O&M) Delhi Catholic tholic Archdiocese through its Secre Secretary v. Ve State of Haryan aryana and others
Case Details
CWP No.25397 of 397 of 2024 (O&M) IN THE H THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB A JAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH CWP N WP NO.25397 OF 2024 (O&M) Delhi Catholic tholic Archdiocese through its Secre Secretary Versus Ve State of Haryan aryana and others ...Petitioner ...Respondents The date w The date w The date w 1. 2. 3. 4. Whether date when the judgment is reserved date when the judgment is pronounce ounced aded date when the judgment is uploaded the judgment is ether only operative part of the ju is judgment jud nounced or whether nounced delay, if any of the pronounceme ment, and reasons thereof pronounce pronounce The delay judgment, the full 5. 12.11.2025 02.12.2025 02.12.2025 Full ncement of full Not applicable CORAM : HO HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEP HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE LAPIT HO DEEPAK SIBAL APITA BANERJI Present : Mr and Mr. Umang Bansal, Advocate and Mr Mr. Shivansh Gulati, Advocate, for the petitioner. for Mr. Saurabh Mago, DAG, Haryana Mr aryana. LAPITA BANE ANERJI, J. The prayer in the present petition f The tition filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constituti nstitution of India is for issuance of a w e of a writ of Certiorari for setting- aside of Award ward No.8 dated March 23, 1993 (A 93 (Annexure P-1) passed by the Land Acquisiti quisition Collector (LAC), Urban Urban Estates, Gurugram. The petitioner has a has also prayed for issuance of a w of a writ for Mandamus for de- notifying the la the land in dispute under Scheme heme No.45 (Annexure P-6) of Haryana Urban Urban Development Authority (HUDA HUDA) and for restoring the title SHALINI BHATIA 2025.12.02 17:45 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 1 of 18 CWP No.25397 of 397 of 2024 (O&M) of the petitione titioner by entering its name in the r the revenue records in place of HUDA. 2. i) The brief facts of the case are as fol The e as follows: The petitioner is a registered soci The d society which was the owner of land ad measuri easuring 04 kanals 04 marlas (i.e 0.5 (i.e 0.52 acres or 22868 sq. ft.) in Khasra No.39/1 o.39/13 and 14/1 situated at village illage Kanhei, Tehsil and District Gurugram. ii) The petitioner purchased the land The e land in dispute vide registered sale deed dated dated June 07, 1963 from Chattar Sin tar Singh, Maan Singh Pisran and Chankaur r/o v r/o village Kanhei, District Gurgao urgaon. The sale deed was duly executed at the at the office of Joint Sub-Registrar, G strar, Gurgaon vide No.440 dated 963. June 07, 1963. iii) Pursuant to the said purchase, t Pur ase, the name of the petitioner society through rough its President was entered into ed into the revenue records vide Mutation No.12 No.1218 dated March 23, 1993 reflec reflected in the Jamabandi for the 2005. year 2004-2005. iv) The disputed land was acquired by The ired by the State for the proposed development of ent of Sector-45, Gurugram by HUD y HUDA. The impugned Award No.8 was passe passed by the Land Acquisition Co ion Collector (for short “LAC”), Urban Estates, G tates, Gurugram, Haryana on March 2 arch 23, 1993. A primary Health Care Centre and tre and a Church had already been co constructed over the disputed land at the time e time of acquisition of the same. v) The petitioner filed a representatio The entation dated February 27, 2023 before responde spondent No.3-The Estate Officer-II, II, HUDA, Gurugram, to de- SHALINI BHATIA 2025.12.02 17:45 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 2 of 18 CWP No.25397 of 397 of 2024 (O&M) notify the dispu disputed land under Scheme No.45 No.45 floated by HUDA but the representation was not responded to. vi) The petitioner again submitted The mitted a reminder letter dated December 04, 2 r 04, 2023 to respondent No.3 but the prayer of petitioner went unheeded. vii) Due to the inaction on the part o Du part of respondent authorities the petitioner has c has claimed that the acquisition pro n proceedings have lapsed under Section 24 (2) o 4 (2) of the Right to Fair Compensatio nsation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Reh n, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Ac ent Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “the 2013 A 2013 Act”) as neither the physical pos cal possession of the land had been taken by the Sta State authorities nor was any comp compensation paid to it. IONS SUBMISSIONS 3.
Legal Reasoning
27. 27. We are of the view that the merely a technical consideration. mer bas based on the principles of sound pu equity. We should not keep the 'S equ the question of limitation is not ion. The rules of limitation are d public policy and principles of e 'Sword of Damocles' hanging Page 11 of 18 SHALINI BHATIA 2025.12.02 17:45 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.25397 of 397 of 2024 (O&M) over the head of the respondent for ove be determined at the whims and fan be t for indefinite period of time to d fancies of the appellants. xxx” xxx 16. From the aforesaid exposition of Fro ion of law, it is clear that this petition is liable s liable to be dismissed on the groun ground of delay alone but at the insistence of the of the learned counsel for the petition etitioner the same is considered on merits as well. well. Even on merits, the claim o laim of the petitioner cannot be entertained as d as the law is now well settled ttled by the Constitution Bench judgment in Ind Indore Development’s case (supra upra). It is unambiguously held by the said judg id judgment that once the possession ssion had been taken over by the State by drawin drawing up of Rapat Roznamcha/Mem /Memorandum of Possession, it would amount t ount to taking of physical possession session by the State and the land would complete mpletely vest in the State, free fro ee from all encumbrances. After vesting, the Stat e State becomes the absolute owner o wner of the land and no contention with regard to rd to non-utilisation of the land for d for challenging the title of the State can be ent be entertained. The owner ceases to ha s to have control over the land and retention of pos of possession of the disputed land by and by him would only be in the capacity of a tre f a trespasser. 17. Relevant extract from the Indore D Rel ore Development’s case (supra) is reproduced he ced herein below: “xxx “xx 245 245. The expression used in Se awa award under Section 11 has proceedings shall continue” under pro 189 1894 Act as if the said Act ha exp expression “proceedings shall proceedings are pending at the ti pro ten tense and envisages that proceedi the date on which the 2013 Act c the in Section 24(1)(b) is “where an as been made”, then “such nder the provisions of the said t has not been repealed. The all continue” that he time; it is a present perfect eedings must be pending as on ct came into force. It does not indicates SHALINI BHATIA 2025.12.02 17:45 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 12 of 18 CWP No.25397 of 397 of 2024 (O&M) apply to concluded proceedings app whi which it becomes functus officio. doe does not confer benefit in the conc legality if questioned has to be leg pro proceedings. It is only in the p awa award has been passed and posses compensation has been paid, it is a com in in case possession has been taken dep deposited with respect to majority o proceeding, higher compensation pro follow under the proviso to Section foll is to any othe is not applicable compensation has been sought by com und under the 1894 Act or where the pro proceedings have been questione concluded. Such case has to be d con and and the provisions of Section 24(2 cases. cas ngs before the Collector after cio. Section 24 of the 2013 Act, concluded proceedings, of which o be seen in the appropriate he pending proceedings where ssession has not been taken nor t is applicable. There is no lapse taken, but amount has not been rity of landholdings in a pending tion under the 2013 Act would ction 24(2). Thus, the provision other case in which higher t by way of seeking a reference the validity of the acquisition tioned, though they have been be decided on their own merits 24(2) are not applicable to such 246. Section 16 of the 1894 Act 246 lan land may be taken by the State Gov award and thereupon land vest fre awa the State Government. Similar are the cas case of urgency in Section 17(1). been used in the 1894 Act, wher bee 2013 Act, the expression “physica 201 sub submitted that drawing of panch possession is not enough when the pos remained with the landowner and S rem phy physical possession to be taken, no form form. When the State has acquire been passed, land vests in the Stat bee enc encumbrances. The act of vesting wit with possession, any person thereafter, has to be treated as tre the pos possess the land which vests in encumbrances. enc Act provided that possession of Government after passing of an t free from all encumbrances in are the provisions made in the (1). The word “possession” has hereas in Section 24(2) of the ysical possession” is used. It is anchnama for taking over the n the actual physical possession nd Section 24(2) requires actual , not the possession in any other red the land and award has State Government free from all ting of the land in the State is on retaining the possession, s trespasser and has no right to ts in the State free from all Xxx Xxx 274. It was submitted on behalf 274 Sec Section 24 the expression used is pos possession. In our opinion, un possession is taken after award is pos und under Section 17 before the pa abs absolutely vests in the State on taking possession, which is the m tak The Thereafter, any re-entry in po possession is wholly illegal and tr pos ehalf of landowners that under d is not possession but physical , under the 1894 Act when rd is passed under Section 16 or e passing of the award, land on drawing of panchnama of the mode of taking possession. possession or retaining the d trespasser's possession inures Page 13 of 18 SHALINI BHATIA 2025.12.02 17:45 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.25397 of 397 of 2024 (O&M) for the benefit of the owner and ev for pos possession is deemed to be that of vac vacant and is lying open, it is presu by this Court as held in Kashi Bai by 195 1958 SC 434]. Mere re-entry on acq acquired and vests absolutely in th does not confer any right to it and doe the effect of divesting the land once the d even in the case of open land, t of the owner. When the land is presumed to be that of the owner i Bai v. Sudha Rani Ghose [AIR on government land once it is in the State (under the 1894 Act) and Section 24(2) does not have once it vests in the State. Xxx Xxx 277 277. In V.Chandrasekaran v. Adm was acquired and possession was aut authorities. Later on the land w ma manipulated, and flats were constr It was held that the land once ac It w The The State has no right to reconvey cla claim such a right nor derive an ad notification under Section 4 of the not It was held in the facts of the ca It w can cannot be used to subvert its way permitted to profit from the frivolo per be prevented from taking false pl be documents or illegal action.” doc . Administrative Officer, the land on was handed over to the nd was sold, documents were onstructed in an illegal manner. e acquired, cannot be restored. nvey the land and no person can n advantage. Sale of land after a the LA Act was held to be void. e case that the judicial process way. Such persons must not be ivolous litigation, and they must e pleas from relying on forged [Emphasis Supplied] 18. Therefore, the contention raised on The sed on behalf of the petitioner that since he is still s still in physical possession of the ac the acquired land the same should be de-notified, i ified, is frivolous and devoid of any m any merit. Furthermore, this Court is of the opini opinion that once the amount of nt of compensation is tendered, meaning thereby thereby the amount is made available ilable to the land owners for their collection, the S , the State’s obligation to make paym e payment stands discharged. The land owners can ers cannot be forced to receive the the tendered amount and in case they have not a not accepted the same they cannot b nnot be allowed to take advantage of their own in inaction. 19. The view of this Court finds suppo The support in Indore Development’s case (supra) and and the relevant extract is reproduc roduced hereinafter: SHALINI BHATIA 2025.12.02 17:45 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 14 of 18 CWP No.25397 of 397 of 2024 (O&M) “xxx “xx 206 206. It was submitted that mer payment. The amount has to be ac pay whe when amount has been tendered fulf fulfilled by the Collector. Landow receive it. In case a person has not rec to t to take the advantage of non-paym rem remained due to his own act. It is that amount has not been paid to h tha lap lapse of the proceedings. Even pay payment has been made but not amount along with interest subsis am ma majority of holding, for that adeq giv given in the proviso also to Sectio Act of 2013 in Sections 77 and 8 Act provided in Sections 31 and 34 of th pro mere tender of amount is not e actually paid. In our opinion, ered, the obligation has been ndowners cannot be forced to s not accepted the amount wants ayment, though the amount has It is not open to him to contend to him, as such, there should be ven in a case when offer for not deposited, liability to pay ubsist and if not deposited for adequate provisions have been ection 24 (2). The scheme of the nd 80 is also the same as that of the Act of 1894. xxx” xxx 20. A perusal of the status report w A port would reveal that the total amount of com compensation to the tune of Rs of Rs.86,676.75 payable to the petitioner was d was duly tendered and readily made a ade available for disbursement to the petitioner. H . However, the petitioner deliberat liberately chose not to receive the said amount. Ou nt. Out of the total awarded amount mount of Rs.12,27,47,937.60/- for the entirety of ty of the acquired land, an amount o ount of Rs.11,20,50,371.55/- has already been dis disbursed to the land owners who s who had come forward to collect the compensatio ensation amount. The balance amoun amount of compensation is ready for disbursemen sement but the landowners cannot be f ot be forced to receive it. 21. A perusal of the status report also i A p also indicates that the notification under Section 6 tion 6 of the 1894 Act was publishe blished in Haryana government’s official gazette azette and two daily newspapers “T “The Tribune (English)” and “Nav Bharat Ti rat Times (Hindi)” on November 14, er 14, 1992. Once the declaration is published in t ed in the official gazette, the same is p me is presumed to be notice to the public at large. large. Therefore, the contention of ion of the petitioner that it was SHALINI BHATIA 2025.12.02 17:45 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 15 of 18 CWP No.25397 of 397 of 2024 (O&M) unaware of the of the notification along with the Awa Award dated March 23, 1993, is bereft of any m any merit. A beneficial reference m ence may be made to the Apex Court’s judgme dgment in ‘Special Deputy Collector ector, Land Acquisition, CMDA v. J. Sivapraka rakasam and others’ reported in d in (2011) 1 SCC 330. Relevant extract thereof ereof is reproduced hereinafter: xxx “xx 21. The purpose of publication o 21. Fir First is to ensure that adequate p lan landowners and persons interested file their objections under Section file put put the landowners/occupants o offi officers will be entering upon the p activities enumerated in Section 4 act before its amendment in 1984, r bef pre preliminary notification only in the not notice of the substance of the notif in the locality. in t ion of the notification is twofold: te publicity is given so that the sted will have an opportunity to tion 5-A of the Act. Second is to ts on notice that government the property for carrying on the on 4(2) of the Act. Section 4(1), 4, required publication of the n the Official Gazette and public notification at convenient places in M.P. 22. This Court, 22. Shafi [(1992) 2 SCC 168] explain Sha notification under Section 4 of the A not “8. … The object of issuing a no the Act is twofold. First, it is a p the Go Government and a public notice b that the land, as specified therein, tha needed by the Government for the nee the therein; and secondly, it authorise or officers of the local authority, a or such acts as are mentioned in Se suc not notification has to be published in persons likely to be affected by the per notice that such an activity is afoo not req required to give with sufficient c pur purpose’ for which the acquisiti commenced but also the ‘locality com wit with as full a description as possibl acq acquired to enable the ‘interested’ land is being acquired and for lan furt further steps under the Act by filin ope open to such persons to canvass th for the alleged ‘public purpose’ a for Sec Section 4(1) of the Act is defective the requirements of the Act, it not o the . Housing Board v. Mohd. plained the object of issuing a the Act thus: a notification under Section 4 of a public announcement by the ce by the Collector to the effect rein, is needed or is likely to be the ‘public purpose’ mentioned orises the departmental officers ity, as the case may be to do all in Section 4(2) of the Act. The d in the locality and particularly y the proposal have to be put on afoot. The notification is, thus, nt clarity not only the ‘public uisition proceedings are being ality’ where the land is situate ssible of the land proposed to be ted’ persons to know as to which for what purpose and to take filing objections, etc. since it is ss the non-suitability of the land se’ also. If a notification under ctive and does not comply with not only vitiates the notification, Page 16 of 18 SHALINI BHATIA 2025.12.02 17:45 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.25397 of 397 of 2024 (O&M) but also renders all subsequent pro but acquisition, bad.” acq t proceedings connected with the 23. By Amendment Act 68 o 23. am amended introducing the addition pub publication of the notification circulating in the locality. The circ new newspaper publication is to give not notification as possible, as the St wide circulation and causing publi wid the the notification at convenient place not notice only in specific pockets in therefore provided for publication i the at l at least one being in the regional reach. Having regard to the o rea that p provision, pro new newspapers which have a reasona loc locality. If the publication is to be m having only token or insignificant hav cos cost of publication or by way of po tha that will defeat the very purpose of newspapers. new 8 of 1984, Section 4(1) was itional requirement relating to ion in two daily newspapers he purpose of requiring such give as wide a publicity to the e State Gazettes do not have a public notice of the substance of places in the locality would give in the locality. The legislature tion in two newspapers (of which onal language) to have a wider e object and purpose of the in at publication should be sonably good circulation in the be made in obscure newspapers ant circulation, either to cut the f political or official patronage, se of providing for publication in is evident it xxx” xxx No attempt has been made to expla No o explain the reason for non-filing of objections un ions under Section 5-A of the 1894 1894 Act. Neither any allegation with regard to th rd to the aforesaid two newspapers not ers not having wide circulation has been brought o ght on record. Therefore, the argum argument with regard to lack of knowledge of e of the acquisition proceedings o ngs of the petitioner cannot be accepted. 22. Pursuant to the above mentioned d Pur oned discussion, this Court has no hesitation to hol to hold that the present writ petition i tition is a frivolous attempt to seek de-notification/r ation/release of the land acquired as f as far as 31 years back, without providing any e any explanation whatsoever as to the to the reason for such inordinate delay in approac pproaching the Court. SHALINI BHATIA 2025.12.02 17:45 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 17 of 18 CWP No.25397 of 397 of 2024 (O&M) 23. Accordingly, the writ petition, bei Acc n, being CWP No.25397 of 2024 is dismissed, n , not only being hit by the princi principles of delay, acquiescence and laches but but also on merits as the land after after being completely vested in State was hande handed over by the State to HSVP an VP and stands utilised as on date, in terms of the f the approved layout plan. 24. Connected application(s), if any, s Con any, shall also stand disposed of accordingly. (DEEPAK SIB DGE JUDGE SIBAL) (LAPITA BANERJI) (LA JUDGE DECEMBER shalini ER 02, 2025 Whether speakin Whether reporta speaking/reasoned: Yes/No Yes/No reportable: SHALINI BHATIA 2025.12.02 17:45 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 18 of 18
Arguments
Mr. Bansal, learned counsel ap Mr sel appearing on behalf of the petitioner societ society submits that no notice of th of the Award as required under Section 12 (2) o 2 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 189 ct, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1894 Act”) Act”) was given to the petitioner soc ner society, resulting in lapsing of the impugned gned Award dated March 23, 1993 , 1993. Furthermore, neither the physical possess ossession of the disputed land was tak as taken by the State nor was any compensation pa tioner. tion paid by the State to the petitioner. 4. It has been vehemently argued on It h ed on behalf of the petitioner that the despite pass te passage of 31 years from the date e date of acquisition, the public purpose for wh or which the land had been acquired quired, remained unfulfilled. The land still remain remains vacant/unutilised and the peac e peaceful possession of the same is still with the th the petitioner society upon which i hich it had constructed a primary health centre a ntre and a church, prior to commen ommencement of the acquisition SHALINI BHATIA 2025.12.02 17:45 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 3 of 18 CWP No.25397 of 397 of 2024 (O&M) proceedings. Th gs. Therefore, it is contended that d that due to non-utilisation of the land coupled w led with the petitioner being in pos in possession of the same for 31 years, the proce proceedings are deemed to have lap ve lapsed under Section 24 (2) of the 2013 Act. T Act. Therefore, the disputed land sho nd should be released/de-notified and the mutatio utation entries should be rectified to fied to substitute the name of the petitioner in pla in place and stead of HUDA. 5. Mr. Mago, learned DAG, Haryana Mr aryana, appearing for the State on advance notice notice, filed a status report which which was taken on record on September 04, 2 r 04, 2025. Relying on the said status status report, he submits that the petition ought to ght to be dismissed in limine as the s s the same has been filed after an inordinate delay delay of 31 years from the date o date of passing of the Award on March 23, 1993 , 1993. He further submits that notifi notification dated April 20, 1990 under Section 4 tion 4 of the 1894 Act was issued for ed for acquiring land ad measuring 1148.91 acres in cres in village Kanhei, Tehsil and Dis nd District Gurugram. Declaration dated April 18, ril 18, 1991 was issued under Secti r Section 6 of the 1894 Act for acquiring 1068. 1068.64 acres of land which was foll as followed by Award No.8 dated March 23, 1993 , 1993 announcing compensation in ion in respect of 948.95 acres of land. The dispu disputed land of the petitioner socie r society was acquired for public purpose of c of constructing residential, comm commercial, institutional and recreational (ope al (open space) area in Gurugram Sect m Sectors 44 to 46. 6. After issuance of notification unde Aft under Section 4 of the 1894 Act, objections unde s under Section 5-A of the 1894 Act w Act were invited from all affected land owners. ers. No objection was filed on beha n behalf of the petitioner-society under Section ction 5-A and therefore, the cha e challenge to the acquisition proceedings is gs is not maintainable. He relies on lies on the judgment of Hon’ble SHALINI BHATIA 2025.12.02 17:45 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 4 of 18 CWP No.25397 of 397 of 2024 (O&M) Supreme Court Court “Delhi Administration v. G v. Gurdeep Singh Urban and others” reported eported in AIR 1999 SC 3822, to co , to contend that once objections under Section 5 tion 5-A of the 1894 Act have not be not been filed by the land owners they could not b d not be permitted to contend that the at the declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Ac 94 Act must be struck down or that r that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed due ed due to the Award not being broug brought to the knowledge of the landowners. 7. The entire amount of compensation The nsation under Award No.8 of 1993 was duly tende tendered in the LAC Office at the at the time of announcing of the Award. Since Since the petitioner did not come come forward to receive the compensation a tion amount to the tune of Rs.86,67 s.86,676.75/- the same had to be deposited before before learned ADJ Court which was ch was done vide Memo No.8028 dated Decembe cember 08, 2022. Furthermore, the p , the possession of the land was taken by the S the State by drawing up of Memora emorandum of Possession/Rapat Roznamcha No No.425 dated March 23, 1993 and the disputed land was handed over to ver to the authorised representative tative of Haryana Shehri Vikas Pradhikaran (H an (HSVP) on the very same day day. Therefore, the acquisition proceedings stoo stood complete in all respects and and the land stood vested in the beneficiary depa y department of the State i.e HSVP. 8. Referring to the approved layout pl Ref yout plan, it is submitted on behalf of the State that that the land stands utilised as nine p nine plots of 02 marlas, 01 green, 01 park, 01 nur 01 nursery school site, 01 R.B site, 01 site, 01 hospital site and 03 of 10 metre wide roa de road, are proposed to be constru onstructed on the acquired land. Therefore, there , there was no question of lapsing of ing of the acquisition proceedings under Section 2 tion 24 (2) of the 2013 Act. Reliance i iance is placed on the judgment of SHALINI BHATIA 2025.12.02 17:45 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 5 of 18 CWP No.25397 of 397 of 2024 (O&M) “Indore Develo velopment Authority v. Manohar L ar Lal and others” reported in (2020) 8 SCC 1 C 129, to submit that no prayer on er on the petitioner’s behalf under Section 24 (2) o 4 (2) of the 2013 Act is maintainable a nable as not only the possession of the land was tak as taken by drawing of the Rapat Roz Roznamcha on March 23, 1993, but also the ent e entire awarded compensation was was tendered to the LAC at the time of passing ssing of the Award. DISCUSSION ION AND FINDINGS 9. This Court has heard learned co Thi ned counsel for the parties and perused the mat e material on record. 10. The petitioner without challengi The allenging the notification under Section 4 of the of the 1894 Act dated April 20, 199 0, 1990 and the declaration dated April 18, 1991 1991, issued under Section 6 of th of the 1894 Act has sought to challenge only t only the Award dated March 23, 199 3, 1993 passed under the said Act by filing the ins the instant writ petition in the year 20 year 2024. It is significant to note that no objectio bjection under Section 5-A of the 1 f the 1894 Act was filed by the petitioner. For t or the first time in 2023, it made made a representation before the authorities for s for release of its land i.e after 30 er 30 years of the passing of the Award. Thereaf hereafter, the petitioner has approach roached this Court 31 years after the passing of ng of the Award dated March 23, 1 23, 1993 without providing any explanation wha n whatsoever, as to the reason for th the said delay in approaching the Court. More Moreover, during the course of argu arguments also, no explanation whatsoever was er was provided for such a belated a lated approach in challenging the acquisition proc n proceedings. 11. Given the conduct/lackadaisical at Giv ical attitude of the petitioner, this Court is of the f f the firm view that instant writ petitio petition is hit by the principles of SHALINI BHATIA 2025.12.02 17:45 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 6 of 18 CWP No.25397 of 397 of 2024 (O&M) delay, acquiesce iescence and laches. 31 years of del of delay in approaching the Court seeking de-not notification/release of the dispu disputed land and consequent mutation reflect reflecting the name of petitioner in the r in the ownership column, is fatal to the prayer of yer of the petitioner. 12. The concepts of delay, laches a The hes and acquiescence has been succinctly expl explained by the Apex Court i ourt in Union of India v. N. Murugesan, rep , reported in (2022) 2 SCC 24. Th . The relevant extract thereof is reproduced here d hereinafter: “xxx “xx Delay, laches and acquiescence Del 20 20. The principles governing dela are overlapping and interconne are However, they have their distin Ho elem elements. One can say that delay i and acquiescence are species. Simi and a genus to a species by name ac a g ma may be a case where acquiescence These principles are common law The could identify that these princip cou stat statutes which restrict the period o con consideration of condonation in c are bound to be applied by way of are of t of the court than of a strict applica prin principle governing these concepts The question of prejudice is also an The note of by the Court. no delay, laches, and acquiescence onnected on many occasions. istinct characters and distinct lay is the genus to which laches Similarly, laches might be called e acquiescence. However, there ence is involved, but not laches. law principles, and perhaps one inciples find place in various od of limitation and create non- in certain circumstances. They y of practice requiring prudence plication of law. The underlying cepts would be one of estoppel. so an important issue to be taken Laches Lac 21. 21. The word “laches” is derive meaning “remissness and slac mea unr unreasonable delay or negligen inv involving an equitable relief whil other party. It is neglect on the p oth whi which law requires while asserting stand in the way of the party getting stan erived from the French language involves slackness”. It ligence in pursuing a claim while causing prejudice to the he part of a party to do an act rting a right, and therefore, must tting relief or remedy. thus SHALINI BHATIA 2025.12.02 17:45 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document 22. 22. Two essential factors to be delay and the nature of acts done d del o be seen are the length of the ne during the interval. As stated, Page 7 of 18 CWP No.25397 of 397 of 2024 (O&M) it would also involve acquiescenc it w app approaching the court apart from t inte interregnum. Therefore, it would be Equity to confer a remedy on a p Equ whe when his acts would indicate a wa con conduct, he has put the other par and therefore, it would be un and cha challenge before the court. Thus con conduct on equity is not expected remedy. rem cence on the part of the party om the change in position in the ld be unjustifiable for a Court of a party who knocks its doors a waiver of such a right. By his party in a particular position, unreasonable to facilitate a hus, a man responsible for his ected to be allowed to avail a 23. 23. A defence of laches can onl no statutory bar. The question as no clea clear case of laches on the part of a one one of fact and so also that of pr may not have any application wh ma ple pleaded and proved by the oth diff difference between the concept of that, in a case involving mere lach tha would apply to all the defences th wou The Therefore, a defendant can succe rais raised by the plaintiff, while an is be amenable to acquiescence. be only be allowed when there is n as to whether there exists a t of a person seeking a remedy is of prejudice. The said principle when the existence of fraud is other side. To determine the t of laches and acquiescence is laches, the principle of estoppel es that are available to a party. ucceed on the various grounds n issue concerned alone would Acquiescence Acq 24. 24. We have already discussed acq acquiescence on the one hand an other. oth ussed the relationship between d and delay and laches on the 25. 25. Acquiescence would mean a It is implied and reluctant consen It i suc such an action would qualify a acq acquiescence takes place, it presup particular act. From the knowledge par the therefore instead of taking any refu refusal to perform the original knowledge of its terms, and instea kno by consciously ignoring it and the by acq take place. acquiescence does reintroduces a new implied agre rein On Once such a situation arises, it is acq acquiesced itself to insist upon the terms. Hence, what is essential, is term We the disti We only dealt with acq acquiescence. When acquiescence become laches. Here again, we a bec con concept of acquiescence is to be see xxx” xxx an a tacit or passive acceptance. nsent to an act. In other words, a passive assent. Thus, when resupposes knowledge against a ledge comes passive acceptance, ny action against any alleged nal contract, despite adequate stead being allowed to continue d thereafter proceeding further, lace. As a consequence, it agreement between the parties. it is not open to the party that n the compliance of the original l, is the conduct of the parties. distinction involving a mere nce is followed by delay, it may e are inclined to hold that the e seen on a case-to-case basis. Page 8 of 18 SHALINI BHATIA 2025.12.02 17:45 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document CWP No.25397 of 397 of 2024 (O&M) 13. In Brijesh Kumar and others v. St In v. State of Haryana and Others, SLP (Civil) No ) No.6609-13 of 2014 reported in ted in (2014) 11 SCC 351, the petitioners chall s challenged the awarded compensati ensation under Section 18 of the Land Acquisitio uisition Act, 1894, after a period of 1 od of 10 years, 02 Months and 29 days. The High High Court had refused to condone t done the delay in spite of the fact that the other l ther land owners, who had preferred eferred the appeals in time, were granted higher igher compensation. While dismissin smissing the appeal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court Court made the following observations ns: “xxx “xx The Privy Council in Gene 7. 7. Ass Assurance Corp. Ltd. v. Janmah upo upon the writings of Mr Mitra in wherein it has been said that: whe eneral Accident Fire and Life mahomed Abdul Rahim, relied in Tagore Law Lectures, 1932 A law of limitation and p operate harshly and unjustly in a p ope pro provides for a limitation, it is to be hardship to a particular party har equitable grounds, enlarge the equ pos ostpone its operation, or introduc by law. by d prescription may appear to a particular case, but if the law to be enforced even at the risk of rty as the Judge cannot, on the time allowed by the law, oduce exceptions not recognized Xxx Xxx It is also a well-settled pri 11. 11. per person has taken a relief appro imm immediately after the cause of persons cannot take benefit thereo per a b a belated stage for the reason that tak take the impetus of the order pa diligent person. dili principle of law that if some approaching the court just or of action had arisen, other hereof approaching the court at that they cannot be permitted to r passed at the behest of some 12. In State of Karnataka v. 12. rejected the contention that a pet reje ign ignoring the delay and laches on pet petition just after coming to know court in a similar case as the sam cou explanation for delay and laches. T exp v. S.M. Kotrayya this court petition should be considered on the ground that he filed the now of the relief granted by the same cannot furnish a proper es. The Court observed that such SHALINI BHATIA 2025.12.02 17:45 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 9 of 18 CWP No.25397 of 397 of 2024 (O&M) a plea is wholly unjustified and ca a p ignoring delay and laches. ign d cannot furnish any ground for xxx” xxx [Emphasis supplied] 14. In Mewa Ram (deceased) by his In his LRs and others v. State of Haryana throu through the Land Acquisition Coll Collector, Gurgaon, reported in 1986 (4) SCC CC 151, the Hon’ble Apex Court d ourt dismissed the Special Leave Petitions on th on the ground that the petitioners oners could not plead their own laches, as a su s a sufficient ground for condonatio onation of delay. It held that the time stipulated ulated for re-determination of the aw the awarded compensation under Section 28-A s A should be adhered to, as any oth ny other view taken by the Courts would lead to ead to disastrous consequences, not i , not intended by the legislature. Therefore, the e, the following conclusion was arrive arrived at: “xxx “xx 7. There is no reason for us to 7. cas cases which are hopelessly barre justification for condonation of inor just s to grant special leave in these arred by time and there is no f inordinate delay. The special leave petitions ions are accordingly dismissed 8. 8. with costs.” wit 15. In a recent judgment passed in Un In a Union of India and another v. Jahangir Byra Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) SLP (Civil) ivil) No. 21096 of 2019 reported in 2024 SCC O C OnLine SC 489 , the Hon’ble Ap le Apex Court refused to condone the delay of 12 y of 12 years and 158 days in filing o g of the restoration application before the Hi he High Court. The High Court h urt had refused to entertain an application file on filed by the appellants for exerci exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of 227 of the Constitution of India for ia for condoning the delay of 12 SHALINI BHATIA 2025.12.02 17:45 I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Page 10 of 18 CWP No.25397 of 397 of 2024 (O&M) years and 158 58 days, when the same was dism as dismissed for non-prosecution. The Apex Cou x Court categorically made the follow following findings:- “xxx “xx In the aforesaid circumstan 24. 24. tha that we are not going to look into lon long as we are not convinced tha made out for condonation of such a ma stances, we made it very clear into the merits of the matter as that sufficient cause has been ch a long and inordinate delay. 25. It hardly matters whether a 25. a State or Union of India when it co a S del delay of more than 12 years. If the the the court long after the lapse of th relevant provisions of the law, then rele say say that no prejudice would be c del delay being condoned. This litig started sometime in 1981. We are star have elapsed. However, till date t hav abl able to reap the fruits of his decre justice if we condone the delay of just once again ask the respondent to u onc legal proceedings. leg er a litigant is a private party or it comes to condoning the gross the litigant chooses to approach of the time prescribed under the then he cannot turn around and be caused to either side by the litigation between the parties are in 2024. Almost 43 years ate the respondent has not been ecree. It would be a mockery of y of 12 years and 158 days and to undergo the rigmarole of the is a relevant matter which the 26. The length of the delay is a 26. ation while considering whether cou court must take into consideration or not. From the tenor of the the delay should be condoned or the t appears that they want to fix approach of the appellants, it ap app for instituting the proceedings the their own period of limitation for a period of limitation. Once it is for for which law has prescribed a per s right to have the matter held that a party has lost his hel of his own inaction for a long, it con considered on merits because of hi deliberate delay and in such can cannot be presumed to be non-de annot be heard to plead that the circumstances of the case, he cann circ o be preferred as against the sub substantial justice deserves to be ile considering the plea for tech technical considerations. While rt must not start with the merits condonation of delay, the court m con owes a duty to first ascertain the of t of the main matter. The court owes n offered by the party seeking bon bona fides of the explanation of sufficient cause assigned by the condonation. It is only if the suffi con he other side is equally balanced litig litigant and the opposition of the ot aid the merits of the matter for tha that the court may bring into aid elay. the purpose of condoning the delay the