the 1894 Act when rd is passed under Section 16 or e passing of the award, land on drawing of panchnama of the mode of taking possession. possession or retaining the d trespasser's possession inures d even in the case of open land, t of the owner. When the land is presumed to be that of the owner i Bai v. Sudha Rani Ghose [AIR on government land once it is in the State (under the 1894 Act) and Section 24(2) does not have once it vests in the State. Xxx” Xxx [Emphasis supplied] 25. Furthermore, it is well settled prop Fur d proposition of law that there is no vested right right in the land owner to seek releas release of the acquired land under Section 101-A o A of the 2013 Act. It is only a lib liberty granted to the State to release the land e land if found unviable/unsustainable inable. A beneficial reference may be made to the to the Apex Court judgment passed in ssed in Civil Appeal No.16421 of 2021 “Ram Swa Swaroop (dead) through LRs and a and another v. State of Haryana and others” aris ” arising out of SLP (Civil) No.1642 o.16421 of 2021. The Apex Court clarified that Se hat Section 101-A did not give a veste a vested right to the land owner to seek de-notifica otification. It is not for the Court to si rt to sit in appeal over the opinion of the competen petent authority which had to ensure nsure effective town planning and the issue of req of requirement of land, which stood stood vested once the award was passed. The clai he claim could not be sustained only o only on the ground of possession, SHALINI BHATIA 2025.11.21 13:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 15 of 22 CWP No.24593 of CWP No.25344 of CWP No.25346 of 593 of 2025 344 of 2025 346 of 2025 since the petitio petitioners continued to be in unauth unauthorized possession once the award was passe s passed. The relevant observations are ons are as follows: “8. 8. Section 101-A of 2013 Ac Haryana) gives liberty to the Sta Ha such land, on such terms, as consid suc Go Government, including the paym account of damages, if any, sustain acc such acquisition. Section 101-A is suc the the State Government to de-notify it f it finds that any public purpose fo under the Land Acquisition Act, und non non-essential. In other words, th Go Government on its satisfaction t become unviable or non-essential. bec righ right to assert that the land acquir non non-essential mainly because the la possession by virtue of an interim pos Court. Cou Act (as inserted in State of State Government to de-notify onsidered expedient by the State payment of compensation on stained by the landowner due to A is an enabling provision with tify the land vested with State if se for which land was acquired Act, 1894 becomes unviable or s, the power is with the State on that the land acquired has tial. No landowner has a vested cquired has become unviable or he landowner continued to be in terim order passed by the High Xxx Xxx 11. 11. The claim of the appellan account of Section 24 (2) had b acc Go Government on 12.09.2016. The w ord order stands dismissed on 12.1 appeal is merely an attempt to con app the land on one pretext or the othe the pur purpose of acquisition of the l utilization of residential, commer util Sector-51, Gurgaon (now Gurugra Sec Sin Singh has held that Section 101-A to the landowner to seek denotif to denotification, the land in question den own owners only. The state Governmen ord order other than release of land in xxx” xxx ellants for release of land on ad been rejected by the State he writ petition against the said 12.10.2020. Thus, the present continue to be in possession of other so as to defeat the public he land for development and mercial and institutional area, ugram). This Court in Raghubir A does not give a vested right notification or even that upon tion must return to the erstwhile nment is at liberty to pass such d in favour of the landowners. 26. Therefore, on merits the petitioner The titioner cannot seek release of the disputed land o land once the State has filed an affid affidavit with regard to viability essentiality and and utilization of the said land. As p As per the approved layout plan of Sector-29, Pi 29, Pinjore, Panchkula, being Annexu nnexure R-2 of the reply filed on behalf of the S the State and not controverted by ed by the petitioner by filing a rejoinder, the la the land in question is essential for al for planning of 60 metres wide road (NH-5), 30 5), 30 metres wide green belt along w long with national highway and 24 SHALINI BHATIA 2025.11.21 13:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 16 of 22 CWP No.24593 of CWP No.25344 of CWP No.25346 of 593 of 2025 344 of 2025 346 of 2025 metres wide in ide internal service road of Secto Sector-29, Pinjore-Kalka Urban Complex and b and being an integral part of the pla the planning, the said land stands utilized. 27. The lis of the petitioners is also hi T also hit by the principles of delay, acquiescence an nce and laches. This Court is of the o f the opinion that the delay/laches on the part of a rt of approaching the Court for the r the first time in 2018 after the Award was pass as passed in March, 2008 along with th 03 years’ delay in filing of the representati sentation under Section 101-A of th of the 2013 Act, is fatal to the petitioner’s claim ’s claim. The concepts of delay, lache , laches and acquiescence has been succinctly expl explained by the Apex Court i ourt in Union of India v. N. Murugesan, rep , reported in (2022) 2 SCC 24. Th . The relevant extract thereof is reproduced here d hereinafter: “xxx “xx Delay, laches and acquiescence Del 20. The principles governing dela 20 are are overlapping and interconne However, they have their distin Ho elements. One can say that delay i elem and and acquiescence are species. Simi a genus to a species by name ac a g may be a case where acquiescence ma The These principles are common law could identify that these princip cou statutes which restrict the period o stat con consideration of condonation in c are are bound to be applied by way of of the court than of a strict applica of t prin principle governing these concepts The The question of prejudice is also an note of by the Court. not Laches Lac delay, laches, and acquiescence onnected on many occasions. istinct characters and distinct lay is the genus to which laches Similarly, laches might be called e acquiescence. However, there ence is involved, but not laches. law principles, and perhaps one inciples find place in various od of limitation and create non- in certain circumstances. They y of practice requiring prudence plication of law. The underlying cepts would be one of estoppel. so an important issue to be taken 21. The word “laches” is derive 21. mea meaning “remissness and slac unr unreasonable delay or negligen involving an equitable relief whil inv other party. It is neglect on the p oth erived from the French language slackness”. It involves ligence in pursuing a claim while causing prejudice to the he part of a party to do an act thus SHALINI BHATIA 2025.11.21 13:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 17 of 22 CWP No.24593 of CWP No.25344 of CWP No.25346 of 593 of 2025 344 of 2025 346 of 2025 which law requires while asserting whi stand in the way of the party getting stan rting a right, and therefore, must tting relief or remedy. 22. Two essential factors to be 22. del delay and the nature of acts done d it would also involve acquiescenc it w approaching the court apart from t app inte interregnum. Therefore, it would be Equity to confer a remedy on a p Equ when his acts would indicate a wa whe con conduct, he has put the other par and and therefore, it would be un challenge before the court. Thus, cha con conduct on equity is not expected remedy. rem o be seen are the length of the ne during the interval. As stated, cence on the part of the party om the change in position in the ld be unjustifiable for a Court of a party who knocks its doors a waiver of such a right. By his party in a particular position, unreasonable to facilitate a hus, a man responsible for his ected to be allowed to avail a 23. 23. A defence of laches can onl no no statutory bar. The question as clear case of laches on the part of a clea one one of fact and so also that of pr ma may not have any application wh pleaded and proved by the oth ple diff difference between the concept of tha that, in a case involving mere lach would apply to all the defences th wou The Therefore, a defendant can succe rais raised by the plaintiff, while an is be amenable to acquiescence. be only be allowed when there is n as to whether there exists a t of a person seeking a remedy is of prejudice. The said principle when the existence of fraud is other side. To determine the t of laches and acquiescence is laches, the principle of estoppel es that are available to a party. ucceed on the various grounds n issue concerned alone would Acquiescence Acq 24. We have already discussed 24. acq acquiescence on the one hand an other. oth ussed the relationship between d and delay and laches on the 25. 25. Acquiescence would mean a It is implied and reluctant consen It i such an action would qualify a suc acq acquiescence takes place, it presup par particular act. From the knowledge therefore instead of taking any the refu refusal to perform the original kno knowledge of its terms, and instea by consciously ignoring it and the by acq take place. acquiescence does rein reintroduces a new implied agre Once such a situation arises, it is On acq acquiesced itself to insist upon the terms. Hence, what is essential, is term the disti We only dealt with We acquiescence. When acquiescence acq an a tacit or passive acceptance. nsent to an act. In other words, a passive assent. Thus, when resupposes knowledge against a ledge comes passive acceptance, ny action against any alleged nal contract, despite adequate stead being allowed to continue d thereafter proceeding further, lace. As a consequence, it agreement between the parties. it is not open to the party that n the compliance of the original l, is the conduct of the parties. involving a mere distinction nce is followed by delay, it may SHALINI BHATIA 2025.11.21 13:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 18 of 22 CWP No.24593 of CWP No.25344 of CWP No.25346 of 593 of 2025 344 of 2025 346 of 2025 become laches. Here again, we a bec concept of acquiescence is to be see con e are inclined to hold that the e seen on a case-to-case basis. xxx” xxx 28. In Brijesh Kumar and others v. St In v. State of Haryana and Others, SLP (Civil) No ) No.6609-13 of 2014 reported in ted in (2014) 11 SCC 351, the petitioners chall s challenged the awarded compensati ensation under Section 18 of the Land Acquisitio uisition Act, 1894, after a period of 1 od of 10 years, 02 Months and 29 days. The High High Court had refused to condone t done the delay in spite of the fact that the other l ther land owners, who had preferred eferred the appeals in time, were granted higher igher compensation. While dismissin smissing the appeal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court Court made the following observations vations: “xxx “xx 7. The Privy Council in Gene 7. Assurance Corp. Ltd. v. Janmah Ass upo upon the writings of Mr Mitra in wherein it has been said that: whe eneral Accident Fire and Life mahomed Abdul Rahim, relied in Tagore Law Lectures, 1932 A law of limitation and p ope operate harshly and unjustly in a p provides for a limitation, it is to be pro hardship to a particular party har equ equitable grounds, enlarge the pos postpone its operation, or introduc by law. by d prescription may appear to a particular case, but if the law to be enforced even at the risk of rty as the Judge cannot, on the time allowed by the law, oduce exceptions not recognized Xxx Xxx 11. It is also a well-settled pri 11. per person has taken a relief appro immediately after the cause of imm per persons cannot take benefit thereo a b a belated stage for the reason that take the impetus of the order pa tak diligent person. dili principle of law that if some approaching the court just or of action had arisen, other hereof approaching the court at that they cannot be permitted to r passed at the behest of some In State of Karnataka v. 12. 12. reje rejected the contention that a pet ign ignoring the delay and laches on petition just after coming to know pet cou court in a similar case as the sam explanation for delay and laches. T exp v. S.M. Kotrayya this court petition should be considered on the ground that he filed the now of the relief granted by the same cannot furnish a proper es. The Court observed that such Page 19 of 22 SHALINI BHATIA 2025.11.21 13:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.24593 of CWP No.25344 of CWP No.25346 of 593 of 2025 344 of 2025 346 of 2025 a plea is wholly unjustified and ca a p ignoring delay and laches. ign d cannot furnish any ground for xxx” xxx [Emphasis supplied] 29. In Mewa Ram (deceased) by his In his LRs and others v. State of Haryana throu through the Land Acquisition Coll Collector, Gurgaon, reported in 1986 (4) SCC CC 151, the Hon’ble Apex Court d ourt dismissed the Special Leave Petitions on th on the ground that the petitioners oners could not plead their own laches, as a su s a sufficient ground for condonatio onation of delay. It held that the time stipulated ulated for re-determination of the aw the awarded compensation under Section 28-A s A should be adhered to, as any oth ny other view taken by the Courts would lead to ead to disastrous consequences, not i , not intended by the legislature. Therefore, the e, the following conclusion was arrive arrived at: “xxx “xx 7. There is no reason for us to 7. cas cases which are hopelessly barre justification for condonation of inor just s to grant special leave in these arred by time and there is no f inordinate delay. The special leave petitions ions are accordingly dismissed 8. 8. with costs.” wit 30. In a recent judgment passed in Un In a Union of India and another v. Jahangir Byra Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) SLP (Civil) ivil) No. 21096 of 2019 reported in 2024 SCC O C OnLine SC 489 , the Hon’ble Ap le Apex Court refused to condone the delay of 12 y of 12 years and 158 days in filing o iling of the restoration application before the Hi he High Court. The High Court h urt had refused to entertain an application file on filed by the appellants for exerci exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of 227 of the Constitution of India for ia for condoning the delay of 12 years and 158 d 158 days, when the same was dism as dismissed for non-prosecution. The Apex Cou x Court categorically made the follow following findings:- SHALINI BHATIA 2025.11.21 13:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 20 of 22 CWP No.24593 of CWP No.25344 of CWP No.25346 of 593 of 2025 344 of 2025 346 of 2025 “xxx “xx 24. In the aforesaid circumstan 24. that we are not going to look into tha long as we are not convinced tha lon made out for condonation of such a ma stances, we made it very clear into the merits of the matter as that sufficient cause has been ch a long and inordinate delay. It hardly matters whether a 25. 25. a S a State or Union of India when it co delay of more than 12 years. If the del the court long after the lapse of th the rele relevant provisions of the law, then say say that no prejudice would be c delay being condoned. This litig del star started sometime in 1981. We are hav have elapsed. However, till date t able to reap the fruits of his decre abl just justice if we condone the delay of onc once again ask the respondent to u legal proceedings. leg er a litigant is a private party or it comes to condoning the gross the litigant chooses to approach of the time prescribed under the then he cannot turn around and be caused to either side by the litigation between the parties are in 2024. Almost 43 years ate the respondent has not been ecree. It would be a mockery of y of 12 years and 158 days and to undergo the rigmarole of the 26. 26. The length of the delay is a is a relevant matter which the ourt must take into consideration cou ation while considering whether the the delay should be condoned or or not. From the tenor of the app approach of the appellants, it ap t appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for the for instituting the proceedings for for which law has prescribed a per a period of limitation. Once it is hel held that a party has lost his his right to have the matter considered on merits because of hi con of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-de can deliberate delay and in such circ circumstances of the case, he cann annot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be sub o be preferred as against the technical considerations. While tech ile considering the plea for con condonation of delay, the court m rt must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes of t owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation of bon n offered by the party seeking con condonation. It is only if the suffi sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the ot litig he other side is equally balanced aid the merits of the matter for that the court may bring into aid tha elay. the purpose of condoning the delay the 27. We are of the view that the 27. mer merely a technical consideration. bas based on the principles of sound pu equity. We should not keep the 'S equ ove over the head of the respondent for be determined at the whims and fan be the question of limitation is not ion. The rules of limitation are d public policy and principles of e 'Sword of Damocles' hanging t for indefinite period of time to d fancies of the appellants. xxx” xxx 31. Pursuant to the above mentioned d Pur oned discussion, this Court has no hesitation to ho to hold that the present writ petition tition is a frivolous attempt to re- SHALINI BHATIA 2025.11.21 13:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 21 of 22 CWP No.24593 of CWP No.25344 of CWP No.25346 of 593 of 2025 344 of 2025 346 of 2025 open the issues issues which have already been adjud adjudicated upon by a competent Court of law and law. aw and is an abuse of process of law. 32. Accordingly, the writ petitions, bei Acc ns, being CWP No.24593 of 2025 Deepak Kumar mar @ Deepak Jerath v. State of of Haryana and others, CWP No.25344 of 20 of 2025 Savita Garg v. State of Ha f Haryana and others and CWP No.25346 of 20 of 2025 Mohinder Kumar Garg v. S v. State of Haryana and others, are dismissed issed, not only being hit by the the principles of res judicata, acquiescence an nce and waiver but also on the su the substantive interpretation of Section 101A o 01A of the 2013 Act, especially keepi keeping in mind the fact that the land already stan dy stands utilised. 33. Connected application(s), if any, s Con any, shall also stand disposed of accordingly. (DEEPAK SIB DGE JUDGE SIBAL) (LAPITA BANERJI) (LA JUDGE NOVEMBER shalini BER 20, 2025 Whether speakin Whether reporta speaking/reasoned: Yes/No Yes/No reportable: SHALINI BHATIA 2025.11.21 13:00 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 22 of 22