Mr. Piyush Aggarwal, Advocate for & Ors. v. Gurdev Singh and Ashok Kumar & Ors.

Mr. Piyush Aggarwal, Advocate for the respondents. *** Harsimran Singh Sethi, J. (Oral) CM-7459-LPA-2025 This is an application for disposing of present appeal, which was admitted on 22.11.2016, in terms of judgment dated 28.03.2023. Notice of the application was given to counsel for the appellants-State. Today, learned counsel for the appellants-State raises no objection for the prayer as made in the present application. Keeping in view the averments made in the application, which are duly supported by an affidavit, coupled with the fact that learned State counsel raises no objection for the grant of prayer as made in the present application, the same stands allowed. CM-7459-LPA-2025 and CM-2743-LPA-2026 in/and LPA-2234-2016 (O&M) 2 On the oral request of learned counsel for the parties, the present appeal is taken up for hearing today itself. CM-2743-LPA-2026 Present application has been filed for placing on record regularization policy of 1992 as also the qualifications along with Annexures A-1 to A-4. Application is allowed and regularization policy of 1992 as also the qualifications along with Annexures A-1 to A-4 are taken on record with all just exceptions. LPA-2234-2016

#1. In the present appeal, the challenge is to the order dated

18.05.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge in CWP No. 4984 of 2014, by which a direction has been given to the appellants to regularize the services of the respondents as per the Policy dated 19.02.1979 i.e. after a completion of 240 days of the services of the respondents.

#2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State submits that the services of the respondents were regularized in the year 1992 vide memo no. 70845-62/E1/E4 dated 05.06.1992 and w.e.f. 01.05.1992 and they continued working on regular basis and no grievance was raised for a period of two decades till the writ petition was filed in the year 2014 claiming regularization with retrospective effect from 1979 in view of Instructions/Policy of Department dated 19.02.1979 and that too without challenging the order regularizing their services in the year 1992 but the learned Single Judge without appreciating the said fact has given the CM-7459-LPA-2025 and CM-2743-LPA-2026 in/and LPA-2234-2016 (O&M) 3 direction to regularize the services from the year 1979 with consequential benefits, which is incorrect. Learned counsel for the appellants further submits that on the day when the writ petition was filed, the services had already been regularized hence, regularization with retrospective effect without challenging the order of initial regularization, could not have been ordered and, therefore, the order dated 18.05.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge may kindly be set-aside.

#3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that the respondents were appointed in the year 1984 and as per the Policy of regularization dated 19.02.1979, the benefit of regularization after completing 240 days of service has rightly been granted to the respondents by the learned Single Judge.

#4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record with their able assistance.

#5. It may be noticed that after the appointment of the respondents in the year 1984, their services had already been regularized in the year

#1992. The respondents raised no grievance for a period of two decades i.e. 20 years before filing a writ petition in the year 2014 claiming retrospective regularization since 1979.

#6. It is a settled proposition of law that even a void order needs to be challenged within a period of three year and the judgment rendered by this Court in Balwant Singh Vs. State of Punjab and another, RSA-554- 2017 dated 25.04.2024 will cover the claim against the respondents. The relevant paragraph 7 of the judgment is as under :- CM-7459-LPA-2025 and CM-2743-LPA-2026 in/and LPA-2234-2016 (O&M) 4 “7. Bare perusal of the above would show that even void orders are to be challenged within the period of limitation and once, it is conceded fact that suit was filed by the appellant- plaintiff beyond the period of three years from the date of cause of action, the same was clearly time barred and was rightly dismissed by the trial Court on the ground of limitation.”

#7. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No. 1852-1989 with Civil Appeal No. 4772-1989 titled as State of Punjab and others Vs. Gurdev Singh and Ashok Kumar, decided on 21.08.1991, stated that even void orders are to be challenged within a period of 03 years. The relevant paragraphs of this judgment are as under :- “4. First of all, to say that the suit is not governed by the law of limitation runs afoul of our Limitation Act. The statute of limitation was intended to provide a time limit for all suits conceivable. Section 3 of the Limitation Act provides that a suit, appeal or application instituted after prescribed "period of limitation" must subject to the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence. Section 2(J) defines the expression "period of limitation" to mean the period of limitation prescribed in the Schedule for suit, appeal or application. Section 2 (J) also defines, "prescribed period" to mean the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act The Court's function on the presentation of plaint is simply to examine whether on the assumed facts, the plaintiff is within time. The Court has to find out when the "fight to sue" accrued to the plaintiff. If a suit is not covered by any of the specific articles prescribing a period of limitation, it must fall within the residuary article. The purpose of the residuary article is to CM-7459-LPA-2025 and CM-2743-LPA-2026 in/and LPA-2234-2016 (O&M) 5 provide for cases which could not be covered by any other provision in the Limitation Act. The residuary article is applicable to every variety of suits not otherwise provided for. Article 113 (corresponding to Article 120 of the Act 1908 ) is a residuary article for cases not covered by any other provisions in the Act. It prescribes a period of three years when the right to sue accrues. Under Art. 120 it was six years which his been reduced to three years under Article 113. According to the third column in Article 113, time commences to run when the right to sue accrues. The words "right to sue" ordinarily mean the right to seek relief by means of legal proceedings. Generally, the right to sue accrues only when then the cause of action arises, that is, the right to prosecute to obtain relief by legal means. The suit must be instituted when the right asserted in the suit is infringed or when there is a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted [See (i) Mt. Bole v. Mt. Koklam and Ors., (AIR 1930 PC 270 and (ii) Gannon Dunkerley and Co. v. The Union of India (AIR 1970 SC 1433). x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x

#8. It will be clear from these principles, the party aggrieved by the invalidity of the order has to approach the Court for relief of declaration that the order against him is inoperative and not binding upon him. He must approach the Court within the prescribed period of limitation. If the statutory time limit expires the Court cannot give the declaration sought for.”

#8. In the present case, even without challenging the order of regularization passed in 1992, writ could not have been filed in the year 2014 claiming retrospective regularization. Learned Single Judge without CM-7459-LPA-2025 and CM-2743-LPA-2026 in/and LPA-2234-2016 (O&M) 6 appreciating the same, has granted the relief of retrospective regularization w.e.f. 1979, which is incorrect.

#9. Further, once the services of the respondents had been regularized and they were working regularly for 20 years, even the writ petition for retrospective regularization could not have been ordered.

#10. Even otherwise, there is no prejudice caused to the respondents as after regularization, the ad hoc service is to be taken into account for counting the pensionary benefits, therefore, in totality, the order dated

18.05.2016 passed by learned Single Judge is perverse not only on fact but only on law and cannot be sustained and accordingly, the present appeal is allowed. The order dated 18.05.2016 is set-aside. The writ petition filed by the respondents is dismissed.

#11. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stands disposed of. July 06, 2026 kanchan (HARSIMRAN SINGH SETHI) JUDGE (AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL) JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes : No Whether reportable