Arsad Hussain & Ors. v. Asru & Anr.

Learned counsel for the pe##oners submits that the suit is one for possession by way of specific performance based upon an agreement to sell and receipt. According to him, during the cross-examina#on conducted at the stage of defendants' evidence, the defendants refused to admit their thumb impressions appearing on the agreement to sell and receipt. It is argued that in order to establish the genuineness of the disputed thumb impressions, expert evidence has become necessary and, therefore, the learned trial Court ought to have permi>ed the pe##oners to examine a handwri#ng/fingerprint expert. It is contended that the impugned order suffers from material irregularity and is liable to be set aside.

#3. I have heard learned counsel for the pe##oners and have carefully perused the impugned order as well as the material available on CR-4935-2026 [2] record.

#4. A perusal of the record reveals that the defendants, while filing their wri>en statement on 14.03.2023, had categorically denied the execu#on of the agreement to sell and receipt and specifically pleaded that the said documents were forged and fabricated. Thus, the execu#on of the documents, including the thumb impressions appearing thereon, had been put in issue from the very incep#on of the li#ga#on. The pe##oners were, therefore, fully conscious of the controversy before they commenced their evidence.

#5. It is not in dispute that a?er framing of issues, the pe##oners were granted eight effec#ve opportuni#es to lead their affirma#ve evidence. They chose to close their evidence on 18.02.2025 without examining any handwri#ng or fingerprint expert. The defendants therea?er concluded their evidence on 15.07.2025. The present applica#on came to be filed only on 29.07.2025 a?er the closure of the defendants' evidence, when the case had reached the stage of rebu>al evidence and final arguments.

#6. In these circumstances, this Court finds itself in complete agreement with the view taken by the learned trial Court. Once the execu#on of the agreement to sell had been specifically denied in the wri>en statement itself, the burden to establish its execu#on squarely rested upon the plain#ffs in terms of Sec#ons 101 to 103 of the Indian Evidence Act. If the plain#ffs intended to rely upon expert evidence under Sec#on 45 of the Evidence Act for proving the disputed thumb impressions, nothing prevented them from producing such evidence during their affirma#ve evidence itself. Their omission to do so cannot subsequently be permi>ed to be rec#fied a?er closure of the en#re evidence merely CR-4935-2026 [3] because they apprehend that the evidence already produced may not sufficiently establish their case.

#7. The law is equally well se>led that the discre#onary power of the Court to permit addi#onal evidence or reopening of evidence cannot be exercised to enable a party to fill up omissions or lacunae le? in its own case. Such power is intended only to advance the cause of jus#ce where the evidence sought to be produced could not, despite due diligence, be produced earlier or where the Court itself finds such evidence indispensable for a just adjudica#on.

#8. In K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, (2011) 11 SCC 275, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that though civil courts possess inherent powers to reopen evidence in appropriate cases, such power is to be exercised sparingly and cannot be invoked merely to permit a party to fill up omissions or improve the evidence already led. The Court categorically observed that reopening of evidence cannot become a device for giving a negligent li#gant a second opportunity a?er having failed to produce the best available evidence at the proper stage.

#9. The aforesaid principle was reiterated in Bagai Construc on v. Gupta Building Material Store, (2013) 14 SCC 1, wherein the Supreme Court held that where adequate opportuni#es had already been granted to a party to lead evidence, reopening of evidence or permiFng addi#onal evidence at a later stage solely because the party omi>ed to examine a witness or produce a document would amount to permiFng it to fill up lacunae, which is legally impermissible. The Court further observed that procedural provisions are meant to ensure orderly conduct of trials and cannot be diluted at the instance of a negligent li#gant.

#10. The present case squarely falls within the ra#o of the aforesaid CR-4935-2026 [4] judgments. The pe##oners had complete knowledge of the defendants' stand from the date of filing of the wri>en statement. They availed eight effec#ve opportuni#es to lead evidence. There is not even a whisper in the applica#on explaining why expert evidence could not be produced during their affirma#ve evidence despite exercise of due diligence. The applica#on, therefore, does not sa#sfy the well-recognised parameters governing reopening of evidence.

#11. The learned trial Court has also rightly relied upon the judgment of this Court in Gajraj Singh and another v. Ashok and others, CR-261-2025, decided on 17.02.2026, wherein it has been held that once execu#on of the disputed document stands specifically denied in the wri>en statement, the plain#ff is required to produce complete evidence in affirma#ve and cannot subsequently be permi>ed to lead expert evidence at the rebu>al stage so as to fill up the deficiencies le? in his own case. The facts of the present case are almost iden#cal and the principle laid down therein squarely applies.

#12. This Court is also conscious of the limited scope of interference under Ar#cle 227 of the Cons#tu#on of India. Supervisory jurisdic#on is intended to keep subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdic#on and is not meant to subs#tute the High Court's opinion for that of the trial Court in ma>ers involving exercise of judicial discre#on. Unless the impugned order suffers from patent perversity, manifest illegality or jurisdic#onal error, interference is wholly unwarranted.

#13. In Shalini Shyam She+y and another v. Rajendra Shankar Pa l, (2010) 8 SCC 329, the Supreme Court authorita#vely held that the power under Ar#cle 227 is supervisory and not appellate and the High Court cannot interfere merely because another view is possible. Likewise, CR-4935-2026 [5] in Ram Ra v. Mange Ram and others, (2016) 11 SCC 296, it was reiterated that discre#onary interlocutory orders passed by trial courts ought not to be interfered with unless they disclose patent perversity or jurisdic#onal infirmity.

#14. Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid principles, the impugned order does not suffer from any jurisdic#onal error, perversity or material irregularity. Rather, the learned trial Court has exercised its discre#on judiciously a?er no#cing that the pe##oners had sufficient opportunity to lead expert evidence and that the present applica#on was merely an a>empt to improve the eviden#ary founda#on of their case a?er closure of the defendants' evidence. The discre#on exercised by the learned trial Court neither suffers from arbitrariness nor calls for any interference in exercise of the supervisory jurisdic#on.

#15. Consequently, finding no merit in the present revision pe##on, the same is hereby dismissed.

#16. Pending miscellaneous applica#on(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

02.07.2026 Yogesh (DEEPAK GUPTA) JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned:- Yes/No Yes/No Whether reportable:-