ANIL KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA & Ors.

Judgment

#1. The present Civil Writ Petition has been filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India seeking the issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction, particularly a writ in the nature of Certiorari for quashing the impugned speaking order dated 06.02.2026 (Annexure P-26) whereby the claim of the petitioner for change of preferences in the allocation of district has been rejected, and a writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondent(s) to consider the district preferences originally CWP-21076-2026 2

submitted by the petitioner and to transfer/post him to the district of his first preference in accordance with the original preference submitted by him.

#2. Learned counsel for the petitioner, inter alia, contends that the petitioner was appointed as a JBT Teacher on 04.01.2011 and was initially allotted Nuh District. Pursuant to the Cadre Change Policy dated 06.09.2018 (Annexure P-1), as amended on 16.10.2018 (Annexure P-2), the respondents initiated a Cadre Change Drive vide notice dated 13.09.2023 (Annexure P-3), followed by a revised schedule dated 12.10.2023 (Annexure P-4). It is submitted that the petitioner duly exercised his district preferences on

02.10.2023 (Annexure P-5), wherein District Hisar was indicated as his first preference, whereas District Faridabad was placed at Serial No.20. However, contrary to the preferences actually submitted by him, the petitioner was allotted Faridabad District vide allocation order (Annexure P-6).

2.1. Learned counsel further submits that immediately upon noticing the discrepancy, the petitioner lodged a complaint before the SHO, Cyber Cell, Manesar on 05.10.2023 (Annexure P-7) alleging unauthorized tampering with his MIS ID and also submitted a representation to the Director, IT Cell on 06.10.2023 (Annexure P-8). Thereafter, the petitioner pursued the matter through the Sugam Sampark Portal on 23.10.2023 (Annexure P-9) and was constrained to approach this Court on several occasions. It is contended that this Court, while disposing of CWP No.24551 CWP-21076-2026 3 of 2023 vide order dated 15.11.2023 (Annexure P-10), directed the respondents to decide the petitioner's representation before the next transfer drive, whereafter a speaking order dated 13.12.2023 (Annexure P-11) was passed stating that appropriate action would be taken upon completion of the investigation. Similar directions were thereafter issued by this Court in subsequent writ petitions filed by the petitioner.

2.2. Learned counsel further argues that the investigation conducted by the competent authority ultimately culminated in the report dated

06.09.2025 (Annexure P-20), which unequivocally recorded that the petitioner himself had not altered his district preferences and that the changes had been made by some other person. The said finding was further corroborated by the official reply dated 18.09.2025 (Annexure P-21), wherein it was admitted that the petitioner's preferences had been hacked. Despite such categorical findings, the respondents rejected the petitioner's claim vide the impugned speaking order dated 06.02.2026 (Annexure P-26), compelling the petitioner to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court.

2.3. It is further submitted that during the pendency of the matter, the respondents approved the Teacher Transfer Policy, 2025 on 28.11.2025 (Annexure P-28), pursuant to which the petitioner again submitted his district preferences on 14.02.2026 (Annexure P-29). Thereafter, the respondents published the list of eligible teachers on 26.02.2026 (Annexure CWP-21076-2026 4 P-30), wherein the petitioner's allocated district was reflected as Sirsa. Learned counsel submits that despite the earlier investigation conclusively establishing that the petitioner's original preferences had been tampered with by an unauthorized person, the respondents failed to rectify the illegality by considering his original preferences, thereby perpetuating the prejudice caused to the petitioner.

2.4. It is, thus, contended that once the respondents themselves have accepted that the petitioner's preferences were altered by an unauthorized person and not by the petitioner, they were under a legal obligation to restore and consider the original preferences submitted by him. The rejection of the petitioner's claim vide the impugned speaking order dated 06.02.2026 (Annexure P-26), despite the findings recorded in the investigation report, is arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel, therefore, prays that the impugned order be quashed and the respondents be directed to consider the petitioner's original district preferences and allocate/post him accordingly.

#4. Notice of motion. Mr. Naveen Singh Panwar, learned DAG, Haryana, appears and accepts notice on behalf of the respondent-State. He opposes the prayer made by learned counsel for the petitioner on the ground that, for operating the MIS portal, a unique password is generated. The said password is, at all CWP-21076-2026 5 times, deemed to be in the exclusive control, custody and knowledge of the candidate/employee, who is the custodian of such credentials. The petitioner bears the sole responsibility for the security and confidentiality of his account. Further, the department is strictly bound to act in accordance with the data and preferences officially recorded in the MIS portal. It is further submitted that the allegation of cybercrime was thoroughly investigated by the jurisdictional police authorities, who submitted an untraced report. As such, there is no conclusive finding in favour of the petitioner or against him. In the absence of any conclusive finding, the department was bound to act upon the options submitted from the petitioner's end through the MIS portal. Moreover, the petitioner has no vested right to seek a transfer. The petitioner would be at liberty to apply afresh as and when a new transfer policy is notified.

#5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon perusal of the record with their able assistance, it transpires that the petitioner claims to have exercised his district preferences on 02.10.2023 (Annexure P-5). According to the petitioner, such preferences were subsequently altered by an unauthorized person. Although the petitioner lodged a complaint before the jurisdictional police authorities alleging cyber fraud, the investigation culminated in an untraced report and no culpability has been fixed upon any person. The respondents, on the other hand, have acted upon the preferences CWP-21076-2026 6 available in the official MIS portal, which admittedly operates through password-protected credentials meant to remain in the exclusive custody of the concerned employee.

#6. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner has repeatedly approached this Court seeking substantially the same relief and the respondents have considered his representations from time to time. However, the relief now sought is not merely consideration of a representation but a positive direction to the respondents to ignore the preferences available on the official portal and to allot him a district of his choice on the basis of the preferences allegedly originally submitted by him.

#7. It is well settled that a writ of mandamus can be issued only where the petitioner establishes the existence of a corresponding legal right and a statutory duty cast upon the respondents. In the absence of an enforceable legal right, no mandamus can be issued. Reference in this regard may be made to South Indian Bank Ltd. and others v. Naveen Mathew Philip and another, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 435, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a writ of mandamus cannot be issued where no legal right exists.

#8. Furthermore, transfer and posting are incidents of service. The determination of the district of posting or transfer falls within the exclusive domain of the employer. Unless the action is shown to be vitiated by mala CWP-21076-2026 7 fides, arbitrariness, violation of any statutory rule or lack of competence, the writ Court would not substitute its own decision for that of the competent authority. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. S.L. Abbas, (1993) 4 SCC 357, has categorically held that transfer is a matter for the employer to decide and executive guidelines or transfer policies do not confer an enforceable legal right upon an employee to seek posting at a place of his choice.

#9. Even assuming that there was some discrepancy regarding the petitioner's preferences, the same by itself would not vest the petitioner with an indefeasible right to claim allocation to a particular district through a writ of mandamus. The Court cannot direct the respondents to allot a specific district contrary to the administrative mechanism prescribed under the applicable policy.

#10. No statutory provision has been pointed out requiring the respondents to restore the alleged original preferences or to necessarily allot the petitioner to the district claimed by him. Consequently, no enforceable legal right is made out warranting interference under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India.

#11. Finding no merit in the present petition, the same is accordingly dismissed. CWP-21076-2026 8

#12. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

14.07.2026 parul verma (HARPREET SINGH BRAR) JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned. : Whether Reportable. : Yes/No Yes/No